The gooey, the bloody, and just plain gross: exploring art and visual culture with an abject visual methodology by Livingston, Susan Briana
 
 
 
 
 
THE GOOEY, THE BLOODY, AND JUST PLAIN GROSS: EXPLORING ART AND VISUAL 
CULTURE WITH AN ABJECT VISUAL METHODOLOGY  
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY 
 
SUSAN BRIANA LIVINGSTON 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISSERTATION 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment for the requirements 
 for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Art Education 
in the Graduate College of the 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
Urbana, Illinois 
 
 
Doctoral Committee: 
 
 Professor Paul Duncum, Chair, Director of Research 
 Assistant Professor Laura Hetrick 
 Professor Brett Kaplan 
 Assistant Professor Jorge Lucero 
  
	  	  
ii	  	  	  	  
	  
ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 This doctoral study concerns itself with the diverse and abundant images of disgust in 
fine art and popular visual culture. My study is ground in a deep understanding of disgust and the 
psychoanalytic theory of the abject as developed by Julia Kristeva and modified by later scholars 
like Chanter and Butler. However, these scholars do not concern themselves specifically with the 
arena of the visual. To address this lack, I have developed an abject visual methodology. This 
abject visual methodology is predicated on other methodological works, like 
Sandoval’s Methodology of the oppressed, and it is designed specifically to elucidate the intricate 
intersections of material, process, subject, narrative and viewership in application to art which 
disgusts. I use my abject visual methodology to create a taxonomy of abject art, which provides 
a broad survey of the types of disgusting or psychological uncomfortable images found in the art 
world. This taxonomy also allows for a demonstration of my abject visual methodology as a tool 
of inquiry and analysis. Finally, I argue for the relevance of both abject art and an abject visual 
methodology in art education, a discipline that in general avoids the controversial. Abject art can 
lead to a fruitful and generative revolt that allows not only for personal expression but the 
construction of deep empathetic connections and the ability to manage critical thinking.     
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1.0: Welcome to the Gooey, the Bloody and the Just Plain Gross 
1.01 I Can Haz Abject Trading Cards, Plz?: Why the Abject Sings to Me 
The abject first came to my attention circa 1989. I had no idea at the age of 7 what 
sociological and psychoanalytic systems were. However, I did have in my possession a 
newly purchased package of Garbage Pail Kids (Figure 1). For those who were not young 
consumers in the 80s, Garbage Pail Kids were the baseball cards of the abject. These 
cards, created by Art Spiegelman of Maus graphic novel fame, were quite simply vile and 
they featured demented spoofs of Cabbage Patch Kids dolls. These adorable chubby-
cheeked children, crowned with Shirley Temple curls sipped ice tea from toilets and 
stuffed themselves with dinner plates of gooey eyeballs, saliva dripping from their 
waiting mouths (Figure 1). These feral cherubim stripped off their skin to reveal bloody 
muscles and brushed their teeth with fresh-squeezed pimple pus.  
My father had purchased, at my eager request, a pack of the cards for me from a 
local convenience store. My mother was repulsed (which at that age was a plus), 
wrinkling her nose at the card deck. Why I wanted these cards so badly is hazy, but I 
imagine a fellow classmate had sung their praises. Or perhaps I had noticed an 
advertisement for them in the back of a comic book alongside an ad for “real” x-ray 
glasses and toy flying saucers. The cards appealed through their astute ability to mock the 
insipid and saccharine Cabbage Patch dolls, the type of dolls that my grandmother loved 
and wanted her little granddaughter to love too.1 These cards were more than just a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 I must admit, her desire for this was never satisfied, as this dissertation will surely 
confirm. 
2 For more on Pop Surrealism see Jordan, 2005. 
3 For more on “The Final Girl” phenomenon in horror movies, see Clover, 1993. 
4 For more on the abject in CSI, see Pierson, 2010. 
5 Darabont, F. (Producer). (31, October 2010). The Walking Dead (Television series). 
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sarcastic recasting of the immensely popular Cabbage Patch Kids, they were undeniably 
and shockingly gross. 
 
Figure 1. Garbage Pail Kids, Larry Lo Mein 
 
It wasn’t until high school that I found any visuals that shook me in the same way 
the images of Garbage Pail Kids had through their potent combination of repellence and 
desirability. I was 17 and looking through a contemporary art book when I encountered 
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the work of Kiki Smith. Instantly, her work took me back to that childhood moment of 
wanting to look and wanting to turn away that I had experienced with Garbage Pail Kids. 
Smith’s Untitled (Train) (1993) (Figure 2) was a challenge to regard, but one I could not 
quite reject. In the image, a white female figure bent slightly at the waist and strands of 
red beads trailed out from her crotch, spilling across the floor behind her. The figure was 
beautiful, like a Greek marble statue, as were the sparkling red beads. However, the 
image of menstruation on display was almost more than my naïve sensibilities could take. 
It was gross, it was shocking and my desire to look made me uncomfortable. 
Menstruation was a private act, something no 17-year-old girl likes to be reminded of, let 
alone stare at in a public space. The paintings I was shown in my high school art class 
were beautiful, the sculptures graceful and technically virtuosic. You were meant to enjoy 
those works. Finding pleasure in Untitled (Train) seemed impossible at first, although 
there was something fascinating or perhaps compelling about her work. I kept going back 
to those pages, to all of Smith’s disgusting but yet strangely beautiful work.  
 Years later in art school, I discovered pop surrealism2, a genre full of disgusting 
and compelling images. Pop surrealism was reminiscent of the beloved toys and Garbage 
Pail Kids of my youth, not the high art images taped to the art room walls or even the 
slides in my art history lectures. This new genre was simultaneously arresting and 
familiar, disconcerting and nostalgic, and the artists were highly skilled, affording a great 
attention to detail. Their work appealed to my love of representational art but differed in 
their concentration on more macabre subject matter: cartoon characters covered in blood, 
little girls who looked like dolls and other uncanny concoctions. The content was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 For more on Pop Surrealism see Jordan, 2005. 
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frequently gross and at times strangely comical, often made more palatable by their sleek 
and polished finish.  
 
 
Figure 2. Smith, Untitled (Train) (1993) 
 
 The more I looked, the more filth I saw. Disgust was everywhere: on movie 
screens, television, magazines and more. Films were filled with blood and gore and yet 
you couldn’t turn away from the “final girl” desperately running from the axe wielding 
maniac3. Television was similarly full of violence, but it also featured gratuitous autopsy 
scenes that took the viewer into the victim’s dead body, following the bullet as it pierced 
flesh and organs4. This is not to mention the renewed fascination with that most infamous 
horror movie icon: the zombie, which proliferates in video games like Left 4 Dead, Dead 
Rising, Call of Duty: Black Ops, appears in films like the Resident Evil franchise (2002) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 For more on “The Final Girl” phenomenon in horror movies, see Clover, 1993. 
4 For more on the abject in CSI, see Pierson, 2010. 
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and 28 Days Later (2002), and television’s hugely popular adaptation of The Walking 
Dead graphic novel (Kirkman, 2006) coming soon after.5 Walking through the aisles of 
the book stores there were magazines advertising extreme tattooing, a glimpse into the 
world of Hollywood monsters and special effects and publications like Juxtapoz and Hi-
Fructose that were devoted to Pop Surrealist art, graffiti and urban fashion (Figure 3).  
 
 
Figure 3. Example of Pop Surrealism, Ryden, The Birth (1994).  
 
And the Internet was home to everything one could possibly imagine! Extreme body 
modification websites6 feature penile bi-furcation, clitoral piercing and scarification, a 
plethora of sub-cultural pornography from hentai7 to tub girls.8 This is not to mention 
websites like Morbid Anatomy (Ebenstein, 2014) devoted to anatomical curiosities and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Darabont, F. (Producer). (31, October 2010). The Walking Dead (Television series). 
United States: AMC Studios.  
6 BME- Body Modification Ezine, http://www.bme.com/ 
7 hentai- animated pornography popular in Japan, which often features tentacles. 
8 an internet phenomenon which features women in bathtubs spraying anal fluids and 
then playing in them (http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=tubgirl) 
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medical history like an online version of the Mütter Museum, or Rotten.com, which 
boasts an amazing fifteen million hits a day9 and houses a collection of disgusting yet 
fascinating mangled and contorted images of the human body, dead from any number of 
improbable causes. These images, whether in print or on screen, are absolutely disgusting 
and horrifying. Yet I, like many others, are strangely compelled to look.    
This conflict between being repelled and being lured in by these images has 
compelled me towards the theoretical realm of abjection and disgust. I have invested time 
and energy in these ideas because I believe they can help explicate the complex attraction 
and repulsion, lure and loathing imbedded in many visuals, from the Garbage Pail Kids 
who play with excrement to Smith’s sculptures that drip iconographic menstrual blood. 
These ideas have the potential to aid in the exploration of these images in a way that can 
unseat the knee-jerk impulse to ignore, denigrate, or reject them. I may not have reacted 
in the ‘typical’ manner to unsavory images, but I have seen my mother, grandmother, 
classmates and professors respond in the immediate and ‘conventional’ way to these 
images, turning away in disgust and abjection. My own interest in these works elicits 
their strong disdain and judgmental retorts, “That’s what you like? But it’s so … gross. 
Why would you look at that?” or “It’s dark—I don’t believe in looking at dark and yucky 
things.” And then there is the ever-present but unspoken question, “What is wrong with 
you? If these images gross me out and make me feel uncomfortable, something must be 
wrong with you if you like to look at them.” The literature of the abject and disgust can 
aid in the exploration of these images and psychoanalysis can explain both the average 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Frequently Asked Question section of Rotten.com (http://www.rotten.com/FAQ/) 
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viewer’s reaction to these works and my own very different reaction while throwing light 
on the rising popularity of these images.  
However, as I explored the abject both theoretically and in the realm of visuals, I 
discovered there was no text that concretely linked the theoretical to the visual. There 
were authors who used the abject to talk about art, but often it was shorthand for disgust 
and didn’t delve deeply into how the works were abject, or what that really meant beyond 
appearing gross. This was particularly true of more contemporary reconfigurations of the 
abject, which politicized the abject as a tool for both understanding the mechanics of 
oppression and possibly circumventing them. No one was linking these possibly 
liberatory ideas to the production of disgusting images, nor was anyone refuting these 
images as having somehow lost their abject and potential radical status. In short, no one 
seemed to be talking in depth about disgusting images. The abject seemed to apply to 
substances and social oppression, not the images upon which these social logics were 
made visible. With a lack of an abject visual methodology, I couldn’t even begin to study 
the images I was interested in, like Pop Surrealism and the abject body in popular culture, 
without first rectifying this gap in the literature through the creation of just such a 
methodology.   
1.02 Dirt Doesn’t Exist, but Disgust Sure Does 
With disgust and the abject in mind, my project focuses on deep philosophical 
matter, matter which has engaged me and other scholars and artists in many hours of 
thought and concentration: shit, blood, urine and pus. Shit may seem to be an odd or at 
least distasteful topic for higher educational inquiry. The gleaming white tower of 
academia may seem incongruous with excrement. However, since the rise of 
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postmodernity, the demolishing of hierarchies and the rise of the lowbrow, shit has 
become fair game and with good reason. It and numerous other substances make us turn 
away in disgust; these materials incite shame; they are the stuff that we label unclean. 
These corporeal visages of filth structure our experience of the world, separating what is 
clean and good from that which is defiled, degraded, dirty and bad (Douglas, 1966/2000). 
The role these substances play in ordering our world seems enough to warrant their study. 
My project deals with getting underneath the “eww” response engendered by these 
images to see what makes them both repulsive and fascinating. 
Understanding disgust is central to understanding these images and exploring 
their impact and popularity. I am using disgust to describe things that elicit or appear as if 
they would elicit a certain affective or emotional response, one of repulsion. Miller 
(1997), author of The Anatomy of Disgust, explains that disgust “is a serious [emotion], 
implicating our moral sensibility, love, politics and our sense of self” (p. x). Disgust, for 
my purposes, encompasses both the psychic and the physical repulsion experienced 
toward certain materials, particularly materials that cross categories and confuse borders. 
As Douglas (1966/2000) notes, “Our idea of dirt is compounded of two things, care for 
hygiene and respect for conventions” (p. 8). It is this ordering system that our disgust 
responses are based upon; thus, our disgust creates and explicates the system all at once. 
Disgust creates the cognitive dissonance that defines the abject.  
The abject is similarly embodied in filthy and sordid materials. Kristeva (1982) 
defines the abject as substances that were once a part of the body but are no longer: urine, 
blood, tears, shit, vomit, snot. These now “othered” substances elicit repulsion and 
anxiety. They create a crisis of cognitive dissonance and shifted consciousness in the 
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viewer that is characteristic of the abject. The abject is also housed in the corpse and in 
rot, decay and vivisection.  
Many images, especially in contemporary visual culture, deploy a kind of 
aesthetics of disgust, a desire for and interest in those things that look like they would 
cause or that do cause feelings of repulsion and unease. This aesthetics of disgust is found 
in high and low forms, in commercial and fine art. The abject provides an entryway into 
the exploration of the aesthetics of disgust and why we like things that also repulse us. 
However, I found that the specifics of how the abject is applicable to images had not been 
concretely theorized or explained in an approachable and comprehensive manner. 
The effect of the abject is more complex, more individualized, more long-lasting 
than disgust alone and is paired with a fascination and an attraction. Some have argued 
that there is attraction in disgust (e.g. Miller, 1997); however, I think that this is 
inaccurate and that what they are describing has slipped over into the realm of the abject. 
I say this because scholars of the abject try to understand how shit can be both a joke and 
a crisis, in turn exciting pleasurable laughter followed by nausea. Scholars of disgust 
seem to ignore where and why disgust is just disgusting versus when disgust joins with 
allure. The psychological shift that occurs from a brush with the abject, or an image of 
the abject, is more impactful than just disgust because it is accompanied by attraction or 
compulsion, a desire to look and to interact. This attachment to a disgusting thing actually 
creates a new classification system, something not quite subject (human), but more than 
object (a thing), the abject.  
The benefits of the abject lie in its potential to radically shift viewers’ subjectivity 
and to reverse hierarchies of denigration as applied to marginal groups (Butler, 1993; 
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Hook, 2006). While disgust and the abject may seem straightforward when explained as 
above, their varying definitions, multiple uses and characteristic ambiguity make the 
terms more complex and often contentious. For example, in contemporary art the abject 
is discussed on a regular basis, but it stands in for disgust and is often stripped of its 
ability to shift or strip subjectivity, its fluid ambiguity, its emphasis on permeable borders 
and its political uses (Butler, 1993; Houser, Jones, Taylor & Ben-Levi, 1993; Hook, 
2006). For example, Kaufman (1998) states that Kiki Smith’s work is abject, but never 
goes into exactly how it is abject, or what that means in the context of Smith’s work. In 
my dissertation, I explore the abject and disgust through an in-depth study of the 
literature surrounding these ideas and pull from scholarship a way to approach dissonant 
visuals that both are meant to be looked at and seem to ask us to turn away, exploring 
how and why this paradox works. 
1.03 Getting to the Gory Core: Research Questions 
My research questions are as follows: 
1) What insight into dissonant cultural artifacts10 can be gained by focusing on 
disgust and the abject as entryways into paradoxically appealing and revolting 
productions? I propose that problematic modernist hierarchies that reify beauty and 
malign disgusting images are at the heart of this question and can be challenged through 
the use of a theory of the abject. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 I use this term because of its broadness as it is a term that originates in the social 
sciences and refers to anything that was made by humans and demonstrates the creator’s 
culture (Ezell & O’Keeffe, 1995). 
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2) What would an abject visual methodology be? This question I frame because of 
the ambiguous and often synonymous use of the terms abject and disgust and by a lack of 
literature that discusses disgust and the abject in visual art in a nuanced and specific way.  
1.04 Other Necessary Veins: Subquestions 
My supporting questions, or subquestions, are as follows: 
• What are the visual characteristics of disgust and the abject?  
• Where and how is the abject used in art and contemporary popular visual culture sites11? 
• Why is the abject both revolting and alluring?  
• How might the abject intersect with political, social, or economic critiques?  
1.05 Disgusting, but Not for Me: Delimitations 
 Within my study I focus on abject objects themselves, my own interaction with 
them and in some cases the intentions and interests of the artists. However, during the 
course of my research I found many interesting visual sites, theoretical veins, and 
methodological tools, which could have been employed within an exploration of 
disgusting and abject images, but are outside the purview of this study. For example, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11  I will be using the term art and visual culture, or popular visual culture, throughout 
this project to refer to the division between the two. Visual culture refers to a broader 
category that includes art as an institution, as well as popular visuals from media, 
advertising, and broader material culture. Art as an institution refers to the museums, 
galleries, and academic centers that determine the conditions of the art world. One of the 
ways in which visual culture acts as an umbrella term that covers more than artistic 
institutions is the expansion of visual culture to include the sensorial and a whole range 
of information that is received from multi-media experiences like those of theme parks 
(Duncum, 2005; 2004). While the use of visual in visual culture may seem at odds with 
the sensorial, our world is still occulocentric making vision the sense that dominates our 
experiences (Mirzoff, 2009; 2012, Sturken & Cartwright, 2009). I refer to both art and 
visual culture to note that the phenomenon I am discussing, usually disgust and the 
abject, occurs both in institutional art settings as well as in the broader arena of visual 
culture, demonstrating an institutional, market, and popular interest in filth. 
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there are a multitude of visual sites that could have been used to demonstrate the role of 
disgust and the abject in art and popular visual culture, including other art works (Houser 
et al., 1993), but also children’s toys like Bratz dolls (Duncum, 2007) with their 
grotesque physical proportions, media sites like Jackass (Brayton, 2007), comics and 
graphic novels (Zolkover, 2008) and cemeteries (Chadha, 2006), to name a few.  
Other methodologies could have been used to address both my sites of study and 
my research questions. For example, Media Studies often focuses on audience reception 
studies, especially as they pertain to movies and television (Staiger, 2005). Issues 
pertaining to reception and the audience could have been used to investigate who looks at 
disgusting images, why some people enjoy them while others simply reject them. This is 
an area that I would be interested in developing in the future. However, anything 
concerning audience in this study is cast in broad statements based on data from Internet 
art and toy blogs or my own personal experience and is not part of a main argument or 
used as primary supporting data.  
Similarly, relying on Appadurai (1988), one might benefit from looking at the 
“secret life” of these objects. This idea comes from art history, museum studies and 
anthropology and could be applied to abject art, examining who looks at these images, 
who buys and owns these objects, where demographically and geographically the objects 
are found. Unlike audience studies, this approach foregrounds the object—a type of 
biography of things. However, this is also outside the purview of this study, since I focus 
on the “work” these objects do, the impact they have on the viewer, not the life of the 
objects themselves.  
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Contemporary art and visual culture could be understood using theoretical 
structures outside of the abject. Ideas used to approach contemporary art are seemingly 
limitless and others have approached pop surrealism in particular through a history of 
comics (Klein, Schaffner, & Nahas, 1999), a more straightforward continuation of 
surrealism (Jordan, 2005), and a combination of fine art with a commercial design 
oriented aesthetic (Anderson, 2004). However, in each of these approaches the authors 
continually discuss the transgression of borders, ambiguity and bodily substances while 
missing the fact that their ideas synchronize with those of the abject and disgust, ignoring 
the theoretical elephant in the room. With these inadequacies in mind, my project fills in 
gaps opened up by other scholars. 
  Trauma studies and memory studies could be used to approach abject art, since 
both are often attuned toward violent or painful imagery. Freud sees trauma as a wound 
to the mind and following this trajectory, trauma studies “explore[s] the ways in which 
texts of a certain period—the texts of psychoanalysis, of literature and of literary 
theory—both speak about and speak through the profound story of traumatic experience” 
(Caruth, 1996, p. 22). Caruth’s work is pivotal to this new theoretical field emerging from 
literary studies. Her and others’ work attempts to understand the experience of war and 
genocide, as well as persistent racism and fear, through artistic representations of these 
events: survivor literature, fictional books on these types of events and artworks that 
memorialize these events or take them as their subject (Kleeblatt, 2002). Even Adorno’s 
proclamation in 1962 that “it is barbaric to continue to write poetry after Auschwitz” (as 
quoted in Kaplan, 2007, p. 21) and the field of Holocaust or memory studies surrounding 
this statement, is something I have pursued during the course of this study, as it deals 
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with horror and catastrophe. However, Adorno’s point, as Kaplan (2007) notes, is about 
the fear of pleasure in the face of horror,  
for while I agree with Adorno that there is something ethically wrong with finding 
pleasure in the representations of the pain of others, the works I examine here 
offer pleasure that derives not from the pain of others but from the complexity of 
artistic representations that invite us to think critically about the Nazi genocide. 
(p. 21) 
Kaplan’s work in studying the aesthetics of catastrophe, specifically how these 
events are memorialized in artwork, as well as Butler’s (2009) work on how war is 
framed culturally, also could be a way to approach these sites since they share a 
commonality of horror and disgust, violence and bloodshed. Similarly, I have considered 
Brown’s “Wounded Attachments” (1993) because many of the images that I study feature 
the wounded, broken, or truncated body that becomes the subject of identity formation 
and politicization in Brown’s work. I have also looked at Scarry’s The Body in Pain 
(1987). However, in the course of these investigations, I have found these works to be 
misaligned with my own. While I respond strongly to them and can even envision some 
of them being applied to some of the sites of this study, the works mentioned above deal 
with real bodies, either literally or representationally. The sites I am studying may 
reference the body, even depict the body, but do not stand in for real victimized bodies. 
Even when the objects of study are fictional—like Time’s Arrow by Amis (1991), about a 
fictional Holocaust doctor—they represent a specific reality that my own sites do not. 
Rather, my objects of study depict fantasies. I have chosen not to emphasize these 
materials because of their application to real tragedies.    
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Another vein of research that could be applicable here, but is beyond the purview 
of this dissertation, is the use of the theory of Terror Management. First developed by 
Ernest Becker in his book The Denial of Death (1973/1997), Terror Management Theory, 
TMT, argues that much of our existence as human beings is devoted to repressing, 
refusing and conquering our fear of death. It is our terror over our eventual demise and 
the rot and annihilation that ensues that has lead to civilizations being formed, the 
creation of religion and the production of great art. This work appears very close to 
Kristeva’s abject, particularly in regards to an emphasis on death and the corpse. 
However, TMT lacks the emphasis on psychoanalysis and sees death as the main 
motivator of all terror. Kristeva’s interest in death is about disintegration and a 
destabilization of the self, which can happen in instances other than death, like serious 
illness, or even codependent maternal relationships where the ego is in jeopardy, but not 
the actual body.  
Similarly, while the grotesque has come up in relation to my study, I have chosen 
to not focus on it because of its long and very specific history, which was not necessarily 
explicitly about disgust. While grotesque in common parlance means disgusting, its 
etymology stems from the Greek use of the word to signify a merger of flora and fauna 
into monstrous creatures and comes from Greek and Roman decorations (Harpham, 
2007). While an exploration of the slippage of the grotesque to mean disgusting might be 
within the purview of this study, the grotesque in its original use is not pertinent to most 
of the contemporary art I am looking at, which can be better explained by disgust or 
abjection.  
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The current focus on ontology or affect—ways of being versus ways of 
knowing—has influenced my interest in disgust and the abject; however, this is not at the 
heart of my inquiry, although it is a supporting theoretical position. Pile (2010) suggests 
that affect is the quality of life that is beyond cognition, beyond expression and “unable 
to be brought into representation” (p. 8). While emotions can be named and expressed, 
that is, they have cognitive and representational elements, affect does not and is 
implicated primarily through bodily reactions. Affect is noncognitive in the sense that it 
happens in the body and can be seen in a bodily reaction, before cognition can take place 
and make sense of the event. Here I refer to Masumi’s (1992) and Sedgwick’s (2002) 
work.           
 Similarly Anderson and Smith offer a “general plea for thinking seriously about 
how ‘the human world is constructed and lived through the emotions’ calling for a fuller 
programme of work, recognizing the emotions as ways of knowing, being and doing, in 
the broadest sense” (as cited in Pile, 2010, p. 8). Deleuze and Guattari (1987) see affect 
as an asocial bodily response that is made known in the passage from one state to 
another, the ongoing process of becoming, that is registered through intensity as an 
increase and decrease in power. Affect, then, is the body’s ability to disrupt social logic, 
and create meaning that cuts through social interpretations, confounds logic and 
scrambles expectations. To Sedgwick, affect offers “a reparative return to the ontological 
and intersubjective, to the surprising and enlivening texture of individuality and 
community” (as cited in Hemmings, 2005, p. 554), or a way to address specificities. For 
many scholars like Sedgwick (2002) affect is political. Influenced by feminist Carol 
Hanisch’s (1970) now famous argument that the personal is the political, scholars (e.g., 
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Sedgwick, 2002) have shown that embodied experiences, like that of sexual desire or 
racial identity, involve the personal and have larger political ramifications. Moreover, 
intersubjective affective experiences can be a way to build community and counter 
political violence through empathy.  
While affect is important because of the embodied nature of the abject, cognition 
or judgement is also important to an abject visual methodology as a way to counter 
emotion, so that the viewer of the abject is not simply overwhelmed, losing the rational 
faculties needed to analyze and reflect on the abject experience. Because of this joined 
need for both emotional and intellectual input, I am influenced by and use aesthetics. 
However, while I believe an understanding of aesthetics is important to understanding art, 
particularly contemporary art and postmodernism’s influence on qualitative evaluations 
of art, my intentions here are not to prove the aesthetic value of these works in a 
modernist way; nor is aesthetics the theoretical foundations of my project. These works 
are most certainly not about beauty in a conventional manner. Kant (1790/2009) would 
be appalled at toys that ooze and sculptures that menstruate. He would deem them 
unworthy of artistic inquiry. Similarly, many modernist aestheticians would find designer 
vinyl toys and pop surrealism unworthy of study, as well as the theories of democracy, 
the power of low brow and the value of disgust, that underwrite these endeavors. My 
work is steeped in postmodern inquiry and based in the democratic, multivocal, 
metanarrative oriented contemporary notion of art and culture. While this is a factor in 
understanding the context of my sites and my own theoretical grounding, demonstrating 
that these theories and sites are postmodern or exploring their fulfillment of postmodern 
aesthetics is not the main point of this work.  
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Another theoretical area that I have steered away from is that of the carnivalesque. 
According to Hyman and Malbert (2000), the imagery of the carnival “deals with masks 
and monsters, bottoms and enemas, feasting giants and misshapen birdmen and a hen 
with fools: fools capped-and-belled, fools hatched from eggs, whole ships crowded with 
fools, processions of fools” (p. 9). The imagery of the carnival is rife with representations 
of the body out of bounds, images that stress the base materiality of the body. Shit pours 
from bared asses, breasts hang pendulously and fat threatens to explode beyond the skin’s 
container, all in a display of grotesque realism “which elevates the lower stratum above 
the upper regions of the body; rationality and mental resolve are replaced with bodily 
fluids and defecation” (p. 63). This sounds like it would be related to the abject and thus 
be important for my own study, and it is to a certain extent. Kristeva was deeply 
influenced by Bakhtin (Moi, 1986), particularly his work on linguistics. However, there 
are two main reasons I am not including the carnivalesque in this study. First, while the 
works I am looking at may be funny, I do not find them to be uproariously so. Humor 
may be at work, but it is not the humor of carnival, which “invokes a laughter linked to 
the overturning of authority; it is ‘that peculiar folk humour that has always existed and 
has never merged with the official culture of the ruling classes’” (Hyman & Malbert, 
2000, p. 14). Like its boisterous laughter, the overall nature of carnival is optimistic. 
Hyman and Malbert (2000) explain that carnival “is authorized transgression, framed by 
the surrounding order in time and place. When the frame constricts, the crowd may rebel, 
but the essential impulse of Carnival is positive, regenerative, a seasonal excess of high 
spirits.” (p. 75). Even when bawdy humor may be active in the images I am studying, I 
feel it is overshadowed by the uncanny, anxiety and an unjoyous, perhaps compulsive, 
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impulse to look. The lack of uproarious laughter and joy signals the abject over the 
carnival. Even when the abject is applied to humor as it is in Limon’s (2000) work, it is 
uncomfortable, obnoxious and an upheaval of the parts of the self that one wishes to 
banish, to abject.  
Second, I am suspicious of the fact that at the end of carnival, there is no 
permanent change; rather, carnival is a part of hegemonic control. It is a safety valve that 
allows for the venting of pent-up desires and aggressions, but in the end life must return 
to normal. Bakhtin (1984) emphasizes the therapeutic nature of carnival, but Gilchrist and 
Ravencroft (2009) argue that Bakhtin’s work “reveals a much deeper message about the 
hegemonic regulatory function performed by the licensing of deviant practices within 
such festivals” (p. 35).  
Hence, I am concerned that carnival is “deployed to maintain and reinforce social 
order and, thus, [enacts] the discipline of bodies and behaviors” (Gilchrist & Ravencroft, 
2009, p. 36). In this way, the carnival displays a correlation to a Gramscian hegemonic 
social order in that it is “maintained through forms of consent: an active mechanism of 
domination between rulers and their subordinates in which structures of social and 
political dominance are maintained through systems of co-optation” (Gramsci, as cited in 
Gilchrist & Ravencroft, 2009, p. 38). With this in mind, I have, for the most part, avoided 
the carnivalesque in this work as I feel that disgust and the abject have a more 
permanently impactful role on both the individual psyche and social systems.  
In the end, while there were many options for visual materials to study and ideas 
that might help address what I was trying to explore, I found that the abject and disgust 
were most closely aligned with my interests and resonated most with the other ideas I 
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found regarding my objects of study. Theoretically, disgust and the abject best allowed 
for an exploration of the paradoxical dynamics of repulsive art that I was trying to 
understand.  
1.06 Outline 
 This chapter began with my own anxious feelings about strangely treasured 
childhood objects, namely Garbage Pail Kids. What follows is my attempt to understand 
my affection for those and other paradoxically disgusting yet appealing objects. It is 
grounded in the literature of disgust and the abject. My literature review, chapter 2, is 
focused on those two ideas and the bodies of literature that explain and expand upon 
them. In terms of methodology, I begin with an overview of the ways in which visuals 
and art can be conceptualized as disgusting and abject. I begin here because Kristeva 
(1982) asserts that the abject is best understood in regards to language and writing, 
something I argue against and while there are articles and even several books that tackle 
abject art (e.g., Houser et al., 1993; Meagher, 2003; Sandoval-Sanchez, 2005), none of 
them lays out a topography of the field, a map of how, why and in what ways images are 
abject in the depth that I do. Also, certain areas of the abject, like its contemporary 
refigurations to understand structures of oppression, have not been connected to the 
visual, which is something that my own abject visual methodology addresses by 
connecting structures of oppression to the visual. Finally, there are elements of the abject 
that other scholars have not drawn out in depth, particularly the abject’s intersections 
with the field of Border Studies, which is something that I outline at length in my 
methodology and connect to visual artists and images.  
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 Having provided an overview of how disgust and the abject function theoretically, 
I move on in chapter 3 to look at the construction of methodologies in general, with a 
particular emphasis on Krauss and Bois (2000) formulation of a methodology to best 
understand formlessness, or informe. Formlessness, while different from the abject, also 
deals with the transgression of borders and debasement. While Krauss and Bois label 
their work a guide, not a methodology, they clearly articulate both a body of knowledge, 
Bataille’s “informe”, and a system to apply that body of knowledge to art, demonstrated 
in their guide and in their curated exhibition on formlessness. Their work stands as a 
guide in regards to the construction of a method, as well as a theoretical point of 
departure as Krauss and Bois argue in favor of the “informe” in place of the abject. 
Sandoval’s (2000) Methodology of the Oppressed is also considered, as it links 
methodology, visual analysis and social justice. While there are definite problems with 
Sandoval’s work, her goals, including implementing social justice, are in line with my 
own interests. 
 Following the review of my methodology, chapter 4, my data chapter, outlines my 
approach to an abject visual methodology. This includes not only a review of some of the 
methods or techniques to employ when using an abject visual methodology, like the need 
for context, but it also provides an extended look at different works of art, what aspects of 
the abject they depict or enact and how to understand or analyze these works with the 
abject in mind. This chapter acts as a kind of map to abject visual materials primarily in 
art, but also in popular visual culture. It is also here that I bring in theoretical ideas close 
to, but outside, the explicit purview of disgust and abjection, like monster theory (Cohen, 
1996) and disability studies (McRuer, 2006), to help argue points that are to be found in 
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my literature review and expand the range of the abject. Moreover, because this 
methodology outlines not only what to look for, but also how to understand the ways the 
abject functions, it can be applied to other works beyond what is covered within the data 
chapter itself, becoming a tool with far reaching applications.   
 Having provided a map to abject images and methods for approaching abject art 
and a taxonomy of the abject in chapter 4. Chapter 5 is an in-depth investigation of the 
artist Kiki Smith. Smith’s work has been called abject by other critics, but it has not been 
thoroughly explored or analyzed in depth, or with my own abject visual methodology. 
This chapter acts as both a testing ground to demonstrate my methodology in depth and 
to provide an example of how a deeper analysis can work. In chapter 6, my conclusion, I 
look at the implications for an abject visual methodology, in regards to its use in 
understanding how abject images function. I also discuss the implications for the 
expansion of the abject to address social issues in application to art, as well as the 
potential that my own development of the abject has. I believe that this project has far 
broader implications than just the art world, particularly in the arena of social justice, 
even though visual art is the primary site of this study and the place in which I have 
chosen to demonstrate this further expansion of the abject.   
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2.0: Filth is Foul and Foul is Fair: Observations and a Literature Review 
2.01 Why Gross Matters 
2.01.01 improper bodies, improper studies. The human being is not only born 
but also constructed. As Kauffman notes (1998) “we may not quite be ready to embrace 
the idea that the human organism is made, not born, but Post Human12 examines the 
implications of that radical proposition” (p. 41). We may not like or even accept the idea 
that we are constructed, but many veins of inquiry have taken this notion under 
consideration. According to this proposal the human body is constructed; like a text it is 
both written and read. Moreover, the body is a cultural text where social law is 
represented, enacted and transgressed (Foucault, 1990). In her essay The Body and the 
Reproduction of Femininity, Bordo (1997) explains, “The body is not only a text of 
culture. It is also, as anthropologist Pierre Bourdieu and philosopher Michel Foucault 
(among others) have argued, a practical, direct locus of social control” (p. 90-91).  
 Whether intended or not, constructionist ideas have denigrated the lived 
experience of material bodies. As Hekman (1998) explains in her critique of Butler and 
Bordo’s approaches to the body, “Although bodies are cultural texts, some texts are more 
important than others and the hegemonic texts that sculpt female bodies cause pain and 
suffering for ‘real,’ ‘material’ women” (p. 69). Bodies exist, live and feel; they are not 
only disembodied social constructions. Butler has pointed out, materiality is joined with 
construction and construction contours materiality in the creation of what she calls 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Post Human is a theoretical body that combines the mechanic and the technological 
with the biological to question what it is to be human (Herberchter & Callus, 2008). 
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performativity (Salih & Butler, 2004). There is a reciprocal, if uneven, relationship 
between materiality and social construction.  
Whether it is studied from a biological perspective or as a social construction, the 
body, in its many forms and functions, has become a major site of study. One track of this 
current research is to look at the more unseemly side of the body, an area of study that 
has until the rise of postmodernism been largely ignored or rejected in favor of beauty. 
Artists have investigated the improper body, asking, “what it means to see the human as 
an organism, to see that organism as an ‘atrocity,’ to see that atrocity as an ‘exhibition’- 
on display like an artifact in a museum?” (Kauffman, 1998, p. 37). Cultural researchers 
and philosophers have devoted a multitude of articles to the abject (Bordo, 1997; 
Gutiérrez-Albilla, 2008; Hughes, 2009; Macedo, 2001; Meagher, 2003), written books on 
disgust (Kolnai, 2001; Miller, 1997) and even curated exhibitions on the abject (Houser, 
Jones, Taylor, & Ben-Levi, 1993; Bois & Krauss, 2000).  
2.01.02 what you notice when you study disgust: some observations. During 
the course of my research, I have seen disgusting objects appear again and again. Defiled 
objects and unsavory substances have been cordoned off from our daily lives and inhabit 
the arena of the private, kept safely away from public spheres where our personal refuse 
may threaten to violate others’ noses (Laporte, 2002). However, these sordid objects 
return in one way or another and haunt us like lingering stenches that for all our efforts 
cannot be ousted with a liberal application of Febreze.13 As my awareness of the 
disgusting grew, I noticed that culturally, we were obsessed with repellent substances and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Febreze is an air freshener and “odor eliminator” (http://www.febreze.com/en-
US/index.aspx). 
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had a wide variety of means to both keep them at bay, but also to play with them. I 
observed that we bag rotten foods in scented plastic before placing them in receptacles 
that are singularly devoted to the housing of waste. Our filth is then hauled away by 
specific professionals in a particular and identifiable vehicle to areas maintained for 
refuse set away from the public eye and nose. Trash is whisked away early in the 
morning before the world is awake. This maintains yet another boundary, preventing us 
from confronting our rotting, smelly by-products and acknowledging their accumulation 
and necessary removal. I perceived that what appeared to be simple was far more 
complex. Bodily fluids are flushed away to amazingly complex facilities where 
technicians manage the waste for us so that we never deal with those products beyond a 
glance into the toilet bowl. I noticed that bathrooms were often white, gleaming, and 
sparkling, a barrier comprised of bleach and cleanliness, to distract and protect us from 
bodily waste products. More than just covering unpleasant odors with perfumes, we 
disinfect the air with products like Oust and Febreze that promise the elimination of odor 
and germs, killing the contamination that is assumed to accompany filth whether tactile 
or olfactory.  
My newfound awareness of disgust had spread to other areas where I noticed that 
our dead have their rotting guts pumped out and replaced by chemicals that give the 
illusion of perpetual life by morticians who are often stigmatized as creepy or strange for 
their connection with death. Similarly, hospitals, places that contain more bodily 
substances than most, are sanitized, sterilized and disinfected not only to prevent disease, 
but also to ward off an association with sickness and death. On television, I saw women 
in bleached white clothes advertise menstrual products that promise odor protection and 
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leak guards, their crisp clean wardrobe acting as a semiotic shield protecting the viewer 
from the messy reality of the menstruating body. We have a need for protection against 
disgust, both literal and semiotic.  
Yet, the body and its sludges reappear in our cultural productions. They haunt us, 
returning as a specter of ourselves that cannot be banished by bleached clothes and 
sanitary workers. While real blood may be a contagion, I watched fake blood splatter 
nightly across televisions and movie screens. Real vomit may invoke a sympathetic 
regurgitation, but in the horror movie genre, fake vomitus spews from the mouths of the 
possessed14. A popular game show from my youth featured barf-like Gak that rained 
down on losing contestants.15 Bile, the near cousin of vomit, has been the key ingredient 
in reality TV show’s strange eating contests,16 where contestants choke down animal bile 
in the quest for fifteen minutes of fame and money, while audiences in their homes watch 
rapt and wincing in commiseration.  
Wandering into a local joke shop, I saw latex vomit for sale, only now 
recognizing the strangeness of desiring a replica of something that in reality is offensive.  
The same goes for the now classic fake dog poop and flies in plastic ice cubes, all 
vulgarities, which induce a disgust reaction in the victim of the prank, but causes humor 
for those who watch piteous displays of repugnance. Watching a television show one 
night, I discovered that dirty diapers are now replicated as a baby shower party game 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 The Exorcist, 1973, Blatty, W.P., & Marshall, N. (Producers), & Friedkin, W. 
(Director). 
15 Double Dare, 1986-1993 children’s game show on the Nickelodeon Network, hosted 
by Marc Summer. Darby, G., LaDuke, D., Kinghoffer, M., & Mittenthal, R. (Creators).  16	  Fear Factor, 2001-2006, stunt based reality game show on NBC. Thompson, J.R.  
(Director). 
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where the challenge is to overcome the context of a soiled nappy, eat the chocolate feces 
and identify the type of candy bar used to make the melted “poo.” Real shit is still 
disgusting. Take for instance the practical joke in which a slightly melted candy bar is 
placed in a swimming pool,17 causing fellow pool goers to feel disgust at the thought of 
their bodies having come in contact with someone else’s feces and vacate the pool. 
Feelings of disgust caused by both real and replicated filthy objects, are ever present. I 
discovered that there was bread that looked like severed body parts,18 fine chocolates that 
looked like poo,19 and candy that had ghastly things in it like worms and crickets,20 toys 
that oozed candy goo from nose shaped containers21 and more. Disgusting objects and 
practices that were once seen as taboo, and in many ways are still forbidden, return to us 
in games and toys. Humanity has created a place to play with disgusting things because 
while we are disgusted, sometimes we are also attracted to the repulsive.  
2.01.03 observations on disgust in the art world. Disgust may seem like a 
strange topic of study, particularly for someone in the arts, which has traditionally been 
focused on beauty. Unlike beauty and its Arnoldian handmaiden goodness (Arnold, 
1869/2009), disgust, “invites discussions of unmentionables that tend to undercut certain 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 This practical joke/urban legend is most famously found in the movie Caddy Shack 
(1980), but has since been a gag in TV shows like Las Vegas (Paul Michael Glaser-
Director), season 4 episode 9 “Wine and Misdemeanors” (2007) and Bob’s Burgers 
(Loren Bouchard-Creator) season 2, episode 3, “Synchronized Swimming” (2012).   
18 Thai artist Kittiwat Unarrom at the The Human Bakery- 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/07/bread-human-body-parts_n_1577787.html 
19 Off Beat Treats- http://store.offbeattreats.com/CHOCOLATEPOO.html 
20 Hotlix makes a whole line of insect candies including Cricket Lick-It’s and InsectNside 
Scorpion Brittle- http://hotlix.com/candy/index.php?route=common/home 
21 Hose Nose is a plastic nose that dispenses candy snot from the nostrils- Candy Addict 
Blog- Top 10 Grossest Candies- http://candyaddict.com/blog/top-10-grossest-candies/10-
9-8/ 
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pretensions and pieties we like to maintain about sex, presentability and human dignity in 
general” (Miller, 1997, p. ix). However, it seems to me that it is disgusts’ ability to 
undercut our pretensions and cause an intense physical reaction that creates a need for a 
deeper understanding of this rejected emotion. Turning my attention from disgust in the 
world at large to the art world, I noted that shit had become as revered as gold. 
Excrement is canned and displayed as art, the asking price determined by the weight of 
the ‘can’ of shit converted to the price of gold.22 Crucifixes submerged in urine are 
photographed,23 the Virgin Mary is painted with elephant dung,24 basketball sized gobs of 
masticated chewing gum25 stick to gallery walls through their own sweet and saliva 
coated stickiness, all of this eliciting a queasy response and disgust, even outrage from 
some. Vivisected animals with their internal organs laid bare inhabit museums26 next to 
rotting food covered in live flies.27 Galleries are populated by now infamous prints of car 
crashes and electric chairs.28 These are the more extreme, literal enactments of foul 
substances, but these don’t begin to cover the multitudes of contemporarily sculpted and 
painted images of bloody flesh,29 sputum, mucus30 and actions of menstruation,31 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Artist’s Shit, Piero Manzoni, 1961. 
23 Piss Christ Andres Serrano, 1987. 
24 The Holy Virgin Mary, Chris Ofili, 1996. 
25 Untitled, Tom Friedman, 1990. 
26 Some Comfort Gained From The Acceptance Of The Inherent Lies In Everything,    
  Damien Hirst, 1996. 
27 Let’s Eat Outdoors Today, Damien Hirst, 1990-1991. 
28 Car Crash & Electric Chair Andy Warhol, 1963 & 1971. 
29 Torso 2, Jenny Saville, 2004. 
30 Bogey Ball, James R. Ford, 2002-2004, Ford collected his own snot for two years 
forming it into a roughly 2 inch ball (http://sabrisfunkyart.blogspot.com/2013/05/james-
robert-ford.html). 
31 Untitled (Train), Kiki Smith, 1993. 
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lactation,32 ejaculation,33 masturbation,34 defecation,35 urination,36 auto-fellatio,37 
coprophilia,38 asphyxiophilia,39 dacryphilia,40 emetophilia41 and necrophilia.42  
The literal objects that cause elicitations of disgust are pushed to the margins of 
our everyday lives. However, they return or are re-enacted in our fantasy lives, which are 
manifest and visualized in culture. What are we to make of this return, especially when 
this re-emergence often inverts our systems of purity and filth, good and bad, clean and 
spoiled? Theorists have attempted to understand our complex relationship with disgusting 
substances, including both our prohibitions surrounding them and our seeming inevitable 
transgressions. At the heart of this new emphasis on the grosser aspects of the body are 
the ideas of disgust and the abject. Disgust describes the initial rejection of repulsive 
images and objects, while the abject deals with both their rejection and their return, as 
both a haunting and as a forbidden or taboo enjoyment. However, the nuanced definitions 
of these terms are often ignored and they become conflated, especially in application to 
the field of visual studies.  
2.02 Introducing the Literature Review 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Mother and Child, Kiki Smith, 1993. 
33 Untitled VII (Ejaculate in Trajectory), Andres Serrano, 1989. 
34 My Lonesome Cowboy, Takashi Murakami, 1998. 
35 Twilight, Odd Nerdrum, 1981. 
36 Untitled (Piss in Mouth), Keith Boadwee, 2004. 
37 The Recluse, John Parrot’s painting from Season 1, Episode 4 of Bravo’s Work of Art, 
2010, http://www.realitywanted.com/newsitem/3425-work-of-art-the-next-great-artist-
episode-4-recap#.UjizMFN6Pdc 
38 Fetishistic excitement for excrement (Love, 1994). 
39 Sexual arousal through oxygen deprivation (Love, 1994). 
40 Sexual excitement from tears or crying (Love, 1994). 
41 Fetish surrounding vomit (Love, 1994). 
42 Erotic interest in the dead and corpses (Love, 1994). 
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 What follows is a review of the literature that has informed my observations 
above, as well as personal insight into some of the texts and ideas that I have garnered 
from the process of researching these terms and sites. In elucidating the interrelated 
concepts of disgust and the abject, particularly in their application to the visual, this 
chapter lays out the definitions of these terms, with an eye towards their similarities, 
differences, and interrelations. An examination of the overlap and distinctions between 
disgust and the abject, as well as an investigation of their origin and loci, can lead to a 
better understanding of the cultural sites that employ them as strategies. At stake is both a 
better understanding of these ideas and the images that use them. But more important is 
the potential of political action associated with disgust and the abject, as well as a better 
understanding of the injustices leveled in the name of disgust. Disgust has been a 
motivating factor in atrocities like the Holocaust and continues to be a qualifier in many 
legal proceedings (Nussbaum, 2007; Nussbaum, 2006), and its role in these matters 
makes it well worth inquiry. However, the abject, according to some scholars (e.g. Tyler, 
2013), has positive political potential. 
My project is the creation of an abject visual methodology, something which in 
the course of my research I found missing. I am limiting my formal literature review to 
the major ideas that move through the entirety of this work and have inspired this abject 
visual methodology. I have chosen to place the supporting literature, like disability 
studies and ideas about the monster, as well as literature about specific works of art, in 
the data chapter where I describe my new methodology in detail. This emphasizes their 
separateness from the main theoretical underpinnings of the dissertation, but it allows for 
their inclusion and a space to demonstrate their overlap.  
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In the following section, I explore disgust as both a physical and cultural 
phenomenon. I am particularly interested in the use of disgust in regards to morality and 
social marginalization, as this is an area that overlaps with the abject productively as a 
means to make sense of, and counter, oppression. I then delve into the literature 
surrounding the abject, beginning with a very close reading of Kristeva’s methods 
chapter in the Power of Horror (1982) in which she defines the abject and uses the abject 
as a tool for literary analysis. Next, I provide a broad look at other scholars’ contributions 
and usages of the abject, pointing out where I agree with their ideas, as well as where and 
when I feel they do not work well. A review of these literatures provides a background 
that helps to explain my own uses of disgust and abjection as applied to visual images, 
including visual art. The current slippage in how the terms disgust and abjection are 
understood and used denies a difference that may obscure key moments in understanding 
the seeming proliferation of imagery that is labeled gross in our visual culture. By 
developing a way to address and clarify unsavory images, an abject visual methodology 
will provide a way to approach both individual repulsive images and the larger trend 
towards disgusting art on a whole. 
2.03 Disgust: The Knee-Jerk Emotion 
Disgust is defined as causing loathing or nausea, a strong distaste, “repugnance 
caused by something offensive; strong aversion” and “to offend the good taste, moral 
sense, etc., of; cause extreme dislike or revulsion” (dictionary.com)43. However, we are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Dictionary.com is a website that provides definitions from multiple official sources 
including Random House dictionary, Collins English Dictionary, and The American 
Heritage Dictionary, among others. While I realize it is perhaps more professional to use 
a single, well-established dictionary, my work is purposefully democratic and engaged in 
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most familiar with the feel of disgust, the unconscious heaving of one’s body, the shudder 
and cold sweat of nausea, the dizzying desire to get away from what is causing these 
sensations and reactions.  
2.03.01 basic definitions. Before further exploring the theories and literature 
surrounding disgust, I will pause here and look at emotions more broadly. Emotion is 
defined simply as any strong feeling, or something that causes a reaction, particularly “an 
intense mental state that arises subjectively rather than through conscious effort and is 
often accompanied by physiological changes.” More complexly, emotion is “an affective 
state of consciousness in which joy, sorrow, fear, hate, or the like, is experienced, as 
distinguished from cognitive and volitional states of consciousness” or “any strong 
agitation of the feelings actuated by experiencing love, hate, fear, etc. and usually 
accompanied by certain physiological changes, as increased heartbeat or respiration and 
often overt manifestation, as crying or shaking” (dictionary.com).  
Emotions have been the cause for debate for centuries. As Solomon (2000) notes, 
“philosophers have been concerned about the nature of emotion since Socrates and the 
‘pre-Socratics’ who preceded him.” (p. 3). Emotions have often been considered “more 
primitive, less intelligent, more bestial, less dependable, and more dangerous than 
reason” (p. 3). In this model emotions are inferior to reason. Solomon notes that “the 
emotions have always lurked in the background - often as a threat to reason and a danger 
to philosophy and philosopher” (p. 3). Emotions were slaves to the master of reason.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
challenging hierarchies of taste. With that in mind, it seemed counter intuitive to use 
something just for elitist purposes, particularly since dictionary.com uses official 
published definitions.  
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However, models of emotions have shifted over time, especially since the 
affective turn, where emotions have been given a more central role in human life and in 
cognition. Biologists and evolutionary psychologists have confirmed both the central role 
and necessity of emotions in human life (Lewis & Haviland-Jones, 2008, Dunbar, Barret, 
& Lycett, 2005). Dunbar, Barret and Lycett (2005) explain, “The past three decades have 
witnessed an extraordinary explosion in our understanding of animal behavior and its 
evolutionary components” (p. 2) including emotions.  
One of the developments in behavioral psychology has been a re-evaluation of the 
cause of emotions. While events have been understood as the cause for emotions, 
behaviorists have suggested that emotions are “aroused not by particular stimuli, but by 
contingencies consisting of the actual or signaled arrival or termination of pleasant or 
unpleasant events…positive or negative reinforcers” (Fridja, 2008, p. 68). This idea of 
contingencies and reinforcers demonstrates that emotions are part of a neural network 
that is predicated on both the body and on learning. However, this still leaves the 
question of degrees; to what degree are emotions biological and to what degree are they 
learned, and thus part of a cultural schema? Fridja (2008) explains that while emotions 
are firmly rooted in biology, “ The precise nature of what they are mechanisms 
for…remains unclear.” (p.69).  
The nature of emotions may still be unclear, but the continued exploration into 
their role and function has resulted in evidence that emotions can impact our ability to 
perceive, as Ray (2012) explains. Researchers have tested physiological measures while 
in the midst of fear and disgust, demonstrating that “individuals were able to take in more 
air, move their eyes faster, and see a larger area during fear than during disgust.” (p. 195). 
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Emotional responses modify “our ability to prepare for perception and action.” (p. 195). 
The facial expressions that have been demonstrated to universally accompany emotional 
reactions (Ekman, 1994) are not just social signals, but offer “biological advantages” 
(Ray, 2012, p. 195). Emotions then structure our perceptions of the world, making them 
much more than a strong feeling and debunking the previous idea that emotions are not to 
be trusted. Emotions cannot be separated from cognition because they structure cognition 
and they cannot be seen as unreliable because they are an adaptive evolutionary feature; 
these mechanics serve a larger purpose that keep us as individuals and our species going. 
The roots of emotions have also been questioned, as evolutionary psychologists 
have argued that emotions are evolutionary adaptations (Ray, 2012; Dunbar, Barrett, & 
Lycett, 2005). Charles Darwin (2012) entered the then nascent field of psychology 
through evolution in his book The expression of the emotions in man and animals 
published in 1872. It is in this text that Darwin addresses the emotional and behavioral 
aspects of natural selection. While this shift to a scientific approach may seem odd in my 
project, since I have marked it out very clearly as a qualitative inquiry into cultural 
objects, Ray (2012) points out that it is important to “not see culture and evolution as 
opposing explanations” (p. 30). Ray goes on to explain,  
As Darwin pointed out, organisms are in a dynamic and close connection with 
their environment. For humans, part of that environment is culture. We live in 
culture much more than we live in nature, although there is, of course, a dynamic 
interaction between these processes. (p. 30) 
On a similar note, Fridja (2008) explains, “Biological dispositions and cultural 
determinants, as we all know, are neither incompatible nor mutually exclusive” (p. 70).  
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Rather there is a dynamic interaction between culture and nature that is particularly 
important to understanding disgust, as it strongly implicates the body, but is structured by 
culture in regards to what elicits disgust. Furthermore, Fridja (2008) explains that, 
“Universality may lurk behind cultural specificity without detracting from the specific 
meanings of each cultural form” (p. 70). Culture and biology are often pitted against one 
another, with biology seen as a universal that unproductively erases cultural specificities. 
However, in positioning culture and biology as intersecting, not opposing one another, 
biological universalities can be acknowledged, while maintaining the specific cultural 
meanings that are the basis for difference. While my project is focused on specific 
cultural productions and cultural trends, the universality that a biological and 
evolutionary perspective on emotions can create need not detract from the specifics of 
cultural productions or a qualitative, even subjective, analysis of the works. In fact, 
disgust’s straddling of the cultural and the biological suggest the necessity of both.  
Inbar and Pizzaro (2009) explain, “Most psychologists consider disgust to be a 
basic emotion” (p. 13). Basic emotions are cross-culturally present, manifesting the same 
way physically in predictable facial expressions and bodily responses universally, and 
they are thought to be part of evolution (Ekman, 1994). The facial expression associated 
with disgust has been linked to the idea of expelling that which we have ingested. Inbar 
and Pizzaro (2009) note,   
the facial expression characteristic of disgust—withdrawal of the upper lip,  
 thrusting out of the tongue, and wrinkling of the nose—may have its origins in the 
 adaptive action of expelling noxious food from the mouth and shrinking the nasal 
 passages in order to prevent pathogens from entering. (p.13) 
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Ray (2012) makes a similar argument, relying on Darwin’s early work on emotions like 
disgust, that disgust’s facial expression is similar to and based on “the motor action of 
vomiting” (p. 196). Ray argues that “ emotional expressions such as disgust previously 
accompanied acts such as vomiting. Over evolutionary time, the expression of disgust 
came to be a response of its own without the gastrointestinal motor component” (p. 197).  
 However, while disgust is defined as repugnance, this barely touches on all that 
disgust can entail. It is related to and caused by rotten foods, swarms of living things, 
death and decay, as well as violations of moral principles. Disgust is not only serious, but 
complicated. Its antonyms are to relish or delight (dictionary.com), but disgust’s binary is 
often constructed as cleanliness or purity. Purity resides next to godliness, making disgust 
godless and heathen. Yet, a sign of humility, of saintliness, is to walk with lepers, those 
seen in Medieval Europe as vile bearers of the plague (Miller, 1997). St. Francis was 
known to have served lepers and St. Roch was known as the patron saint of the plague 
(Delaney, 2005). Somehow crossing the taboo of disgust in some instances raises the 
transgressor to a position of spiritual enviousness, while in other instances it 
contaminates the transgressor. Consider, for instance, the Orthodox Jewish tradition of 
not touching a niddah, a menstruating or unclean woman, for fear of contamination 
(Branham, 1997) and association with disgust. Miller (1997) explains that, “disgust is not 
simply aversive and the content of the disgusting is complex and at times paradoxical. It 
is commonplace that the disgusting can attract as well as repel” (p. x). These moments of 
changeability in our relationship to disgust demonstrate its complexity and versatility, as 
well as it’s dependence upon cultural difference and context.     
 2.03.02 beyond basic definitions. 
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2.03.02.01 physicality and disgust. The physicality and immediacy of disgust 
appear to be an instinctual response, a near universal reaction to things that evoke a 
strong bodily repulsion (Ray, 2012; Inbar & Pizarro, 2009; Inbar, Pizarro, & Bloom, 
2009). We do not choose to tear up when something is in our eye or cough to clear our 
throats. Our bodies take over and deal with the offending substance. Similarly, some 
argue that disgust is a similarly protective agent, causing us to expel foul tasting foods 
that may be spoiled, or to avoid death and decay for fear of disease (Ray, 2012; Rozin, 
Haight, & McCauley, 1993; Rozin & Fallon, 1987). However, this assertion is challenged 
by others, as Miller (1997) notes that humans are likely the only species to experience 
disgust and its close kin, self-loathing, since we are messy creatures, “emitting substances 
and odors that make us doubt ourselves and fear our neighbors” (p. xiv). This may be 
supported by the observation that some animals wallow in shit, where the thought of that 
for most humans is rather offensive.44 Miller would have us believe that it is cognition 
that controls disgust, not our biological bodies. As Meagher (2003) states, disgust is 
“fundamental to human beings-we all suffer disgust” (p. 24). With this in mind, disgust is 
particular to humans, while other emotions can be found in other animals. Fridja (2008) 
explains that primate grief and elephant grief are like human grief, demonstrating grief’s 
human, universal status. However, to be disgusted is both “human and humanizing” 
(Miller, 1997, p. 11) and some (e.g. Miller, 1997; Meagher, 2003) would argue that either 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 While it is counter to Miller’s argument, it is worth noting that many animals, like pigs, 
do not wallow in shit and actually have a prohibition against their own waste. When kept 
in paddocks, pigs will use one specific area of the stall for waste and can be easily litter 
box trained because of their innate desire to separate living space from waste space 
(Paine, B. (Writer). (1996, November 17). The joy of pigs [Television series episode]. In 
Kaufman, F. (Executive Producer), Nature. United States: Partridge Films Ltd.).   
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disgust is not an emotion, because it seems culturally dependent and based in cognition, 
or disgust is an emotion that is unique to humans. Only proto-humans (children), sub-
humans (the mentally ill) and supra-humans (saints) are insensitive to disgust and belong 
to a category other than “human” (Miller, 1997; Kolnai, 2001). The apparent lack of 
disgust in those considered inhuman seems to reinforce the idea that disgust is unique to 
humans.  
But what appears to be instinct, may very well be based in cultural and contextual 
backgrounds. Stinky tofu is a delicacy in parts of Asia, but the intentionally rotten and 
fermented tofu is something most Westerners have a hard time stomaching (Steward, 
2006). Those who have studied disgust seem to agree on “…its requirement that there be 
a sensory experience, of a quite specific type, that triggers the emotion” (Miller, 1997, p. 
14). There must be some sensation, which causes disgust: the texture of stinky tofu; the 
smell of rotted foodstuffs; or even the reflection upon a previous sensory experience of 
disgust, a kind of thinking yourself into a disgusted state. Emotions are more than just 
physical reactions, they involve ideological and cognitive frameworks (Lewis & 
Haviland-Jones, 2008). As Miller (1997) explains, “emotions are feelings linked to ways 
of thinking about those feelings, to social and cultural paradigms that make sense of those 
feelings by giving us a basis for knowing when they are properly felt and properly 
displayed” (p. 8).  
2.03.02.02 ways to approach disgust. A taxonomy of disgust has been suggested 
which categorizes disgust into nine specific traits labeled as, “materially disgusting” 
(Korsmeyer & Smith, 2001, p. 16) including, excrement, secretions, dirt, disgusting 
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animals, rotting food, imperfection, fat, diseased and deformed bodies, as well as 
putrefaction. Korsmeyer and Smith (2001) explain that,  
objects of material disgust share the impression of life gone bad, of flesh  
turning towards death and of a ‘primordial and profuse regeneration of life from 
the muck of decaying organic matter’. Things that rot and putrefy become the fuel 
for maggots and bacteria; insects in swarms give the impression of excessive, 
mindless generation, of life “senseless, formless, surging”. (p. 16)  
That disgust is caused by excrement or secretions is really no surprise; they appear as 
contagious, as formless, they signal the body in flux, moving, digesting bleeding, full of 
fluids and unpleasant life. Disgust applies to particular animals, like rats, that “exhibit 
parasitic tendencies,” lurking in dark, dirty places and causes “an almost universal feeling 
of specific disgust … indefinable anxiety, … the uncanny” (Kolnai, 2001, p. 57), as well 
as swarms of insects that similarly lurk but also threaten to overwhelm as a horde. It 
applies to bodies out of bounds, bodies that have transgressed the normal limits through 
lack or profusion, amputation or malignant growth, even fatness. As Braziel (2001) notes 
in Bodies out of Bounds, “Fat equals … violation of order and space, a transgression of 
boundaries” (p. 13). Corpulence then becomes disgusting, flesh stretched beyond its 
precincts, threatening to burst forth, to over take, to reveal its internal putrefaction, the 
digestion of foodstuffs. That fat is considered undesirable can be seen in the research of 
McFarren, Dahl, Fitzsimons, and Morales (2010), who have demonstrated that showing 
people fat bodies while they eat makes the test subjects consume less for fear of 
becoming out of bounds, or fat, themselves.  
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Fecundity, usually associated with joy, can become disgusting, signaling not only 
an over-abundance of life, the swarm, but “life in the wrong places” (Kolnai, 2001, p. 59) 
or an “‘indecent surplus of life’” (p. 54). It is this surplus that makes figures like the 
Elephant Man Joseph Merrick or congenital twins and images of tumors appear abhorrent 
as life bursts forth in the wrong places, disrupting the systematized topography of the 
normal body.  
Disgust applies to dirt itself, “a grayish black layer of uncertain composition … 
involving smallish sticky particles of … ickiness” (p. 55), which shares a connection with 
feces, as well as grease, sweat, and nearly all bodily fluids. It is this disgust of dirt that 
makes us wipe our hands on pant legs when a sink is nowhere near or pull back with the 
typical nose wrinkle of disgust when we lean on an unclean table and discover it sticky 
with who knows what.  
Yet, disgust finds its most ready vessel in the corpse as the “prototypical object of 
disgust is … the range of phenomena associated with putrefaction” (Kolnai, 2001, p. 53). 
This includes, but is not limited to, decomposition, the scent of corpses and the 
corruption of living bodies. In general, it is the “transition of the living into the state of 
death” (p. 53) that causes the highest disgust response, because the process from living 
being to nothingness is itself fluid, full of the wrong kinds of life like maggots and 
pathogens attacking flesh that is still life like.  
2.03.02.03 another approach. Historically, disgust has been theorized as a way to 
protect the organism from contamination (Angyal, 1941). Charles Darwin was one of the 
first to write on disgust in his work journals from Tierra del Fuego in 1839. He notes in 
his journal that the soup on a man’s beard looks disgusting, even though there is nothing 
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there but soup, because the soup is out of place, contaminated by the whiskers (Miller, 
1997; Meagher, 2003).  
2.03.02.04 hair. The fact that it is the whiskers, or hair, that contaminates here is 
worth mentioning as hair, according to Miller, (1997) is akin to other offending bodily 
substances like pores and sweat. Hair grows out of the body, has intimate contact with 
sweat and bodily secretion like urine, feces and sexual fluids, and it springs up in 
unwanted places. Culturally, hair is determined by and symbolically represents race, sex, 
age and class. It is a cultural and religious symbol in regards to how it is worn or cut and 
at times a foil to disgust with its attachment to beauty. This is particularly manifested in 
women’s hair. Hair, because of its relationship to beauty and through that purity and 
sanctity, is vulnerable to desecration. Desecration as an act causes disgust both through 
the desecration itself and through the image of desecration that is left in its aftermath. In 
this instance, desecrating someone’s hair can be disgusting for the individuals whose 
being is violated. It could be disgusting to the perpetrator of the desecration because they 
are in intimate contact with another’s body, their hair. It could be disgusting to watch 
someone’s hair being desecrated because the viewer may empathize with the victim. The 
image that is left behind after the desecration, the befowled or shorn locks, can disgust 
those who view it as it is a semiotic sign that stands in for the act of desecration. This 
explains the impetus in the shaving of heads during the Holocaust and in other instances 
of imprisonment as a way to punish or denigrate the individual. However, while the 
shearing of hair can be seen as a desecration when it is done to long locks of head hair, 
Menninghaus (2003) notes that other hair’s removal is a condition of beauty:  
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The positive requirements of the aesthetically pleasing body-elastic and slender 
contours without incursions of fat, flawless youthful firmness and unbroken skin 
without folds or openings, removal of bodily hair and plucked eyebrows forming 
a fine line, flat belly and ‘trim’ behind and so on - are at the same time 
prescriptions for the avoidance of disgust. (p. 7)  
Hair is something that must be monitored in its relationship to disgust and helps to 
explain Darwin’s reaction to the soup on the man beard (and not say soup on his lip or 
shirt for that matter). This is related to what Herz (2012) calls, “The I’m okay, you’re not 
okay” (p. 53) reaction. What is disgusting about the whiskers, beyond their over 
determined relationship to disgust because they are hair, is that Darwin later envisions 
those whiskers having touched his soup, in fact, all soup. This is an imagined 
transgression as the other man’s beard has not touched Darwin’s soup. Darwin is not 
pulling a lost hair from his own bowl and feeling the effects of a tangible encounter with 
another person’s sloughed off body hair. Nor would Darwin feel disgusted at having soup 
in his own beard, as it is fairly easy to assume that at one point or another in his life, 
Darwin himself had soup on his whiskers or chin. Rather, it is a fantasy based on the 
inherent disgust of other people’s bodies.  
2.03.02.05 food. Further grounding his ideas on disgust as a food prohibition, 
similar to kosher or halal,45 Darwin discusses a moment of food-based revulsion 
experienced with a native in Terre del Fuego. The native is disgusted by the meat Darwin 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Halal specifically means any object or action permitted by Islamic law. It is most 
commonly referenced in relationship to Islamic food and drink prohibitions, including the 
exclusion of pork and alcohol, as well as how animals are slaughtered and how food is 
prepared. 
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is consuming, poking at it suspiciously, showing displeasure with its texture, while 
Darwin is disgusted at a native touching his food. This anecdote demonstrates the 
dualistic nature of disgust. On the part of the native, it is a bodily response, particularly 
associated with food, often seen as a biological mechanism that keeps us from eating 
spoiled or rotten things (Ray, 2012; Rozin & Fallon, 1987; Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 
1993). For Darwin, it is a cultural outsider who is perceived as dirty touching his food 
that is disgusting. Disgust is not caused by “inorganics or non-biological matter” (Kolnai, 
2001, p. 30) which seems to support the idea that disgust’s function is keeping the body 
safe from disease.  
2.03.02.06 scent and taste. Disgust can involve all the senses; however, Kolnai 
has argued that “the true origin of disgust is the sense of smell” (p. 50), which is 
inextricably tied to ingestion and food prohibition. Kolnai (2001) notes in his extensive 
work on disgust,  
The gustatory and olfactory sphere appears to be the primary habitat of disgust. A 
frightful reek ‘stinks in our nostrils, it has invaded us and intruded into our 
corporeal intimacy. Nauseas and vomiting, we eject what has in a more massive 
sense infested our body, possibly with our own initial consent. (p.101)  
It seems to me that upon being invaded by a scent that we willingly breathed in, we 
become ill in an attempt to remove what has entered our space and violated our bodies, 
and we retch. Scent can be key in the evocation of disgust (Herz, 2012). This vomit is not 
the sickness of illness, but a sickness specific to disgust. This is a sickness that seeks to 
avoid contamination, to prevent us from becoming disgusting through our contact with 
the repulsive.     
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 However, sometimes the scent and taste of disgust are appealing, not prohibitory. 
Take for instance the taste for gamy meat, things that have been left out to intentionally 
rot ever so slightly, or ripe cheeses, strongly flavored haut gout, which “skirts the edge of 
the revolting but is thereby rendered - not marginally acceptable - but actually better” 
(Korsmeyer & Smith, 2001, p. 20-21). Herz (2012) explains, “It might seem that smells 
are most disgust-inducing because they are so enveloping…. Yet sniff information can be 
misinformation” (p. 54). She goes on to explain the role of learning in the processing of 
physical stimuli like scent. For example, the scent of things like spoiled milk do not smell 
innately wrong; wrongness is learned. As a child, you don’t know the milk is spoiled 
based on the scent, not until you have either tasted it and had a bad reaction or have been 
cautioned against it. Both Herz (2012) and Miller (1997) argue that we have a body of 
knowledge, a culturally specific matrix that may be specific to the individual, about what 
is good and what is not, to map experiences of disgust onto that allows us to determine 
what is disgusting.  
 Even with taste, if milk is only slightly spoiled it may not stimulate a response 
like sickness and induce a prohibition. It seems to me that there are many convincing 
arguments to the role of biological evolution in the creation of disgust and that the scale 
upon which many disgust reactions occur may reflect the level of toxicity or threat that 
the offending substances possesses. For instance, slightly spoiled milk will not kill you, 
where as toxic plants that will do serious harm are often very bitter, a taste sensation that 
most people are so adverse to that it seems biologically programmed as opposed to 
culturally learned. In short, you must learn what spoiled is and that it is bad before you 
know that a particular smell signals spoilage and should be rejected. Moreover, a scent in 
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one context, say in the restaurant, is mouthwatering, but a similar smell in the back alley 
behind the restaurant can induce vomit (Herz, 2012). For instance, the catch of the day 
may within the bounds of a restaurant seem fresh and consumable. The same fish just 
hours later, if that long, can disgust in an alleyway as the same fishy smell in the context 
of garbage cans is interpreted as having gone off. Taste, Herz (2012) argues is similarly 
tricky, as something like bitter greens taste bad, or at least like other bad things, but are in 
fact healthy and desirable.         
 2.03.02.07 touch. Touch, too, can lead us astray, as in the Halloween game where 
one is blind-folded and feels inside a bowl for peeled grape eyeballs, which stimulate a 
disgust reaction. It is the grape and eyes proximity in density, weight and shape that 
enable the confusion and disgust issues forth.46 Because of the faulty and learned 
attributes of the other senses, Herz (2012) argues for a primacy of vision in regards to the 
experience of disgust, because, “[s]ight is not instinctive, but it is definitive” (p. 56). She 
explains, “If you open a container from the refrigerator and see chicken legs covered in 
furry black mold, you have no doubt that the meat is rotted and you don’t need to check 
any of your other senses to be sure” (p. 56).      
 2.03.02.08: sight. However, seeing something disgusting may not prevent you 
from the emotion of disgust. Take for instance the horror movie. Reports circulated that 
The Exorcist caused viewers to vomit (Bailey & Barbaton, 2005) and according to Evans 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 I can verify this personally through another experience. While teaching I would have 
my students do a “Touchy Feely” activity where they would reach inside a paper bag and 
draw what they felt. This activity always created great anxiety and an adrenaline rush for 
many students who were frightened both by touching something that they could not see 
(even though it was in the safety of a college classroom) and often troubled or disgusted 
by the feeling of things like a Swiffer duster, clay, or fur.  
	  	  
46	  	  	  	  
	  
(2012), viewers ran from a screening of V/H/S (2012) at Sundance from illness due to a 
graphic scene featuring a bloody compound fracture combined with shaky camera effects. 
Others reported illness including fainting and needed EMT assistance during James 
Franco’s 127 Hours (2010), a real life story of a mountain climber who is forced to cut 
his own arm off to survive (Carr, 2010).  
 Thus, seeing something disgusting does not prevent the experience of disgust; 
rather, it seems to me and others (e.g., Herz, 2012) that seeing infects us more, or at least 
more easily, than other senses. While vision does not have the same metaphors of 
permeability, sight equally infects. Reflecting on the permeation of the body that occurs 
with scent or taste, I believe that disgusting elements must actually enter the body to 
cause a full-fledged disgust reaction. As Lazarus (1991) explains, disgust is related to “a 
strong desire to keep the substance away to preserve one’s bodily integrity” (p. 260), 
which eventually becomes more than literal. Permeability is integral to understanding 
disgust contaminating effects. For disgust to be evoked by sound, taste, and scent, I argue 
that an offending object must enter the body. Permeation or bodily contact in one form or 
another is necessary for disgust to occur. Simply knowing that there is spoiled milk in the 
garbage can is not enough to actually elicit disgust, since tucked away in the receptacle 
designed for filth it cannot threaten the bodily border until the garbage can is open and 
the scent wafts up and into the body. Similarly, touch has a permeable quality. The body 
itself is permeable. Our borders are not sealed, but porous. That means that when we 
touch something disgusting, not only are we in very close proximity to the offending 
object, we may experience a sense of contamination because of our penetrability.    
 I maintain that vision lacks the same idea of permeability, as there seems to be 
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less of an invasion of the body through scopic means. Visual observations can cause 
immense disgust, but without the same type of permeability or close contact with the 
offending substance or act. This can be seen in the distance between the audience and a 
film screen; a distance that can be understood as both a physical distance from the screen 
and the distance that images create between the viewer and reality. I assert that this is an 
example of how imbricated vision is within disgust, that even seeing something 
disgusting at a distance, which dissipates the object’s perceived ability to infect, still 
causes intense discomfort and disgust. A cultural matrix must be present even with vision 
because as Herz (2012) explains the viewer still needs to learn what looks disgusting.  
 However, there is a difference in the way distinct senses process or make sense of 
disgust. Vision has often been ignored in regards to disgust, with more emphasis placed 
on taste (Kolnai, 2001; Rozin, Haight, & McCauley, 1993; Miller, 1997). But vision has a 
much more powerful role in disgust according to Herz (2012), a point with which I am in 
total agreement. For example, Herz notes that the disgust face also features a narrowing 
of the eyes, which curtails one’s field of vision, and protects one from disgusting images 
entering the mind’s eye. Herz also argues for the dominance of vision in disgust 
responses because vision provides the clearest and most unadulterated meaning.  For 
example, smell or taste information may be confused, but seeing rot or death leaves no 
doubt.          
 2.03.02.09 animal origins. Another researcher who has studied disgust as a food 
prohibition, or as a means to prevent the ingestion of certain foods, is Rozin. Rozin, 
Haight, and McCauley (1993) view disgust as more than just about food and the sense of 
smell and taste, noting “a spread of the focus on threat from just the mouth to contact 
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with the body in general and even offensive sights’’ (p. 584). Disgust is expanded from 
food prohibitions and rejection, to include hygiene, death, sex, social morals and 
violations of the body as a whole. Rozin’s work is most well known through a series of 
experiments he conducted, testing participants physical and emotional responses to things 
like plastic “gag” cockroaches, the participant’s willingness to drink a glass of water 
containing a clean newly opened hair comb and whether participants would consume 
their own spit collected in a glass.      
 Eventually Rozin settled on a more generalized theory of disgust as a way to be, 
“quite distinct from (and superior to) other animals’’ (Rozin & Fallon, 1987, p. 28). As 
Rozin, Haight and McCauley (1993) explain,  
disgust serves to ‘humanize’ our animal bodies. Humans must eat, excrete and 
have sex, just like other animals. Each culture prescribes the proper way to 
perform these actions—by, for example, placing most animals off limits as 
potential foods and most people off limits as potential sex partners. People who 
ignore these prescriptions are reviled as disgusting and animal-like.... Finally, 
hygienic rules govern the proper use and maintenance of the human body and the 
failure to meet these culturally defined standards places a person below the level 
of humans. (p. 584)  
Disgust is both what signals our roots in the animal kingdom and what points to the 
constructedness of culture (Meagher, 2003; Miller, 1997).  
2.03.02.10: morality and disgust. According to Korsmeyer and Smith (2003) 
disgust is, “at work in creating and sustaining our social and cultural reality” and “helps 
us to grasp hierarchies of value, to cope with morally sensitive situations and to discern 
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and maintain cultural order” (p. 1-2). Through this, disgust is leveled at individuals who 
come to embody disgust, through their inability to discern (ie, their bad taste), their 
proximity to other substances that are disgusting (garbage men, doctors, funerary 
workers, or those who work with animals like butchers) and their lack of what society 
deems clean and proper (the “proper” complexion, gender, sexuality, income, etc.). These 
things make them dirty, disgusting and immoral. Darwin’s disgust is then centered on the 
native’s race, his perceived lack of “civilization” and even, perhaps, his lack of Christian 
morals or “heathen” status. This story demonstrates the role of taste, distinguishing 
between good and bad and the moral application of disgust, because disgust moves 
beyond the transgression of taste and smell, beyond the physical to a psychic and moral 
dimension. As Meagher (2003) explains, while disgust is visceral and embodied, it is also 
“a socially circumscribed and habituated emotion established and experienced within 
social, cultural and political structures and settings” (p. 30). Disgust marks out what is 
clean and proper. 
2.03.03 Douglas, dirt and systems. The above type of disgust is related to 
Douglas’s work in Purity and Danger (1966/2000) where disgust stems from cultural 
taboos about what is clean and proper versus what is dirty. Disgust is envisioned as a 
transgression of taboos of purity and related to the binary of the sacred and the profane 
(Douglas, 1966/2000). Brayton (2007) explains that for Douglas, disgust and the removal 
of dirt as a response “is not based on any hygienic anxiety but rather an arbitrary 
paradigm that presents itself as an economy of the sacred and profane” (p. 59). Douglas 
(1966/2000) explains that “reflection on dirt involve[s] reflection on the relation of order 
to disorder, being to non-being, form to formlessness, life to death” (p. 5). For Douglas, it 
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is not literal dirt that raises anxiety or creates the emotional response of disgust, but the 
transgression of the structure of what is sacred, that which is pure and clean and what is 
profane, that which is disgusting and dirty. Dirt and its emotional counterpart disgust can 
be created by anything that is out of place according to one’s cultural schema of what is 
deemed sacred versus profane, pure versus dangerous and clean versus dirty. Douglas’s 
version of disgust is both broad, in that anything can in theory cause disgust, and 
culturally determined, rather than a bodily response based in hygiene or a protective 
mechanism for physical health.47  
2.03.03.01 dirt. Thus, disgust seems to go beyond simply spitting out or vomiting 
up physical contaminates. Schaller and Duncan (2007) have argued that disgust is a 
“behavioral immune system” as well as a physical protectant. Proponents of this theory 
argue that it was an evolutionary advantage to view other groups of foreign or unfamiliar 
people as disgusting and thus to be avoided because the new pathogens that these people 
may have carried could have killed our ancestors. While this was once a survival benefit 
to our ancestors, it is no longer beneficial and is actually overstimulated making us 
unfairly shun people. As Inbar and Pizarro (2009) note, “any individual seen as belonging 
to a group viewed as strange, foreign, or “dirty” is at risk for evoking a disgust response, 
and for the reduced moral sympathy that it may entail” (p. 16). 
2.03.03.02 disgust, morality and law. It is this notion, that clean is sacred and dirt 
is taboo and profane, that explains the moral connection to disgust. And while theorists 
like Kolnai (2003) use disgust as a reliable moral compass, others like Miller (1997), 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 This being said, disgust is still protective, culturally speaking, because of its role in the 
policing of taboos, the transgression of which could lead to real life material problems, 
like disenfranchisement from the group, or even legal ramifications. 
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have noted the danger in assigning morality to an emotion as powerful as disgust. Miller 
notes that “disgust makes beauty and ugliness a matter of morals”(p. 11) and not just of 
preference. As Masquelier (2005) explains,  
Filth, in short, may be nothing but sin and vice versa. Those who engage in 
morally suspect activities (prostitution, usury) are considered ‘dirty’ and in need 
of ‘cleansing,’ while those who ‘stink’ and cannot wash are condemned as 
morally corrupt, put in seclusion, or placed at the bottom of the social ladder. (p. 
11) 
Disgust becomes an issue of moral hierarchies in Kantian and Arnoldian aesthetics, 
where all that is good is sweetness and light and all that is dark and ugly is debased 
(Arnold, 1869/2009; Duncum, 2008). It also becomes an issue of law, as moral disgust 
has been leveled against homosexuals, Jews, minorities, even women. Nussbaum (2006) 
has explored the problematic use of disgust in the law, citing examples like Stephen Carr, 
a drifter who killed two lesbians he encountered making love at their campsite in the 
woods. Carr argued that his disgust at homosexuality caused his brutal reaction and 
should factor in mitigating his charge from murder one to manslaughter, since he couldn’t 
control his revulsion, which lead to the crime. Nussbaum’s concern is that some laws cite 
disgust as their main or only qualifier, as if all people are disgusted by the same thing, 
that it is both universal and substantive enough for the law. Take for instance the 1973 
opinion from Chief Justice Warren Burger that still legally defines obscenity in such a 
way that it “includes reference to the disgust and revulsion that the works in question 
would inspire in ‘the average person, applying contemporary community standards.’” 
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(Nussbaum, 2006, p. 2). To further his point, Burger added in a footnote to his court 
opinion that obscenity was defined in multiple dictionaries as disgusting or filthy.  
 2.03.03.03 disgust and minorities. Disgust has been leveled against many 
minority groups. Holtz and Wagner (2009) study disgust as a way to understand the 
motivations and rhetoric of far-right conservative bloggers on the internet who write 
about African Americans and Jews.  
They explain that,  
The most important and historically old ones [derogatory terms] are likening the 
members of target group to animals and thereby projecting the disgust associated 
with certain animals (e.g., Royzman & Sabini, 2001); attributing supposed 
aesthetic aberrances such as ugliness (e.g. Heatherton, Kleck, Hebl, & Hull, 
2000); and depriving the members of a group of self-control (Joffe & Staerkle, 
2007). These repertoires of derogations derive from and in fact are a functional 
part of, the representational universe of the dominant group, its culture and ways 
of rhetoric, serving, at the end, the maintenance of the status quo (Jost, Hunyady, 
Stroebe, & Hewstone, 2002). (p. 412)      
Racist works on the internet rely on a standard, essentialist perspective that conflates the 
“offending” group with other things that create disgust, making the group themselves 
disgusting. These blogs rely on disgust and its use as a tool of hegemony that polices and 
recreates the status quo to enact hatemongering.     
 While Rozin argues that it is our capacity for disgust that makes us human, the 
emotional reaction of disgust is leveled against groups that are perceived to break 
normativity and are through this dehumanized. Holtz and Wagner (2009) describe this in 
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their account of racist hate blogs,       
 Research on the psychology of hatred-related behaviour shows that  
dehumanization is frequently associated with legitimizing inhuman acts against 
others (Bandura, 2002; Bar-Tal, 1997; Kelman, 1976). But even before aggression 
takes place, dehumanization or infra-humanization48 can be seen in the perception 
of groups and their members, who are not actively discriminated against or 
stigmatized and even when they are presented as a relatively abstract other. 
Accordingly, dehumanization can result from denying targets some typical human 
or uniquely human qualities (Haslam, Bain, Douge, Lee, & Bastian, 2005; Leyens 
et al., 2003). (p. 413) 
When disgust is leveled against a group it dehumanizes them, making it easier to 
act out racism in the form of violence. Racism has been analyzed in relation to disgust in 
Banks and Valentino’s (2012) work on the shift from a disgust mechanism to disgust 
combined with anger in cultures like in the US and Europe where explicit or official 
racism like Jim Crow has been abolished, but unconscious or individual racism like the 
racial animosity leveled at President Barack Obama still flourishes (Bonilla-Silva, 2009; 
Alexander, 2012). Hostetter (2010) similarly explores disgust’s intersection with racism 
in views of public housing, explicitly connecting “public housing, African–Americans, 
disgust and fear through a detailed discourse analysis of contemporary representations of 
public housing” (p. 284). Also, the experience of disgust is explored in the relationship to 
the sick and disabled in an atmosphere of explicit care and acceptance in Botswana in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Infra-humanization is a term coined by Jacques-Philippe Leyens in 2000 and describes 
the essentialist belief that one’s ingroup, whether that is racial, sexual, religious, etc., is 
more human than the outgroup (Leyens, et. al., 2000).	  
	  	  
54	  	  	  	  
	  
work of Livingston (2008) who,  
explores how people approach and navigate their own feelings of disgust and  
morbid curiosity towards the aesthetically impaired bodies of their fellow citizens 
and the problems and opportunities these feelings present in a context where a 
humanistic ethos is stressed in the public discourse of nationalism. (p. 288) 
Livingston (2008) is attempting to understand how disgust is still present and active in 
both how people feel and act towards the sick and disabled, even when the overarching 
cultural discourse argues for embracing them and their care as a part of national pride.   
Olatunji and Sawchuk (2005) argue that rather than fear or even hatred, disgust is 
at the heart of homophobia, as well as constructions of the unnaturalness of vegetarianism 
and the unhealthiness of cigarette smoking. They note that “Given disgust–based 
appraisals of certain sexual matters and the recent expansion of the boundaries of disgust 
to include social/moral and interpersonal contexts, disgust may play a role in the 
formation of negative attitudes toward homosexuality” (p. 946). Furthermore, they argue 
that,           
 Despite the fact that disgust is part of our basic repertoire of emotions, capable of  
eliciting fairly intense physical reactions, being associated with strong avoidance 
action tendencies and evaluations of certain objects and situations as threatening, 
surprisingly little theoretical and empirical attention has been given to the role 
disgust may play in human misery and psychiatric disorders. (pp. 946-947) 
2.03.03.04 disgust and the psychological. This role of disgust in psychiatric 
disorders applies both to how patients are treated, as well as the presence of disgust in 
place of, or in addition to, the commonly assumed emotions of fear or hatred in phobias 
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(Olatunji & Sawchuk, 2005, Power & Dagleish, 2007, Hertz, 2012). Disgust can be 
useful in the treatment of these disorders as well, through exposure therapy (Hertz, 2012) 
or in the treatment of obsessive compulsive disorder and eating disorders (Olatunji & 
Sawchuk, 2005). Disgust’s role for the most part, however, has been used not in 
treatment situations, but as a tool in the formation of hegemony in the forms of not only 
social attitudes but laws, policy making and public aid that marks out the aberrant or 
different as not only strange, but disgusting and dangerous.     
 2.03.03.05 disgust, psychology and politics. The experimental moral psychologist 
Pizarro, studies the disgust response in application to morality. In their research, Inbar 
and Pizzaro (2009), have demonstrated a relationship between having high disgust 
receptivity, or being easily disgusted, and moral and political conservatism. Studies show 
that those who are easily disgusted tend to be homophobic and that judgement of 
homosexuality can be manipulated through environmental disgust factors (Inbar & 
Pizarro, 2009; Inbar, Pizarro, & Bloom, 2009; Inbar, Pizarro, Iyer, & Haidt, 2011). When 
the participants were exposed to foul smells or asked to sit at a dirty desk and then asked 
how they felt about homosexuality, those exposed to disgust evokers, like the dirty desk, 
consistently judged homosexuality more harshly (Inbar & Pizarro, 2009; Inbar, Pizarro, 
& Bloom, 2009, George, 2012). Similarly, when people were reminded to wash their 
hands or were put in proximity to a hand sanitizer, they also made more conservative or 
harsher moral judgements (Inbar, Pizarro, Iyer, & Haidt, 2011). The relationship between 
disgust receptivity and political affiliation is so strong that Pizarro has been able to 
predict who the participants voted for in the previous election based on their disgust 
sensitivity (Inbar, Pizarro, Iyer, & Haidt, 2011). According to Inbar and Pizarro (2009), 
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this research has stemmed from a concern that the emotion of disgust has been under 
researched in regards to the role it plays in moral judgment, particularly in regards to the 
legal system. Inbar, Pizarro, Iyer, and Haidt (2011) even offer suggestions on how to 
counter disgust’s role in judgement, explaining that lawyers who deal with ethnic clients 
should stress the similarities between that person’s culture and white American culture 
and try to build empathy through commonalities. These tactics work to “‘de-otherise’ the 
individual” (p.17) and mitigate disgust in a legal setting.  
2.03.03.06 problems with disgust and the law. Much of disgust’s use in the law 
can be traced back to Lord Devlin’s work The Enforcement of Morals (1965), which 
argues that the disgust of an average person is reason enough to make something illegal 
in the defense of society, even when there is no harm to others at stake. As Nussbaum 
(2006) explains,  
Similar arguments have been used to support the illegality of homosexual 
relations between consenting adults: they should be illegal, it is alleged, because 
the “average man” feels disgust when he thinks about them. It is used to justify 
the criminalization of necrophilia; it has been proposed as a reason for banning 
human cloning. And disgust has also been taken to be an aggravating factor in 
acts already illegal on other grounds: the disgust of judge or jury at a murder may 
put the defendant into a class of especially heinous offenders. (p. 3) 
The defense of society may be difficult to argue with, yet it seems overblown when no 
one suffers. Nussbaum is critical of the deployment of disgust within the law, not only for 
its reliance on something that is subjective, but also because it is used both as an 
explanation for law and in mitigating culpability. Nussbaum (2003) explains,  
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 Thus, throughout history, certain disgust properties—sliminess, bad smell,  
 stickiness, decay, foulness—have repeatedly and monotonously been associated  
 with, indeed projected onto, groups by reference to who privileged groups seek to  
 define their superior human status. Jews, women, homosexuals, untouchables,  
lower-class people—all of these are imagined as tainted by the dirt of the body. 
(p. 347) 
It is the systemic leveling of disgust against those that are marginal combined with 
disgust attendant reactions of fear and anger that concerns Nussbaum. Furthermore, when 
the power imbalance that disgust encourages becomes law then the legal system is 
hijacked from a place of equality. The inclusion of disgust into jurisprudence can mean 
that the privileged are treated differently than those categorized as undesirable, furthering 
inequality and undermining the democratic foundations of our juridical system.  
More than just the inclusion of disgust in the legal system, Nussbaum is critical of 
the very experts in disgust theory. Nussbaum argues that Miller, author of The Anatomy 
of Disgust, himself a legal scholar, and his definition and use of disgust are too close to 
Devlin’s argument “that a society’s hatred of vice and impropriety necessarily involves 
disgust and cannot be sustained without it” (Nussbaum, 2006, p. 5). It is not just disgust’s 
use in the legal system then, but also the continued understanding of disgust as necessary 
or natural and justly applied to people. However, not all who defend the use of disgust in 
the law are conservative. Kahn in his work The Progressive Appropriation of Disgust 
(1999), argues for a need “to redeem disgust in the eyes of those who value equality, 
solidarity and other progressive values” (cited in Nussbaum, 2006, p. 5). Kahn argues 
that disgust is too powerful of a rhetorical tool to cede to those who use disgust for 
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conservative and reactionary reasons and that it can be used for progressive ideals. 
Emotions may seem at odds with a legal system that appears based in reason and 
rationality, but “law without appeals to emotion is virtually unthinkable” (p. 5). Not only 
emotional appeal, but emotional consensus is necessary according to Kahn, as Nussbaum 
explains:  
Without appeal to a roughly shared conception of what violations are outrageous,  
what losses give rise to a profound grief, what vulnerable human beings have 
reason to fear—it is very hard to understand why we devote the attention we do, 
in law, to certain types of harm and damage. (p. 6) 
However, Nussbaum’s concern over the inclusion of disgust is a fair concern 
since disgust in law has a history of abuse. As Miller (1997) notes, “disgust has thus 
served as a tool of injustice by discrediting and condemning the distasteful persons and 
behavior of others and has rendered that condemnation all the more powerful by its origin 
in a strong emotive response” (pp. 1-2). This is in part because of disgust’s history in law 
that Nussbaum (2006) cautions against its use. She explains “that shame and disgust are 
different from anger and fear, in the sense that they are especially likely to be 
normatively distorted and thus unreliable as guides to public practice, because of features 
of their specific internal structure” (p. 13).  
 Take for instance the Ugly Laws, ordinances passed across the country that 
targeted the poor and disabled for removal from the public eye. As the ordinance in 
Chicago passed in 1881 explained,  
Any person who is diseased, maimed, mutilated, or in any way deformed, so as to 
be an unsightly or disgusting object, or is an improper person to be allowed in or 
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on the streets, highways, thoroughfares, or public places in this city, shall not 
therein or thereon expose himself to public view under the penalty of a fine of $1 
for each offense. (Chicago City Code 1881, cited in Schweik, 2010, p. 293)  
Schweik (2010) argues, that Ugly Laws were part of  
a strong and unified project shared by and across various city cultures, involving  
both a judgment about bodily aesthetics and the use of law to repress the visibility  
of human diversity in social contexts associated with disability and poverty-what  
we might call the sighting/citing of the ugly. (p. 3)  
Ugliness is related to disgust; it can cause disgust and has many of the same qualifiers as 
disgusting objects in regards to disease and deformation. Ugly laws relied on a “rhetoric 
of disgust” (p. 17) that was made manifest in eugenics, in the temperance and prohibition 
movements, in anxieties surrounding animality that was applied to both the individual 
and to the behavior of the public (a disgusting crowd), in urban planning that redefined 
how bodies were meant to be presented in the public sphere and in other technological, 
economic and social forms. Disgust acted as an impetus, or at least explanation, for 
prejudice.  
2.03.03.07 disgust, ugliness and aesthetics. Ugliness has a long association with 
disgust, particularly in the realm of aesthetics and art. Ugliness and disgust were rejected 
during the Enlightenment, in favor of an aesthetic of beauty and its association with both 
rationality and morality. Aesthetics can have many meanings. From the original Greek 
word aesthesis, which referred to all visual stimuli, aesthetics can simply refer to visuals 
and their impact on us. As Korsmeyer (1998) notes, “Aesthetics may also deal with 
conceptions about beauty, but inasmuch as the grotesque may also play an active role in 
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art, aesthetics in not solely a theory of beauty.” (p. 20). Like aesthesis, aesthetics in this 
use includes more than beauty and moral effects. 
Here aesthetics can refer to stylistic elements that enable the viewer to distinguish 
one style or type of visual from another. Aesthetics can simply be synonymous for 
appearance. However, the modernist form of aesthetics “equated aesthetic experience 
with high moral purpose” (Duncum, 2008, p. 124). This version of aesthetics ostensibly 
separated visuals from social and ideological values, leading to what O’Neil (2002) 
called an “amoral hedonism, which had no social purpose other than to give a higher 
form of pleasure” (p. 32). This “hedonism” stems from discounting the social, economic, 
and ideological content of images in favor of an emphasis on their beauty. In this use of 
aesthetics cathedrals are only seen for their impressive and beautiful architecture, while 
their reliance on near slave labor is overlooked. Similarly, the rape scenes in famous 
paintings like Poussin or Cortona’s Rape of the Sabine Women are seen only as beautiful 
uses of color and composition and the horrific subject matter is ignored (Duncum, 2008). 
Modernist aesthetics not only ignored ideological and social value, but also repressed 
sense perceptions that were not in line with moral beauty. As Duncum (2008) explains, 
the modernist use of aesthetics was founded “on the deliberate suppression of the body 
and the privileging of mindful activity” (p. 124). The body has to either be suppressed or 
cleaned of all its vulgar substances.  
 Ideas about the body as spiritual perfection in material form stripped of 
uncomfortable animalistic substance like waste, come into prominence during the 
Enlightenment, which also saw a coexistent interest in scientific exploration. The idea 
that purity of the body is analogous to the purity of the soul is contemporary with an 
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emphasis on the body as a place of scientific inquiry, the rise of public dissections and 
the importance of anatomical inquiry. In 1795 Goethe stresses the need for sciences 
attuned to the inner body and the need for dissections to gain anatomical knowledge in 
the face of the emotional response of disgust in his work Outline for a General 
Introduction to Comparative Anatomy (Menninghaus, 2003). Menninghaus (2003) 
explains that many living during this time period felt that “In the realm of the ideally 
beautiful, when not only the body’s excretions, but literally its inner organs become 
visible on the outside, what is at play can only be the disgusting in service to the 
monstrous or ridiculous” (p. 55). While dissection became popular among the learned, it 
was not widely accepted. Dissection was seen as an immoral corruption of the corpse, as 
well as something disgusting to behold. Instead, ideas about the body as an empty vessel, 
a “glass puppet without an inner corporeal life” (p. 56) were popularized, repressing the 
inner organic functions and flesh of the body.  
Menninghaus (2003) examines the writings of 17th century art historian 
Winkelmann and the philosopher Herder, describing their ideas on the ideal body. 
Winkelmann decried painters who, when they could not attain beauty, turned instead to 
warts and wrinkles. Winkelmann asserted that “wrinkles and folds are ruined regions” 
(cited in Menninghaus, 2003, p.52) of the body. Furthermore, Winkelmann praised Greek 
statuary for its perfect contours, uninterrupted by fat, scars, dimples, body hair or other 
irregularities. Herder agreed and described the presence of veins as “crawling worms” 
and “knuckles as extruding excrescences” (p. 53). In Winkelmann and Herder’s accounts, 
flesh that is wrinkled or imperfect is likened to the wriggling, dirt-inhabiting worm, 
which supposedly consumed dead rotting corpses. The imperfect body was strongly 
	  	  
62	  	  	  	  
	  
linked to the corpse and the lowness of imperfection was both a physical attribute, but 
also had the connotations of moral failings.  
  Aesthetics in this period worshipped perfect flesh, smooth unmarred skin that 
covered and contained the body’s organs. The model body refused bulges and hollows 
that might allude to an inside that pulsed, flexed and digested. The ideal form must 
appear to have been inflated by God’s breath, analogous to glass blowing. The 
body/vessel must appear empty, devoid of internal systems, filled with nothing but 
hollow space (Menninghaus, 2003). The emphasis on the body as a shell was adopted by 
others like Hogarth, who explained in his text The Analysis of Beauty (1753) that,  
In order to my being well understood, let every object under our consideration, be 
imagined to have its inward contents scoop’d out so nicely, as to have nothing of 
it left but a thin shell, exactly corresponding both in its inner and outer surface to 
the shape of the object itself. (cited in Menninghaus, 2003, p. 55)  
Arnold (1869/2009) in his famous work on sweetness and light and their role in the ideal 
culture claimed that “beauty and sweetness are essential characters of a complete human 
perfection” (p. 46). Perfection is moral, intelligent and beautiful, all things found in high 
culture and its ideal antecedent, which was Hellenism (Garnett, 2009). As beautiful 
sensuality was linked to the expression of the soul, the ideal non-corporeal body was to 
be raised up as a moral thing. It is a desire for the body to express divinity that “the 
aesthetically pleasing body has no interior, hence allows no dissection or anatomy” 
(Menninghaus, 2003). The beautiful body as carved by the Greeks is then a counter to the 
instrumentalized nature of the body in the realm of science. Representation in these 
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philosophical approaches must be beautiful and through that must implicate a high moral 
ground.  
2.03.03.08 disgust, aesthetics and Kant. In his Critique of Judgment Kant 
(1790/2009) explains that,  
Where fine art evidences its superiority [to nature] is in the beautiful descriptions 
it gives of things that in nature would be ugly or displeasing. The Furies, diseases, 
devastations of war and the like, can (as evils) be very beautifully described, nay 
even represented in pictures. (p. 141) 
Nature appears to be the home of beauty and any representation of nature is like Plato’s 
cave, a mere shadow to the beauty of the real thing. However, art has the unique ability to 
imbue with beauty what in nature would displease. Thus in some instances art can 
subsume nature when its purpose is to improve upon nature.  
Art has a purpose, it exists for a reason and that reason must be known to evaluate 
or judge the artwork. However, as Korsmeyer (2005) explains, “the autonomy of art as 
purpose without purposiveness” (p. 17) comes from Kant. Art’s usefulness is not found in 
its purpose but rather in the aesthetic judgment of the work. Graham (2005) goes on to 
say that   
the peculiar value of aesthetic delight lies in this: it is composed of a judgment 
that is disinterestedly free, free that is to say from both practical and cognitive 
determination. It is not a judgment of either personal like or general usefulness 
but a judgment arising from the “free play of the imagination”. (p. 17) 
For an aesthetic judgement to be made, artworks must be disinterestedly contemplated, 
meaning that the work must not be seen as singularly useful, nor can its visual appeal be 
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purely subjective (Scruton, 2011). Rather, the art must be evaluated in relationship to a 
“free play of imagination” (Graham, 2005, p. 17) that is not totally free, but bounded by 
the sensus communis, or “a shared sensibility among human beings” (p. 17). Aesthetic 
judgement is based on taking a disinterested view of a work, subjective taste and the 
sensus communis to make objective statements about the work.  
Art’s ability to represent must be evaluated, “it follows that in estimating the 
beauty of art the perfection of the thing must be also taken into account” (Kant, 
1790/2009, p. 140). In regards to aesthetic judgement, it is more important that beauty is 
harnessed in service of the imagination, than it is that something is simply beautiful or 
realistic. When something that is horrible or ugly in life, like war, disease or even the 
overwhelming sublime, can be made beautiful through art’s intervention it becomes a 
moment of sensus communis, or a communally imagined possibility. And through that 
imagining, the naturally displeasurable becomes something that can be objectively 
pleasing.  
 However, disgust is a displeasure that cannot be rescued. Korsmeyer (2005) 
explains that, “While fear, pity, grief and other discomforting emotions have a long 
history in the philosophy of art, disgust has no such ancestry. In fact, it is frequently 
singled out as the one emotion utterly incompatible with beautiful art” (p. 61). Kant 
(1790/2009) explains that only, “[o]ne kind of ugliness alone is incapable of being 
represented conformably to nature without destroying all aesthetic delight and 
consequently artistic beauty, namely, that which excites disgust,” (p. 141). 
For Kant, disgust can never be beautiful, so too it can never be pleasing, worthy, 
or morally relevant. War, disease, even the sublime can be made into art and become 
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beautiful and uplifting; disgust alone is outside the ability of the artist and his genius to 
transmogrify into something more. Kant (1790/2009) continues with disgust saying,  
For, as in this strange sensation, which depends purely on the imagination, the 
object is represented as insisting, as it were, upon our enjoying it, while we still 
set our face against it, the artificial representation of the object is no longer 
distinguishable from the nature of the object itself in our sensation and so it 
cannot possibly be regarded as beautiful. (p. 141) 
For something that elicits disgust, for example rotting food, to be considered art it must 
be made in such a way as to ask us to aesthetically enjoy the image and to enjoy it within 
the realm of acceptable group imaginings that form the sensus communis. Meanwhile, the 
image must reiterate the object that it is meant to depict, the rotting food, so skillful and 
accurately as to be a re-presentation or improvement upon reality, including its affective 
impact. This creates a double bind as the original rotting food disgusts us, then so too 
must the image. But art must please us and we cannot be pleased by the experience of 
disgust. For Kant, even if it is a carefully constructed and well-executed image, if it is 
disgusting, it can never truly be art. Kant (1790/2009) goes on to say,  
The art of sculpture, again, since in its products art is almost confused with 
nature, has excluded from its creations the direct representation of ugly objects 
and, instead, only sanctions, for example, the representation of death (in a 
beautiful genius), or of the warlike spirit (in Mars), by means of an allegory, or 
attributes which wear a pleasant guise and so only indirectly, through an 
interpretation on the part of reason and not for the pure aesthetic judgment. (p. 
142) 
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Sculpture, as a field, is closer to the accurate replication of its objects than say a painting 
since sculpture produces literal three-dimensional copies which may even be confused 
with nature. However, sculpture has excluded ugly and disgusting objects in favor of 
allegories, which allows them to convey ugly ideas, like death, in a beautiful manner. In 
this way sculpture maintains its position as art by virtue of its aesthetic pleasure 
combined with emotive and cognitive qualities. Winklemann and Herder similarly held 
sculpture in high esteem. Not only was sculpture art, but it was great art because “its 
beautiful stony form was a consequent sublimation of all materiality and scripturality on 
and beneath the skin of the beautiful” (cited in Menninghaus, 2003, p. 56). Sculpture 
erased the disgusting innards of the body through its illusionistic depictions of the 
perfectly contoured shell of the body. It would seem to me that Kant, and others (e.g., 
Winkelmann), among other reasons, enshrine sculpture for its avoidance of that which 
cannot be redeemed as art, beauty, or aesthetics; disgust.  
2.03.03.09 disgust, contemporary aesthetics and art. Enlightenment ideas about 
aesthetics continue into modernity. Clement Greenburg, one of Modernism’s most 
influential art critics, based his work in an “aesthetic modernist approach to art” 
(Cahoone, 2003, p. 310) that has roots in Kantian aesthetics. Famously, Greenburg 
(1982) called Kant the first real modernist and Greenburg’s championing of Modernism 
was based in Enlightenment aesthetics. Much modern art has attempted to find beauty in 
abstraction, formal elements of color and shape and material expression. Early 
modernists like Manet may have shown at the Salon de Refuses (“the gallery of rejects”), 
but their works have been canonized in the history of art and are now upheld for the 
beautiful use of paint as a material and their intentional move towards abstraction through 
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flatness. What was once seen as terrible - Manet’s Olympia was likened by one critic to a 
giant spider on the ceiling (Clark, 1984) - became part of a new canon with a different 
stylistic sensibility that was both new and difficult. While much modern art might be 
labeled disgusting by the layman, or at the very least ugly, its motivations were often 
similar to the Kantian sublime, what Korsmeyer (2005) calls “terrible” and “difficult” 
beauties. Korsmeyer (2005) explains, “Despite their many differences, most of the 
theories of beauty to be found in the history of philosophy connect the experience of the 
beautiful with pleasure” (p. 51). However, much art that is quite obviously attractive is 
also confrontational or discomforting and deals with pain and grief. This is what 
Korsmeyer (2005), borrowing from Bosanquet, calls “difficult beauty” (p.170). Foster 
(1995) creates another difficult beauty when he approaches the surrealist’s work through 
the idea of “compulsive beauty” (p. 102), a beauty that is predicated on compulsion and 
“the death drive” (p. xix) and contains a dark or disgusting element. Difficult beauty can 
be something quite different than the consensus built idea of taste or the once popular 
synonym to beauty, sweetness. However, these examples are simply an expansion of 
what is beautiful to include a larger or more diverse set of alluring phenomenon, they do 
not actually address disgust, in large part because these philosophies of beauty are the 
heritage of Kantian aesthetics.  
While Kant cannot find a place for disgust in the realm of art, contemporary 
aesthetician Korsmeyer argues in the introduction to her work Savoring Disgust (2011), 
“I believe that in its own way disgust is a conduit for accurate if unsettling insights, a 
feature of the emotion exploited in multifarious aspects in art” (p. 4). Korsmeyer notes 
that until recently the history of art has for the most part neglected, if not out and out 
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rejected, disgust. Korsmeyer (2011) explains that “traditional opinion to the contrary, the 
arousal of disgust often has a positive value in appreciation and understanding of 
artworks” (p.11). She continues, “In addition to its role as the opposite role to beauty – 
the paradigm of the ‘antiaesthetic’ as some would have it – there are many ways that 
disgust converts from pure aversion to paradoxical attraction while retaining its 
trademark visceral shock” (p.11). Korsmeyer (2005; 2011) addresses the possible 
presence of disgust within beauty in her exploration of “difficult beauty” (Korsmeyer, 
2011, p. 170). Difficult beauty is beauty that is tinged with difficult emotions like pain, 
making terrible beauty a test case for the inclusion of the one emotion that seems 
resolutely incompatible with beauty - disgust. Korsmeyer continues, noting that one of 
the reasons that disgust and beauty seem discordant is that objects that arouse disgust are 
incompatible with honor and dignity. Korsmeyer (2005) explains, “Unlike the 
circumstances that promote fear or grief, disgust dangerously truncates sympathy and 
admiration” (p. 61). She similarly notes that much art that deals in disgust is not 
beautiful; it satisfies for a variety of reasons like curiosity, but does not please in the way 
beauty does. Korsmeyer (2011) seems correct in her assessment that it is contemporary 
art that has dealt most specifically, openly and directly, with disgust. While there have 
been examples of terrible beauty throughout history, Korsmeyer (2005) cites 
Caravaggio’s Doubting Thomas (1601-2) and John Donne’s poem The Flea (1633): 
however, she also grants that contemporary art has become the home to many 
explorations into terrible beauty.  
2.03.03.10 disgusting conclusions. Korsmeyer (2005) claims that disgust has 
been something that has been considered in the realms of philosophy, aesthetics and art 
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for a considerable time. And like the Kantian roots of the rejection of disgust in 
aesthetics, many of the current debates in disgust theory still focus on early texts and 
examples. For instance, contemporary conversations surrounding disgust still discuss the 
biological reasons for disgust, which date back at least to Darwin. Disgust’s attachment 
to the body is so strong that it continues to motivate work on the biological aspects of this 
affect. But, while its origins are in the body, disgust is deeply intertwined with culture, 
demonstrating the social aspects of that affect. However, disgust seems to have its limits, 
limits which contemporary scholarship may have reached. Korsmeyer (2005), discussing 
the problematic categorizations of difficult and terrible beauty explains that, “…decisions 
are complicated because the border between terrible beauty and the grotesque or horrid is 
hazy. Just as prettiness shades into beauty, so terrible beauty shades towards horror and 
other difficult aesthetic categories” (p. 63).  
Disgust’s limits are hazy, but worthy of further inquiry and thought. I turn next to 
the concept of the abject for a deeper inquiry into what looks very much like disgust, but 
functions differently. The abject has roots in the psychoanalytic; it is tied to the maternal 
and has a different relationship to the marginal body. The abject’s relationship to 
marginalization is co-constitutive as the abject is the jettisoned but the jettisoned allows 
for ego construction through opposition to the excluded. However, a more 
straightforward top-down hierarchy of disempowerment occurs with disgust as disgust is 
simply excluded and does not return, haunt, or aid in the construction of ego. By 
exploring the abject, I will clarify some of the haziness that surrounds the border between 
terrible beauty and powerful horror, demonstrating both the deep connections, but 
important difference between disgust and the abject. 
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2.04 Powerful Horror: The Abject 
2.04.01 you mean object? no. abject: an introduction. The abject is another 
concept that, understood broadly, causes the affect of disgust. The abject describes a 
subject position that is founded on “the infant’s relation to the pre-Oedipal mother” 
(Gutiérrez-Albilla, 2008, p. 66). The relationship with the mother that the abject is 
predicated upon was first formulated by Klein in response to Freud’s work (Doane & 
Hodges, 1992). Krauss (2000) links the uses of the term abject with the sociological 
works of Bataille who used the term in a series of unpublished works “which were 
concerned with the exclusionary forces that operate within modern state systems in order 
to strip the labouring masses of their human dignity and reduce them to dehumanized 
social waste” (Gutiérrez-Albilla, 2008, p. 69). Bataille’s work with the abject, or what he 
referred to as the Informe, was influential and has much overlap with the use of the 
abject, particularly in the arts.49 However, Kristeva popularized the abject, and she,  
rethought Bataille’s concept of abjection from an anthropological and 
psychoanalytical perspective in order to address the constitution of the subject in 
its negative aspect, emphasizing a subject position which is located at the border 
between its own subjecthood and objecthood. (Gutiérrez-Albilla, 2008, p. 69)  
Writing as a psychoanalyst-semiologist, Kristeva “re-reads” Freud and Lacan, as well as 
others ranging from Derrida to Leviticus (Kauffman, 1997). In her famous book The 
Powers of Horror (1982) she develops the abject further, leading her to “re-emphasiz(e) 
the maternal body as the central axis in the process of the formation of the child’s 
subjectivity” (Gutiérrez-Albilla, 2008, p. 67). Kristeva traces the development of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 The Informe and abject will be discussed further in the methodology section. 
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monstrous female through Western history as a forerunner for her reworking of the 
maternal body.  
2.04.02 the mother. Kristeva believes that “The mother-child relationship is the 
paradigm for all subsequent subject-object divisions” (Kauffman, 1997, p. 17) and that 
the abject is “a pre-Oedipal component of the self that is neither subject nor object” 
(Brayton, 2007, p. 59) and being neither subject nor object, it is abject or a third category 
of being (Kristeva, 1982). From a psychoanalytic position, the abject is that which must 
be gotten rid of to become whole, “something that must be rejected for the healthy 
subject – the “I” – to develop” (Brayton, 2007, p. 59). The abject is both known and 
unknown, me and not me. It represents binaries and dualisms collapsed into one. McAfee 
(2004) explains that the entirety of The Powers of Horror is about,  
the process by which a child who is still in the imaginary realm begins to expel 
from itself (physically and psychically) what it decides is not part of its own clean 
and proper self. This is the way the child begins to develop a sense of a discrete 
“I,” rather than remaining part of the undifferentiated semiotic chora. Abjection 
begins in early childhood and continues throughout one’s life. What is abject is 
never excluded once and for all; it remains on the periphery of consciousness, 
haunting the ever-tenuous borders of selfhood. (p. 129) 
However, some have argued that the abject is not always as violent as this, Goodnow 
(2009) explains. The abject is that which disturbs systems that could very well refer to, 
“forms of satire or comedy. It also does not enable us to say whether the emotion that 
results will be one of horror or one of panic, suspicion, aggression, amazement, or 
amusement” (p. 33).  
	  	  
72	  	  	  	  
	  
However, according to Kristeva (1988), the very term abject has “a much more 
violent sense” (p.135) in French than it does in English. In an interview she explains that 
it is,  
something disgusting… an extremely strong feeling which is at once somatic and 
symbolic and which is above all a revolt of the person against an external menace 
from which one wants to keep oneself at a distance, but of which one has the 
impression that it is not only an external menace but that it may menace us from 
the inside. (p. 135)  
Thus, according to Kristeva the abject is a violent disturbance of order, but it is also much 
more.  
 2.04.03 too close for comfort: a reading of Kristeva’s method. The bulk of my 
understanding of the abject stems from Kristeva’s first chapter of Powers of Horror 
(1982), which outlines a methodology of the abject, or an explanation of how she defines 
and will use the abject to interrogate her objects of study, primarily literature. The 
following is an extended explanation of chapter one, “Approaching Abjection,” which 
will better situate the Kristevan abject.  
2.04.03.01 neither subject nor object. The first section of Kristeva’s method, 
“Neither Subject Nor Object,” defines the abject most notably as neither a subject nor an 
object, but a third category of being which exists in between the two. Kristeva, like 
Lacan, uses dense almost poetic language throughout her work, beginning The Powers of 
Horror (1982) with,  
There looms, within abjection, one of those violent, dark revolts of being, directed 
against a threat that seems to emanate from an exorbitant outside or inside, ejected 
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beyond the scope of the possible, the tolerable, the thinkable. It lies there, quite 
close, but it cannot be assimilated. (p. 1) 
This is typical of Kristeva’s prose style, which appeals through the affective 
qualities of the language, but also challenges the reader to understand some of the 
specifics of her argument. Kristeva explains that the abject is tied to desire through 
negation: “Apprehensive, desire turns aside; sickened, it rejects” (p. 1). The abject is “the 
jettisoned object, [it] is radically excluded and draws me toward the place where meaning 
collapses” (p. 2); it is the opposite of desire, or rather it is the desire to reject. Abjection 
“is in fact recognition of the want on which any being, meaning, language, or desire is 
founded” (p. 5). Kristeva explains that desire exists before the creation of self and the 
division with the mother; desire then exists before language, is even the predication upon 
which language is created. Language exists to give form to our wants.  
The child experience want before they50 know themself as a separate being, while 
it is in an undivided state with the mother. Even though the child is not fully separate 
from the mother the child engages in the desire for autonomy through the rejection of 
certain things, like milk, which will be examined later. “I” want to exist, or at least to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 I am using the singular non-gender specific form of the word they and them in this 
work. The Oxford Dictionary had officially accepted the use of they as a singular in 
instances when gender is not known, instances where a third gender fluid pronoun is 
needed, and in instances of gender neutrality. I will use they and them particularly around 
“the child” as a way to denote the lack of a specific gender or gender neutrality 
surrounding the ideal subject. For more on the use of gender neutral pronouns, see Oxford 
Dictionary (http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/words/he-or-she-versus-they) and 
Gender Neutral Pronoun Blog (https://genderneutralpronoun.wordpress.com/). 
Furthermore, I am using the child and not children to indicate that this is a fictional ideal 
child subject, not a real individual. This format is used by other psychoanalytic works 
which refer not to mothers, but the mother, not women, but woman, etc.  
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demonstrate my existence as a separate subject, thus “I” spit out, or reject, and in that 
rejection make my identity known. 
 Kristeva, influenced by Lacan’s semiotic approach to psychoanalysis, says that 
abjection is the sign, a combination of the signified and its signifier, both the concept and 
what makes the concept known. The sign is predicated upon a recognizable system, or 
language. It is abjection’s deep ties to structures like language, which forms our 
experience of the world, that make literature an obvious choice for Kristeva’s 
explorations of the abject. She argues that literature can best represent abjection, the 
psychological state of desire, which is made manifest in rejection. This explains 
Kristeva’s literary analysis in later chapters of Powers of Horror (1982). This is related to 
the pre-lingual roots of the abject. The foundation of abjection occurs at a pre-linguistic 
time, the first experiences of want that are linked to the abject are experienced before the 
creation of the subject and the ego; they occur in the Lacanian register of the Imaginary, 
the phase in which the ego begins to form through misidentification with the Imago, or a 
false image of cohesion. To access the signifier of abjection, or the form that the signified 
takes, one must imagine, as literature does. Kristeva is drawn to the imaginative qualities 
of literature, it’s ability to project backward and forwards, to enter the mind and its ability 
to articulate or speak the unspeakable, giving imagined voice to both prelingual desires 
and to experiences of the Lacanian Real, or that which language cannot fully capture but 
can gesture towards.51 She is also interested in contemporary literature’s rejection of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 I differ with Kristeva here. While she argues for literature as abjection’s signifier 
because of the shared imagined qualities, I would argue that the abject is closer in 
relationship to the image, that Lacan’s Imaginary is in fact based on the Imago, an image, 
albeit a false one. The role of the image in its direct and often linguistically unmitigated 
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sacred; it “acknowledges the impossibility of Religion, Morality and Law” (p. 16), which 
is in a broader sense a challenge to the Lacanian Symbolic order. This leads to writing’s 
“ability to imagine the abject, that is, to see oneself in its place and to thrust it aside only 
by means of the displacement of verbal play” (p. 16); for example, language has the 
ability to both figure and conquer the abject.  
2.04.03.02  Lacanian roots. Kristeva’s work is built upon Lacan’s 
psychoanalysis, particularly his three registers or orders that structure our lives, the 
Imaginary, the Symbolic and the Real. Translating and reworking Freud, Lacan (1997) 
develops the idea of the Mirror Stage, where the child begins to form their own ego. The 
explanatory metaphor of the Mirror Stage is that when the child sees themself in a mirror 
for the first time, they identify with the false image of wholeness and plenitude in the 
mirror, which Lacan labels the imago. During the Mirror Stage, the child develops a false 
sense of unity. As an infant before the mirror, the child experiences a plethora of sensory 
stimuli affecting different parts of the body without a sense of wholeness or structure. 
Until now the child has only seen pieces of themselves, a foot or a hand, but not a whole 
image. However, between six and eighteen months the child sees themselves in a mirror 
or another reflective surface. Upon seeing an image of self that is whole, unfragmented 
and seemingly calm, the child falsely identifies this as the image of unity that they must 
attain. The imago, or ego ideal, is something that the child will strive for because of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
representation of the abject, or at least the abject’s signified, the visual representations of 
abject and their application in art, analogous to the signifiers (words) relationship to 
literature, are closer in impact to the actual abject than words could ever be, making art 
the better home of the abject than literature. My position is also influenced by Lakoff and 
Johnson’s (1999) work where they suggest that metaphors, which are how we understand 
the world, are predicated on a pre-lingual visual language of metaphors. This indicates 
that the visual is actually our first structural schema of knowledge and understanding.   
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image’s unity and apparent calmness, which is in contrast to their experience of 
fragmentation and emotional unrest. However, this is a false identification, since the 
human experience is never wholly unified; we are always fragmented, in large part 
because we are both thinking beings, but also sensory-driven emotional animals. This 
misrecognition sets up the quest for a single, cohesive and independent self and is the 
birth of the ego. In Lacanian terms,  
The Mirror Stage is a phenomenon to which I assign a twofold value. In the  
first place, it has historical value as it marks a decisive turning-point in the  
mental development of the child. In the second place, it typifies an essential  
libidinal relationship with the body image. (cited in Evans, 1996, p. 118) 
This libidinal relationship with the false image of self, or Lacan’s idealized imago, is a 
key concept to the Imaginary. The Imaginary is a realm of fantasy, of misrecognition and 
it precedes the child’s movement into the Symbolic order of paternal law and language. 
The Imaginary is a realm of narcissism, as the child is invested primarily in themselves 
and their attempts at an ideal ego, but it is also a time of alienation, since that ideal ego is 
an unattainable “other.” Lacan (1997) explains, “Alienation is constitutive of the 
Imaginary order. Alien is the Imaginary as such” (p. 146).  
 The Mirror Stage is the process by which the child enters into the Imaginary 
Order. It is not a singular event because one slides into and out of the Imaginary Order 
throughout life. The hallmark of the Imaginary Order is the creation of the ego, but this is 
not a singular or stable process. Rather, the ego is threatened and remade or strengthened 
throughout life, even after one has entered the Symbolic. To become a fully speaking 
subject in the world, one must enter into the Symbolic Order, even if at times one slides 
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back into the Imaginary. The Symbolic Order is centered on law and structure, both of 
which are made possible by language, making the Symbolic primarily the register of 
language, or more specifically the signifier.52 It is the domain of culture, which structures 
how we see and understand the world. The Symbolic is gendered as male, the Father, 
with its emphasis in law and discipline and is the Order the subject must proceed into if 
they are to be seen and understood as a speaking subject. Lacan (2007) links the symbolic 
to the Oedipal Complex, explaining that the Symbolic role of the Father is a distancing 
one, interceding between the mother and the child. That distance allows the child to break 
away from the mother and enter the Symbolic order, which allows for intersubjective 
communication and gives the child their place in the symbolic system, or their role in 
culture.   
This is in contrast to Lacan’s third register, the Real. The Real is everything that 
is outside of the Symbolic and the Imaginary, things that exist outside of and cannot be 
captured or fully described by language and are beyond the scope of imagination because 
its fantasies are structured by a language system. As Storey (2009) explains, the “Real is 
like nature before symbolization (i.e., before cultural classification) … before it became 
mediated by the Symbolic” (p. 101). Storey further explains that what we call a natural 
disaster is an “irruption of the Real” (p. 102) because the words natural disaster, while 
they describe the event, do nothing to convey what has actually just happened; they pale 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 The Imaginary is also involved in language; it is home to the signified and 
signification, which involves a certain level of abstract imagining. Lacan (1999) 
notes that, “…words themselves can suffer symbolic lesions and accomplish 
imaginary acts whose victim is the subject” (p. 248), explaining languages 
Imaginary and Symbolic qualities.   
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in comparison to the event itself. Storey also notes that the Real can be “everything 
merged into one mass”(p. 102).  
Like the abject, the Real is a place where meaning has collapsed. Gutiérrez-
Albilla (2008) states, “the Real thus uncovers the gap that is covered over by symbolic 
representation” (p. 79). If the symbolic makes language appear to be complete, makes the 
words natural disaster stand in for the event itself, then the Real exposes that these are 
unsuccessful attempts at true communication and that language is arbitrary and futile in 
the face of true horror or nature unbound. The Real and the abject find themselves 
combined in the art world. Whereas reality was once a function of mimetics, there has 
been a shift, according to Foster (1996), in contemporary art from “reality as an effect of 
representation to the Lacanian Real as a thing of trauma” (p. 146). Foster links the 
“Return of the Real” or the proliferation of images of the traumatic Real to the rise in 
abject art or, “artworks [which] tear the screen so that the object-gaze not only invades 
the subject-as-picture but also over-whelms it” (p. 66). The screen here acts as a fence, a 
policed border, but when that screen is torn and there is ambiguity in the borderlands, 
both the abject and the Real are felt. A brush with the abject may cause a puncture or tear 
in one’s separation between the Real and the Symbolic. That tear could include a feeling 
of disgust; however, the effects on the individual are deeper, more fracturing, more 
violent and undoing than just a feeling of disgust.  
Kristeva (1982) explains the interaction between the abject and culture as follows; 
“On the edge of nonexistence and hallucination, of a reality that, if I acknowledge it, 
annihilates me. There, abject and abjection are my safeguards. The primers of my 
culture,” (p. 2). The abject is what acts as a barrier between ourselves and the Lacanian 
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Real, which strips culture away and presents only the live experience outside of language. 
Without language, or a schema with which to approach and make sense of the world, we 
as subjects would cease to exist. It is the abject that keeps us safe, even as it causes us 
pain, by perpetually drawing our attention to the Symbolic. The abject reminds us of the 
laws and language that create our subjectivity and identity; it acts as a barrier between 
ourselves and pure experience. The abject creates and maintains culture.  
2.04.03.03 chora and the maternal meat of the abject. Kristeva borrows the term 
chora, meaning receptacle, from Plato. It refers to the state of the child while they are 
still considered to be an object to the mother, undifferentiated and in union. The natal 
subject is at this point an object, an object, which holds drives, drives that have not yet 
become the desires of a fully formed subject. The ego creates the self as a sign through 
the Mirror Stage and then moves the self into the symbolic and away from chora. To 
become a subject through the creation of an ego, the child must individuate, which is a 
narcissistic process. However, the abject is “a kind of narcissistic crisis” (Kristeva, 1982, 
p. 14) because it points out that narcissism is never a purely reflective process; the waters 
of the pool in which the narcissist looks are always rippling and muddy. This narcissistic 
crisis stems from either too much control on the part of the other (read mother) or a lapse 
in care from the other, either the mother smothers the child refusing separation or ignores 
the child making the child not want to leave. Both result in an inability to fully divide 
through narcissism, as well as the inability to remain in chora with the mother leading to 
an ambiguous state that is too close but not unified.  
For Kristeva, the time before individuation from the mother is a time of unity and 
is not unpleasant until the push towards the imaginary and symbolic occurs and demands 
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that the child develop their own sense of self, divorcing themselves from the maternal. 
Similarly, Freud discusses this in regards to the death drive, our desire to return to a pre-
individuated, pre-subjective state even though it equals our own ego’s death through 
absorption into the mother (Freud, 1995). As McAfee (2003) explains, “Freud sets up 
what will become Kristeva’s view: that this phenomenon conjures up a memory of the 
self prior to its entrance into the symbolic realm, prior to becoming a subject proper” (p. 
49). 
 Kristeva argues for the existence of a maternal language within the chora, as 
opposed to the paternal language of the symbolic, that begins the process of dividing 
clean from dirty, separating self from other even before the ego has formed. Kristeva 
(1982) explicates this further saying that,  
Through frustrations and prohibitions, this authority shapes the body into a 
territory having areas, orifices, points and lines, surfaces and hollows, where the 
archaic power of mastery and neglect, of the differentiation of proper-clean and 
improper-dirty, possible and impossible, is impressed and exerted. It is a ‘binary 
logic,’ a primal mapping of the body that I call semiotic to say that, while being 
the precondition of language, it is dependent upon meaning, but in a way that is 
not that of linguistic signs nor of the symbolic order they found. Maternal 
authority is the trustee of that mapping of the self’s clean and proper body; it is 
distinguished from paternal laws within which, with the phallic phase and 
acquisition of language, the destiny of man will take place. (p. 72)  
She places the focus of selfhood back in the maternal, noting that the divisions of the 
body into binary categories of what is clean/proper and dirty/improper belong to a 
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language system that exists before literal language, before the transition into the paternal 
symbolic order, a language system that owes its development to the othering of the 
maternal body. This primal body language (Jay, 1998) is necessary as a precursor to 
symbolic language, yet it is thrust aside and pushed back, repressed, only finding an 
outlet at moments when the abject is present. As McAfee (2003) states, “Recall that 
abjection first arises when the infant is still in an imaginary union with its mother, before 
it has recognized its image in a mirror, well before it begins to learn language and enter 
Lacan’s symbolic realm” (p. 47).  
The child exists not only in a state of sensory chaos before the mirror stage, but 
also lives in a state of undifferentiated chora with the mother and with the world at large. 
There is no division between self and other, subject and mother. There is a “reluctant 
struggle to establish a separate corporeal schema” (Young, 1990, p. 207) on the part of 
the child to leave the, “primal fluidity of maternal jouissance” (p. 207) to interject an “I.” 
The state of chora with the mother is comforting and comfortable, the child is reluctant to 
go through the messy and painful process of creating an ego, a separate I, unless there is 
an element of crisis fueling this division. The emergence of the ego is an uneasy and 
often traumatic shift, which makes the child anxious. We were objects to our mothers, a 
piece of her, almost organ-like, lacking subjectivity, individuality and will, even after 
birth. It is a slow process of individuation and a breaking away from the mother in which 
our subjectivity is formed as distinct and we lose our status as object. This is a messy 
progression that also causes anxiety for the mother, since she has gained a place for 
herself within the Symbolic by having a child and is reluctant to let the child go and lose 
her symbolic status.  
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2.04.03.04 monstrous mothers. The anxiety that this division will be incomplete 
realizes in the figure of the monstrous pre-symbolic feminine seen cross-culturally as 
mythologist Joseph Campbell’s vagina dentata, (toothed vagina) (Creed, 1993). This 
monster not only threatens to castrate, but threatens to consume the subject, swallowing it 
back into the womb. Like Medusa, who threatens to halt Perseus’ journey by freezing 
him in place, both literally and metaphorically, turning him permanently stiff (Creed, 
1993), the monstrous female illustrates the feminine gone wrong and threatens the 
subject, demonstrating what happens to those who do not finish their journey into the 
Symbolic. This swallowing up is metaphorically linked to the subject formation process, 
which is tenuous and emotionally fraught. As Goodnow (2009) explains,  
For Kristeva, the progression to the symbolic order and the need for maintained 
contact with the semiotic contribute to the inherent instability of the imposed 
symbolic, paternal order. “Language and thus sociality, are defined by boundaries 
admitting of upheaval, dissolution and transformation.” Life becomes like 
“dancing on a volcano:” a state where the carefully constructed borders between 
meanings of male and female, human and animal, living and dead, clean and 
unclean, self and other, are continually liable to collapse. (p. 30) 
The abject always threatens the subject with a slide backwards but it also allows for a 
reiteration of that break, a repetition of ego construction, a statement of existence.  
As Young (1990), explains, “The infant struggles with its own drives in relation to the 
Other, to attain a sense of body control, but the struggle is reluctant and the separation 
experienced as a loss, a wound, a want” (p. 207), simultaneously “while rejecting, a re-
enclosure by the Other” (p. 207).  
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 As Young (1990) notes, “The concept of the abject theorizes one way that the 
subject is split between a discursive symbolic mode, on the one hand and pre-symbolic 
relation to the mother’s body, on the other” (p. 206). The pre-symbolic refers to 
Kristeva’s semiotic and  
 the abject draws upon Kristeva’s distinction between two worlds, states of  
 being, or forms of experience. One of these is fluid, suffused with feeling and  
 attuned to the physical, to music and - to the extent that it is not wordless - to  
 the rhythm of speech and the ambiguities of poetry. The other (the symbolic  
 rather than the semiotic) is more conventionally ordered. (Goodnow, 2009, p. 30) 
 Kristeva poses the chora as maternal emotional poetry in opposition to the 
structured paternal and discursive language of the symbolic. This split between chora and 
the symbolic is the split between the child and the mother that the child must move 
through in their progression into the symbolic. The division between mother and child, 
chora and symbolic, becomes the basis of all later subject-object divisions. However, the 
production of the subject is not limited to the new relationship between self and other, 
subject and object, “but rather the moments of separation, the border between the ‘I’ and 
the other, before an ‘I’ is formed, that makes possible the relation of ego and its objects” 
(Young, 1990, p. 206). This is to say, it is the actual process of separation, of split, a 
process that gives birth to the ability to categorize, that creates the ego and objects as the 
opposite of the ego. Young explains, “The movement of abjection makes signification 
possible by creating a being capable of dividing, repeating, separating” (p. 207) because 
abjection keeps the child from returning to the mother-child state. Abjection pushes the 
child forward into the symbolic. As Oliver puts it, “The not-yet-subject with its not-yet, 
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or no-longer, object maintains ‘itself’ as the abject. Abjection is a way of denying the 
primal narcissistic identification with the mother, almost” (cited in McAfee, 2003, p. 48). 
The abject is then the process and the status between fully formed subject and object to 
the mother, the liminal space between chora and the symbolic. Kristeva herself links 
experiences of the abject with the maternal divide. As she explains,  
The relation to abjection is finally rooted in the combat that every human being 
carries on with the mother. For in order to become autonomous, it is necessary 
that one cut the instinctual dyad of the mother and the child and that one becomes 
something other. (Guberman, 1996, p. 118) 
 Kristeva builds upon Lacan’s imaginary and symbolic orders, but repositions the 
maternal within them. “Kristeva agrees that the mirror stage may bring about a sense of 
unity, but she thinks that, even before this stage, the infant begins to separate itself from 
others in order to develop borders between “I” and other” (McAfee, 2003, p. 46). For 
Kristeva “the semiotic precedes the symbolic, but is never completely overridden by it” 
(Goodnow, 2009, p. 30). As Kristeva explains in an interview, 
 The subject-in-process is always in a state of contesting the law,53 either with  
 the force of violence, of aggressivity, of the death drive, or with the other side  
 of this force: pleasure and jouissance. (cited in Guberman, 1996, p. 26) 
Guberman (1996) explains that this supports Kristeva’s idea that the human being is not a 
theoretical unity but an “open system” (p. 18). Thus the pre-lingual chora and its role in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 For Lacan, the law is tied to the symbolic order. Language is the basis for all social 
institutions; thus, the symbolic order is the arena of language, rules, institutions and laws. 
It is also associated with the Father because of this. Its existence allows the subject to 
participate in culture and to communicate; however, it does not account for all of the 
subject’s nuances, which includes holdovers from the Imaginary (Wright, 1992). 
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early differentiation and ego formation is significant to Kristeva’s creation of the abject, 
as is the perpetual eruptions of the semiotic imaginary and threat that these disruptions 
pose to the symbolic. The abject is both the process that allows us to divide, but it can 
also pull us back to the time we needed to become abject, to the time of both swirling 
stimuli and maternal unity, to the liminal and ambiguous state between joy and chaos. 
The abject can pull us back to a time when we were attempting to divide ourselves from 
our mother’s body, by othering or degrading the maternal body, as a way to establish the 
self (Kauffman, 1998; Gutiérrez-Albilla, 2008).  
The abject maintains the double bind that the child is in, “a longing for 
narcissistic union with its first love and a need to renounce this union in order to become 
a subject” (McAfee, 2003, p. 48). The double bind of the abject is furthered because, as 
noted, the abject is the process of separation; it describes us as we occupy a transitional 
state between objects to our mothers and full subjects. However, at the same time it 
describes things that after we have become subjects haunt us, reminding her of her 
origins in objectness and in undifferentiated fluidity with her mother and the world at 
large. And these abject hauntings are both painful in the fear of losing the self that they 
represent, but they are also intriguing in that they seem familiar and remind one of a 
jouissance that they experienced before subjectivity, making abject hauntings perversely 
pleasurable.   
These contradictory emotions of “horror and fascination” (Kristeva, 1982, p. 147), 
longing and rejection, manifest in culture in the forms of taboo foods, perverse acts, 
incest, violence and “religious notions of abomination and sacrilege” (p. 146). Vice 
(1998) argues, that 
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“abjection dread” can “explain the incest dread of which Freud speaks”; it 
protects one from the “temptation” to return to the maternal semiotic. Abjection, 
[Kristeva] argues, preserves the “immemorial violence with which a body 
becomes separated from another body in order to be”. (p. 173)  
Incest then becomes yet another longing to reunite with the mother in a semiotic state and 
the dread that accompanies those longings.  
2.04.03.05 repression. Kristeva (1982) then shifts her emphasis away from the 
maternal body towards primal repression. Having argued that the mother/child divide is 
the origin of all subject/object divisions, Kristeva recants somewhat, arguing instead that 
primal repression predates even this divide. Primal repression is predicated upon Freud’s 
(1995) idea of the unconscious, or that there are many drives, instincts and ideas that 
cannot be known by the conscious subject because they are too violent, sexually explicit 
or transgressive; they are actively repressed, pushed out of the conscious mind. However, 
these thoughts return, often in pleasurable eruption of what has been pushed out of the 
conscious realm in dreams, jokes, slips of the tongue and art works. Repression is usually 
seen as occurring after the formation of the ego. The ego is associated with the conscious 
mind while the id, is repressed becoming the unconscious. However Kristeva (1982), 
borrowing from Freud, argues for primal repression “effected prior to the springing forth 
of the ego, of its objects and representations,” (p. 11) upon which later ego repression is 
based. Thus the abject reminds us and moves us to a primal space before language, even 
before the ego, where we discover “an effervescence of object and sign -not of desire but 
of intolerable significance; they tumble over into non-sense or the impossible real, but 
they appear even so in spite of “myself” (which is not) as abjection” (Kristeva, 1982, p. 
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11). Primal repression is the first repression of something too difficult or damaging to 
allow the conscious mind to know, which is that we are actually divided in two from the 
start, into the unconscious and the conscious. Our first divide is not from the mother, but 
the divide within the self between the conscious and the unconscious. Kristeva (1982) 
says, “As if the fundamental opposition were between I and Other or, in more archaic 
fashion, between Inside and Outside. As if such an opposition subsumed the one between 
Conscious and Unconscious, elaborated on the basis of neuroses” (p. 7). The binary upon 
which other binaries are to be enacted is the first binary within our world, which is 
between our conscious and our unconscious minds, a divide onto which later divides are 
mapped. This explains the early mechanics of the inside/outside binary and the sharp 
divide between the two that the abject often destabilizes. The instability of the divide 
between the unconscious and the conscious, as the unconscious often emerges into our 
conscious realm, also explains the instability that the abject symbolizes within other 
binary divides. If our first division is unstable, likely to create ambiguous moments, then 
it is no wonder that other, later divisions, which may, like the conscious minds separation 
from the unconscious, appear to be a stable divide but are fraught with intrusions, 
eruptions and ambiguity.  
Kristeva (1982) agues that the abject is the object of primal repression, it is what 
is first repressed, the abject being the ambiguous third space of the lived experience of 
the conscious and unconscious together. Primal repression is “the ability of the speaking 
being, always already haunted by the Other, to divide, reject, repeat” (p. 12). The subject, 
even before individuation from the mother, can reject and thus divide and create self, 
forming the ego out of the primal repression of the abject as an uneasy binary divide of 
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the conscious/unconscious. Even before the creation of the ego, the child has begun to 
practice separation through rejection, “Even before being like, ‘I’ am not but do separate, 
reject, ab-ject” (p. 13). Even before the ego or “I” is created, the child has begun to 
practice the type of rejection that will eventually allow them to separate from the mother 
and firmly establish their ego; this rejection is based in primal repression and the 
abjection of otherness even before there is a formal “I” for the Other to oppose.  
2.04.03.06 superego. The process of rejection as signifier of desire is closely tied 
into the abject’s refusal of rules and the superego. From the periphery the abject refuses 
to obey rules and perpetually challenges the subject, particularly in regards to bodily 
integrity, the subject’s division of inside/outside. Kristeva explains that every ego has an 
object and every superego has an abject. She says, “A certain ‘ego,’ that merged with its 
master, a superego, has flatly driven it [the jettisoned object] away. It lies outside, beyond 
the set 54and does not seem to agree to the latter’s rules of the game” (Kristeva, 1982, 
p.2).  
The superego is the moral center and holds the id in check by reigning in our 
socially unacceptable desires and fantasies. The superego is based on rules and structures 
learned from both the individual’s literal father, but also the Father, or the Lacanian 
Symbolic register, the masculine, disciplining and lawful world of language and culture 
that must be entered to become a fully functioning subject. Thus an individual who has 
been consumed by the rule-oriented superego rejects the radically excluded abject object; 
however, the abject refuses this exclusion. “And yet, from it’s place of banishment the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Set refers to the parameters of the game, a metaphor Kristeva is using for culture and 
the abject’s refusal to ‘play by the rules’.   
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abject does not cease challenging its master…it beseeches a discharge, a convulsion, a 
crying out” (Kristeva, 1982, p. 2). Not only does the abject refuse rules and exclusion, it 
haunts from the periphery, demanding a violent acknowledgement of existence. It is “a 
brutish suffering that ‘I’ put up with, sublime and devastated, … I endure it, for I imagine 
that such is the desire of the other” (p. 2). The abject is suffering, a suffering that the 
subject endures thinking it is the desire of others for them to do so. 
 2.04.03.07 food. This suffering and its rejection can be explained in relationship 
to food. Kristeva (1982) notes, “Food loathing is perhaps the most elementary and most 
archaic form of abjection” (p. 2) and “speaks of food’s potential to ‘penetrate’ the self’s 
‘clean and proper body’” (Vice, 1998, p. 169). She explains the abject through an 
experience of either seeing or touching the surface of milk with a thin skin on it and then 
the gagging, stomach spasm, bile, dizziness, rapid heartbeat and perspiration that follow 
its ingestion. Vice (1997) states that “the skin on milk disturbs order, adds an 
unexpectedly lively element to food and reminds the subject of the fragility of their own 
clean and proper body, bounded only by the same kind of ‘pitiful’ skin” (p. 163). The 
skin on the milk signals age, rot and death, as well as the link to our own skin, a border 
that contains. As it references the self, one is in danger of consuming oneself through 
consuming the skin. This rejection also signals the system of what is good to eat and “the 
efforts of clean and proper subjects to avoid excessive contact of the social with the 
organic represented both by food and by excrement” (p. 163). 
The suffering of the abject is made visible because to drink the milk, to endure the 
skin on the milk that signifies rot, is to do what the other, your parent, wants. This is to 
bear the suffering that you imagine the other wants from you. The milk becomes a 
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signifier of the mother, where consuming the milk could amount to “a phobic 
disintegration of the taboo barring the mother” (Vice, 1997, p. 163) or a signifier for 
parental desire. Kristeva (1982) explains the milk and the nausea it has induced, saying 
that the sickness 
separate[s] me from the mother and father who proffer it. “I” want none of that 
element, sign of their desire. “I” do not want to listen. “I” do not assimilate it, “I” 
expel it. But since food is not an “other” for “me,” who am only in their desire, I 
expel myself, I spit myself out. I abject myself within the same motion through 
which “I” claim to establish myself. (p. 3)  
You spit the milk out, but the milk is not an other, so the other that is jettisoned in the spit 
is yourself in opposition to the self that your parents are constructing through giving you 
the milk and expecting you to drink it. You refuse to agree to the rules of the superego, 
which is built by obedience to parents, thus furthering the creation of your own ego 
through rejected desire of the parents and rejected suffering at the hands of the parents. 
Kristeva continues,  
 That detail,55 perhaps an insignificant one, but one that they56 ferret out, 
 emphasize, evaluate, that trifle turns me inside out, guts sprawling; it is in this that 
 they see that ‘I’ am in the process of becoming an other…I give birth to myself 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 The simultaneous expulsion and establishment of the self. 
56 Your parent, or another other, see and focus on this moment giving it even more weight 
and taking note of it as a rejection of them as well as the milk. Think of a parent talking 
to a child who has spit up their milk, questioning them; is it not good? Is it different than 
before? Why would you spit it out? Why make such a mess? I drink the same milk, it is 
good and good for you, etc. This is less about the milk and the mess and more about a 
willful rejection of the parent’s authority and desire.  
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 amid the violence of sobs, of vomit. Mute protest of the symptom, shattering 
 violence of a convulsion. (p. 3) 
Subjectivity is born in violence and vomit.  
2.04.03.08 abject shit, the role of waste. For Kristeva (1982), waste of all kinds: 
vomit, blood, excreta, sweat, etc, must drop away from us. The excretion of any waste 
makes us expel ourselves, like the milk-vomit. This expulsion and rejection works as a 
way to solidify the subject’s sense of self. However, at the same time it threatens the self 
through the admission that the self is in flux, perpetually threatened by rot, and in need of 
solidifying. In regards to waste, it is “no longer I who expel, ‘I’ is expelled” (p. 4). Thus, 
our adherence, or rejection, to cultural schemas of the clean and proper actually act as a 
way in which our subjectivity is built. Kauffman (1998) explains that, “Freud speculates: 
In the nursery. . . excreta arouse no disgust in children. They seem valuable to them as 
being a part of their own body which has come away from them” (p. 43). He uses this 
example as a way of approaching the subject/object relationship of the abject, as the child 
later learns to find feces abhorrent, but is still plagued by its status as not quite subject, 
nor object.  
Fecal expulsion is needed, not because of a violation of purity taboos, or its literal 
ability to cause disease, but it must be rejected because of its association with the 
maternal, as it is the mother who assists the young child in toilet training and sphincter 
control. Blood produces a similar repulsion. It has a close association with the female 
body and menstruation, as well as the trauma associated with blood becoming 
externalized through a breach of the body. Sweat points to the porousness of the body, as 
does breast milk, which also harkens back to the mother and chora. Kristeva explains 
	  	  
92	  	  	  	  
	  
that, “the subject achieves autonomy through the process of rejecting improper and 
unclean elements that are reminiscent of his/her initial fusion with the maternal body” 
(cited in Gutiérrez-Albilla, 2008, p. 67). Vomit, as seen in the milk, proves bodily orifices 
work in both directions, expelling a product that was meant to be incorporated into the 
body – food – but has now turned to waste through its interaction with the inside of the 
body through mastication and bile. It is also an expulsion of the mother, the other’s desire 
for you to drink the milk. The only bodily substance that Kristeva leaves out of her 
discussion of that which is contaminating or dirty is tears, because they look like water 
and have a historical attachment to religiousness and purity.  
2.04.03.09 the corpse. Kristeva (1982) explains “The corpse (or cadaver: cadere, 
to fall), that which has irremediably become a cropper, is cesspool and death: it upsets 
even more violently the one who confronts it as fragile and fallacious chance” (p. 3). The 
height of abjection, according to Kristeva, is the corpse as it is, “a border that has 
encroached upon everything” (p. 3); it “shows me what I must permanently thrust aside 
in order to live” (p. 3). She goes on to note that, “the corpse, seen without God and 
outside of science, is the utmost of abjection. It is death infecting life” (p. 4). The corpse 
is abject because it reminds us of what we must ignore or repress to exist: death, our 
body’s eventual decay and annihilation, as well as our body’s defilement through the 
production of shit and fluids. The corpse causes a traumatic brush with what Lacan called 
the Real, or life as it exists outside the mitigation of language, essentially pure 
experience, without the screen of religion or science to shield from the horror of what we 
will eventually become, the most “fundamental pollution” (p. 109): death. In this way, 
the abject is related to Freud’s uncanny which is promulgated by an “ambiguity about the 
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extent to which something is, or is not, alive” (Kauffman, 1998, p. 27). Like the uncanny 
which confuses life and death, the abject’s relationship to the corpse is the cadaver’s 
refusal of systems, systems which say that human is life, is subjectivity, is permanent, 
where the corpse reminds us that we die, that subjectivity ends at the death of the body. 
The abject is, however, deeper than just a feeling of strangeness; it is a shift in how we 
constitute ourselves because the self, both our bodily dissolution and the end to our 
unique subjecthood, is what is at stake when touched by the abject.  
Death, putrefaction, bodily excreta are all things, which “threaten the 
subject/object divide, [and] must be expelled if the “I” is to unfold” (Brayton, 2007, p. 
59). Moreover, “The abject must not touch me for fear that it will ooze through, 
obliterating the border between inside and outside, which is necessary for my life, but 
which arises in the process of expulsion” (Young, 1990, p. 207). The I, or the subject, a 
fully-fledged identity, is dependent on wholeness in the Western tradition. These fluids 
represent fragmentation. I am not these fluids; I merely produced them. Thus they are not 
me (but are more me than a random object) and must be voided to establish an 
unfragmented self, or a healthy I. 
While the abject forms the subject, it simultaneously threatens its own formation, 
reminding us of our origins in chora. Kristeva (1982) says that the abject, 
“simultaneously beseeches and pulverizes the subject” (p. 5) and that this happens the 
most when the subject turns inward. Turning inward the individual can see that their 
being is predicated upon abjection, that they are both subjects, speaking personalities and 
objects, bodies full of substances, and that neither of these formations separately address 
the totality of the individual’s existence. Rather, the subject “finds that the impossible 
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constitutes its very being, that it is none other than abject” (p. 5). It becomes clear that the 
individual is abject through their dual being because the individual’s existence is 
predicated on the abject as humans are uneasy chimeras, difficult mixes of objectness and 
subjectivity.  
2.04.03.10 an exile who asks “where?”: dejects, jouissance and phobia. Kristeva 
(1982) addresses the spatial and temporal aspect of the abject when she explains that the 
deject, or the abject subject, inhabits “a land of oblivion that is constantly remembered” 
(p. 8). Through an apocalyptic - looking scene, Kristeva argues that the abject must have 
once been a coveted place, but now detritus has turned this land into something aversive. 
But the covetousness still exists, at the same time as repulsion, paradoxically bringing 
two opposites together in the same space, two times together at once. As Kristeva notes, 
“The time of abjection is double: a time of oblivion and thunder, of veiled infinity and the 
moment when revelation bursts forth” (p. 9). This seems most easily understood in the 
binary of the loving mother of the chora versus the devouring mother of the vagina 
dentata. This is the same mother seen from different points of time in our development, 
but both of these versions of mother exist simultaneously in the abject through both the 
allure of home and comfort combined with the fear of destruction.  
Kristeva goes on to describe the deject as someone who occupies multiple times, 
like the figure of the mother who is both loving and frightening based on time. She calls 
the deject an exile or “stray,” one who wanders off course and doesn’t realize their own 
abject/deject status. Rather than asking who I am, the abject subject asks where am I, as 
space and borders, engross them because the deject “places (themself), separates 
(themself), situates (themself) and therefore strays instead of getting their bearings, 
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desiring, belonging, or refusing” (p. 8). Kristeva explains that the deject is, “a deviser of 
territories, languages, works, the deject never stops demarcating his universe whose fluid 
confines - for they are constituted of a non-object, the abject - constantly question his 
solidity and impel him to start afresh” (p. 8). However, it is straying that saves the deject, 
because “the more he strays, the more he is saved…. For it is out of such straying on 
excluded ground that he draws his jouissance” (p. 8). Straying and its accompanying 
preoccupation with spatial demarcation, is one of the pleasures of the abject, it provides 
jouissance, a transgressive, excessive pleasure in splitting the self through spatial 
demarcations. It is in this section that the spatial aspects of the abject become articulated 
through the deject. This relates to the inside/outside binary of the abject and the idea that 
the self is spat out into the world, both spatial metaphors that reinforce the power of 
space.  
2.04.03.11 jouissance. Kristeva asserts that the deject engages in the demarcation 
of space because of jouissance. The term jouissance denotes a pleasure that is also 
painful and it is another way the “fascinated” victim of the abject is created. The subject 
is threatened, caused pain, but it is also a pleasurable or generative pain as it helps to 
form the subject. Kristeva (1982) explains, “Hence a jouissance in which the subject is 
swallowed up but in which the Other, in return, keeps the subject from foundering by 
making it repugnant” (p. 9). She connects jouissance to the abject to explain why it is that 
we engage in the abject, why, if the abject is a collapse of meaning, we choose or need to 
engage with it. It is here that Kristeva argues that the abject is above all ambiguity, 
stemming from the dual pleasure and pain of jouissance and the need for and fear of the 
abject.  
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Accompanying abject jouissance, one finds fear and phobia. The subject is 
threatened by dissolution or fracture in the face of the abject, creating fear of that which 
can nullify or break our existence. Kristeva (1982) uses another parable of a child to 
address the role of fear within the abject. This child “who has swallowed up his parents 
too soon, who frightens himself on that account, ‘all by himself,’ and, to save himself, 
rejects and throws up everything that is given to him - all gifts, all objects” (pp. 5-6). The 
child, having rejected everything (including the mother’s body, which had been a comfort 
for him and an unsteady, if formative, father), experiences fear as “the phobic has no 
other object than the abject” (p. 6). In other words, phobia’s basis always lies in the 
abject, the jettisoned that returns and not only causes disgust, but also fear, particularly 
fear of contamination. 
Like the milk, this creates the child’s own self and borders through rejection of 
the parents and their desires in favor of the child’s own ego. However, fear now takes 
over because in forming the self, the child has abjected themself, turned themself, and the 
ego that they spat out, into waste. But the self cannot be waste, it cannot be the other, or 
rather it cannot continue on as abject. This is a momentary event. Once the child abjects 
themself, spitting out filth and otherness, they reaffirm themselves because the other to 
parental desire is the child’s own ego, which has been manifest. The self is produced in 
the same motion that waste is expelled, creating a strong and frightening connection 
between ego and abject. The fear that accompanies this process does not simply disappear 
during the restoration of the self; it diffuses and infects everything around the subject, 
often creating associations between the abject and things near the child during this 
process, the phobic objects of abjection. This diffusion simultaneously “bracket[s]” 
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(Kristeva, 1982, p. 6) fear, which results in discourse seeming “tenable only if it 
ceaselessly confronts that otherness, a burden both repellent and repelled, a deep well of 
memory that is unapproachable and intimate: the abject” (p. 6). To dissipate this fear of 
losing one’s self, the child must engage with the abject and approach the phobic object 
again and again. Each engagement with the abject provides an opportunity for the child to 
abject themself, which strengthens their ego, while still leaving a residue of fear that they, 
and all humans, are simply waste. This becomes part of the appeal or allure of the abject; 
to dissipate the phobic feeling of the abject, the subject must perpetually engage in the 
abject, becoming a fascinated victim.  
2.04.03.12 from perverse to sublime: the profane and the sacred. According to 
Kristeva (1982), beyond jouissance and phobia, “the abject is related to perversion” (p. 
15). Perversion in this instance stems not from a breaking of laws, but a refusal to 
acknowledge that laws exist. Corruption is then the socialized form of abjection. Kristeva 
suggests that early writing on religion, morality and law all attempt to hem in the abject, 
to contain it and keep it away from society. Related to perversion, is its near opposite: the 
sacred. Kristeva discusses the abasement of self in relation to Christian mysticism and the 
notion of humility, as well as self-mutilation in masochism, as abjection. Abasement is 
making oneself low or dirty. Abasement also means making oneself fall outside the 
normative systems that prop up the ego and make the self appear beautiful and whole. In 
short, abasement is a type of abjection. While it seems counter indicative, abasement 
creates the self through an expulsion of societal desires, in a similar manner to the 
expulsion of self through the rejection of milk/parental desire. The abject accompanies all 
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religious structures, texts and laws. Within the context of religion, abjection appears as 
defilement or pollution and exclusion or taboo.  
However, as Kristeva (1982) also notes, “The various means of purifying the 
abject - the various catharses - make up the history of religions and end up with that 
catharsis par excellence called art” (p. 17). This passage becomes very important not only 
in understanding the abject's relationship to religion, but to the role of abjection in art. 
Kristeva argues that art is part and parcel of religiosity, even in a post-religious era,57 a 
statement with which I disagree. Citing a crisis in religion, Kristeva says “abjection 
elicits more archaic resonances that are culturally prior to sin” (p. 17). The heart of 
religion is described in the duality of clean/dirty, sacred versus profane and this 
historically predates not only Christianity, but religion in general, as they are related to 
innate human drives. New texts that feature the same patterns of the sacred versus the 
profane, the duality of clean and proper and the defilement that occurs in ambiguity, 
become Biblical or at least religious in that they instruct us in the foundational binaries.  
The sublime, often associated with religious awe, and sublimation, the 
transformation of unacceptable impulses into socially acceptable actions, are also 
attached to the abject. Kristeva (1982) explains that the abject exists between bodily 
systems, bodily responses and sublimation, or the conscious transformation of the 
unacceptable biological drives into socially acceptable mitigated forms. She says that, “In 
the symptom, the abject permeates me, I become abject. Through sublimation, I keep it 
under control. The abject is edged with the sublime” (p. 11). Exploiting the slippage in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Kristeva neglects to address contemporary art and how its form and function differs 
radically from art of previous eras.  
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meaning between sublime and sublimation, Kristeva connects the sublime and the abject, 
noting that they both expand and overstrain us, they overwhelm, they cause us to exist in 
two spaces, corporeal and spiritual/psychological. However, the abject is held in check 
through sublimation; its potential to totally overwhelm or obliterate us is consciously 
altered into more socially acceptable outlets. The abject is a permanent state that we 
intentionally direct ourselves away from into socially productive activities to maintain 
order and the appearance of cleanliness. The sublime, or that which inspires wonder 
through its immensity, shares its roots with sublimation and maintains the same upward 
mobility of veneration, but specifies its origins in the low and base human instinct, 
whereas sublimation is not necessarily born out of the low, but the unacceptable. Kristeva 
not only labels the abject sublime, but uses the language of the sublime, of thunder and 
awe, affect and terribleness to address the abject’s unchecked power and the need for 
conversion through sublimation. This language of thunder and awe and links to the 
sublime further suggest the abject’s relationship to the Lacanian Real or the place of 
sublime experiences of life unchecked by culture.  
2.04.03.13 Kristeva’s intellectual kin: Douglas’ dirt. One definition of the abject 
is “a ‘border’ that is ‘above all ambiguity’” (Macedo, 2001, p. 75), a boundary that is 
unstable, even permeable. Abjection is the transgression of a system’s borders. Much of 
Kristeva’s work borrows from Douglas’ Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of 
Pollution and Taboo (1966/2000), which argues that dirt is what defies classification. 
Douglas’ work was mentioned earlier in regards to disgust, but it is also foundational to 
much of Kristeva’s work with abjection. Douglas (1966/2000) explains that “taboos 
depend on a form of communitywide complicity” (p. xii) or that, “There is no such thing 
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as dirt; no single item is dirty apart from a particular system of classification in which it 
does not fit” (p.xvii). Rather systems of hygiene and of convention structure our ideas of 
dirt, creating a communal schema that calls for participation and condemnation of certain 
substances. For Douglas, this complicity is assured by an inherent human impulse 
towards classification and ordering behaviors. In a move, which could be seen as 
biological essentialism, Douglas asserts that, “this activity of classifying is a human 
universal” (p. xvii). However, Douglas furthers her argument saying,  
If we can abstract pathogenicity in hygiene from our notion of dirt, we are  left 
 with the old definition of dirt as a matter out of place… Dirt then, is never  a 
 unique, isolated event. Where there is dirt there is system. Dirt is the byproduct of 
 a systematic ordering and classification of matter, insofar as ordering involves 
 rejecting inappropriate elements. This idea of dirt takes us straight into the field of 
 symbolism and promises a linkup with more obviously symbolic systems of 
 purity. (p. 44) 
Dirt is matter out-of-order. With its cleaning, perfuming and beautifying, society is 
perpetually reordering the environment and casting out, rejecting and condemning “any 
object or idea likely to confuse or contradict cherished classifications” (p. 45).  
 Douglas sites the need for ordering as a way to make sense of “inherently untidy 
experiences” (p. 5). Thus, dirt is attached to confusing and difficult experiences like 
death, menstruation and violence, sickness, physical and psychological aberrations, as 
well as religious taboos that attempt to explain large-scale trauma like famine and natural 
disaster. To build a stable worldview out of the shifting chaos of our surroundings, we 
accept certain ideas and in doing so, in the same motion, we reject others to create a 
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pattern, a system. Ideologies are easily explained as cultural common sense. They are 
“the mental frameworks - the languages, the concepts, categories, imagery of thought and 
the systems of representation - which different classes and social groups deploy in order 
to make sense of, define, figure out and render intelligible the way society works” (Hall, 
1986 p. 30). Ideology can also be understood as the “standardized values of the 
community, [that] mediate the experience of individuals” (Douglas, 1966/2000, p. 48). 
These systems often distance the individual from experiences of dirt by providing a 
method for approaching different forms of pollution, such as that which warrants wiping 
your hands on your pants versus washing them thoroughly versus procuring gloves before 
tackling a mess. Douglas (1966/2000) explains that certain “ambiguous [experiences] 
tend to be treated as if they harmonized with the rest of the pattern. Discordant ones tend 
to be rejected” (p. 45). This can be cognitively difficult, as these experiences exist in 
between two states at once. In a social context, these experiences cannot exist, but they 
are tangibly real so they must be rejected, even though they necessarily, even naturally, 
exist. Shit for example, is a day-to-day necessity of inhabiting a body, it exists and often 
makes itself known, but also it reminds us that the body is in flux, digesting, changing 
and ultimately rotting, sloughing off dead cells. To repress the pollution that this 
realization causes, shit must be handled in particular ways, constrained by different 
systems for dealing with pollution that often limits where elimination happens, who is 
present for it and what is done with it afterwards.  
 Abjection pulls us back to our first sensations of system, a primal system before 
language and the symbolic; an order that definitions of dirty/danger and clean/sacred are 
based upon; the mother’s body versus our own body. Foster (1996) and Gutiérrez-Albilla 
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(2008) support this idea as both see the abject as opposed to culture, or as linked to a pre-
symbolic system. 
 2.04.03.14 stickiness. Jean-Paul Sartre addresses this ambiguous zone of dirt and 
defilement in his inquiry into sticky substances that create a physical quandary, as 
stickiness exists between two states. Sartre finds sticky substances like honey to be dirty, 
because they inhabit a space between a solid and a liquid. Douglas (1966/2000) explains 
Sartre’s concept,  
 An infant, plunging its hands into a jar of honey, is instantly involved in  
contemplating the formal properties of solids and liquids and the essential 
relationship between the subjective experiencing self and experienced world… 
[it] is like a cross-section in a process of changing. It is unstable, but it does not 
flow. It is soft, yielding and compressible. There is no gliding on its surface. Its 
stickiness is a trap, it clings like a leech; it attacks the boundary between it and 
myself. Long columns falling off my fingers suggest my own substance flowing 
into the pool of stickiness. Plunging into water gives a different impression. I 
remain a solid, but to touch stickiness is to risk deluding myself into viscosity. 
Stickiness is clinging, like a too possessive dog or mistress. (p. 47) 
For Sartre, stickiness is dirt because it defies classification, a solid that loses its form, yet 
not a yielding liquid. The implicit dirtiness of stickiness explains the unease that many 
feel when encountering it, because while honey may be edible, when on one’s hands it 
either necessitates washing or licking it off, a disgusting act in itself that still leaves the 
fingers unclean with saliva.  
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 2.04.03.15 breaking borders. Encounters with system breakers and outliers cause 
pollution, dirtiness and impurity. Conversely, pollution and taboos mark the boundaries 
and margins of the culture. However, “this is not necessarily an unpleasant experience. 
There is a whole gradient on which laughter, revulsion and shock belong at different 
points and intensities” (Douglas, 1966/2000, p. 46). Pollution is on a sliding scale of 
reactions and levels of rejection. Dirt is not only a necessary category, it is desirable, as it 
provides a way to reassert cultural schemas either through upholding them or 
transgressing them. Through systems of differentiation between what is pure and dirty a 
unified experience is created for the subject. Without dirtiness not only would there be no 
cleanliness, but there would be no system with which to understand the world, since for 
Douglas, the clean/pure system is what other binary systems are predicated upon.  
 This supports Kristeva’s work on the abject. For Kristeva and Douglas, it is not  
bile that is disgusting, but the fact that bile58 breaks down the classifications between 
pure and impure, self and other, subject and object, inside and outside. Kristeva (1982) 
explains, “It is thus not lack of cleanliness or health that causes abjection, but what 
disturbs identity, system, order” (p. 4). It is through its non-adherence to rules of the 
Symbolic order that the abject is then applied to crime, to liars and to atrocities like 
Auschwitz. Kristeva explains this in a story of seeing the piles of shoes at the Holocaust 
Memorial at Auschwitz and experiencing such a strong sense of the uncanny that it 
transcended the notion of the uncanny through its horror becoming the abject. These 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Bile becomes an especially good example of the abject. Bile outside the body in the 
form of vomit breaks down the border of internal and external, while bile inside the body 
breaks down food stuff in the digestive system so that is can be absorbed by the digestive 
system, further confusing the divides between self and other, as well as inside/outside and 
food/waste. 
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innocent shoes, familiar in other contexts, like under a Christmas tree, become perverse 
when piled together in this context. The shoes become a semiotic sign of the atrocities 
that have lead to those shoes being piled there, so that seeing the shoes out of place is to 
see the horrors that created this confusing, uncanny, pile. Furthermore, the fact that they 
are children’s shoes makes the experience of the pile more abject because children are the 
essence of life and everything that combats the terror of death. “The abjection of Nazi 
crimes reaches its apex when death, which, in any case, kills me, interferes with what, in 
my living universe, is supposed to save me from death: childhood, science, among other 
things” (Kristeva, 1982, p.4).  
Abjection sits on the margins, close, haunting from “just the other side of the 
border. So the abject is not opposed to and facing the subject, but next to it, too close for 
comfort” (Young, 1990, p. 208). Binary systems create a line, a border that splits the two 
opposites from one another and the abject sits near this border. Thus, the abject causes us 
anxiety and discomfort as “the subject is ‘thrown down,’ towards a boundary its existence 
is premised on forgetting” (Vice, 1998, p. 164). The boundary then is every border - 
when a finger is pricked we are made violently aware of the thinness of our own border, 
our skin. The image of an immigrant causes some to be reminded of the border of the 
nation, which is unconsciously visualize as solid, even though it is actually open 
uninterrupted space. The border is in fact fictive or at least abstract. The abject, then, is 
any rupture in the symbolic code, “Any border ambiguity may become for the subject a 
threat to its own borders, a revelation that the separation between self and Other is the 
product of a violent break, an irretrievable loss, a lack without name or reference” 
(Young, 1990, p. 208). The abject is “the negative side where the semiotic or imaginary 
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realm seems to threaten to disrupt the orderly symbolic realm” (McAfee, 2003, p. 45). As 
Grosz (1990) further explains,  
Abjection is the underside of the symbolic. It is what the symbolic must reject, 
cover over and contain. The symbolic requires that a border separate or protect the 
subject from the abyss, which beckons and haunts it: the abject entices and 
attracts the subject ever closer to its edge. (p. 89) 
However, while a disruption of the symbolic causes anxiety, there is also a necessity for 
the imaginary within the symbolic. The abject performs a necessary function pulling us 
back from the edge and a plummet into ambiguous entropy. If one were to embrace the 
abject entirely, one would lose their subjectivity, ceasing to understand the border 
between themselves and everything else, resulting in a state of formlessness (Bois & 
Krauss, 2000). 
 Interiority versus exteriority as a system, particularly in relation to the body, is 
important to the abject because it is from both the inside and outside that the abject 
threatens. As Grosz (1989) writes, abjection 
 involves examining the ways in which the inside and outside of the body are  
 constituted, the spaces between the self and the other and the means by  
 which the child’s body comes to be a bounded, unified whole [and] gains  
 access to symbolization. (p. 169) 
Others beyond Grosz have focused on the inter/external binaries of the abject. Goodnow 
(2009) for example, offers a qualitiative difference in the abject based on the abject 
within the body and the abject outside the body. She explains that,  
 The distinctions have to do with the abject without as against within the  
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 body, with the abject that is recognizable as against the abject which presents  
 with a clean, false face and with the abject in the form both of the collapse of  
 differences between male and female and of reminders of some particular  
 differences between them. (p. 28) 
Whenever there is tension surrounding a collapse of difference, there is also tension 
around the difference itself. This stems from the abject’s perpetual state as a signifier that 
identity itself is unstable and artificial. The abject is a fear of identity collapsing. 
With an assault on the boundaries of order in mind, it is no wonder that the abject 
“carries with it an element of crisis” (Meagher, 2003, p. 33) and trauma and “calls 
attention to the fundamental instability upon which psychic realities are constituted” (p. 
33). The experience of abjection is described as that of bodily disgust “a feeling, a 
visceral suspicion that one is or could easily become out of bounds, unruly, disgusting” 
(p. 33). This emotional response, the feeling of disgust, “raises the subject’s suspicion 
that psychically established boundaries - as well as those that are socially constructed - 
are not in fact secure” (p. 33).  
Insecurity surrounding our selves leads to constant self-surveillance for the abject, 
which “haunts” (Cooklin cited in Brayton, 2007, p. 59) our identity with ambiguity. 
Specifically the abject manifests itself in blood, gore, vomit, urine, feces, saliva, sweat, 
tears, but also finds a home in the maternal body (Creed, 1993), the aging body, the 
menstrual body, or the body which is turned inside out (Kauffman, 1998; Hughes, 2009). 
In looking at abject art, like the works of Cindy Sherman or Robert Gober, Foster (1996) 
explains that such ‘‘images evoke the body turned inside out, the subject literally 
abjected, thrown out. But they also evoke the outside turned in, the subject-as-picture 
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invaded by the object-gaze’’ (p. 149). Bodily fluids, which make evident the abject, do so 
because they are not just objects, they were once a part of the body, the self, the subject. 
However, they are not truly the subject either; they do not live, they do not have identity. 
They occupy a space in between, a space that alludes to subjecthood and objecthood, but 
also is neither. They embody abjecthood. It is this liminal, third space, to reference 
Bhabha’s (2004) work or what Anzaldua (2007) calls the borderlands. The abject refuses 
neat definitions; rather, it sits on the crest between asking us to question those “cherished 
classifications” through an insertion of ambiguity and disorder.  
2.04.03.16 if Freud and Kristeva had a baby: the uncanny. When encounters 
with the abject do not wound, when the abject haunts rather than attacks, these 
experiences can best be described as uncanny, or the feeling of both foreignness and 
familiarity at once. The uncanny’s relationship to abjection has much to do with the 
confusion of boundaries, as the uncanny is the feared confusion between whether an 
animate being is truly alive and conversely whether a lifeless object might be animate. 
The uncanny is also something familiar that feels strange and foreign or vise versa. Freud 
explained that the uncanny is “something which is secretly familiar, which has undergone 
repression and then returned from it” (cited in McAfee, 2003, p. 49). This confusion over 
what is and is not alive, what is or is not known, what is or is not familiar, causes 
cognitive dissonance, or both an attraction and repulsion to the same object. This 
cognitive dissonance often leads to a rejection of the troublesome object. It is easier to 
reject something than to rationalize the pleasure experienced from what is also 
discomforting or peculiar (Storey, 2009).  
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According to McAfee (2003), “Freud traces this feeling of uncanniness back to 
‘particular phases in the evolution of the self-regarding feeling, a regression to a time 
when the ego had not yet marked itself off sharply from the external world and from 
other people’” (p. 49). The uncanny is a repression of our origins in the maternal body. 
The feeling of the uncanny, in German das Unheimliche (un-home-like), is in opposition 
to das Heimliche (the home-like) and becomes a metaphor for being subsumed back into 
the mother’s womb, or to lose our unique identity (Bishop, 2006). The uncanny then is 
the return of the repressed; as Freud notes, “We can understand why linguistic usage has 
extended into its opposite, das Unheimliche; for this uncanny is in reality nothing new or 
alien, but something which is familiar and old-established in the mind” (cited in McAfee, 
2003, p. 48). Freud (2003) also explains that, “Heimlich thus becomes increasingly 
ambivalent, until it finally merges with its antonym Unheimlich. The uncanny (das 
Unheimliche, ‘the unhomely’) is in some way a species of the familiar (das Heimliche, 
‘the homely’)” (p.134). The uncanny is ambiguous, a hybrid of both homely and 
unhomely, that is not new, but is newly returned from repression. This return disturbs in 
its pleasurable and alluring home qualities, while disturbing with its foreignness. 
 Kristeva (1982) notes that, “the abject has only one quality of the object – that of 
being opposed to I” (p. 1), thus to be neither object nor subject, is to be abject and to 
cause uncanniness within this third subject position, which breaks the binary. While this 
formation is usually noted as neither subject nor object, in light of the uncanny, the abject 
is better understood as both subject and object, both homely yet unfamiliar. This then 
explains the abject’s dissonant qualities of attraction and repulsion. Kristeva describes the 
quality of abject as being, “beyond the scope of the possible, the tolerable, the thinkable. 
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It lies there, quite close, but it cannot be assimilated” (p. 1). Again, like the uncanny, the 
abject is close, it is similar to the “I,” yet not a subject. The uncanny and the abject are 
both object - like, but with more meaning, having a type of partial life of their own. 
According to art historian Hall Foster (1996), in “the canonical definition of Kristeva, … 
[abject] is what I must get rid of in order to be an I… a fantastic substance not only alien 
to the subject but intimate with it” ( p. 153).  
 2.04.03.17 the uncanny and the corpse. The uncanny is also found in the specter 
of death that further links the uncanny and the abject. Like our origins, we repress that we 
will die, even though it is an obvious and familiar fact, until we are confronted with a 
corpse and that which was familiar (Heimlich), a human being, a loved one, becomes 
unfamiliar or foreign (Unheimlich). The experience of the uncanny is a sense of unease at 
whether the corpse is truly dead and conversely whether the viewer of the corpse is 
wholly alive, as death is a constant process (Bishop, 2006; Clark, 2006; Freud, 2003). 
Images of the corpse, “anticipate the culminating moment when the total body becomes 
waste through its transforming into a corpse” (Jay, 1998, p. 146). The fact that our bodies 
(something familiar) house these precursors of death (something foreign) creates the 
cognitive dissonance of the uncanny and yet there is something appealing about 
abjection, something that, “points back to a time before individuation, just as it signifies 
the time after when the body becomes a mere corpse” (p. 147). Thus abjection becomes, 
as Kristeva (1982) says, a “massive and sudden emergence of uncanniness” (p. 2). These 
moments of uncanniness, of confusion between life and death, self and other, familiar and 
unfamiliar, point to the border instability that is abjection. As Macedo (2001) explains of 
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Kristeva’s work, the abject is, “what ‘disturbs identity, system, order’. What does not 
respect borders, positions, rules. The in-between, the ambiguous, the composite” (p. 75).  
The uncanny becomes abject and loathsome because it is not radically excluded, 
the subject recognizes the abject as “Not me. Not that. But not nothing, either” (Kristeva, 
1982, p. 2). This “not nothing either” is the familiar of the uncanny, familiar because of 
its attachments to the self, because it once inhabited or was attached to us. However, it is 
also foreign since it has been rejected through the process of abjection. The abject is then 
both meaningless and meaningful. The abject is meaningless because it exists outside of 
our ordering system and before language. The abject is meaningful because as Kristeva 
(1982) notes, “there is nothing insignificant” (p. 2) about the abject. This meaning comes 
from the overdetermined nature of abject substances and the structuring effects of 
abjection.  
 2.04.03.18 recapping Kristeva. Kristeva’s configuration of the abject labels 
certain substances as the excluded and jettisoned: blood, vomit, rotten food, death and 
putrefaction. The process by which these substances are excluded, but haunt us from the 
margins, is abjection, a seemingly failed method that human beings use to mark out what 
is clean and proper. The failure here stems from the inability to radically and totally 
exclude these substances. This also applies to non-substances like borders, since borders 
cannot be radically excluded either; they are necessary demarcations between here and 
there, us and them, so they menace us like bodily substances. Abjection begins in early 
childhood as the child tries to differentiate themselves from their unified existence with 
their mothers. The split from the mother, which is actually predicated upon an even 
earlier split between the conscious and unconscious, is the division that forms all other 
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divisions between subjecthood and objects. Kristeva’s use of the abject is deeply 
embedded in psychoanalysis, borrowing heavily from Lacan and Freud. It begins with 
food loathing and moves on to death, religion, other bodily substances, but never goes 
beyond the individual. It engages with ambiguity and borders, but doesn’t directly engage 
with the literature of the third space or liminality. While understanding Kristeva’s 
seminal text is necessary to understanding the abject, other scholars have taken Kristeva’s 
ideas and either transformed them or applied them to things far beyond the scope of 
Kristeva’s original text.  
2.04.04 new directions in abjection. Kristeva’s work has been both criticized  
and altered by later scholars. While some critics like Bois and Krauss59 (2000) have 
dismissed the abject in favor of other theoretical approaches to the liminal, like 
formlessness, others have reconfigured the abject to make it work better in a 
contemporary context and to be used for more than literary analysis. In the next section I 
will cover authors who have either built upon Kristeva’s abject, creating their own 
particular approaches to the abject, or have applied the abject to subject matter far beyond 
Kristeva’s original literary sites. These more recent scholars have often politicized the 
abject, looking at how it effects political and social formation in ways that Kristeva did 
not. Much of this scholarship has influenced my understanding of the potential of the 
abject and has been foundational to my own abject visual methodology.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 It would be hard to discuss art and abjection without looking closely at the work of 
Bois and Krauss (2000) on formlessness. However, their work theoretically has not 
inspired my own work, while their methodological structure has been influential. With 
this in mind, a more thorough account of formlessness as articulated by Bois and Krauss 
is included in my methodology chapter.  
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2.04.04.01 abjection as waste production. Chanter (2008) reconceptualizes 
abjection as the process by which waste is created and excluded. All systems create waste 
and byproducts, and that waste is abjected or jettisoned out. Chanter argues that, “Any 
discourse that claims for itself a foundational status by exempting from its orbit those it 
designates as other at the same time as appropriating what it can from them conforms to 
the logic of abjection” (p. 3). Thus any system in which there is exclusion falls under the 
logic of abjection. Chanter explains, “there is a systematic production of waste, of that 
which is useless, unproductive, of that which does not conform to the logic of patriarchy, 
capitalism, or colonialism” (p. 3). Waste is the other to the logic of hegemony and the 
systematic production of waste through othering is combined with “a usurpation, 
exploitation and appropriation of precisely that which is only admitted in so far as it is 
capable of conforming to such logics” (pp. 3-4).  
2.04.04.01.01 abject waste and hegemony. Abjection is the process by which 
waste is created and excluded, but it also entails the coopting of anything that will 
conform to the dominant, making abjection the way in which hegemony is both formed 
and a way in which it can be challenged. Anything that does not conform to the logics of 
the dominant discourse, is labeled as nonsensical. To exceed the terms of this logic, is to 
be labeled inferior. As Chanter (2008) notes, “Anything that cannot be converted into 
assets from this point of view is discarded as incoherent, insane, nonsensical, outside the 
bounds of reason, as defined by a logic that is taken to be universal” (p. 5).  
Chanter discusses the process of assimilation and exclusion in-depth in regards to 
women. Chanter (2008) explains,  
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The production of the feminine as a site of excess by a masculine imaginary 
allows for the inclusion of those aspects that prove useful for inclusion and 
incorporation by a masculinist and ostensibly universalist logic. The feminine is 
admitted only insofar as it constitutes the raw material to be worked over and 
made to conform to a logic that will not admit it as excessive or different, but that 
requires its otherness or alterity to subsist as inferior and contained. Thus, both at 
the material level of the reproduction of the species and at the level of 
signification, the feminine is admitted only insofar as it can contribute 
productively to the society, or the state, the ends of which are defined by an 
invisibly white, patriarchal capitalism. (pp. 4-5)  
Chanter (2008) links her revision of abjection to a larger process of identification, 
explaining that,  
subjects are abjected by identificatory regimes that preclude them or render them 
unintelligible. Striving to establish or maintain their integrity, subjects abandon 
others to abject states, often in an attempt to consolidate boundaries that are 
threatened. Yet abjection can also be taken up as a political strategy, given shape 
as a way of protesting and disrupting imaginaries that are sustained through the 
systematic exclusion of certain others. (p. 2) 
2.04.04.01.02 abject peoples. The abject can be deployed to either make further 
invisible an already deject group, or to shore up the dominant group’s identity. More than 
defining the parameters of identity, the abject makes “available for reflection and 
interrogation the imaginary operations that we usually take to be indicative of who we 
are, of our identities and the identity of others” (Chanter, 2008, p. 3). This means that the 
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abject is one of the few ways in which we can step out of our ideological practices of 
identification and can question the ways in which our identity and others are constituted, 
the ways in which we are hailed as subjects, or shut out of the identificatory process.  
 2.04.04.01.03 possible problems. Chanter’s project allows for more nuance than 
Kristeva’s project. Chanter (2008) is conscious of the systematic nature of the abject and 
that all systems produce waste of one sort or another. She explains,  
The very process of rendering determinate this indeterminacy leads to possibilities 
of reifying or fetishizing those marginal excluded others who have played a 
constitutive role in the configuration of gender or race discourses, but whose role 
has not been acknowledged as such, or has only been acknowledged in 
exclusionary ways. Not only is there a danger of fetishizing previously excluded 
others, but in the process of bringing to light their abjection, in the process of 
giving shape to, or specifying the contours of their history and experience, as 
often as not new others are abjected. (p. 6) 
In using the abject as a tool to undo systemic oppression, one must be conscious that the 
system does not simply create new abjects, or further abjects, further jettisons, those who 
are already marginalized. Chanter (2008) further explains,  
The tendency of radical politics to reproduce at another level and in a new guise 
the exclusionary gestures against which they are protesting and thus to invent a 
new series of others in their attempt to combat the processes that have in turn 
hypostasized them as other, demands theoretical reflection. (p. 5) 
The systemic quality of the abject which is predicated on the perpetual replication of the 
abject, demands a reflection; why the abject at all? In trying to effect political change, 
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why use something that replicates itself in further marginalization? This is an important 
point to Chanter’s argument about the negative and positive political ramifications of the 
abject. The abject is deployed to trouble dominant borders, but is also used to secure 
them. For Chanter, the politics of the abject can be progressive through a redistribution of 
agency to those labeled waste, but can be equally conservative as it stabilizes borders that 
protect hegemonic dominion.  
2.04.04.01.04 benefits of an abject systemic critique. Because the abject in 
Chanter’s (2008) reformulation is applied to systems, it can be applied to a far broader 
series of cultural productions than Kristeva’s original work. While Kristvea’s site of 
study is literature, Chanter’s work can be applied to the critique of any system. Chanter’s 
abject addresses both identity formation as a system, looking towards the exclusion of 
women from the phallic order of psychoanalysis and the racialized body as other, as well 
as systems of capital, imperialism and even environmental degradation.60 Chanter 
explains, “The environment is reduced to the wasteland of slag heaps, while the natives 
of colonized lands either are not recognized as properly human, or only become so 
through forced practices of assimilation” (p. 3). There are systems at play in these events, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Chanter is not the only scholar to link the abject to environmental degradation. Bert 
Olivier is his work “Nature as ‘abject,’ critical psychology and ‘revolt’: The pertinence of 
Kristeva,” in South African Journal of Psychology, 2007, 37(3), pp. 443-469, explores the 
ways in which nature is constructed as the devouring mother and the other that needs to 
be dominated. Nature is the opposite of culture and often gendered as feminine versus 
society and civilization, which is constructed as masculine. The environment then 
becomes a marginalized other, exploited by the dominant, in this instance capitalism, like 
low-income workers and racialized or immigrant bodies. The treatment of the 
environment as an other that by the logic of abjection needs to be excluded and can be 
exploited without censure has led to our current environmental crisis.  
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primarily mechanics of rejection, exclusion, and exploitation that can be understood 
through abjection.  
Returning to the earlier question as to the importance of the abject and its 
usefulness, the answer lies in how an understanding of the abject can uncover the 
unconscious and imaginary role of disgust and waste in the creation, use and maintenance 
of systems. Chanter (2008) argues, “At the same time as threatening the current symbolic 
order, abjection provides the opportunity for its reworking, precisely insofar as it 
represents a crisis in meaning” (p. 6). Waste, while a natural byproduct, also has the 
element of crisis, of ambiguity, of danger to the established borders that Kristeva (1982) 
establishes in her own work. But Chanter expands the abject to apply to a broader range 
of systems than that of the body, providing the logic for which minorities of all types are 
excluded and attaching the abject not just to the symbolic, but to capitalism and 
patriarchy. Thus, Chanter infuses the abject with a political agency that Kristeva’s work 
lacked.  
2.04.04.02 abject embodiments. 
2.04.04.02.01 the mechanics of desire in abject embodiments. Picking up on an 
under developed theme in Power of Horrors (1982), Grosz (1994) emphasizes that as 
well as loathing, there is desire within the abject. While Kristeva addresses a fascination 
that can be understood as desire, she does not emphasize this point. Grosz (1994) 
explains in regards to objects that were once closely connected to us, like vomit, that 
they,  
retain something of the cathexis and value of a body part even when they are 
separated from the body. There is still something of the subject bound up with 
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them—which is why they are objects of disgust, loathing and repulsion as well as 
envy and desire. (p. 81) 
Grosz explains that jettisoned substances contain something of ourselves that fascinate us 
and call to us; we desire a reunion with this lost piece of ourselves, but the excluded 
nature of this not-quite subject disgusts us as foreign. The abject is in tune with the ebb 
and flow of the body, a necessary absorption and expulsion that is a necessary desire to 
transcend flesh but the impossibility of leaving the body, that marks the abject as closer 
to the subject than its third position might appear. Grosz (cited in Weiss, 1998) expands 
on abjection and the fascination associated with abject experiences, noting, 
Abjection involves the paradoxically necessary but impossible desire to transcend 
corporeality. It is a refusal of the defiling, impure, uncontrollable materiality of 
the subject’s embodied existence. It is a response to the various bodily cycles of 
incorporation, absorption, depletion, expulsion, the cycles of material 
rejuvenation and consumption necessary to sustain itself yet incapable of social 
recognition and representation. (p. 90) 
For Grosz, the abject is centered in the corporeality of our flesh and the 
dissonance between our bodies made of tissue (what has been called our “meat suit” in 
horror films61) and the psychic nature of the subject, which exists primarily within the 
Symbolic Order. With this in mind, I see the abject as pointing to the failure of the 
Cartesian divide between the mind and the body. As the abject returns, the body reasserts 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 This term has been used so frequently in the horror genre that it has gained its own 
entry in urbandictionary.com, a crowd sourced online dictionary for urban and 
contemporary slang. The entry defines meat suit as, “The human body, especially one’s 
flesh, suggesting the burdens of corporeality for otherwise ethereal being” 
(http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=meat%20suit).  
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itself as the primary means of ego development, denying the mind its seat as the sole 
progenitor of the self. 
2.04.04.02.02 haunting. As Weiss (1998) explains, we are haunted by the abject 
through its rejected territories as,  
This abject specter, which continually haunts the ego and seeks to disrupt the 
continuity of the body image, is all the more terrifying because it is a ghost 
incarnated in flesh, blood, spit, mucus, feces, vomit, urine, pus and other bodily 
fluids. (p. 90)  
Weiss, drawing on Kristeva (1982) and Grosz (1994), emphasizes the bodily and 
corporeal nature of the abject in its relationship to the imago, or imagined body image, 
explaining that the abject must “be understood as a corporeal refusal of corporeality” (pg. 
90). The fleshy specter of the abject is a corporeal reminder that we must refuse 
corporeality or else become abject ourselves through rot, death or contamination. 
2.04.04.02.03 fatness. This emphasis on the abject’s connection to flesh resonates 
with other scholars who say that “fat people constitute society’s ‘haunting abject’” 
(LeBesco, 2004, p. 28) as their bodies transgress the norms of size, literally growing out 
of the bounds of the ideal body image. With this transgression of boundaries and space in 
mind, Meagher (2003) notes, using, “language inspired by Michel Foucault (1995), the 
representation of the abject body speaks to the ways in which women experience social 
and cultural imperatives through self-surveillance, self-denial and constant control” (p. 
38). The policing of the body responds to a constant fear of slipping into the realm of the 
disgusting and the abject, a fear of failing to inhabit the imagined sealed body, the 
haunting of corporeality and fracturing of identity between material existence and 
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Symbolic subjectivity that the abject represents. Weight is policed because it expands the 
limits of the body, stretching, threatening to burst our cherished borders. It becomes an 
instance of growth out of bounds, of too much life and of excessive corporeality. Those 
who fit the category of fat are characterized as disgusting, slovenly, lazy, sick and 
ultimately abnormal (Rothblum & Solovay, 2009). 
LeBesco (2004) relies extensively on the abject to understand the position of the 
fat body within culture, as well as “examining strategies for transforming (widening) the 
fat body” (p. 5) through an understanding of the abject. Other fat studies scholars have 
noted that the fat body, is an abject body. Mendoza (2009) explains in her analysis of 
films using fat suits,62 arguing that they are a type of revenge fantasy predicated upon 
seeing the “idealized body buried, even temporarily, under the folds of abject fat” (p. 
282). Asbill (2009) argues, in her study of fat burlesque dancers, that through the 
sensuous performance of the striptease, “performers invoke, inhabit and challenge 
limiting cultural conceptions about fat women’s sexuality, purposefully creating social 
commentaries about their “abject” bodies” (p. 300).  
2.04.04.02.04 dearth. Warin (2010) uses the abject as a tool to understand 
anorexics who often see fats and certain foods as irrationally contaminating. Battersby 
(1998), also approaching anorexia and other extreme forms of body management through 
the abject, is interested in the abject’s relationship to space, mapping and borders in 
relation to women’s bodies. She argues that because women employ, occupy, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Fat suits are bodysuits with padding that are worn by actors and actresses to change 
their forms into obese characters.  
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experience space differently that they may well experience the abject differently. She 
explains,  
There is a good deal of work by psychologists, artists and theorists of opposing 
political persuasions that shows that females in our society employ space 
differently – even whilst young – and that this can be detected by observing their 
games, their bodily movements and the projects that they devise for themselves. 
(p. 46) 
This spatial difference can become an obsession since “Via anorexia, slimming, cosmetic 
surgery, the fashion industry and simply the way they stand, move or play, women 
discipline their body boundaries intensively” (Battersby, 1998, p. 47). It is this obsession 
with space and policing a closed and sealed body that many anorexics site as reasons for 
their rejection of foods. Battersby (1998) explains,  
The female anorexic … – and ninety percent of all anorexics are female – knows 
that the normalized female body is permeable; penetrable, with the potential of 
becoming more-than-one body through a gradual process of growth and the 
labour of separation. The boundaries of the female anorexic’s body - in so far as 
they are establishable at all - are insecure and thus require careful policing. (p. 46) 
Anorexia is then related to the abject’s obsessive marking out, management and 
protection of borders; to the deject who asks “where?” as a way to sound out identity in 
relation to spatial position, a reminder of the border and space’s role in identity 
formation. Anorexia is also about excess and dirth, and a fragile imago that mistakes the 
two, as well as an obsession with cleanliness and a fear of the dirtiness of fats and sugars, 
which will contaminate the body if consumed.  
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2.04.04.02.05 relatedness. While Battersby (1998) emphasizes the need to 
understand the abject in relationship to ideas about Foucaultian biopower, the policing of 
the body and even performativity, Warin (2010) argues for a modification to the abject, 
adding ideas of relatedness to its framework. Warin explains that “[r]elatedness is at the 
very core of abjection for, in being cast out, one moves away from relationships with 
people, oneself and objects and creates a different kind of relatedness” (p. 5) which 
“moves beyond Kristeva’s location [of the abject] in the imaginary psyche and language 
to the everyday practices and terms of sociality” (p. 5). Warin’s approach to the abject is 
materialist, interested in the lived experience of anorexics, particularly as patients who 
are often pathologized and conflated with their illness. This leads in her work to a 
complex piecing apart of causation where the abject is both the rationale of anorexics for 
their disorder and, conversely, anorexia causes feelings of abjection.  
 Warin’s reformation of the abject as a social process of relatedness that has real 
material qualities and consequences, like isolation, is something other scholars have tried 
to bring into conversation with the abject. The abject can be found in disruptions in size, 
shape, color, sex and gender. Through rejection, the abject is not only a corporeal 
reminder to refuse our corporeality in general, but it is a reminder that certain corporeal, 
material existences are even less desirable than that of the norm. And,  
where one body… takes on the function of model or idea, the human body, for all 
other types of body, its domination may be undermined through defiant 
affirmation of a multiplicity, a field of differences, or other kinds of bodies and 
subjectivities. (Grosz cited in LeBesco, 2004, p. 5) 
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In this way, the abject body can become a political defiance of the hegemonic and an 
affirmation of multiplicity.  
2.04.04.03 homosexual horrors: Butler’s abject. 
2.04.04.03.01 abject homosexuality in opposition to heterosexuality. Butler’s 
expansion of Kristeva’s ideas to specifically address socially marginalized bodies is 
probably the most well-known attempt to address materiality in the abject and explore 
“the possibilities of reworking abjection into political agency” (LeBesco, 2004, p. 5). 
Butler is interested in applying the abject to bodies, to real life and to identity. Benjamin 
Buchloh (1994) explains in a conversation about the informe versus the abject with other 
art historians, that Butler’s work is a materialist approach to the abject that still engages 
with the recuperative nature of Kristeva’s work. Buchloch says,  
Judith Butler’s modification of the notion of abjection, clearly derived from 
Kristeva, to theorize heterosexuality as a principle that needs to position 
homosexuality in the abject in order to constitute itself. That is, on the one hand, a 
structural model because it describes a process of differentiation and 
identification. Yet, on the other it never pretends that all those differentials take 
place within language or the semiotic system alone. They also take place in the 
enacting of homophobia, in the material reality of day-to-day social behavior. (p. 
5)  
Butler’s reformation of the abject as a material, as well as a psychic, a linguistic 
and a semiotic experience adds “a complex actuality that a merely structural insistence on 
the notion cannot” (Buchloch, 1994, p. 5). In Butler the abject becomes a “productive 
expansion of the model to recognize that psychosexual and social behavior, even if it is 
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structured around such principles, is enacted in material ways” (p. 5). While Kristeva 
may expound on the imagined mechanisms of the abject at length, Butler attaches the 
abject to lived experiences and material practices of exclusion. Buchloch continues to 
argue for the power of the abject particularly in Butler’s configuration as it has the power 
to address the irrational formation of certain ideologies in a way that Marxist theory has 
not. Buchloch (1994) explains,  
One has to recognize there is a stake in her argument and this is the attempt to 
clarify ideology formation on the level of the unconscious. It is not about creating 
new oppositions called heterosexuality and homosexuality; it is about describing 
an unconscious formation called homophobia, its origins and functions. And the 
use of the process of abjection with regards to that formation, as well as to that of 
racism, seems to me productive. (p. 6) 
Oftentimes ideologies are irrational and contradictory. The rhetoric of freedom is 
deployed regualrly in America, often within progressive and conservative circles at the 
same time. The freedom of religion is currently espoused as rational to deny the freedom 
for homosexuals to marry. Because the abject can address unconscious or pre-lingual 
schemas of dirt that are often mapped onto the real bodies of human beings, a  
continued exploration of the abject is justifiable.  
Theoretically, the abject is perhaps not the most popular of theoretical paradigms 
at the moment, even as visual culture is filled with both lowbrow and high culture 
examples of the abject and abjection. Kristeva’s work dates from the 1980’s and Butler’s 
from the 1990’s, and with an emphasis in academia on new ideas, or new 
reconfigurations and applications of ideas, it seems to me that the abject has been 
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absorbed into many academic discourses in the same way it has been absorbed into the 
artworld, as an uncomplicated and stripped down term that simply means disgust or 
difference. However, it is the expansion of the abject to deal with social issues of 
exclusion and its violence, as well as the abject’s continued and expanding popularity 
visually, that call for a reconsideration of the abject in all its facets.  
Butler’s work with the abject begins by looking at the system or matrix that 
creates the abject. Butler (1993) writes,  
 This exclusionary matrix by which subjects are formed thus requires the  
simultaneous production of a domain of abject beings, those who are not yet  
“subjects,” but who form the constitutive outside to the domain of the subject.  
The abject designates here precisely those “unlivable” and “uninhabitable” zones  
of social life which are nevertheless densely populated by those who do not enjoy  
the status of the subject, but whose living under the sign of the “unlivable” is  
required to circumscribe the domain of the subject. This zone of uninhabitability  
will constitute the defining limit of the subject’s domain; it will constitute that site  
of dreaded identification against which - and by virtue of which - the domain of  
the subject will circumscribe its own claim to autonomy and to life. In this sense,  
then, the subject is constituted through the force of exclusion and abjection, one  
which produces a constitutive outside to the subject, an abjected outside, which  
is, after all, “inside” the subject as its own founding repudiation. (p. 3)  
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Butler describes abjection as a process through which certain bodies are 
marginalized and pushed to uninhabitable zones of existence.63 These marginal abject 
subjectivities are denied so that the dominant subject may exist more fully intact. In this 
way the abject functions on a broader social level, moving from the body and the 
symbolic order, to the social body’s role in the symbolic. The material consequences of 
exclusion are important to include in theorizing the abject, because, as earlier noted by 
Hekman (1998), “bodies are cultural texts, [where] some texts are more important than 
others and the hegemonic texts that sculpt female bodies cause pain and suffering for 
‘real,’ ‘material’ women” (p.69).  
The material suffering of those denied subjectivity and labeled abject is a 
component that has often been missing and is something that Butler is conscious of in her 
work. Material suffering can not only negate life to the point that it is unlivable, even 
ungrievable (Butler, 2006, Butler 2010), but some have argued that what Foucault (1995) 
had labeled biopower, or the sovereign’s ability to make live or let die, should be further 
understood as necropower. Informed heavily by the field of postcolonialism and writers 
like Foucault, Agamben and Bataille, the theoretical concept of necropower is “the 
generalized instrumentalization of human existence and the material destruction of 
human bodies and populations” (Mbembe, 2003, p. 14). In necropower, “sovereignty 
means the capacity to define who matters and who does not, who is disposable and who 
is not” (Mbembe, 2003, p. 27). Necropower deals with social death, which comes to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Uninhabitable zones describe lives that are deemed by dominant discourse as not worth 
living, even unworthy of mourning.  Uninhabitable zones also describe a type of 
precariousness that Butler discusses at length in Frames of War: When is Life Grievable 
(2010), Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence (2006) and 
Dispossession: The Performative in the Political (2013) with Athena Athanasiou. 
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mean an “expulsion from humanity” (p. 21). One is no longer subject to social death as a 
human being, but rather one’s status as human is revoked; the subject is expelled from 
humanity, making social and physical death easier for the government and dominant 
culture to enact. This work, like Butler’s, places an emphasis on lived experience as 
crucial to ideas of psychic exclusion. 
Rather than simply adopting Kristeva’s framework, Butler (1993) takes care to 
define the abject through her own engagement with psychoanalytic materials and lived 
experience. She explains,  
Abjections (in latin, ab-jicere) literally means to cast off, away, or out and, hence, 
presupposes and produces a domain of agency from which it is differentiated. 
Here the casting away resonates with the psychoanalytic notion of Verwerfung, 
implying a foreclosure which founds the subject and which accordingly, 
establishes that foundation as tenuous. Whereas the psychoanalytic notion of 
Verwerfung, translated as “foreclosure,” produces sociality through a repudiation 
of a primary signifier which produces an unconscious or, in Lacan’s theory, the 
register of the real, the notion of abjection designates a degraded or cast out status 
within the terms of sociality. Indeed, what is foreclosed or repudiated within 
psychoanalytic terms is precisely what may not reenter the field of the social 
without threatening psychosis, that is, the dissolution of the subject itself. I want 
to propose that certain abject zones within sociality also deliver this threat, 
constituting zones of uninhabitability which a subject fantasizes as threatening its 
own integrity with the prospect of a psychotic dissolution (“I would rather die 
than do or be that!”). (p. 243) 
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What Butler describes above is the logic of abject exclusion that is foundational to 
genocide, as well ethnic and religious cleansing like the Holocaust.  
2.04.04.03.02 Butler on systems and bodies. Butler maintains the abject’s 
jettisoned status, but connects it not to bodily substances, but to entire bodies and to 
matrixes or systems of the clean and proper enacted in a social dimension. Butler is 
primarily concerned with homosexuality as abject, as the excluded other whose exclusion 
is necessary for the creation of the norm. Butler explains,  
How, then, can one think through the matter of bodies as a kind of materialization 
governed by regulatory norms in order to ascertain the workings of heterosexual 
hegemony in the formation of what qualifies as a viable body? How does that 
materialization of the norm in bodily formation produce a domain of abjected 
bodies, a field of deformation, which, in failing to qualify as fully human, fortifies 
those regulatory norms? What challenge does that excluded and abjected realm 
produce a symbolic hegemony that might force a radical rearticulation of what 
qualifies as bodies that matter, ways of living that count as “life,” lives worth 
protecting, lives worth saving, lives worth grieving? (p. 16) 
The hegemonic norm is heterosexuality; its abject, homosexuality. However, as its abject, 
homosexuality haunts and fascinates and, moreover, actually constitutes heterosexuality 
through its exclusion. As with the expulsion of milk, the expulsion of homosexuality also 
creates and makes visible the distinct category of heterosexuality.  
This is the same binary configuration of life/death or inner/outer which are central 
to Kristeva’s abject, simply shifted to figure the hetero subject as life and the inner while 
establishing the homo as a non-subject related to death and the outer, and relegated to an 
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uninhabitable life. However, inner and outer are just words, a spatial metaphor used to 
theorize desire, fear and fantasies. Thus, “‘Inner’ and ‘Outer’ make sense only with 
reference to a mediating boundary that strives for stability. And this stability, this 
coherence, is determined in large part by cultural orders that sanction the subject and 
compel its differentiation from the abject” (Butler, 2006, p. 182). This is to say that 
binaries work as a way to stabilize the boundary between two sides, and this stabilization 
supports the normal subject which must then inhabit one or the other. Butler (2006) 
continues, 
“inner” and “outer” constitute a binary distinction that stabilizes and consolidates 
the coherent subject. When that subject is challenged, the meaning and necessity 
of the terms are subject to displacement. If the “inner world” no longer designates 
a topos, then the internal fixity of the self and, indeed, the internal locale of 
gender identity, become similarly suspect. (pp. 182-183) 
Destabilization of the border between inner and outer constitutes larger concerns 
about the formation of identity, particularly for Butler, that identity is not an inner 
expression of some core essence; rather identity is external, or “outer,” to the subject and 
composed of learned behaviors that are adopted and repeated in a process she calls 
performativity. Shildrick and Price (1999) explain that, “The precariousness of all bodies 
is exposed by paying attention to their ‘constitutive outside,’ from which they are 
alienated and yet on which they are dependent” (p. 9). This dependency is linked also to 
identifactory practices, or ways in which the body can be read. Butler (1993) explains,  
The forming of a subject requires an identification with the normative phantasm 
of “sex” and this identification takes place through repudiation which produces a 
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domain of abjection, a repudiation without which the subject cannot emerge. This 
is a repudiation, which creates the valence of “abjection” and it’s status for the 
subject as a threatening specter. Further, the materialization of a given sex will 
centrally concern the regulation of identificatory practices such that the 
identification with the abjection of sex will be persistently disavowed And yet, 
this disavowed abjection will threaten to expose the self-grounding presumption 
of the sex subject, grounded as that subject is in a repudiation whose 
consequences it cannot fully control. (p. 3) 
Becoming subjects must involve an attempt to identify with a vision of the 
normative body, which automatically includes the repudiation and rejection of the other 
and this process creates a domain of abjection. However, the very domains of abjection - 
the homosexual, the fat, the anorexic, the person of color, the immigrant, the disabled -
threaten the binary norm, which they have co-created through their incomplete rejection. 
The norm is dependent upon the ‘constitutive outside’, which both creates the norm and 
disrupts it. Shildrick and Price (1999) continue,  
As Butler sees it, a wide range of normative binaries that are used to characterize 
 embodiment - male/female, health/ill-health, heterosexual/homosexual, 
 black/white and so on - may be exposed in their instability - but also 
 paradoxically confirmed - by the performativity of abject bodies. (p. 9)  
To identify with the abject is to be continually disavowed, denied being, because 
of the threat that the identification with the other poses to hegemony. Butler (1993) 
continues,  
	  	  
130	  	  	  	  
	  
The task will be to consider this threat and disruption not as a permanent 
contestation of social norms condemned to the pathos of perpetual failure, but 
rather as a critical resource in the struggle to rearticulate the very terms of 
symbolic legitimacy and intelligibility. (p. 3)  
I would argue, that even when the stability of the norm is undermined, the abject’s 
performance of itself as created by the norm, the performance of rejection, paradoxically 
seems to stabilize the norm again. However, while the status, or performance, of the 
abject will be perpetually disavowed, this doesn’t mean that the abject is failing in 
regards to challenging social norms. Rather, the struggle to be visible, to be identified 
even as abject, continually challenges and reveals the co-constitutive, thus constructed, 
nature of the norm, which becomes a political tool.  
I find the “performativity of the abject” to be similar to ideas of internalized 
racism, put forth in work like Fanon’s Black Mask, White Skin (2008), which will be 
discussed further in a later section. Since performativity is based in the unconscious 
repetition of cultural schemas about race, class, gender, and so on, abject performativity 
is then performing the rejected, the other, the jettisoned. The script for this performance 
has been provided by hegemony itself, as the cultural script of exclusion is drafted in the 
same ink as the performance of the hegemonic norm. Even when the dominant is unstable 
or transitory, it has already provided for its consolidation through the abject’s 
performance of otherness.  
2.04.04.03.03 benefits of Butler. However, Butler argues that we must embrace 
the abject, the excluded, as a site of the possibility of refiguring the hegemonic symbolic, 
imagining a future horizon that values bodies differently, even if there is failure attached 
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to the abject. Hekman (1998) looks at how Bordo’s work can be read as an example of 
the type of re-inscription that Butler suggests and how it might work in practice. 
Hekmans explains,  
Bordo takes the excluded identities of the anorexic and the bulimic as sites of 
resistance, as places where critiques of hegemonic subjectivity are enacted. The 
anorexic and the bulimic exaggerate the contradictions and exclusion of the 
hegemonic construction of subjectivity that feminists seek to displace. They do so 
not by appealing to the real or material, but by magnifying key aspects of that 
construction, turning them into grotesques. In both Bordo and Butler's theories the 
critical construction of exclusion is deployed to resignify the symbolic that 
constructs that exclusion. (p. 69) 
While Butler and Bordo have emphasized the female body, the anorexic and the 
homosexual as the excluded and explained their interest in these abjects as challenges to 
hegemonic ideals, others have taken the reformations of the abject and applied it to other 
marginal bodies.  
2.04.04.04 social abjection. While the previous scholars all engage with real 
material bodies at some level and acknowledge the role of abjection in the creation of 
marginal subjects, many (e.g. Butler and Chanter) are still primarily concerned with the 
abject as a theoretical structure. These scholars’ work is primarily in reformulating the 
theoretical with the idea that it may have material benefits, but they themselves do not 
explore the material lives of real people. The following scholars use the abject in 
application, to understand the creation of marginalized bodies outside of the rather 
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narrow focus heretofore on women and homosexuals. These scholars also explore more 
of the lived experiences of abject subjects, or people at the margins.  
2.04.04.04.01 social abjection and poverty. In Revolting Subjects: Social 
Abjection and Resistance in Neoliberal Britain (2013) Imogen Tyler uses a metaphoric 
double of revolting as disgusting and revolting as in to rise against authority to describe 
the role of marginal figures in neoliberalism. Tyler’s main project is to use social 
abjection “as a theory of power, subjugation and resistance” (p. 4). Tyler employs 
abjection “as a lived social process” (p. 4) to redress a lack in the literature on the abject 
which takes into account “what it means to be (made) abject, to be one who repeatedly 
finds herself the object of the other’s violent objectifying disgust” (p. 4). While Tyler’s 
work is deeply imbedded in Kristeva’s account of the abject, it is expanded to address the 
political and the material. Tyler clearly links the status of the abjected with violence, 
particularly the violent physical reaction of disgust.  
As discussed earlier in this chapter, disgust has been used as a tool of violence in 
the oppression of the disabled, the mentally ill and the criminal. Tyler explores what it 
means to have disgust leveled against one’s body on a regular basis, what it means to 
perpetually be abjected, to be turned into as Chanter (2008) would says, social waste. 
Drawing on Fannon and Bhabha, Tyler argues that “National Abjects” are the social 
insecurities of the state personified. The insecurities are made manifest through the 
abject’s ability to create subjects through expulsion, but what is “spat out” of the national 
body are the criminal and the degenerate. Tyler argues that neoliberal governance rules in 
part through generating insecurities in the body politic, fears about terror threats and 
border control, which are channeled towards groups that are constructed as drains on 
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national resources, like the poor, the unemployed and the undocumented immigrant. 
However, these figure’s abject status is overblown, constructed and conflated with larger 
social threats “in excess of what can be empirically proved or logically construed” 
(Bhabha, cited in Tyler, 2013, p. 9).  
2.04.04.04.02 Young’s abject racism. In looking at oppressed peoples, Young 
(1990) looks to abjection’s role in the creation of the ego and how the abject constitutes 
the subject through division and differentiation. With this in mind, she applies the ego 
creating division from the mother to a separation between groups of people, based largely 
on their perceived differences. This separation ends in marginalization and creates the 
categories of racism, xenophobia, homophobia and sexism. On a similar note, Buchloch 
(1994) argues that the abject could be beneficial in understanding “the historical 
pervasiveness of racism and homophobia [and] might justify treating them as though they 
were natural phenomena” (p. 6). The naturalness that Buchloch speaks of is not meant to 
make this practice acceptable; he specifically calls on the abject to help to dismantle these 
oppressions. He is attempting to understand their pervasiveness and its possible link to 
abjection., The abject involves a natural and even necessary rejection of the mother and 
of the other to constitute the self; however racism and other forms of oppression seem to 
be the abject run amok in an attempt to perpetually solidify the ego by violently abjecting 
others. 
Similarly, Young (1990) attempts to understand social exclusion through the 
abject explaining that,  
 [a]lthough a certain cultural space is reserved for revering feminine beauty,  
 for example, in part that very cameo ideal renders most women’s bodies  
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 drab, ugly, fleshy, loathsome by comparison. Old people, gay men and  
 lesbians, disabled people and fat people are other groups perceived to have  
 ugly, fearful, or loathsome bodies. (p. 201) 
The abject can be applied to more than bodily substances, like non-normative bodies 
based either on aesthetics or on deeper differences that contradict not only the visual 
normal, but embody what is considered aberrant within symbolic law. Those who possess 
abject bodies are feared, avoided and considered loathsome. Young (1990) further 
explains,  
 Xenophobia as abjection is present throughout the history of modern  
 consciousness, structured by a medicalized Reason that categorizes some  
 bodies as degenerate. I suggest that the role of abjection increases, however,  
 with the shift from a discursive consciousness of group superiority to such  
 group superiority lived primarily at the level of practical consciousness and  
 the unconscious. (p. 208-209) 
Young purposes that since society has explicitly embraced equality in our discursive 
world, racism and sexism have begun to emerge in non-discursive and habitual behaviors, 
which are not often interrogated to the same extent as law or language. The practical 
commonsense that Young (1990) mentions is analogous to ideology, or a “general sense 
of characterizing ideas, ideals, beliefs and values” (Duncum, 2008, p. 225) or as van Dijk 
(1998) explains, “ideologies are…socially shared ideas.” (p. 15). Hall (2011) explains 
that ideologies of racism and sexism then appear implicitly through ideological 
apparatuses like the media, which continue to rely on and perpetuate the abject status of 
the other. Abjection’s attachment to the imaginary and the pre-discursive mark it as a 
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way to interrogate our habituated attitudes of oppression that continue to exist in the 
imaginary register, even when they have been formally rejected by the symbolic through 
civil rights laws, for example. Discursive oppression has in the past cast the oppressed as 
objects; however, “Now the Other is not so different from me as an object – indeed, 
discursive consciousness asserts that the Blacks, women, homosexuals, disabled people 
are like me. But at the level of practical consciousness they are affectively marked as 
different” (Young, 1990, p. 209). Young is attempting to address racism and sexism in a 
society that claims to be “postracial” (Bonilla-Silva, 2009) and “postfeminist” (Tasker & 
Negra, 2007). Structural policies like affirmative action announce that difference is over 
and equality reigns; however, inequality persists, even grows (Tasker & Negra, 2007; 
Bonilla-Silva, 2009). Young’s logic is that if a shift in the symbolic, in laws and 
structures, towards equality has not rendered equality, then there must be something at 
work on the level of the imaginary. Something at the level of the unconscious perpetually 
marks difference as abject, even if the law explicitly argues for parity. While this 
argument neglects a structural critique of the legal system that asks whether laws 
surrounding equality are actually carried out, which many times they are not, Young 
effectively argues for the usefulness of abjection in addressing the complicated 
relationship between oppressed and oppressor, as well as why equality laws and civil 
rights have not ended domination.  
2.04.04.04.03 abject racism in South Africa. Continuing in the vein of social 
abjection and the attachment to living marginal bodies, Hook (2006) explains, “the abject 
is that intolerable contaminating thing, that historically – variable ‘entity of threat’ that 
can include ‘other people … [and] an infinite number of phenomena’” (p. 219). Hook is 
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interested in the abject as a material condition of marginal bodies, drawing not only on 
Kristeva but also on Bataille’s abject, which was “concerned with the exclusionary forces 
that operate within modern state systems in order to strip the laboring masses of their 
human dignity and reduce them to dehumanized social waste” (Gutiérrez-Albilla, 2008, 
p. 69). The connection between the abject and marginalized bodies, those who are not 
granted full subjectivity (or full citizenship), becomes more clear through these scholars. 
Bodies classified as deviant, or abnormal, because they do not fit the classification 
systems of the state become sites of anxiety. In Kristeva the process of abjection creates 
anxiety for the individual. On a larger scale, the failed exclusion of the other or the abject 
of society, creates socio-political anxiety.  
Similar to Young’s work, but with a specific critique of post-apartheid South 
Africa, Hook (2006) utilizes Kristeva’s abject, to “explore racism as a mode of reactivity 
that has been routed through the dreads, aversions and nausea of the body” (p. 208). In 
the work ‘Pre-discursive’ Racism, Hook argues that the abject can help explain the 
continuance of racism in places where discursive institutions have articulated a tolerance 
or anti-racist policy, as in Post-Apartheid South Africa. Hook looks towards an 
“embodied form of racism that is played through and substantiated by, the body’s 
economy of separations and distinctions” (p. 208). This bodily, pre-discursive, reaction 
becomes an affective response to a violation of order. Pile (2010) suggests that affect is 
the quality of life that is beyond cognition, beyond expression and “unable to be brought 
into representation” (p. 8) but manifest in the body’s reaction. Affect shares common 
ground with the Real, as it is beyond representation and abjection and it implicates the 
body. Racism then becomes an embodied affective response to a violation of a 
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prediscursive bodily schema of order that determines what is dirty and what belongs. It is 
in part due to affect and embodiment that racism continues, even grows, “in societies 
where equality and democracy have become enshrined ideals” (Hook, 2006, p. 213).  
While some have argued that psychoanalysis is unfit for use in critical race or 
gender studies (e.g., Hoad, 2000), Winnubst contends that psychoanalysis, provides 
opportunities to “articulate how race is historically and socially constructed and yet, 
nevertheless, individually embodied” (cited in Hook, 2006, p. 212). Hook (2006) agrees 
and argues that an understanding of the abject is necessary,  
Based as it is on such a prioritization of the body, the theory of abjection offers an 
extraordinary set of insights not only into the ‘physicality’ of the phenomena of 
racism - its bodily fascinations and anxieties, the visceral quality of its most 
primal reactions—but also into the linked qualities of psychological and indeed 
symbolic survival that seems to underwrite its affects. (p. 216) 
Hook doesn’t ignore the discursive components of racism, but argues that “we cannot 
properly apprehend racism if we fail to adequately understand what sustains it, what 
lends it its potent affective qualities, what supports its most visceral aspects” (p. 209). 
With a focus on the body and affect, Hooks analyzes abjection on a pre-discursive level 
to understand the crisis and anxiety that difference causes as it disrupts and haunts our 
systems of self and the world.  
 2.04.04.04.04 abjection, racism and Scott. Hook is not alone in locating the abject 
in proximity to the black body. Scott (2010) links the abject to black subjectivity in 
America with a particular reconfiguration of the abject as,  
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a lowering historical cloud, a judgment animating arguments and rhetoric in both 
currents in which the history of people in the African diaspora - having been 
conquered and enslaved and then, post-Emancipation, being dominated by 
colonial powers or by homegrown white supremacists - is a history of humiliating 
defeat, a useless history which must be in some way overturned or overcome. (p. 
4) 
Building his definition of black abjection based on Kristeva and Fannon,64 Scott 
argues that those involved in the African diaspora have had a pervasive experience of 
abjection. Scott’s argument is based on the radical exclusion of the diasporic African, an 
exclusion through slavery, Jim Crow, and the prison industrial complex that was so 
complete that they had no subjectivity, only defeat. The abjection of the black figure is 
not only a racial exclusion, but is also based in the black body as inherently queer. Queer 
in this instance stands in broadly for abnormal sexuality. The black body is shown as 
queer through stereotypes of hypersexuality like the “black buck” or the “hottentot” 
(Gilman, 2002). It is also made queer through emasculating stereotypes that are read as 
“gay”, which as Butler (1993) explains, is abject. Scott (2010) explains that his use of 
abjection is, in part, to investigate the ways that “blackness is rendered by the various 
cultural, social and economic processes of white supremacist domination as the exemplar 
of non-normative genders and sexualities” (p. 10). While Scott is interested in abjection 
as the material experience of absolute defeat, like the other authors writing on the abject, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Although, Fannon doesn’t use the term abject, Scott persuasively links the two authors, 
discussing Fannon’s writings on the experience of othering, being othered, and the deep 
dissonance this can cause in one’s subjectivity as abject.  
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he sees a possibility for reinscriptions of power through the embodiment of alienation 
that the abject can effect. Scott explains,  
But the alienation of an embodied consciousness is common to all humans. 
Blackness is nonetheless in the Americas one (but only one, among the brethren 
of racially marked bodies) of the primary means to access that alienation and its 
(perhaps surprising) powers. (p. 13)  
Scott (2010) continues, explaining that “abjection in/of blackness endows its inheritors 
with a form of counterintuitive power” (p. 9), a power, or freedom, that is found at the 
point of where ego protection breaks down and collapses into abjection. Stockton (2006) 
also uses the abject’s emphasis on borders as a way to approach the intersections of 
blackness and queerness and the concordant experience of shame. 
2.04.04.04.05 racism, abject death, and Holland. Holland (2000) is another 
author who looks at the relationship between the black body and abjection. While 
Holland doesn’t use the term abject specifically, the language of the abject abounds in her 
work on the role of the dead in African American fiction. She is interested in the 
construction of African Americans as haunting figures that menace from beyond. Holland 
(2000)  explains that, “it is important to conceive of death and discourse as linked to and 
comprising ideas about nationhood and nationality, about belonging and 
disenfranchisement” (p. 23) and that “the dead and their relations are perhaps the most 
lawless, unruly and potentially revolutionary inhabitants of any imagined territory, 
national or otherwise” (p. 23). Holland links the construction of national identity to 
notions of death, using a slippage between social and literal death, noting the deep 
connections between the two in light of slavery and colonialism. This in and of itself 
	  	  
140	  	  	  	  
	  
sounds like the abject, haunting from the margins, particularly with the abject’s 
connection to death through the corpse.  
Holland is also interested in the figure of the undead, the zombie.  
Reduced to the machinery of bodily physical labor, black people learned to appear 
 before whites as though they were zombies, cultivating the habit of casting the 
 gaze downward so as not to appear uppity. To look directly was an assertion of 
 subjectivity, equality. Safety resided in the pretense of invisibility. (bell hooks, 
 cited in Holland, 2000, p. 15)  
Zombies are discussed in terms of the uncanny and the abject within the genre of horror 
(Bishop, 2006; Clark; 2006; Creed, 1993). For Holland the black body of the slave is a 
metaphoric revenant, where the body lives, while subjectivity is denied and rendered 
“dead”, creating an abject figure. Holland borrows heavily from Butler, arguing a 
similarly co-constitutive creation of white hegemonic culture upon the back of the slave 
and black body built as a non-entity and perpetually denied full subjecthood, even after 
emancipation. Holland asks, “What if some subjects never achieve, in the eyes of others, 
the status of the “living?” What if these subjects merely haunt the periphery of the 
encountering person’s vision, …seldom recognized…often unnamed?” (Holland, 2000, p. 
15). Holland is interested in who occupies the space of national social death and why. 
She describes her project as an investigation into authors who  
are raising the dead, allowing them to speak and providing them with the agency 
of physical bodies in order to tell the story of a death-in-life. Perhaps the most 
revolutionary intervention into conversations at the margins of race, gender and 
sexuality is to let the dead - those already denied sustainable subjectivity - speak 
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from the place that is familiar to them. Moreover, speaking from the site of 
familiarity, from the place reserved for the dead, disturbs the static categories of 
black/white, oppressor/oppressed, creating a plethora of tensions within and 
without existing cultures. (p. 4) 
Holland (2000), like Hook (2006) and other authors (Chanter, 2008; Scott, 2010; 
Fleetwood, 2011; Tyler, 2013;), is interested in the political agency and redress that an 
investigation can yield into the marginal figures through the abject and a focus on death 
and haunting.65  
2.04.04.04.06 immigration. The abject is further linked to the political in 
Moruzzi’s (1993) examination of Kristeva’s subsequent works in National Abjects: Julia 
Kristeva on the Process of Political Self-Identification. Kristeva’s later works are 
contextually influenced by some of the recent changes in European nations like non-
European immigration, the reunification of Germany and the formation of the European 
Union. Moruzzi (1993) argues that Kristeva’s later work still focuses on the abject, but in 
the broader political context of the nation-state. Kristeva’s later works, while not on the 
abject per se,  
concentrates on the experiences of a stranger who is not simply an other, but who  
is defined as an exile, an immigrant, or foreigner; one who is other by virtue of  
the laws of the soil and of blood (which are sometimes placed in opposition),  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 It is worth noting that while I have focused on African Americans as the racialized 
others of the abject, which is the most obvious example in the United States, that abject 
otherness could be applied to any group that was not constructed as the norm. Not only 
are brown bodies the abjected other to whiteness, but whiteness, in a different context, 
could be equally othered, becoming a spectral pale haunting to the solidity and normalcy 
of the dark body.  
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disoriented in place and time. (Moruzzi, 1993, p. 137) 
More than just examining the experience of the immigrant or stranger, Kristeva’s 
later work looks at how the two are mutually constitutive of each other and the nation. 
Moruzzi sees this as abjection and explains, “The process of national consolidation is also 
a process of ongoing (international and intranational) estrangement” (p. 142). Moruzzi 
further explains, that, “the subject abjects itself and discovers itself in its own abjection; 
historically, the nation-state establishes itself, defined as other or excess, whose rejected 
alterity then engenders the consolidation of a national identity” (p. 143). Abjection 
creates the self, so national abjection, exclusion of certain types of bodies, creates the 
nation itself. In this way, the abject becomes a geopolitical tool of the nation state that 
sheers up unstable borders and solidifies national identity often through an imagined 
threat (Anderson, 2006). This focus on borders and specifically border attacks connects 
Kristeva’s later work on the nation (Kristeva, 2001; 2011) with her earlier work in 
Powers of Horror (1982) and the abject as representing a border crisis for the body in the 
form of substances and the nation in the form of undocumented immigrants and other 
non-citizens. As Smith (1998) notes, the abject is “closely bound up with questions of 
identity, boundary crossing, exile and displacement” (p. 29). The system that is in crisis is 
not only our personal bodily borders, but the borders of the state, of nationality and its 
stakes are a continuity of national belonging, as well as safety in the face of a perceived 
threat.  
2.05 Gooey Ends and Revolting Beginnings. As this literature review has 
demonstrated, disgust and abject are intimately linked. While disgust itself is a 
multifaceted affective phenomenon, many of its causes, food, waste, death, overlap with 
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the abject. However, the abject is more expansive, implicating psychological states and 
depths that surpass disgust. In the end disgust is the primary affective response of the 
abject, combined with both horror and the uncanny. The noun abject describes both the 
general body of ideas stemming from Kristeva’s work, expanded by later scholars, as 
well as, the actual excluded substances and categories of people. The verb abjection 
describes the process of exclusion and the jettisoning of the waste. While abjection in 
Kristeva’s formulation deals mostly with the exclusion of bodily substances and a 
following recuperation, this same process is applied by later scholars to lived experiences 
and material bodies. These later authors politicize the abject beyond a reification of 
binary inversion, emphasizing the abject’s potential to challenge the very hegemony it 
has co-created.  
This chapter has served to delve into the foundations of Kristeva’s abject and 
provide a review of the new avenues that the idea has taken more recently. What has been 
lacking in the works on the abject is its application to and use in the visual realm, since 
Kristeva, as well as later authors, emphasized the abject as a tool for literary analysis 
(Holland, 2000; Scott, 2010). Having laid this groundwork, the following chapters will 
explore the abject in application to visuals, creating an abject methodology for visual 
analysis that is both indebted to Kristeva but attuned to the more political implications of 
later ideas on the abject. 
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3.0: Meta-Methodologies: Or, What to do When your Methodology Doesn’t Exist 
Yet. 
3.01 In a Slimy Nutshell…The Journey Until Now. 
In the previous chapters, I have described both my own interest as an artist and 
scholar in the abject. I have also elucidated a broader context to understand visual 
expressions of excreta and other disgust inducing images. I have discussed the theoretical 
basis for disgust and the abject; looking at both the abject’s original context within 
psychoanalysis, as well as its broader application within social theory through scholars 
like Butler (1993; 2006), Scott (2010), and Chanter (2008). In the course of studying 
these ideas and their application to art, I discovered that not only are there theoretical 
slippages that conflate the abject and disgust, but that these concepts had not been applied 
to the visual arena in any consistent or in-depth manner. Secondly, the ways in which 
these concepts are applied to contemporary visual and material culture are not well 
documented. Third, where disgust and the abject overlap and diverge is flattened into an 
overly simplified response of gross. The nature of these slippages is important to address. 
Disgust is a retrograde emotion with a history of being used as a faulty rationale in both 
law and other structural forces for the creation and consolidation of borders, which 
further marginalizes certain behaviors characterized as aberrant, and where particular 
segments of the population are constructed as deviant or criminal. On its own, disgust, 
while a component of the abject, lacks the abject’s liberatory associations. The abject has 
the ability to empower the marginalized with its challenge to hegemony through a 
multiplicity of othernesses that constitute the abject. With this in mind, visual culture 
needs a method for approaching disgust as the rationale for what is rejected and the abject 
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as the mechanism of rejection and its haunting return. In common discussions, anything 
that is gross is overly simplified and flattened out as simply being anathema to the 
aesthetic and it thereby loses its nuances. A deep critical understanding of visuals as 
complicated and more than a binary of either enacting the hegemonic norm or 
challenging the status quo is also lost. My methodology can make sense of art depicting 
foul materials and the political implications of these works by exploring slippery 
substances and the equally complex theoretical ideas needed to comprehend their 
meaning.  
3.02 The Problem with Studying Ambiguity: Or, Why is There No Abject 
Methodology?  
The short answer to the question of why is there no abject methodology is that 
there is. Methodology is the larger body of knowledge, which dictates the system of 
discreet methods or techniques used to study a given artifact. The abject, as articulated by 
Kristeva, is itself a methodology. She creates a body of knowledge from which to 
understand the psyche and its responses to certain substances, particularly the psyche 
made accessible through the study of literature. 
The first chapter of the Powers of Horror (Kristeva, 1982), entitled Approaching 
Abjection, describes the features and functions of the abject. After establishing her object 
of study, the abject and abjection, Kristeva looks to literature to try and demonstrate the 
existence and function of her newly explicated abject. For Kristeva the abject is found 
most prominently in modern literature. According to her “the abject is related to 
perversion” (p. 15). Perversion in this instance stems not from a breaking of laws, but 
from a refusal to acknowledge the existence of those laws. Kristeva suggests that early 
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writing on religion, morality and law attempts to control the abject, to either purify it or 
to thrust it away. However, she explains, contemporary literature does not follow suit; 
rather, it “… acknowledges the impossibility of Religion, Morality and Law” (p. 16). 
Contemporary writing is not devoted to the creation of laws like earlier texts were, rather, 
contemporary, postmodern literature is informed by existentialism and the demise of 
grand narratives like that of truth, the primacy of the author and God. Literature now 
focuses on deconstruction, on the breaking of rules and the transgressing of propriety and 
morality.  
Contemporary writing is thematically the home of the abject. However, for 
Kristeva, the abject belongs to the realm of writing not only because of thematics, but 
also because of language and the imaginary. Kristeva explains that literature has the 
“ability to imagine the abject, that is, to see oneself in its place and to thrust it aside only 
by means of the displacement of verbal play” (p. 16). Literature not only allows for 
readers to imagine themselves in the place of the abject, but it allows for its resolution. 
Freudian displacement is an unconscious defense mechanism wherein the mind 
substitutes something new for something dangerous or unacceptable. Lacanian 
displacement is predicated on the unconscious having the structure of a language. Then 
displacement is a metonymy, where the object is not called by its name but called 
something with which it is associated or a fragment of the whole. It is a slippage of 
meaning that the unconscious uses to foil censorship (Lacan, 2004). Take for instance an 
old movie in which the camera pans away from an amorous couple on the beach to focus 
on the crashing waves. The ocean waves are a metonymy for sexual intercourse, a 
slippage that censors the literal, but acknowledges the act. In regards to the abject, verbal 
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play, like metonymy, allows for displacement, or a way for the unconscious to make 
itself known, but not in such a way that is damaging. The displacement of verbal play 
allows for playing with abjection rather than just rejection. That play allows for rejection 
and acknowledgment, a literary dipping of one’s toe into the cesspool that allows for both 
the pleasure of a squish between the toes and the accompanying rejecting “Ewe”.  
For Kristeva the par excellence of the abject in literature is Louis-Ferdinand 
Celine’s Journey to the End of Night (1934), a nightmarish account of war, written in 
jarring rhythms with the vulgar language of a soldier. Vice (1997) comments, “The fact 
that Kristeva chooses Louis-Ferdinand Celine to function as a literary exemplar of the 
abject, as Bakhtin chooses Rabelais for the grotesque, shows how much more obviously 
dark the transgressive realm has become” (p. 169-170). Kristeva, having noticed a trend 
in modern writing towards the transgressive, used her background as a psychoanalyst to 
try to understand the roots of this shift, its uses in literature and the implications of these 
developments for society.  
 Similarly, when Butler (1996; 1993) and Chanter (2008) articulate their different 
visions of the abject, they too are creating methodologies, or bodies of knowledge that 
form a way of researching or a system of knowing, based on Kristeva’s original 
methodology, that are then applied to social arrangements in the case of Butler and to 
film in the case of Chanter. They may not articulate their works as a methodology, but 
they are creating, or at least modifying, the body of knowledge that is the abject and 
using it as a tool for analysis. However, what is still lacking in this expansion of the 
abject is an application to the visual arts. A methodology is needed that like Kristeva’s 
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(1982), Butler’s (1996; 1993) and Chanter’s (2008) takes into account the abject and this 
scholar’s chosen object of study; that is, visual culture. It is this need that my work fills. 
3.03 How Can a Methodology be Abject? Or Methodologies that Make Your 
Stomach Turn 
An abject visual methodology may sound strange; how is a methodology abject? 
A methodology is a body of knowledge that informs research methods. However, the 
body of knowledge in question is the abject and the abject is that which refuses orders 
and disgusts from the periphery. Even reading Kristeva, one is contaminated by a close 
contact with bodily fluids and the jettisoned wastes of society. The abject, even when 
printed in text on the clean white pages, defiles through the imagination.  
An abject visual methodology asks the researcher to engage with abject images, 
allowing the abject images to penetrate the viewer’s senses. The researcher must see the 
artwork, but must also smell66, or imagine the scent that would accompany the image67 or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 The artist Peter De Cupere is a scent artist who creates installations that smell. In his 
2010 performance, Olfactory Dance: Sweat, De Cupere created sweat capturing suits that 
five dancers wore while performing to gather the scent of the performance 
(http://www.peterdecupere.net/). There are many other examples like Tom Friedman’s 
Untitled (1989), which is a square of Crest toothpaste on the wall which smells minty 
when the viewer approaches. I have been told that Damien Hirst’s works smell even if 
they are sealed. For example, A Thousand Years (1990) features rotting meat and Isolated 
Elements Swimming In The Same Direction For The Purpose Of Understanding (1991) 
features formaldehyde, both of which have a strong odor that apparently lingers in the 
gallery.   
67 Vanitas images of food, famous for their inclusion of rotting fruits and flowers that 
symbolize the temporal nature of life, are so realistic as to induce the imagining of scents. 
For example, Abraham van Beijeren’s Banquet Still Life from 1655-1665. Similarly, 
Géricault’s Raft of the Medusa (1818-1819) convincingly portrays the rotting corpses of a 
shipwreck so that one can imagine the stench coming from the beleaguered vessel. While 
there are idealized elements in this work to be sure; the deathly palor of many of the 
figures, the bodies that are truncated referencing the cannibalism that supposedly took 
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the taste,68 the touch,69 even the sound.70 The abject is sensorial, even haptic. It is a full-
bodied experience. This methodology not only asks its user to engage with abject art, but 
to sit with the abject, to investigate the abject and its attending emotion - disgust. By 
digging into these substances and the structures that form our responses to these 
substances, the researcher is contaminated through their close association with the 
polluting dirt, whether that filth is literally some grimy substance or the systematically 
jettisoned peoples of society. While this type of contamination is different than the literal 
contagion of handling dead flesh, there is nonetheless an othering process in place that 
marks out the researcher of the abject using an abject visual methodology as defiled.  
I can attest to this myself through the sheer number of disdainful looks and 
disgusted faces I have seen upon telling people what I study, even more so upon showing 
them. At times my lectures have almost been drowned out by the knee-jerk reaction of 
loud groans from the audience upon viewing my objects of study. While this is not the 
systemic or chronic othering that many minority peoples face, it is an insightful 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
place, and dead bodies left to float partially off the raft, create a beautiful but nightmarish 
mixture that is painted deftly enough to be both alluring and disgusting.   
68 Hyper realistic painters like Tom Martin (http://www.tommartinpaintings.com/) and 
Tjalf Sparnaay (http://www.tjalfsparnaay.nl/actueel.html) paint food so believably that it 
makes your mouth water like a food commercial. In a slightly different vein, Jennifer 
Rubell makes installations that feature food and drink that the audience is welcomed to 
consume. Her Pissing Gnome (Biker) 2011, is a commercial garden gnome that urinates 
beer.  
69 The Touch Art Fair in 2013 celebrated tactile and haptic art 
(http://www.touchartfair.com/). Many works now ask for audience participation like 
Jennifer Rubell’s piece Portrait of the Artist (2013) which, is a 25 foot long nude 
pregnant sculpture of herself with her belly hollowed out for the audience to climb into 
and take the position of the fetus.  
70 Paintings of battle like Vroom’s Battle of Gibraltar (1621) or images of music making 
like Carvaggio’s Concert of Youths (1595) ask us to imagine either the clang of weapons 
or the soft strumming of instruments.  There are also artworks with sound components 
like the artist Bobby Bird’s sound installations (http://bobbybirds.wordpress.com/).  
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experience to be judged by students as disgusting or perverse and to have that judgment 
made known. To think that there are no stakes in studying the abject would be wrong. 
Being in close contact with disgust through investigating the generative possibility in 
these sites and position is often met with resistance, particularly when there is no desire 
to disinfect or sanitize the disgusting elements. Furthermore, the resistance that the 
researcher is apt to experience is itself a visceral, almost violent, reaction in the audience 
fueled by the threat to their own cherished borders that the research represents. As a 
researcher of the abject, one’s own scholastic productions become abject themselves, and 
then, in turn, threaten with contamination those exposed to their research. This threat asks 
the average audience to patrol or contain the pollution, to show displeasure and to 
distance themselves, and then to judge or try to shame others, like the researcher, who 
have violated the taboo of dirt and disgust.  
 This is not to say that everyone responds this way to the abject, or feels the fear 
of pollution when an actual pollutant is not present. I have had wonderful experiences at 
conferences where like-minded individuals found the abject liberatory and responded to 
my research with affirmations. However, the average response has been at best confused 
as to why anyone would look at or better yet make something that evokes revulsion, and, 
at worst, outright disgust and border patrolling through grimaces and disgusted 
expressions. I have even been told my work was terrible. It is a prolonged exposure to 
that which is considered polluting, even if it is only in representational form and not 
reality, that makes this methodology an abject methodology. While this is an abject visual 
methodology, the ethnographic, self-reflexive, and immersive nature of this methodology 
as well as the expanded views on the abject could be applied to other non-visual abject 
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material, like literature. However, the visual nature of this abject methodology 
compounds the polluting factors. When reading one must digest, or translate the written 
word. There is a mitigating process between seeing the words on the page and being 
affected by them. The visual nature of this methodology makes it all the more 
contaminating since the imagining of literature is made visible instantly to the viewer.  
3.04 Sanguine Snippets: A Brief Outline of my Own Methodology  
 My abject visual methodology is predicated on viewing these works in person to 
experience the embodied nature of our reactions to disgust and the abject, but also about 
questioning one’s own reactions to the work and comparing them to other’s reactions to 
try to undercover what precisely is disgusting and why. This is about creating an 
autobiographical account of viewing the abject and being disgusted. My methodology 
emphasizes the need for contextualization in the face of disgust because as discussed in 
the literature review, disgust and the abject are culturally specific. This creates an 
ethnographic account of the abject art that has been experienced, which addresses the 
many facets of the cultural phenomena known as disgust and the abject. 
  Moving on from these broad approaches to disgusting images, this methodology 
outlines categories of images that are disgusting or abject, why and how they are 
considered abject, as well as some of the factors which may impact how the abject 
functions within these works, like whether the works use real disgusting substances or 
depict disgusting things. By outlining how to approach these images and what images are 
best suited for an abject visual methodology, I explore disgusting and abject images while 
providing a way for others to do the same.  
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The visual materials that I have chosen have not always been characterized as 
abject and when they have been, they have not been thoroughly explored through the 
abject. An investigation of how these images use the abject can expand the discourse and 
understanding of the term, and in a reciprocal relationship, produce new ideas about the 
visual material. By connecting these images to the abject and through that to other bodies 
of literature that help explain the abject, like crip theory (McRuer, 2006) 71 or monster 
theory (Cohen, 1996)72, theorists not only deepen and expand the abject, but also uncover 
new visual ways of knowing and understanding. In the following sections, I will discuss 
how I arrived at and understand the visual in my abject visual methodology. What 
follows is a documentation of my process creating my own methodology, with special 
attention paid to other methodologies that have influenced the creation of my own, and 
why the creation of an abject methodology was necessary.  
3.05 Methodological Delimitations 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Crip theory is a disability analytic and an identity practice articulated by 
McRuer(2006) and others (eg. Kafer, 2013; McRuer & Mallows, 2012) that is focused on 
disabled cultural productions. It emphasizes the exploration of difference and individuals 
interested in the ownership of an anomalous body.  It positions itself outside of the rights 
- based Eurocentric model of most of disability studies, where the end goal is often 
mainstreaming, which creates “compulsory ablebodiedness” even within the disabled 
community.  The inclusion of crip theory, particularly instead of disability rights 
advocacy, expands the abject as the disabled body is a marginal body, but the crip body is 
a marginal body that is empowered in and through its marginality and difference. 
72 Monster theory has been articulated by Cohen (1996) and others (eg. Kearney, 2002) as 
a “… method of reading cultures from the monsters they engender” (Cohen, 1996, p. 3).  
Cohen lays out seven theses about monsters, many of which overlap with the abject, like 
the monster’s body is a crisis of categories and monsters police the borders of the 
possible.  Since many disgusting images feature “monsters” or at least monstrousness, 
and the monstrous maternal body is the home of the abject, the inclusion of Cohen’s work 
helps to further expand and explain abject art.  
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  3.05.01 the visual in an abject visual methodology. While Kristeva sees 
literature as the home of the abject, I find the abject to be more closely related to the 
visual for several reasons. First, as mentioned above, the visual has a more direct and 
immediate somatic response than reading does; the cliché idiom “a picture is worth a 
thousand words” comes to mind. Pictures instantly convey mass amounts of information, 
which is interpreted as with any other form of communication but is done so instantly. As 
Feng and O’Halloran (2013) explain, “visual images, like language, fulfill the 
metafunctions of representing the experiential world (representational meaning), 
interacting with viewers (interactive meaning) and arranging the visual resources 
(compositional meaning)” (p. 322). This is to say that images convey complex 
experiences of the world and that “abstract concepts can also be metaphorically 
represented in visual images” (p. 323). Metaphor is a key aspect here as Serig (2006) 
explains, “Metaphor… is foremost a mapping of concepts and only secondarily takes 
form in language, image, or other forms of human expression.” (p. 231). Metaphor is, 
then, a mapping of our cognitive, sensorial and emotional experiences into a pattern or 
network that can be accessed again, understood and reorganized or blended into new 
knowledge and adapted to new experiences. Some (e.g. Lakoff & Johnson, 1999) have 
suggested that long-term memories are structured metaphorically because of the 
interconnectedness of our minds and bodies, combining sensory, emotion and cognitive 
data to create a more complete or richer representation.  
Art plays a role in the metaphorical storage of memories. Serig continues, “In 
efforts to bridge an experiential, sensorial world with an abstract conceptual world, 
artworks become the vehicles and the embodiment of meanings” (p. 233). Art often 
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represents one thing while explaining something else through it, like a larger or more 
abstract concept. According to Lakoff and Johnson many ideas are explained through 
other ideas. This creates a conceptual metaphor of A is B (Lakoff, 1993; Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1999). Others, like Aldrich, envision a different arrangement for art, where A, 
understood as the material and B, the subject matter represented, combine to create C, the 
content of the work (Serig, 2008; 2006). Visual metaphors are powerful representations 
of more than what is physically depicted and seem related to both the cognitive mapping 
system that define metaphors for Lakoff and Johnson (Lakoff, 1993; Lakoff & Johnson, 
1999; Serig, 2006; Serig, 2008), but one also related to iconography. Iconography, 
articulated by the art historian Panofsky (1983), argues for an emphasis on the 
interpretation of the subject matter or the meaning of the work over the form or formal 
qualities. Meaning can be determined through an understanding of the signs and symbols 
used in the works through intertextual knowledge. While Panofsky’s work is far more 
systematized than this, what matters is that an iconographic understanding of an artwork 
is achieved through metaphoric mapping. Metaphor works visually, as seen not only in 
iconography, but also in representations of the abject where bodily fluids are metaphoric 
stand-ins for the abject itself.  
Moreover, visual materials activate multiple areas of the brain. This is backed up 
by neuroscience’s theory of mirror neurons, in what has been called by some an 
“embodied simulation” (Jeffers, 2009, p. 4). Mirror neurons act in such a way that when 
we see an image of an action, the same part of our brain activates as if we were doing that 
action or even thinking about doing that action (Jeffers, 2009; Rokonitz, 2008). As 
Gallese notes, “we don’t just perceive with the visual system, we perceive also with the 
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motor system” (cited in Jeffers, 2009, p. 4). This “allows human beings to experience 
their own actions and those of others at an abstract level of representation” (Jeffers, 2009, 
p. 4). As Rokonitz (2008) explains in his look at the role of mirror neurons in the 
perception of disgust in theater and film,  
When we observe an action we perceive to be intentional, or meaningful, our 
mirror neurons activate both the visual areas that observe the action and, 
concurrently, recruit the motor circuits used to perform that action - the circuits 
that we would use were we to perform that action ourselves. (p. 411) 
Mirror neurons’ role in human cognition extends to what has been dubbed “tactile 
empathy” (p. 412), or the fact that mirror neurons are “activated by the sight of touch” (p. 
412), which reflects a “systematic tendency of our brain to transform visual stimulus of 
touch into an activation of brain areas involved in the processing of our own experience 
of touch” (Keysers, et al., cited in Rokonitz, 2008, p. 412-413). This creates empathy, 
which is defined as “an intellectual identification with or vicarious experiencing of the 
feelings, thoughts, or attitudes of another” (dictionary.com).  
Empathy has long played a role in art, as the first use of the root word for 
empathy, einfuhlung, “describe[d] the projection of human feelings into art objects” 
(Jeffers, 2009, p. 3). The German philosopher Vischer developed the concept of empathy 
in 1873 and explained it as “transpos[ing] myself into the inner being of an object and 
explor[ing] its formal character from within” (cited in Jeffers, 2009, p. 3). Vischer’s work 
has in recent years been validated by neuroscience’s claims about mirror neurons. The 
intersubjectvity created by mirror neurons with both other people and even objects “show 
that we are not alone, but are biologically and evolutionarily designed to be deeply 
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interconnected with one another” (Iacoboni cited in Jeffers, 2009, p. 7) and “that 
connectivity is at the heart of all human understanding” (Rokotnitz, 2008, p. 412). This 
means that to see disgust is to feel disgust both emotionally and physically. As Rokotnitz 
(2008) explains in regards to the representation of Rochester in The Libertine, a play by 
Thomas Shadwell, that twists “Rochester’s own disgust with humanity into an 
embodiment of disgust itself: causing audiences to feel disgusted by him” (p. 402). 
Through the work of mirror neurons and empathy, disgust can be not only represented 
but also embodied, “just as our sympathy, curiosity and perhaps even libido are 
pleasantly aroused, Jeffreys and Dunmore co-opt our mirror-matching networks in order 
to elicit disgust” (Rokonitz, 2008, p. 413).73 This instant and embodied empathetic 
response to visuals seems to make art a more natural place for an expression of disgust 
and the abject, which are similarly tied to the body.  
Another reason that the abject is more related to the visual realm than the literary 
has to do with the changing nature of media and imagery. Many visual culture scholars 
have argued that the world is increasingly visual (Mirzoeff, 2012, 2009; Freedman, 2003; 
Duncum, 2006). Visual Culture seeks to understand what Mitchell (2006) calls “the 
visual construction of the social field” (p. 345). Visual culture scholars argue that our 
social field is increasingly created and replicated through the visual. We no longer read; 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Jeffers (2009) connects mirror neurons to the early self-other relationship between 
mother and child. Mirror neurons activate the intersubjectivity that is displayed between a 
child and parent. As the mother/child relationship is the fundamental site of the abject, it 
is worth noting that mirror neurons may play a role in the difficulty that the child 
experiences in dividing from the mother. This relationship is the child’s first use of 
mirror neurons, which are associated with memory making and connectivity to larger 
neural networks and the development of cognition through pattern. Empathy is a 
“biological drive” (p. 7), which then makes the mother-child division, or a break in 
intersubjectivity, difficult.  
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instead, we watch. Our home is no longer the page, but the screen, where data streams to 
us 24/7 on hundreds, even thousands of channels, websites and on multiple handheld 
devices.  
Mirzoeff (2009) explains, “We live in a world saturated with screens, images and 
objects, all demanding that we look at them” (p.1). Video is the means of communication 
by both professional news and media networks, and from user-uploaded content shot on 
cell phones, iPods, tablets and cameras. He continues, “Visual culture is everywhere: all 
around us are screens on computers, game consoles, iPods, handheld devices and 
televisions, far outnumbering those used by the still-healthy cinema industry” (p. 2). Still 
and moving images proliferate around us, demanding our already overburdened attention. 
This expansion of images and image technology has allowed for the globalization of 
images and the ideas behind them as they circulate to anywhere with a Wi-Fi signal or a 
modem (Sturken & Cartwright, 2009). This expansion of images, image technology and 
image practices call for new ways to make sense of the visuals around us, what Sturken 
and Cartwright (2009) call “practices of looking”.  
My abject visual methodology is indebted to Sturken and Cartwright’s assertion 
that there are new visuals produced by our ever expanding and changing culture and that 
those visuals call for new approaches, new lenses, to understand them and the culture that 
produces them. While abject images have existed for millennia, their current 
proliferation, their intersection with technology and popular media, as well as their 
current commodification, all call for a new methodology that can address these emergent 
moments. The abject is digital, Wi-Fi, and in HD now. My abject visual methodology is a 
way to try and understand the expansion and popularity of gross and disgusting imagery. 
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Many have tried to understand the allures of violence (eg. Duncum, 2006a; 2009a), 
horror (eg. Hutchings, 2004; Clover, 1993), sexuality (eg. Duncum, 2009b; Langman, 
2008), and even just the gross things that one finds on television like the antics of the 
creators of Jackass (Jonze, Knoxville, Tremaine, Miller, 2000-2002) that feature massive 
amounts of nudity and violence (Brayton, 2007). It has been argued that many of these 
things appeal because of their transgressive nature (Richardson, 2010; Duncum, 2009b; 
Owen, Stein, & Berg, 2007; Stallybrass & White, 1986): they break rules. However, the 
mechanics of transgression and the taboo, which are glossed over in many texts, are 
imbedded in the abject. While many texts rely on the transgressive as an explanation or 
look at particular examples of transgression, few dig down all the way to the mechanics 
that construct the abnormal and the process of abjection, which creates the very borders 
that are crossed during transgression. My abject visual methodology is designed to dig 
deep and explore these early mechanics that so much of our culture’s rules and pleasures 
are based upon.  
Furthermore, the screen nature of much digital abjection, or the material presence 
of abject art for that matter, is often glossed over in favor of the narrative or pictorial 
elements that can dominate an abject image. My abject visual methodology takes into 
account the medium. It takes into account whether the abject is mitigated by a screen or 
other recording process; whether the abject was ever really present but is no longer, as in 
the case of film or photography; whether the abject is gestured to through abstraction; or 
whether it is literally present in front of the viewer. These levels or degrees of mitigation 
alter the abject, particularly in the digital age, but they have not been addressed in other 
literature on the abject.  
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Commodity items, including fine art that exists in the blue chip or museum 
market, must have a certain amount of appeal to ensure their viewing or purchase. 
However, many works of art, both fine and popular, depict things, which are broadly 
defined as gross and undesirable. The paradoxical appeal and repulsion of these objects 
fits best within Kristeva’s (1982) configuration of the abject. Art that addresses social 
issues, like the marginal position of certain bodies, engages in the expanded application 
of the abject reconfigured by Butler (1996; 1993), Chanter (2004) and others as dealing 
with social waste and the construction of hegemony. I have focused on the art world, but 
the contemporary trend towards the proliferation of disgusting images can be seen in 
television, movies, media, even designer vinyl toys. 
The abject becomes shorthand for waste, a shorthand visually represented most 
often in the forms of blood and vomit. And while blood and vomit are abject, without a 
guide to the application of the theory of the abject to visual imagery, a more complex 
analysis of these visuals and other more nuanced, less outwardly disgusting visuals seems 
difficult. It is easy to understand the abject when it is represented in vomit, but it is much 
harder to see the abject in an image of the fence that delineates the US/Mexico border, 
even though that fence is the border of the national body and creates abject, or marginal 
figures through its exclusions. The perpetual conflation of the abject with disgust and the 
lack of careful and rigorous attention to the subtleties of the abject is one of the main 
forces prompting my own project. Beyond this general conflation, the lack of a careful 
analysis of the abject in regards to the visual is the other main reason for my project. 
While Kristeva’s work has been applied extensively and with subtle nuance to literature, 
the conflation of the abject and disgust seems most present in regard to art. However, it is 
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in the arts that the abject needs its own special attention and methodology to understand 
the mechanics of disgust and the abject in complex and intersecting ways. This is because 
of art’s unique ability to make present the imaginative world in a literal and physical way, 
which evokes an embodied and visceral reaction that is closer to reality and more 
immediate than the literary. This immediate physical reaction has the ability, like reality, 
to override our ability to think and act critically. Contemporary art has, since the 
postmodern turn, shifted towards both analytic viewership and theoretical creation of art. 
However, disgust and the abject often override the analytical parts of our brain with a 
knee-jerk, or instant, reaction. We need tools for the exploration of visual culture in all its 
facets; particularly those aspects that would have us leave our critical faculties behind. 
Disgust and the abject then call out particularly strongly for a methodology that allows 
for intervention and critique.  
What is particularly lacking in visual analyses of the abject are the more recent 
developments in the theory of the abject (Butler, 1993; Chanter, 2008; Tyler, 2013; Scott, 
2010) that link the abject to marginal bodies and political potential. While the abject as 
blood and vomit is well established in the visual arena, the abject as the marginal figure 
or the ambiguous border is not well understood. This confusion seems to result from the 
lack of a methodology that is adapted to both visuals and the abject in its full and 
complex nature. With the intent of exposing the limitations in the methodologies 
currently used to interpret marginalized communities and abject visual imagery, I am 
creating a new, more inclusive abject visual methodology that can be applied to the study 
of a myriad of images, resulting in a more sophisticated understanding of these often 
rejected bodies of work. 
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 3.05.02 women of color feminist reading practice. In the course of studying 
disgusting art, I thought through many metaphors and theories in trying to find the 
appropriate methodology that suited this project. I thought about using the idea of an 
abject reading practice, borrowed from Women of Color feminism and particularly from 
the work of Hong (2006). In her work The Ruptures of American Capital: Women of 
Color feminism and the Culture of Immigrant Labor, Hong (2006) outlines a reading 
practice which focuses on the need to “read”, or to apprehend and to find meaning, not 
only in text, but in cultural productions and identity. This practice asks how an individual 
is read in different spaces, stressing the mobile and circulating nature of identity. Both 
Women of Color feminism and the reading practice associated with it appealed because 
of their intersectional critique, which accounted for multiple, often conflicting, identity 
categories, their deconstruction of the state and structural forces and interest in social 
justice. Hong (2006) explains,  
Women of Color feminist practice emerged to name the contradictions of the 
racialized nation-state by deploying tactics that exceeded nationalism’s scope: 
intersectional analysis, an attention to difference and a critique of identification 
with the normative race, gender and sexual institutions of the state. (p. xix) 
While an intersectional critique of the structures that have continued to divide the country 
into racialized sectors and have often coopted difference to negate radicalism74 is a 
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  For those unfamiliar with Hong’s (2006) work or Women of Color feminism as an 
analytic, let me offer an example of the types of cooption that Hong is critiquing. 
Homonormativity is a term used to describe the ways in which homosexuality has been 
absorbed into discourses of normativity through marriage equality, economic station, and 
cisgendered status. (Note: Cisgendered refers to those whose gender matches their 
biological sex). Homonormativity assumes that queer individuals can and want to be like 
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strategic tactic that I embrace, a reading practice seemed at odds with a visual project that 
seeks to redress the emphasis on the abject in text. While intersectionality is at times a 
necessary method for an abject visual methodology, both intersectionality and Women of 
Color feminism as methodologies do not address the embodied nature of an abject visual 
methodology. Moreover, disgust and abjection are often a composite of multiple identity 
categories, and while an intersectional approach can help to understand the specifics of 
individuals with multiple conflicting identities, it is not equipped to look at the broader 
categories of disgust and abjection. My own abject visual methodology is heavily 
indebted to feminist methodologies like Women of Color feminism, but is its own 
specific methodology with different emphases.  
3.05.03 Wilson and lenses. I considered employing an abject lens, borrowing 
from Wilson (1997), who argues that by adopting different lenses one can see more of an 
image. This stems from the idea that different lenses bring different areas of the artifact 
into focus and “provide important insight into their meaning” (p. 93). Wilson notes, 
“when these lenses are used, the physical art object, at different times and for different 
individuals, reveals works of art differently” (p. 89). Lenses are diverse, including lenses 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
heteronormative people. As Duggan (2002) explains, homonormativity is,“ a politics that 
does not contest dominant heteronormative assumptions and institutions but upholds and 
sustains them while promising the possibility of a demobilized gay constituency and a 
privatized, depoliticized gay culture anchored in domesticity and consumption.” (p. 179). 
Hegemony has coopted the radical potential of queer into the discourse of 
heteronormativity. A careful intersectional analysis of identity categories can help to 
unpack homonormativity in relationship to class, gender, and race to reveal an often 
white, affluent cisgender male at the center of this particular inclusion debate. Women of 
Color feminism and intersectionality also point out the further exclusions that happen 
when homosexuality is coopted into the norm and further disenfranchising poor, queer, 
people of color. Further divisions within the queer community make organizing for 
political effect difficult and threaten to depoliticize sexuality. 
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of formal analysis based in the elements and principles of art, theoretical lenses that 
approach the work through bodies of knowledge like feminism or the abject, personal 
lenses, even ideological lenses. As Gude (2009) explains, habits of viewership create 
lenses, “habits of mind… can be used as lenses through which to view and re-view art” 
(p. 9). Ideology is often explained in shorthand as common sense, the habit or way we are 
acculturated to think (Hall, 1981). We can similarly become acculturated to a particular 
lens and view things in a way that seems normal and natural but often leaves part of the 
image uncovered or ignored. An abject lens could perhaps disrupt this habitus of 
viewership. However, lenses can be taken on and off. They do not necessarily lead to 
permanent change or implicate the body, beyond the eyes, in the way the abject does. 
Lenses are designed to see what is there, while much of the abject is based in the 
unconscious, or what is not expressly present. While this may be a slide from the 
metaphoric to the literal, it is worth noting, as these metaphors structure the use and 
understanding of these tools. In the end, lenses with their focus on vision seem to lack a 
key component to the abject, embodiment.  
3.05.04 ways of seeing and practices of looking. I have considered an abject 
way of seeing, based on Berger’s foundational work Ways of Seeing (1972). The Western 
scopic regime is predicated on European male dominance and has created a “habit” of 
seeing that many disgusting works challenge. As Ways of Seeing criticizes some of the 
basic assumptions of that scopic regime, primarily its supremacy and singular legitimacy, 
it is an attractive approach as a methodology.  
However, one of the major detractors to Berger’s work that Sturken and 
Cartwright (2009) discuss is that “the terrain of images and their trajectories has become 
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significantly more complex since Berger” (p. 6). Berger’s work, while innovative at the 
time, does not have the complexity to address contemporary images that exist in a 
thoroughly technologically saturated world. Another issue with Berger’s work, which is 
somewhat related to the somatic experience of technology, is that he is singularly 
concerned with vision. Berger explains, "It is seeing which establishes our place in the 
surrounding world; we explain that world with words, but words can never undo the fact 
that we are surrounded by it" (Berger, 1972, p. 7). While I agree with him to a point, his 
neglect of the other senses puts his work at odds with the abject, which invokes, either 
literally or figuratively, a wide breadth of the sensorium from pungent smells, to foul 
tastes, even slimy touches. Also, the abject is streamed to computers and television sets, 
is downloaded and appears in video games, all technologies that Berger does not address.  
Later scholars like Sturken and Cartwright (2009) are also influenced by Berger 
(1972) but recognize that technology and “the economic context of postindustrial 
capitalism has enabled a blurring of many previously understood boundaries between 
cultural and social realms” (Sturken & Cartwright, 2009, p. 6). With this in mind, Sturken 
and Cartwright design new practices of looking that can approach the complexity of 
contemporary images that go beyond Berger. In their work, Sturken and Cartwright use 
interdisciplinary practices rooted in culture studies, feminism, and media analysis to 
understand the multiple technologies that inform and create our images. They focus on 
how images can carry multiple meanings depending on inter and intracultural contexts. 
Sturken and Cartwright’s text Practices of Looking (2009) inspired me to consider an 
“abject practice of looking” as a methodology.  
While valuable as an influence and a point of departure, Sturken and Cartwright’s 
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work seemed equally limited as a primary methodology insofar as the abject is about 
much more than looking because it involves a physical, as well as social and 
psychological component. With Sturken and Cartwright’s model in mind, an abject visual 
methodology would be more in line with practices of feeling and the interrogation of 
immediate emotional responses to the visual. Moreover, while the abject can be found in 
the contemporary scopic field, the abject is also historical, whereas Sturken and 
Cartwright’s (2009) work is geared more towards contemporary multimedia viewing 
practices. Finally, Sturken and Cartwright offer numerous “practices” of looking, or 
multiple methodologies ranging from Marxism to feminism, and semiotics to 
psychoanalysis. Their work lacks a unified approach beyond the desire to understand 
contemporary images, and while my own project is an attempt to do the same, it is 
unified under, an albeit broad, heading of disgusting and abject images. Sturken and 
Cartwright’s “practices” could have been applied to my objects of study, but their 
analytic frameworks are broad and varied to uncover the specifics that an abject visual 
methodology was designed to reveal.  
3.05.05 psychoanalysis. An abject visual methodology is directly related to 
psychoanalysis as a methodology. Psychoanalysis as a practice lends itself to 
methodology. As Brown and Heggs (2011) state, “Freud’s psychoanalytic sessions were 
predicated on a supposed cure achieved through ‘helping the subject to overcome the 
distortions that are the source of self-misunderstanding’ (Ricoeur, 1981: 265)” (p. 297). 
However, “what he [Freud] was in effect doing was constructing a method for the 
renewal of self identity” (Giddens, 1999 cited in Brown & Heggs, 2011, p. 297). This 
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method can be adjusted to understand the roots of miscommunication and 
misidentification, in the individual and within a broader societal context.  
Psychoanalysis as a methodology is concerned with stories that are “ haunted by 
the bits that she [the researcher] chooses not to see or is unable to see” (Brown & Heggs, 
2011, p. 298). However, these stories might be “ a cover story for things the researcher is 
finding difficult to address …. But more broadly these cover stories might pertain to a 
wider community, specific forms of common sense or ideologies that govern ways of 
life” (p. 298). Psychoanalysis not only uncovers the unconscious of the individual 
researcher, but also the unconscious ideologies of the society that the researcher lives 
within.  
Within psychoanalytic methodologies there have been few attempts to 
systematically address the multiple facets of the abject, particularly in regards to visual 
culture. There are some scholars that endeavor to provide a deeper understanding of the 
abject in application to artists like Jenny Saville (Meager, 2003) and Cindy Sherman 
(Foster, 1996; Mulvey, 1991). There are scholars like Shimakawa (2002) who have taken 
Kristeva and reformulated the abject into a methodology for understanding theater, 
arguing for a connection between national identity formation and the Asian body in 
theater as understood through the abject. But within these examples and others (e.g. 
Houser, Jones, Taylor & Ben-Levi, 1993; English & Spurlock, 2008; Welchman, 2001), 
the abject is not fully explored, suffering a conflation with disgust that obscures the 
works’ nuances.  
Psychoanalysis and thus the use of an abject visual methodology, is an 
excavation-like process that delves into the self/society divide and attempts to uncover 
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the larger social workings through the individual’s experience, particularly experiences of 
disgust. As Rose (2006) notes, “psychoanalysis consists of a range of theories that deal 
most centrally with human subjectivity, sexuality and the unconscious” (p. 107), all of 
which take time and energy to understand as they are often buried in repression, 
displacement and metonymy. The psychoanalytic methodology in application to images 
is, according to Rose (2006), “centrally concerned with their social effects: the ways they 
produce particular spectating positions that are differentially sexualized and empowered” 
(p. 107). Mulvey’s thoughts have been influential in regards to the usefulness of 
psychoanalytic methodologies to look at social issues manifested primarily in film. 
Mulvey explains, “psychoanalytic theory is … appropriated here as a political weapon, 
demonstrating the way in which the unconscious of patriarchal society has structured film 
form” (cited in Rose, 2006, p. 137). Psychoanalytic methodologies, pluralized because 
there is no one body of literature that all of these methodologies draw from, when applied 
to issues beyond those concerned with the self, offer a way to address broader social 
justice issues and connect to critical culture studies and its relationship to power and 
oppression. Similarly, an abject visual methodology seeks to understand the appeals of 
the abject on more than a personal level, broadening out to understand social trends 
towards disgusting images and the questions that come with that trend, like what does 
this development say about our current culture? 
While psychoanalysis as a method can be applied to art, putting the work “on the 
couch” so to speak, and also to artists,75 it is not specifically or singularly designed for art 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 A well-known and contentious example of this is the art historian Meyer Schapiro, who 
famously put Cézanne and his apples “on the couch”, arguing that the works depicted a 
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and is open to multiple approaches beyond the abject (Rose, 2006; Adams; 2009). 
Moreover, some have criticized the use of psychoanalytic theory (e.g. Hoad, 2000) in 
general. This stems from a lack of consensus as to what psychoanalysis is and what is 
does. Hoad (2000) has argued that psychoanalysis is not truly political, and that it is too 
sexist and antiquated to be useful. Hoad has maintained that psychoanalysis naturalizes 
sexual and racial difference and acts as a colonizing force from the West. However, 
“Juliet Mitchell (1974: xv), insists that ‘psychoanalysis is not a recommendation for a 
patriarchal society, but an analysis of one’” (Hoad, cited in Rose, 2006, p. 113).  
In a similar vein, Oliver (2004) suggests that psychoanalysis can be a tool for 
understanding oppression as a social phenomenon, through an acceptance of the notion 
that the individual and thus the psyche are “thoroughly social” (p. xiii). The idea that the 
psyche is social, or a cultural production whose function and form is based on particular 
commonly shared representation of self and mental health, stems from Freud and his 
work on trauma after World War I (Freud, 1995). Psychic trauma and pain have real 
world effects and documentable consequences for both the individual and the larger 
community and social order. Oliver (2004) explains that subjectivity and the psyche are 
built in a social context and that one cannot “explain the dynamics of oppression without 
considering its psychic dimension” (p. xiv). Psychoanalysis is then, with certain 
modifications, suited to understanding social operations. While Oliver doesn’t focus on 
the abject per se, she instead develops a theory of alienation positioned within the notion 
of the abject arguing that alienation as a core experience of both the social and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
“latent erotic sense” (Schapiro cited in Erwin, 2002, p. 121). While exalted in the field of 
art history as someone who opened the field up to new possibilities of analysis, there has 
been much criticism of Schapiro and this type of use of psychoanalysis (Erwin, 2002).  
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psychic is an abject experience. Alienation is the excluded position of the “Other”: it is 
the place of the rejected from which the abject haunts, excluded but not completely. 
Psychoanalytic methodologies are a political and social tool as well as bodies of 
knowledge. They can be, and have been, applied to projects beyond the field of 
psychoanalysis itself and its therapeutic goals. While this methodology could be used for 
my own work, it is not specific enough to address the abject, particularly abject visuals, 
which need a deep understanding of how visuals work as well as how the abject works as 
a psychoanalytic methodology.  
Psychoanalytic methodologies are inline with my own work as I envision my 
methodology as a political and social tool with applications beyond psychoanalysis and 
art. However, the existing psychoanalytic methods, even the abject one formulated by 
Kristeva, have not covered either an expansive view of the abject or the visual arena. I 
view my own abject visual methodology as a type of psychoanalytic methodology, one 
specifically attuned to both the abject and the visual and expanded beyond the model of 
putting either the art or artist on the couch, to include audience responses.  
3.05.06 further inspirations. I investigated more traditional methodologies and 
found that some were helpful, but none completely filled the bill, so to speak. An abject 
visual methodology should be a tool that aids in exploration. The abject as a body of 
knowledge prescribes techniques of investigation that can be simultaneously a panoramic 
view that allows one to see broad trends, a macroscopic view that is attuned to the fine 
detail directly in front of the viewer, and a microscopic view that allows the viewer to see 
past the surface to uncover hidden depths and obfuscated structures. Following this visual 
exploration, an abject methodology deals with the somatic, the haptic and the sensorial as 
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disgust activates the whole body, particularly the digestive system. This methodology 
engages in what is both literally present, as well as what is hidden in the unconscious. 
The preceding section has been a delimitation of the many methodological approaches 
that I have considered using to understand abject visuals because of their compelling 
aspects, but are lacking in enough ways to call for the creation of my own methodology. 
Next, I turn to works that have had a more fundamental impact on the construction of my 
own abject visual methodology.  
3.05.06.01 informé. It is with a lengthy quest to find an appropriate methodology 
for my project in mind that I turned to Bois and Krauss’s work Formlessness: A User’s 
Guide (1997) and Sandoval’s Methodology of the Oppressed (2000) for inspiration. 
These two works, which are outside of the predominant theoretical works on the abject 
and disgust that are contained in my literature review, have been most influential in the 
production of my abject visual methodology. As mentioned in the literature review, 
Bataille first theorized the abject and called it l’informe or formlessness. L’Informe 
originates from Bataille’s unpublished papers and is known primarily through the work of 
Bois and Krauss, particularly their book Formless: A User’s Guide (1997). Formless is a 
theoretical text that interprets and reformulates Bataille’s work while mapping his ideas 
onto modern art. Simultaneously, Formless is a catalogue from the exhibition L'Informe: 
Mode d'emploi, which occured May 21 to August 26, 1996 at the Centre Georges 
Pompidou in Paris. Bois and Krauss believed that the exhibition, which they curated, 
“operationalized” their theoretical work and demonstrated their understanding of Bataille. 
Both the show and their book, which offer a methodology of the formless, outline 
categories with which to understand formlessness. Within each of these broader 
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categories Bois and Krauss offer subcategories that help to explain and expand the 
broader categories and situate works of art within both the more specific and more 
general categories of the informe. For example, under base materialism, they discuss 
ideas surrounding the cadaver, entropy and dialecticism and pair images with their 
discussion of these categorical explorations. Bois and Krauss (1997) explain the 
motivation for their work, arguing that  
certain artistic practices with which Georges Bataille's name had never been 
associated – the sculpture of Alberto Giacometti from the late 1920s and early 
1930s on the one hand and the repertory of surrealist photography on the other – 
could only be characterized adequately through the operations of Bataille's 
l’informe. (p. 9)          
It is with the application of Bataille’s work to a broader set of artistic practices in mind 
that they develop four key categories from Bataille’s work to demonstrate the process of 
formlessness: base materialism, horizontality, pulse, and entropy.  
Bois and Krauss approach some of the same works that I have labeled as abject 
through formlessness, specifically rejecting the abject and its trend in the art world. For 
example, Bois and Krauss categorize some of Cindy Sherman’s works as dealing with 
horizontality and include them in their show and catalogue. Her centerfold series is 
included because the series has an elongated format that challenges the traditionally 
vertical orientation and form of portrait images. Her Old Master’s series is included 
because while the format is that of traditional portraits, the prosthetics that Sherman uses 
are pulled downward by gravity, signaling not only that they are faux, but that the work is 
about debasement through putting into a prone and horizontal position that which is 
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meant to be upright, heroic, and at eye level; the traditional portrait (Bois & Krauss, 
1997). Bois and Krauss also discuss Mulvey’s (1991) reading of Sherman’s work in 
relationship to the abject. However, in the end they renounce the use of the abject in favor 
of their own categorical system and frame, formlessness, explaining, “that ‘abjection,’ in 
producing a thematics of essences and substances, stands in absolute contradiction to the 
idea of the formless” (Bois & Krauss, 1997, p. 238).  
Bois and Krauss argue for using the term formlessness rather than the abject 
because of its relationship to sublimation, or an intentional move in Bataille’s writings to 
raise up the lowered and lower the high; the informe is an operation, not a theme or 
substance, whereas for them the abject is not operational, but rather thematic. This 
becomes clearer in Bois and Krauss’ definition of horizontality, which is not simply 
works that are horizontal, but is rather a change in the viewer’s relationship to the art 
object that is traditionally vertical on the wall and most closely related to the viewers 
eyes and sense of sight. By placing the work on the floor, or in a different mode of 
viewing other than the vertical which is ennobling and hierarchical, the artist enacts the 
process of horizontality and changes the viewers relationship to art. Bois and Krauss 
(1997) have championed the formless as opposed to the abject because formlessness is an 
operation, a “performative ‘force’ of the ‘formless’” (p. 9). Formlessness is not about the 
object itself, per se, but what the object does, the operation it performs, which is usually a 
leveling or inverting of hierarchies, often through denigration. 
They also argue that formlessness is a more appropriate term than the abject as it 
has the ability to pick apart the categories of form and content and upend the very divide 
between the two. Formlessness is a type of operation  
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that brush[es] modernism against the grain, and of doing so without countering 
modernism’s formal certainties by means of the more reassuring and naïve 
certaintines of meaning. On the contrary, these operations split off from 
modernism, insulting the very opposition of form and content - which is itself 
formal, arising as it does from a binary logic - declaring it null and void. (Bois & 
Krauss, 1997, p. 16) 
For Krauss, it is the performative and structural nature of the formless that separates 
Bataille’s ideas from Kristeva, especially since Kristeva is more interested in the content, 
or “certainties of meaning”, which Krauss finds naïve. Bataille’s idea, according to 
Krauss, “is about attacking the very imposition of categories…But Kristeva’s project is 
all about recuperating certain objects as abject” (Foster, et al., 1994, p. 3).76 Kraus is 
willing to acknowledge that Butler’s work with the abject perhaps has potential to move 
beyond the simple inversion that Krauss argues is characteristic of Kristeva, but 
repeatedly rejects Kristeva’s views as juvenile. Kraus explains informe as “ structural. I 
take it to be a way for Bataille to group a variety of strategies for knocking form off its 
pedestal” (Foster, et al., 1994, p. 4). Kraus acknowledges that Kristeva’s work is 
grounded in Bataille, but calls Kristeva’s abject “merely a way to characterize bodily 
substances so that the formerly disprivileged becomes the privileged” (p. 4) and claims 
this is “childish” (p. 4). While I think this is a fundamental misreading of the abject, 
which seems to ignore the ambiguity and complicated nature of Kristeva’s work, it is 
worth noting that there is a difference between how Bois and Krauss theorize 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 This text is a round table discussion between the authors on the popularity, problems 
and possibilities of the abject. 
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formlessness and the abject, even as there are deep connections between Kristeva and 
Bataille’s work. Bois and Krauss’s use of formlessness is quite their own and is a single 
interpretation of Bataille’s work. It is an interpretation that aligns with Bois and Krauss’s 
own work within modernist art history. Kristeva herself is influenced by Bataille and 
formlessness, which inspired her own project on the abject. While Bois and Krauss and 
Kristeva are influenced by some of the same source material, they end up with very 
different products. It would seem that Krauss’s dislike of the way Kristeva handled 
Bataille, is part of the reason for her and Bois’s own project on formlessness.  
Krauss is particularly upset with Kristeva’s abject for the literalization of filth and 
the body and the direct depiction of waste that has accompanied the rise of the abject. She 
even goes so far as to say she has a “horror of literalization” (Foster, et al., 1994, p. 12). 
Krauss explains, “The ‘body’ – as it has increasingly surfaced in current theoretical work 
– is rapidly becoming my phobic object” (Foster, et al., 1994, p. 12). Krauss is distressed 
by the literal representations of shit and the body, something she admits to avoiding in 
her own analysis of artists like Jackson Pollock and Cy Twombly, in part because 
literalness forecloses open signification and sublimation, but also because the literalness 
seems distasteful.77 For numerous reasons, Krauss and her work with Bois in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Labeling Krauss’ reaction as distaste comes from a number of comments she makes in 
the article. She admits to her own phobia of bodies and substances. She makes derisive 
comment about how “awful” Art Brut (Foster, et al., 1994, p. 18) is because of its 
literalness and sexual content. When fellow critic Buchloch asks about the sexual 
explicitness of Twombly’s work, Krauss responds that she didn’t see it, and seems to find 
it disgusting in retrospect. She also refuses to discuss Pollock famously pissing in Peggy 
Gugenheim’s fireplace. It would seem that she is quite phobic of filth. Finally, her label 
of Kristeva’s work as childish and her own championing of Bataille marks her work as 
modernist and points towards her distain for championing low substances and her 
adherence to modernist hierarchies.   
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formlessness is less than helpful in regards to understanding the abject; however, it is 
very useful as a model for the creation of a visual methodology that is based in 
psychoanalytic thought.  
There is a difference between Bois and Krauss’ project and my own, as their work 
is self-referentially embedded in the art world. They are not trying to draw larger 
conclusions about society, nor are they interested in any area of visual culture beyond the 
art world’s avant-garde. They also do not infuse their work with any broader cultural 
critique like feminism or critical race studies. My own project is interested in a broader 
range of imagery, particularly emergent genres and lowbrow art. It is also infused with a 
larger goal based on providing a voice and consideration to the margins through an 
analysis of images of and from the margin. However, Bois and Krauss’ project is helpful 
in its construction of a methodology, which attempts to provide form and a map to that 
which, by definition, lacks form. An examination of formlessness is important for two 
reasons: one being the need to differentiate between the abject and formlessness as being 
separate projects with different approaches and goals that necessitate the creation of both 
Bois and Krauss’s work, as well as my own; and two, because my own work has been 
influenced by the ways in which Bois and Krauss have used Bataille’s ideas in 
application to the interpretation of art. 
3.05.06.02: methodology of the oppressed. Another work that has been influential 
in the creation of my own methodology is Sandoval’s Methodology of the Oppressed 
(2000). Sandoval begins by arguing that a number of thinkers, including Derrida, Barthes, 
and Fannon, have reached a critical mass in regards to postcolonial and postmodern 
thinking. They each approach the problem of social oppression through similar types of 
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critique, citing the role of capitalism, of empire and of media in the unequal distribution 
of resources. This shift in culture has been identified in many ways: globalization, post-
industrialism, post-modernism, post-colonialism, transnationalism, technological, and 
consumerism. While these are each different concepts, they each describe a similar 
manner of breaking with the past. Sandoval (2000) notes that “the rationality of Western 
thought can be said to have found its limits” (p. 8) and that, “The twentieth-century 
season of reproachment shook the Western will to know in all its settling points, 
permitting a release of new knowledges in the sciences, arts and humanities”(p. 8). These 
new knowledges have lead to the creation of new academic disciplines, like ethnic and 
feminist studies, that “defied and transgressed the traditional boundaries of academic 
disciplines” (p. 8). At the center of these new fields were scholars like Jameson, 
Harraway, Anzaldua, Lorde, and Foucault. These theorists discuss how to address the 
problematic moment of what bell hooks (1994) has called “white supremacist capitalist 
patriarchy”, although to this I would add ableist,78 sizist,79 mentalist80 and imperialist81. 
Sandoval (2000) explains that,  
The goal here is to consolidate and extend what might be called manifestos for 
liberation in order to better identify and specify a mode of emancipation that is 
effective within first world neocolonizing global conditions during the twenty-
first century. (p. 2)  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 For more on ableism, see Davis (2010).  
79 For more on sizism, see Rothblum & Solovay (Eds.) (2009). 
80 For more on mentalism and the rise of mad pride, see Dellar, Curtis, & Leslie (Eds.) 
(2000).  
81 For more on imperialism, see Said (1994).  
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Sandoval’s project is based in the review of these scholar’s work, uncovering linkages 
and overall themes, particularly that many of these thinkers have argued that love is the 
best way to counter the new cultural shifts. Sandoval (2000) notes that,  
a diverse array of thinkers are agitating for similarly conceived and unprecedented 
forms of identity, politics, aesthetic production and coalitional consciousness 
through their shared practice of a hermeneutics of love in the postmodern world 
and it demonstrates that the apartheid of theoretical domains dividing academic 
endeavors by race, sex, class, gender and identity is annulled when this 
fundamental linkage is discerned. (p. 4) 
Taking this critical mass of scholarship on both the cultural turn and possible 
antidotes to its oppressive structures, Sandoval creates a methodology to redress 
oppression, a plan of action to follow not only for scholarship and critique, but also for 
possible social change. Sandoval outlines ten discussions that are the ideological basis of 
her methodology including,  
the principal of primal love and desire, love as a political apparatus, the end of 
academic apartheid, the bases for creating interdisciplinary knowledge, radical 
mestizaje82, différence, the grammatical position of subjugation, the middle voice 
as the third voice, technoscience politics 83and decolonizing cyberspace. (p. 4) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Mestizaje means mixture, and usually refers to the cultural and biological blending of 
pre-colonial South Americans and Europeans (dictionary.com). The inclusion of Spanish 
and other languages is a strategy that Anzaldua often uses to gesture towards the 
experience of living in between, on the edges, and in a culturally blended world. Like 
différence, mestizaje means more than its literal definition of blending and encompasses 
something for which the English language has no equal.  
83 Knowing Sandoval’s background I believe that she is using technoscience politics in 
the ways outlined by Donna Harraway. Harraway explains that “Technoscience 
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The form and content of these conversations, which according to Sandoval (2000) are 
happening throughout both the university and activist organizations, led her to create her 
methodology “of emancipation” (p. 2) which is comprised of five “skills” or methods to 
help enact those conversations. These skills include semiotics, deconstruction, meta-
ideologizing, democratics and differential consciousness. Much of Sandoval’s text 
focuses on an expansion of Barthes Mythologies (2013), the aim of which Sandoval 
(2000) explains as, “how to go about describing the methodology that permitted the 
colonized to see, hear and interpret what appeared to be natural to the colonizer as the 
cultural and historical productions that they were” (p. 87). Sandoval borrows from 
Barthes in creating a decolonizing methodology. She explains that,  
Barthes hoped to locate what he called the “ethical” and “political” sensibilities, 
that is, the specific methodologies, that might lead to the emancipation of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
extravagantly exceeds the distinction between science and technology as well as those 
between nature and society, subjects and objects, the natural and the artifactual that 
structured the imaginary time called modernity” (cited in Asdal, Brenna, & Moser, 2007, 
p. 7). Asdal, Brenna, and Moser (2007) look at the field of STS, or science, technology, 
and society. They argue that STS is “a field of research with an articulated goal of 
conducting better, more relevant studies of science” (p. 7). Technoscience politics breaks 
down the binary between science and society, noting that these divisions are psychic not 
real. Harraway approached technoscience using the example of the first patented animal, 
the OncoMouse™, which was designed by Harvard with a genetic modification that 
makes the mice more susceptible to cancer. Asdal, Brenna, and Moser explain that “The 
mouse is a creation of science. Its natural environment, its arena or physical and genetic 
development, is the laboratory and the regulatory institutions in a powerful nation-state” 
(p. 8). Harraway calls the OncoMouse™ a vampire as it pollutes natural categories 
between living creatures, subjects, and things, objects. It similarly confuses the fact-based 
realm of science with the seemingly separate social world of values and morality. 
Technoscience becomes biopower and political. Asdal, Brenna, and Moser explain, 
“Technoscience metes out chances to live or die. Some win, some lose. But who?” (p. 8). 
Technoscience politics are the real world consequences of the expansion of science into 
society and the activism that surrounds technoscience; in the end it is the bio-political 
(Asdal, Brenna, & Moser, 2007).  
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consciousness from its slavery in and to the dominant order and for everyone, in 
the same way that feminist theorist Nancy Hartstock hoped, some twenty years 
later, that the “feminist” standpoint could liberate consciousness from its 
strictures in masculinist order, or in the way Donna Harraway hoped that “cyborg 
feminism” would free citizen-subjects from every order. (p. 88) 
Furthermore, Sandoval pulls even more scholars into her formulation of the methodology 
of the oppressed, citing particularly Third World feminist scholars like Moraga and 
Anzaldua (1984).  
U.S. peoples of color have long acted, spoken, intellectualized and lived out what 
Cherríe Moraga calls a ‘theory in the flesh,’ a theory that allows survival and 
more, that allows practitioners to live with faith, hope and moral vision in spite of 
all else. (Sandoval, 2000, p. 7)  
Sandoval’s inclusion of Third World feminists stems from these scholars’ argument that 
many oppressed people have cultivated a unique ability to survive in the midst of 
domination. Third World people survive by relying on the skills that Sandoval turns into 
methods and through a politics of love. Moraga and Anzaldua (1984) explain,  
The vision of radical Third World feminism necessitates our willingness to work 
with those people who would feel at home in El Mundo Zurdo, the left-handed 
world: – the colored, the queer, the poor, the female, the physically challenged. 
From our blood and spirit connections with these groups, we women on the 
bottom throughout the world can form an international feminism. For separatism 
by race, nation, or gender will not do the trick of revolution. Autonomy, however, 
is not separatism. We recognize the right and necessity of colonized people 
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throughout the world, including Third World women in the United States, to form 
independent movements towards self-government. But ultimately, we must 
struggle together. Together we form a new vision which spans from the self-love 
of our colored skins to the respect of our foremothers who kept the embers of 
revolution burning, to our reverence for the trees-the final reminder of our rightful 
place on this planet. (p. 196) 
Third World feminist scholars connect the theoretical ideas of Foucault and Derrida and, 
in turn, connect them to the material existence of colonized and disempowered people. 
Sandoval (2000) includes Third World feminism for a number of reasons including their 
material reality as people who “live and are gendered, sexed, raced and classed ‘between 
and among’ the lines” (p. 46) as opposed to being defined within the dominant spaces. 
This existence leads to both a split consciousness and a tactical subjectivity, or an identity 
that is predicated not on the individual ego, but on the super ego and survival. This 
bifurcated and survivalist subjectivity can be employed to shift and mobilize power 
despite conflicting with other Third World feminist ideas, even contradicting themselves 
at times. Sandoval includes Third World feminists because of the political implications of 
their work, particularly the concept of self-love, as well as community and coalition that 
challenge traditional modernist forms of opposition through an embodied understanding 
of contradiction and levels of complicity within the system. Sandoval argues that the 
methodology of the oppressed articulates and operationalizes the existing skills of the 
oppressed, “the skills necessary for accomplishing sign reading across cultures; 
identifying and consciously constructing ideology; decoding languages of resistance 
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and/or domination; and for writing and speaking a neorhetoric84 of love85 in the 
postmodern world” (p. 3). 
 My own interest in Sandoval’s text is multifold. It is appealing because of its 
political aims, its project of methodology construction (it is methodology of the 
oppressed), its response to aggregate knowledge, and its sources and metaphors. 
Sandoval’s theory is appealing because the aim of the theoretical project is to create a 
framework that encourages social justice. While it seems narcissistic to envision my own 
work to be as transformative as Sandoval’s intentions, my own project is aimed at 
politicizing the abject in its application to art and with instilling the abject with the 
potential for social justice, specifically through an expansion of voices and images from 
the margins. Similar to Sandoval’s aggregate or collective approach to contemporary 
ideas, I have culled together many scholars discussing the abject, some of which do not 
discuss the abject per se, but rather deal with issues tangentially linked to the abject, such 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Sandoval is referring to the field of New Rhetorics, which has sought to restore rhetoric 
after a perceived cooption into political misdirection and a marginalization due to a 
patriarchal and modernist emphasis on Greek and Roman terms. Another way of phrasing 
this is the emphasis on postmodern analysis within rhetoric (Enos & Brown, 1992; 
Donsbach, 2008).  
85 Sandoval is gesturing towards an expanded view of love which includes, but is not 
limited to eros (sexual love), storge (familial love), philia (“brotherly” love or deep 
friendship), and agape (non-sexual or religious love and unconditional love). This 
neorhetoric of postmodern love includes non-traditional, polyamorous, and queer love, as 
well as, a love of, and found in, community that goes beyond philia.  Sandoval addresses 
this as a hermeneutics of love in Methodology of the Oppressed (2000), relying heavily 
on Barthes writings about love. Lourdes (2000), herself a Women of Color and Third 
World feminist, suggests a return to erotics in everyday life as an antidote to systemic 
racism and patriarchy. Erotics is expanded and redefined as a female centered sensual 
practice of power achieved through embracing the everyday with a type of love that the 
West has primarily reserved for a particular narrative of romance and sexual union. I will 
return to both erotics and a hermeneutic of love in my conclusion as I offer possible 
conclusions and further ways to utilize my abject visual methodology.  
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as liminality, ambiguity, death (both social and material), borders and transgression from 
the margins. I am creating a methodology by pulling together these diverse scholars and 
works that are circling disgust, the abject and the marginal and applying these ideas to a 
different context: art. Many of the same sources and scholars influence my work and 
Sandoval’s, even if they have not been singularly articulated. Sandoval’s work is 
predicated on the cultural turn, or post-modernity, with its interest in poly-vocality, 
Derridean différance and rhizomatic leveling. Both Sandoval’s and my own work seek to 
address emergent trends. Sandoval is interested in the new global terrain, where it is 
neocolonial and where it can be occupied for decolonial emancipation. Sandoval (2000) 
explains,  
With the transnationalization of capitalism, when elected officials are no longer 
leaders of singular nation-states but nexuses for multinational interests, it also 
becomes possible for citizen-subjects to become activists for a new decolonizing 
global terrain, a psychic terrain that can unite them with similarly positioned 
citizen-subjects within and across national borders into new, post-Western-empire 
alliances. (p. 184)  
I am interested in the proliferation of disgusting visuals in the same landscape as 
Sandoval, the globalized, postmodern, media saturated contemporary sphere. I am 
concerned, but hopeful, about what the emergence of disgust and the abject signals for 
art, aesthetics and culture at large. My own methodology has a more narrow focus than 
Sandoval’s, but it takes place in the same cultural atmosphere of neoliberal and 
neocolonial policy seen in the expansion of privatization, national deregulation, the rise 
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in the rhetoric of individualism and meritocracy and imperialist war incursions around the 
globe.  
Finally, I borrow some of Sandoval’s metaphors for my own methodology, 
particularly her reliance on the idea of topography as the metaphor for the exploration 
and charting of a broad expanse of theory, authors and cultural sites. Sandoval 
specifically outlines her use of topography as originating in the Greek topos, meaning 
place, but applies that place to both a material and psychic space in which oppression and 
liberation can occur. Sandoval (2000) says, “These orientations can be thought of as 
repositories within which subjugated citizens can either occupy or throw off subjectivities 
in a process that at once enacts and decolonizes their various relations to their real 
conditions of existence” (p. 54). My own project is conceived of, beyond a methodology 
for approaching abject images, as a map to those images and considers where they are 
found, who makes them and what they mean beyond a more conventional analysis. 
Sandoval’s interest in psychic spaces is also pertinent to my own topography and 
methodology as the abject initiates in the unconscious. While there are very real material 
and physical consequences, the drama of disgust and the abject takes place largely within 
the psychic. It is a psychic border that is transgressed more often than a literal border 
when looking at abject art. In addition to the unconscious and the psychic, the abject 
deals with early childhood traumas of differentiation. When those moments are recalled, 
they take the individual back to their childhood, to a still lurking fear that their ego will 
be lost. The drama of the abject then takes place within the unconscious, within 
memories, and within psychic spaces. It is within the broader discourses of 
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psychoanalytic methodologies, as well as the more specific ideas presented by Bois and 
Krauss (1999) and Sandoval (2000), that I construct my own abject visual methodology. 
The following chapter will explore the taxonomy of abject visuals, expanding on 
the specific ways to approach art using an abject visual methodology. It will provide an 
extensive map of the aforementioned abject taxonomy, surveying what qualifies as abject 
art, how it is abject, and the factors that influence how the work is read and understood as 
abject.  
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4.0: An Abject Visual Methodology: Drafting A Map & A Key to Things We May 
Not Want to Find 
4.01 What an Abject Visual Methodology Entails: Or is that Entrails? 
In the previous chapter I laid out both a brief explanation of my abject visual 
methodology and the materials that influenced its construction. Many of these materials 
are other methodological approaches that, while attuned towards art, psychoanalysis, and 
social justice, seemed insufficient alone. They did not address the embodiment or the 
visceral implication of the body that often accompanies experiences of disgust and the 
abject, nor did they fully address the visual nature of my sites of analysis or the specific 
psychoanalytic dimensions of the abject. This chapter, I further develop my own abject 
visual methodology, laying out key analytic steps, and then use my methodology to 
create a taxonomy of the world of the visually abject.  
 4.01.01 identifying the abject: what’s abject and what’s just gross: a fine 
distinction. The first and most obvious step in using an abject visual methodology is to 
identify what the abject is specifically. This is an early and critical step as understanding 
what is abject allows for more specific classification and further analysis. Notions of both 
the abject and disgust are very similar, as chapter two’s literature review reveals. 
However, there are, what I consider to be, some key distinctions, which are also 
elucidated in the literature review. Disgust is the emotional response that demands that 
we thrust waste away. We feel the need to enact clean and proper in a multitude of ways, 
from hygiene, to cleaning, to thrusting away what is considered improper.  
When we do not or cannot enact this “cleanliness”, we experience disgust at what 
is making us, or our space, dirty, unruly, or non-normative. Upon the experience of 
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disgust, we then reject the “dirty” elements from our lives. However, the abject is more 
than just a disgusting thing we need to eliminate. In fact, the abject, by definition, can 
never be totally excluded. The abject is necessary for the perpetual reinforcement of our 
ego, and so while it is the harbinger of crisis and chaos, it is also necessary for the 
maintenance of our egos, a maintenance that is pleasurable. Feeling disgust and being 
able to enact total rejection is a complete circuit, it ends in the radical exclusion of the 
thing that is disgusting to us. If it is truly excluded, completely gone, if it never returns 
from repression in any form, never haunts, never fascinates, then it is not abjection. It is 
just disgust. Some like Miller (1997) see disgust as having a fascinating or appealing 
component, rather than just repulsion. However, I theorize that this connection between 
disgust and fascination is demonstrating another slip between the tenuous borders 
between the abject and disgust. That is to say, I believe what Miller and others who 
similarly find pleasurable or fascinating elements in disgust (e.g. Herz, 2012; Kelly, 
2011) are responding to is not disgust, but rather the abject and its deeper paradoxical 
dimensions of pleasurable disorder.  
The abject is a complex psychological phenomenon that includes a thrusting away 
what is polluting in order to maintain a clean and proper self. However, in the thrusting 
away, we are never able to truly exclude or eliminate what we have deemed to be 
“waste”. We are forever haunted by it and this haunting, this failed exclusion, creates a 
fascination for that “waste”. This fascination and haunting create a type of desire, a 
complicated desire that is both a yearning to reclaim the waste as a part of the self, and a 
desire to exclude the waste entirely, neither of which can be fulfilled.  
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Disgust is a component of the abject, but there needs to be more than just disgust 
for abjection to occur. An object is not abject unless we are both horrified and drawn to 
it. There must be some pleasure, some fascination, some unpleasant but seemingly 
compulsory attraction that makes a work of art abject and not just disgusting. This is the 
“fascinated victimhood” (Kristeva, 1982, p. 9) which Kristeva claims is the state of the 
abject, a state in which the individual is both horrified and violated, but is also 
constituted, which is gratifying. Fascinated victimhood seems analogous to the practice 
of “rubber necking” or of looking at an accident as one drives past. The “rubber necker” 
peers with trepidation at a grisly scene of mangled flesh, blood and cars, knowing that 
there is a probability that serious injury or death was a result of the accident yet they are 
compelled to look anyway. Disgust must be joined with fascination or attraction to be the 
abject and not just a reaction of disgust. Disgust is the knee-jerk reaction to turn away, 
but the abject is a covert, sometimes even unabashed, glance back at the crash site.  
This is one difference between the experience of disgust and what constitutes the 
abject, the addition of desire. This desire signals that the abject involves deeper 
psychoanalytic dimensions than disgust. Abjection is more than an emotion, it is a 
process which includes multiple contradictory emotions, as well as an overall shift in 
subjectivity. When one encounters an abject object, one abjects oneself, enacting 
abjection, which includes the emotional experience of disgust, combined with a sense of 
pleasure, or pleasant familiarity combined with the unknown foreign uncanny. This 
abject object is abject because it causes this dual complicated experience and causes the 
viewer to abject themselves. If one were to experience a disgusting object, one would 
reject it and that would be the end. There is no interwoven pleasure in disgust. The 
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pleasure in encountering dirt stems from the generative nature of the abject, which 
explains the formation of ego in the face of dirt, which is a satisfying and necessary 
activity. The experience of disgust is never discussed as being creative in regards to the 
ego; that is singularly the realm of the abject. Experiences of disgust simply threaten the 
ego, while the abject is actually involved in the process of ego creation through 
individuation and the rejection of parental desire in favor of ones own self86. Disgust’s 
role seems solely defensive, whereas the abject threatens and menaces, but also creates 
and solidifies the self. As Barrett (2011) explains, “abjection is a process that can 
collapse meaning, but which is nevertheless fundamental to the constitution of identity 
and renewal of meaning” (p. 94).  
Dirt is matter out of place, a break in the system that establishes clean and proper 
from dirty and disorder. Experiencing a break in that system causes the experience of 
disgust. However, that system is already in place, it already exists and disgust serves as a 
way to solidify those existing borders. Disgust does not make new systems or new 
borders, it simply enforces what already exists. The abject seems more productive 
because of its role in the production of the ego and is the foundation of all systems that 
mark out self and other, because of the role abjection plays in the mother/child divide. 
The “deject”, or abject subject, is a marker of borders, a creator of divisions, but the 
deject must already know the systems upon which those divides are predicated.  
The above divisions between abjection and disgust offer new territories, new 
systems and new borderlands, which can be productively explored with an abject visual 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 This is explained in depth on page103-106 in the section on expelling spoiled milk, as 
an abjection of self that is also ego formation.  
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methodology. This is not to say that the abject and abjection are never destructive or are 
solely positive, rather that the abject has the potential to be creative in a way that is 
outside the purview of disgust. This productive value of the abject maybe as simple as 
switching the hierarchy of privilege, as Krauss has suggested (Foster, Buchloch, Krauss, 
Bois, Hollier, & Molesworth, 1994), so that the disprivileged and the disenfranchised 
becomes enshrined rather than the normative. With this in mind, the abject puts shit on a 
pedestal, while disgust simply sees shit as a lowly substance. This is tricky as abjection is 
a waste system, which means that new abjection forms new types of marginal figures, 
new wastes, but maintains a hierarchical regime. However, even the imagining of this 
reversal when applied to marginal bodies instead of marginal fluids has exciting 
possibilities for broadening and altering the hegemonic. However, disgust lacks this shift 
in privilege. Disgust simply debases, while the abject can appear to enshrine debasement. 
Moreover, reading abjection as simple inversion, while an easy interpretation, is counter 
to Kristeva’s intent. While there is much about binaries and a sense of reversal in 
Kristeva, it is not truly a reversal; it is not just about making the low high. Rather, it is 
about the in-between, the liminal; abjection is not opposition. Kristeva (1982) explains, 
“The abject is perverse because it neither gives up nor assumes a prohibition, a rule, or a 
law; but turns them aside, misleads, corrupts; uses them, takes advantage of them, the 
better to deny them ” (p. 15). Abjection doesn’t break rules by doing the opposite, but by 
simply refusing the law through a side step. Understanding rule breaking and violation of 
the law as opposites is easy and commonplace in the Western world where binary 
distinctions are upheld, like black/white, good/bad, right/wrong. However, abjection is 
not about making what was bad now good, but rather refusing to accept bad and good as 
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the only categories, or even as opposite categories. Categories, rules, and binaries are all 
too simple and too safe to be the focus of the abject, although they are tools that the 
abject may utilize, or take advantage of, as a way to demonstrate the overall impossibility 
of laws. Kristeva (1982) explains, “abjection is above all ambiguity. . . it does not cut off 
the subject from what threatens it - on the contrary, abjection acknowledges it to be in 
perpetual danger” (p. 9). While the abject relies on the binary that is found in disgust, the 
abject offers a third space or identity that is beyond the duality of disgust.  
Disgust has a different political valence as well. Disgust has been used as a rather 
conservative and moralistic rationale for laws (Nussbaum, 2006) and some researchers 
have demonstrated a link between high disgust receptivity and conservative Republican 
political leanings (Inbar, Pizzaro, & Bloom, 2009). Disgust has been deployed in 
propaganda against the marginalized (Pratkanis & Aronson, 2001). However, the abject, 
with its attachment to non-normative and marginal bodies is not necessarily a 
conservative notion. Society perpetually demarcates others to its ideal state body, abject 
others that while rejected cannot be fully excluded. Butler (1993) has demonstrated this, 
explaining that to fully exclude these individuals actually undoes the work that they do in 
defining the ideal state body through opposition. There is always a conservative element 
to the political abjection, since disgust is used to maintain the status quo through leveling 
it against the marginalized as a way to control the oppressed. However, political abjects, 
those who are the political systems metaphoric wastes, represent a radical position that 
questions the normative state body, even while building it through opposition. While 
Audre Lourdes (2007) has argued that the master tools will never bring down the 
master’s house, the abject seems to have both the constructive and destructive forces of 
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hegemony coded into its very existence, making the liminal space between construction 
and destruction a place for change.  
As previously discussed, disgust and the abject appear to overlap, particularly in 
regards to how they are visualized. Bodily waste, for example, can be just disgusting or 
both disgusting and abject. The difference between whether we consider a reaction to 
waste one of simple disgust or the abject depends on whether or not one totally rejects the 
material or if the denouncement is haunted and incomplete. However, there are also 
theoretical categories like the maternal, borderlands, and childhood, that have much 
stronger associations with the abject than disgust. Disgust is not connected to the 
maternal, the mother-child divide, or childhood, beyond the sense that childhood is a time 
when disgust prohibitions are taught. The abject, on the other hand, is predicated upon 
the mother-child divide and an even earlier pre-symbolic female language described as 
chora. This means that most images of the maternal, particularly ones depicting the 
mother as monstrous, devouring and threatening, are abject.  
Much of the literature surrounding disgust seeks to define it as a universal 
biological trait that everyone experiences as a protective emotion that is activated to 
protect our species from pathogens in things that are rotten (Ray, 2012; Rozin, Haight, & 
McCauley, 1993; Rozin & Fallon, 1987). Many have argued for the cultural specificity of 
disgust (e.g., Miller, 1997; Meagher, 2003). But the discourse of disgust still circulates 
around the biological cause or evolutionary rationale for disgust. In opposition to the way 
we theorize disgust, the abject is firmly situated as a challenge to the symbolic order, that 
is, as a transgression of culture. While Kristeva similarly approaches the abject as 
universal, in no way does she link it to a common biological imperative. For her, it is a 
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psychological imperative that drives the formation of the ego and the child’s development 
into the symbolic realm of dominant culture. This is something everyone must go through 
to become a healthy “I,” but again, it is not linked to a biological or evolutionary 
imperative.  
With this in mind then, an abject visual methodology asks us to do more than 
simply find disgusting or unsettling imagery. One must stop and reflect on the images 
and ask oneself, is there something else here? Why am I disgusted? If I am disgusted then 
why am I interested in looking at this image? What makes it appealing? Is it appealing 
because of the transgression of disgust taboos or in spite of it? Many of these questions 
call for a self-reflexive inquiry regarding the visceral responses to disgust and the 
embodied viewership of the abject.  
 4.01.02 embodied looking: or, abjection is in the gut of the beholder.  
 4.01.02.01 knowing your own gut. A further step in an abject visual methodology 
is an interrogation of visceral bodily reactions. Because the abject happens within the 
body, not just the mind, determining whether an image is abject involves self-reflection 
on the embodied experience of viewing the work. Because of the way the body is 
implicated by the abject, it is important to view abject art in person whenever possible. 
As many have noted (e.g. Danko-McGhee, 2006; Ministry of Education, 1986), viewing 
artwork in person is a profoundly different experience than looking at it in books or 
prints. This is particularly important for the abject because it works on a visceral, 
phenomenological level. The way disgust is manifested in the body has been 
demonstrated by recent work in mapping emotions on the body. A Finnish research group 
asked participants to self-report areas of the body that changed in response to emotional 
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stimuli. When mapped onto an image of the body, this study showed that the emotion of 
disgust activates the digestive system including the mouth, throat, esophagus, and 
stomach (Nummenmaa, Glerean, Hari, & Hietanen, 2013). Disgust, which can be an end 
reaction in and of itself, but can also be part of the phenomenological experience of the 
abject, manifests in the body, particularly in the regions associated with consumption. 
Abjection would then share some of the same physical overlap within the body, similarly 
activating the digestive track, since disgust is a part of abject experiences.  
Art moves us through both emotional impact and the neurobiological response of 
mirror neurons to sensory data (Jeffers, 2009; Rokonitz, 2008). But being physically 
moved is not enough when using an abject visual methodology. One must be physically 
moved, as well as conscious and self-reflective. Disgust is characterized as the knee-jerk 
emotion because it causes us to react without thought, which means that the abject will 
similarly effect us, making us react to the disgusting components without clear and 
rational thought. However, the user of an abject visual methodology must be reflexive in 
these instances, staying suspended in the embodied reaction so as to interrogate the 
reaction. The researcher must look towards the causes of such a reaction, both the 
obvious and the unconscious. For example, is the popular British dish blood pudding 
disgusting because the individual has had blood pudding before and finds the taste 
unappealing, because it is made of blood, because it is “foreign”, or for some other yet 
undiscovered reason. Furthermore, if the individual likes blood pudding, is it fair to say it 
is not disgusting, particularly in light of many others finding it distasteful. The researcher 
must be self-reflexive, looking at their own reactions, but also cognizant of other’s 
reactions, which can be both similar and contrary to one’s own response, and from where 
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those reactions stem. Disgust asks the body to short circuit clear and rational thought, to 
become conservative and overly protective, so the researcher must overcome this 
embodied reaction to conduct their research. The researcher, suspended in the embodied 
reaction of disgust, must ask if there are other emotions present, particularly some form 
of desire or pleasure. When out and out disgust or violent repulsion is not present, the 
researcher must still be attuned to other responses like a feeling of unease or creepiness, 
perhaps a sense of the uncanny. These other formations of disgust like distaste or 
aversion, must be interrogated concomitantly for secret desires and pleasures that signal a 
form of the abject. The researcher must ultimately determine whether the object of 
inquiry is disgusting or abject, and this is before the researcher even has the opportunity 
to delve into the object or really use the abject visual methodology fully.  
4.01.02.02 listening to others’ retching. An attunement to trends that constitute 
cultural characteristics versus individual preferences is why an abject visual methodology 
must pay attention not only to one’s own experience of disgust, but to what others profess 
to find disgusting and yet enjoyable, or at least intriguing. Being in the presence of the 
works allows for an unmitigated experience of the work and what it does to the viewer, 
both bodily and cognitively. An abject visual methodology combines a deeply analytical 
approach – which attempts to dig through the individual and cultural unconscious – with 
an embodied component that honors and analyzes the body’s reactions and knowledge in 
the face of these works. Thus exposure to the actual physical presence of the artwork is 
the preferred approach for an abject visual methodology whenever possible.  
 4.01.03 cloying contexts 
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 4.01.03.01 personal versus cultural context. While one’s own personal 
experiences are a dynamic and necessary component of an abject visual methodology, 
other areas of analysis must be considered as well. An abject visual methodology calls for 
a deeply contextual approach to uncover where the abject lies within complex emotional 
encounters. Psychoanalysis has been criticized as ahistorical and culturally myopic, 
focusing only on the Western experience (Rose, 2006). However, psychoanalysis’ 
argument of universality can be contextualized. By understanding that the abject may 
look different in different places and may be experienced differently by different people, 
we can attempt a less hegemonic psychoanalytic practice, which takes context, 
historicism, and culture into account.  
 It has been argued that disgust is a universal emotion, however, the specifics of 
disgust and abjection are culturally determined. While it could be argued that everyone 
feels disgust, not everyone is disgusted by the same things, and those parameters are 
determined both by the individual and by the individual’s culture. The cultural specifics 
of disgust can be seen quite easily in television shows like Andrew Zimmern’s Bizarre 
Foods (Steward, 2006-present) or Anthony Bourdain’s No Reservations (Aga, 2005-
2012) (Figure 4).  
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Figure 4. Film still from Bizarre Foods America  
 
 
These and other shows feature the hosts eating foods that are considered disgusting by 
average American standards, but are quite common or rare and desirable in another 
culture, like raw worms, beating hearts, and intentionally rotten, fermented tofu. The 
hosts argue for the cultural specificity of gustatory preferences while chowing down on 
things that make the audience at home squirm and gag, occasionally even causing a 
shudder in the host. These are popular examples of the cultural nature of disgust, which, 
has also been established by scholars of disgust (Miller, 1997; Kolnai, 2001; 
Mennighaus, 2003; Korsmeyer, 2006, 2011). As disgust is the affective component of the 
abject, it seems then that the abject would also be culturally specific. Kristeva’s (1982) 
emphasis is obviously Western, since the works she analyzes and uses to establish the 
abject are primarily Western authors: Céline, but also Dostoyevsky, Artaud, Kafka, 
Proust, and Joyce. But like disgust, Kristeva’s methodological structure of the abject 
which Kirsteva develops in The Powers of Horror (1982), if not her specific examples, 
can be applied cross-culturally. She discusses food prohibition as many individual’s first 
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encounter with the abject, specifically the skim on milk. Milk may or may not disgust; 
however, understanding that food prohibitions is central to the abject, and that food 
prohibitions are widely practiced and quite common. It demonstrates both the social 
construction of taste and with it disgust, as well as its relationship to early ego formations 
because even if it isn’t milk that is offered by the parent but another food, parental desire 
and its rejection is present. In particular, children often have different food preferences 
than adults because of developmental reasons that make many foods literally unappealing 
and metaphorically gross because of their newness and foreignness. Pantley (2011) notes 
that children have more taste buds than adults, an evolutionary mechanic that keeps them 
from ingesting things with strong flavors, which could be rancid or spoiled. However, 
this rejection of foods, according to Kristeva, (1982) has an impact on ego formation as 
well. In short, gustatory taste, with its connections to the broader experiences of disgust 
and the abject, is personally and culturally flexible, but universally present.  
4.01.03.02 historical context. As the abject is impacted by the individual and by 
culture, so it is historically dependent. What is considered disgusting now, has not only 
been considered commonplace, but even desirable at other points in time. While fat has 
become a dirty word in the West, standing in for ill health, gluttony, and moral failure, 
one needs only look to the art of Peter Paul Ruben’s to see that voluptuous curves were a 
sign of health, abundance, and fertility at other points in time (Figure 5).  
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Figure 5. Detail of Ruben’s The Disembarkation of Marie de Médici at Marseilles (1623-
1625) 
 
Another example is Maurer and Sobel’s book, Interpreting Weight: The Social 
Management of Fatness and Thinness (1999). It is an example of the field of fat studies, 
which is in part dedicated to understanding the changing social norms around body size. 
Another example of shifting historical perspective comes from the field of mental illness. 
While mental illness is still stigmatized, it is no longer linked to supernatural beliefs 
about witchcraft and demons. Its current stigmatization is more related to its non-
adherence to the normal able-bodied ideal and our tendency to pathologize the individual, 
than the idea that people are transgressing religious or otherworldly domains (Porter, 
2003). Similarly, ideas about what is clean and proper versus what is dirty and 
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contaminating and the threat posed by that dirt, shifts throughout time. Take for example 
an edict disseminated by King Francois of France in 1539 that decried the filthy state of 
the city of Paris and forbade  
all emptying or tossing out into the streets and squares of the aforementioned city 
and its surroundings of refuse, offals, or putrefactions, as well as all waters 
whatever their nature, and…[the King] command[s] you to delay and retain any 
and all stagnant and sullied waters and urines inside the confines of your home. 
(as cited in Laporte, 2002, p. 4) 
This edict provides a concrete instance of a shift in ideas about waste and waste 
management that modified the idea of waste from a public, even social, occurrence to a 
private act to be sequestered within the home (Mohr, 2013). Historical factors such as the 
edict and overall shifts in ideologies must then be taken into account in an abject visual 
methodology to better analyze the objects of study. If one were to use an abject visual 
methodology on a historical piece of art, one must interrogate the ways in which the 
creator and original viewers of the work would understand the piece. Take for instance, 
an image of defecation, like the anonymous Flemish Satirical Diptych (1520) in the 
Université de Liège collection in Belgium, which features a man on one side, and his up-
turned and bared buttocks on the other side with a thistle plant growing from it (Figure 
6). The diptych is accompanied by a textual joke: the front says do not open, while the 
inside says, I warned you. To understand the work one must understand that the image 
was naughty, or carnivalesque. It’s diptych form is a reference to religious art, but it’s 
combination with the excremental was not the deep kind of sacrilege we might consider 
the same action today (Hyman & Malbert, 2000). As ideas about waste are somewhat 
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culturally dependent, so they are historical as well. The researcher cannot assume that 
how they or even other contemporaries feel, is how people felt at another time or place. 
They must instead look at the reactions to the work, which were recorded at the time to 
use as personal reflection.  
 
 
Figure 6. Flemish Diptych, Artist Unknown (1520) 
 
4.01.03.03 institutional contexts. Similarly, other types of context impact the 
understanding of the abject and should be considered as well. In looking at art and visual 
materials, context can mean the art movement that work is situated within, where the 
work is displayed, the other objects it is surrounded by, who owns the work or who made 
it, geographic location of creation and exhibition, time of creation and exhibition, as well 
as critical reception and general popularity. As context can impact what is considered 
abject, it must be addressed early in the application of an abject visual methodology to 
determine whether this methodology is best suited for the object of study.  
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The visually abject is a complex arena. With text, the reader often knows what the 
protagonist is thinking or feeling; they can say I feel abject, or describe the paradoxical 
push/pull of abjection. With art, there is no protagonist, but rather a subject. Critics are 
often left guessing what the artist’s choice of subjects is meant to convey, as well as the 
impact of that subject upon the general population. Even when the artist is alive and can 
be interviewed, they are not always aware, or even that concerned, with what their art 
does to other people. Andre Serrano received death threats because of his work Piss 
Christ, which has been vandalized repeatedly (Kammen, 2007) (Figure 7). While some 
find the work blasphemous, art historian and TV personality Sister Wendy Beckett said in 
an interview with Bill Moyers “I thought he [Serrano] was saying, in a rather simplistic, 
magazine-y type of way, that this is what we are doing to Christ, we are not treating him 
with reverence” (Beckett as cited in Simek, 2011). Art is a subjective field. Disgust is 
similarly subjective, or culturally conditioned and by proxy so is the abject.  
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Figure 7. Serrano, Piss Christ (photograph), 1987. 
 
Art objects are created to cause emotional and cognitive impact, often one more 
than the other based on artistic intent. However aesthetic style, disgust and the abject, are 
all subjective responses, making it difficult to pull apart whether the artwork is 
disgusting, or depicts something disgusting, and if that makes a difference. It’s also 
difficult to piece apart the role of material in abject art, since some works are literally 
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made of abject substances like shit, while others are made of traditional materials but 
represent abject substances using beautiful pigments or bronzes.  
There are multiple discourses concerning the role of the museum to consider, 
which can instruct the viewer to look at abject art even if their first response is to turn 
away or ignore. The museum or gallery can authenticate that the work is something worth 
viewing, proving through cultural capital that it is art and belongs somewhere higher up 
on the hierarchy of good taste, even when it looks like waste. Similarly, work created 
outside the fine art domain is often labeled popular and lowbrow and, if lucky, amateur, 
subcultural, or at the worst, not art at all. For example, returning to Serrano, 
photographing a jar of urine in the context of the art world is perfectly acceptable, even 
desirable as it can lead to controversial art, which in the current art world climate can 
translate into critical success and high prices. However, if the average person were to 
collect their urine and photograph it they could be labeled deviant, or even perverted, or, 
at the very least, weird. The context of creation and of the institutional art world must be 
considered when using an abject visual methodology, especially as these contextual 
elements are often in conversation with one another, or are intersecting. Looking at these 
intersections can uncover how abject substances can be made less abject by existing in a 
codified space of beauty and art, or how formal qualities of material may make an image 
even more abject than just the subject itself through a thick application of paint that 
simulates a viscous bodily fluid. Multiple layers of context must be sifted through to 
understand the nuances of abject images.  
4.01.03.04 egocentrism? maybe.: ideal viewership and the context of this study. 
All of this being said, while I consider other voices in the following taxonomy, this 
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chapter, this dissertation as a whole, is predicated on my own responses to abject images. 
I have taken myself as the ideal viewer, someone who is both fascinated but also 
uncomfortable with the abject. The following analyses of the different categories that 
create this taxonomy of abject art are prefaced on my own reactions, both embodied and 
reflective. I have followed my own methodology and it’s call for embodied viewing and 
contextual emphasis, noting my own reaction to the works, looking at historical and 
critical texts about the artworks, and finding other scholars who substantiate my own 
analysis. However, for the sake of ethical efficacy and the acknowledgement of bias, it is 
only fair to clearly spell out that not everyone comes to these images with the same 
knowledge of the abject, or same interest in it. The guide that I am providing is largely 
based on what I have found personally useful in understanding the abject and is deeply 
embedded in the scholarship of the abject.   
4.02 Abject Visual Types: But what does it look like already?  
 4.02.01 what the abject looks like in literature. Having established the need to 
be contextual when using an abject visual methodology and having argued for the 
necessity of approaching the abject objects physically to address the visceral nature of 
their impact, there is still the matter of what does the abject look like? Kristeva is 
interested in language, her par excellence of the abject being the work of Louis-
Ferdinand Céline both because of his scabrous language and his violent subject matter. 
Céline (1934) writes in Journey to the End of the Night:  
This body of ours, this disguise put on by common jumping molecules, is in 
constant revolt against the abominable farce of having to endure. Our molecules, 
the dears, want to get lost in the universe as fast as they can! It makes them 
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miserable to be nothing but "us," the jerks of infinity. We’d burst if we had the 
courage, day after day we come very close to it. The atomic torture we love so is 
locked up inside us with our pride. (p. 291) 
It is no wonder that Kristeva focuses on Céline, as in this passage alone we see the 
nihilism that the abject is often associated with, combined with an intense attraction or 
affinity towards revulsion and a dissolution of being. Céline (1934) also writes,  
in Topo the raw, stifling heat, so perfectly concentrated in that sand pit between 
the conjugated mirrors of the sea and the river, would have made you swear by 
your bleeding buttocks that you were being forced to sit on a chunk of the sun that 
had just fallen off. (p. 129) 
Here the body bleeds and is forced open. The oppressive atmosphere is made palpable, 
implicating the body through sweat, and stickiness; they are all abject moments. Céline’s 
texts, those featured above and others that depict syphilitic whores and the broken bodies 
of war, give us textual examples of the abject beyond Kristeva’s own characterization. 
Kristeva argues that abject literature acts as a type of catharsis, a necessary release of 
repressed psychological and emotional impulses. Literature allows the author and the 
reader a way to “work through some of the maladies that afflict their souls” (McAfee, 
2004, p. 50) including abjection. This allows the subject to work through these conflicts 
psychologically, so they are not forced to act them out in real life to achieve resolution. 
While Kristeva looks for this catharsis in literature, she acknowledges catharsis in all art 
McAfee, 2004; Barrett, 2011).  
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 4.02.02 abject categories. The above text demonstrates Kristeva’s categories in 
literature. Céline’s text emphasizes the body under stress, feelings of discomfort both 
psychic and physical, and the idea of the body’s borders breaking down, opening up, or 
dissolving. Visual art deals with similar concepts, but approaches them in different ways. 
While abject art deals with the abject in different ways than literature, I am using many of 
the same categorical groupings that Kristeva lays out in The Powers of Horror (1982): 
namely bodily substances, the corpse and the maternal. The idea of excess and dearth 
stems from Kolnai’s (2001) classifications of disgust, but are also discussed by Kristeva 
(1982) just not as explicitly as I describe them in this chapter. Kristeva never clearly 
discusses the social dimensions of the abject; rather the sections on gender and queerness 
stem from later scholars like Butler (1993), the particular emphasis on the monstrous 
mother comes from Creed (1993), and the link between disability and the abject comes 
from Clarke (2004). Regarding disability, its connection to excess and dearth are my own 
mapping of Kristeva (1982) and the literature of disability studies (Millet-Gallant, 2013), 
onto Kolnia (2001). Finally, the section within excess and dearth on the animal is also my 
own mapping of Kristeva’s brief mention of animality as abject and the literature of 
animal studies (Fudge, 2004) as understood through Kolnai’s excess of the swarm.    
4.03 An Abject Taxonomy.   
 The chapter up to now has focused on how to enact an abject visual methodology: 
the need to consider context, viewing the work in person, and being self-reflexive in the 
face of difficult and uncomfortable emotions. I have also discussed a series of categories 
used by Kristeva in her work and categories developed by later scholars of the abject that 
I have adopted and adapted in places to best understand abject art. These categories stem 
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from scholarship on the abject, but also they, as well as the subcategories that I have 
labeled in the following taxonomy, come from my own-grounded observations of a large 
breadth of abject art. The subcategories in particular are predicated upon divisions and 
differences in abject art that I have found useful in understanding the works and act as a 
meta-analysis of the categories pulled from other scholars. These categories are the basis 
of the taxonomy of abject art that follows.  
 However beyond simply categorizing art, another element that I am including in 
an effort to fill in some of the gaps in the research surrounding abject art is an in-depth 
explanation of how the works are abject through the application of abject scholarship 
from Kristeva and other scholars. This taxonomy goes beyond labeling work as abject; it 
delves deeply into why and how the works of art are abject in regards to subject matter, 
material and stylistic choices, as well as other contextual influences like the work’s 
setting or the artist’s biography. This classification system, with its emphasis on the how, 
pays particular attention to what makes these works more than just disgusting, what 
captivates the viewer and refuses the complete circuit of rejection that I believe marks 
one of the key distinctions between disgust and abjection. In the end, the following 
taxonomy uses the abject visual methodology I have created to both classify and analyze 
the followings works, creating both a well-developed exploration of abject art and 
demonstrating how to use an abject visual methodology, as well as, its advantages.  
 4.03.01 bodily substances: gooey, leaky, fleshy bits. The first, and easiest 
qualifiers of the abject are bodily substances. A user of an abject visual methodology 
must be looking for blood, vomit, piss, shit and any number of substances that were once 
inside the body, which now seen outside the body become abject and threatening. 
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Kristeva (1982) specifically addresses only a limited number of substances, particularly 
vomit and shit. However, what makes them abject is the fact that they were once in the 
body and are now outside, yet still carry with them a part or quality of the self. This 
notion can be applied to a broad range of bodily substances. In fact, the only bodily 
substances that Kristeva marks out as not wholly abject are tears, because of a perceived 
purity, and semen because of it’s generative role in procreation, “Neither tears nor sperm, 
for instance, although they belong to borders of the body, have any polluting value.” (p. 
71).87 The presence of these substances indicates that the body, which we imagine as 
sealed tightly and impermeable, is actually porous and vulnerable to leakage. Visuals that 
feature bodily substances, or art that is made from these substances, often enters the 
realm of the abject because, while threatening, these substances are able to draw us to 
them through familiarity and a desire to recuperate.  
 4.03.02 literal substances. The most easily identifiable abject art is art that 
features literal or concrete bodily fluid including shit,88 piss,89 actual skin,90 hair,91 
blood,92 and vomit93 to name the most obvious.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 I would disagree with Kristeva on the account of semen, which I think in contemporary 
contexts of disease activates disgust. I think this is particularly evident in Serrano’s 
ejaculation photos, which have caused controversy for their content, which is simply a 
slightly blurred whitish streak, which is only recognized as seminal ejaculate through the 
wall text. 
88 The Sprinkle Brigade is a group of artists who design small dioramas around found 
animal droppings and then document their creations like the Poodolph (2006), which is a 
turd dressed in antlers and a bright red-nose (http://sprinklebrigade. com/gallery-main. 
html).  
89 The Brazilian artist Vinicius Quesada makes bright graphic collaged paintings that 
include his own blood and urine (http://sobadsogood. com/2013/01/22/vinicius-quesada-
creates-his-imagery-using-his-own-blood/).  
90 Belgian artist Wim Delvoye tattooed live pigs, using them in an exhibition entitled Art 
Farm (2008), before having some of them mounted as taxidermy pieces (http://www. 
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 4.03.02.01 shit. Shit is a substance that is closely tied to the abject because 
of toilet training and waste. Shit appears often in contemporary art as a literal substance. 
While this section is devoted to exploring shit as a taxonomical category of the abject, I 
would also like to demonstrate an extended use of my abject visual methodology. By 
moving through the steps of analyzing artwork using an abject methodology, I 
demonstrate the process and show the roots of analysis for later works within the 
taxonomy.  
I begin with the work of Keith Boadwee (Figure 8), who inserts paint in his 
rectum and then defecates the paint, along with any anal remnants, onto canvas. Boadwee 
literally performs abjection, jettisoning paint as if it was shit. The finished paintings most 
likely contain some fecal material and saving those fluids on canvas means that they are 
never thoroughly excluded, but haunt from the edges of the frame. I begin with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
wimdelvoye. be/#). Ariane Page Russel is a photographer who used her skin as a canvas. 
She has a condition called dermatographia, which means that her skin is extra sensitive 
and small scratches or light abrasions become swollen red imprints. To combat the stigma 
of her skin disease, she started pressing a blunt knitting needle into her skin to create 
delicate and personal drawings over her body (http://www. dailymail. co. 
uk/femail/article-2402987/Dermatographia-sufferer-Ariana-Page-Russell-creates-body-
art-using-skin-canvas. html).  
91 Zhu Tian’s work Babe (2014) is a pair of flesh colored stilettos with human hair 
implanted into them. Loren Schwerd’s series Mourning Portraits (2007-2009) are a series 
of sculptural reliefs of houses destroyed by hurricane Katrina that are made in part from 
human hair (http://www. lorenschwerd. com/mourning/work_ms_1317. htm).  
92 Ted Lawson created his work Ghost in the Machine (2014), a digitally printed self-
portrait of himself, in his own blood by hooking himself directly to the printer 
intravenously (http://www. tedlawson. com/artwork/ghost-in-the-machine/).  
93 Millie Brown makes Jackson Pollock inspired splash paintings by consuming colored 
soy milk and then vomiting it up onto canvases. She sells the paintings and also records 
the creation of the pieces through videos and photographs. She has been featured in one 
of Lady Gaga’s music videos (http://www. dailymail. co. uk/femail/article-2549351/Its-
like-cleanse-body-mind-Vomit-Painter-throws-canvas-create-Jackson-Pollock-style-
splatter-paintings-Lady-Gaga-loves. html).  
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Boadwee’s work because it appears fairly straightforward, but actually demonstrates 
many of the complexities of an abject visual methodology. While I have not seen 
Boadwee’s paintings or performance documents in person, which is most desirable, this 
piece, in fact many abject art works, are spectacular enough to move the viewer, even if 
not witnessed in person.   
 
 
Figure 8. Photo documentation of Keith Boadwee’s process/performance, including Blue 
Squirts (1996). 
 
 It is also worth noting that the paintings (which look like fairly traditional abstract 
expressionist paintings), the performance through which the works were created, the 
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documentation of those performances, and the photographs of Boadwee “squirting” paint 
out of his rectum, each operate in different ways. The painting alone, without knowledge 
or visual documents of its creation, is rather unremarkable and would most likely not fall 
within the realm of the abject. While there is fecal matter is within the paint, it appears to 
be unnoticeable in the overall paintings. They do not “scream” literal shit.  
 There is much discussion of the embodied nature of abstract expressionism, such 
as how Pollock’s drip paintings operate as metaphoric masturbation with the white paint 
standing in for semen (Jones, 1998), but there is little in the visuals of most abstract 
expressionist works that reads immediately as abject or disgusting. However, Boadwee’s 
performance and the documentation of the performance absolutely activates disgust.  
When I say that disgust is activated, I am speaking from my own original 
impressions of seeing the work. As both the ideal viewer of this study, and as the first 
step in an abject visual methodology, I record my own initial responses to the work, 
which was that of squeamish interest, both disgusted on one hand, but curious on the 
other. Watching Boadwee shoot paint out of his rectum stimulates disgust most obviously 
through the use of an orifice of the body that is mapped as improper and unclean; the 
anus. Abjection is performed in the act of defecation. As something that was once part of 
you, cells and digested food, are ejected from the body and turned into another substance 
that is more than just an ordinary object, but far less than a fully formed subject. 
Abjection may be performed with paint, rather than feces, but the abject ejection is 
similar. My feelings of disgust are further activated while viewing this work through 
tactile empathy, as when I view this work, I think about the act of inserting paint into my 
own body and the act of defecation (albeit in this instance, a bright and colorful 
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excretion). Seeing an artist literally defecate paint onto a canvas is a sensational act that 
captures my attention. The shock makes me want to look at it longer – as that is a 
transgressive act – but also turn away – since the work is unclean and improper. As the 
performances are documented through photographs rather than video, I am left to 
imagine the sounds of him painting, particularly in light of the title “Blue Squirts” (1996), 
which is an onomatopoeia, as well as a descriptor of the action. According to Rokonitz 
(2008) watching a disgusting actions elicits more of a response than seeing a disgusting 
object, meaning a video can create more of an embodied connection between the viewer 
and the actions on the screen.  That means that Boadwee’s performance videos would 
disgust more than the still documentation photos of the same performance. In fact, the 
still documents become more abject and less singularly disgusting. Watching Boadwee 
defecate on the screen might be too disgusting, resulting in simple exclusion and turning 
away. But the still photographs, while they show him ejecting paint from his anus, do not 
show the actual process in motion, which may help to disrupt sheer disgust and rejection, 
making the photos more abject since they fascinate, as well as disgust. 
The documentation of the performance is second to the performance itself in 
terms of its abject quality, since it depicts abjection at a distance through photography, 
rather than witnessing the work in person. The paintings, outside of the performance and 
documentation of the performance, do not activate disgust until I am aware of how they 
were made. Once I am aware of how they were made, I am disgusted by how the painting 
was made and I am also disgusted by the painting itself. It surely contains fecal matter of 
some kind, bits of sloughed off Boadwee in the form of intestinal cells mixed in with the 
paint, in an artwork that appears to be about the beauty and materiality of paint. I wonder 
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if perhaps the painting smells, or smells of something more than paint. The painted 
canvases remain as souvenirs of Boadwee’s abject performances, the porousness of the 
body and our fascination with things that were once inside of us, either naturally formed 
or placed there.  
I am disgusted, but I am also rather fascinated by the whole thing: a clear marker 
of the abject is fascinated victimhood, which I now embody. This fascination is based on 
notions of the practical: how did he get the paint inside of himself? What about the 
material? Is that lead-free acrylic or are his bowels soaking up toxins as he poisons 
himself for art? Even the idea and meaning of inserting paint into your body, particularly 
your rectum, is fascinating. The work also includes a certain level of embodied eroticism. 
It is somewhat titillating to imagine inserting things into your body, particularly a part of 
the body that is demarcated as both erotic and improper.  
Several things push the work towards the abject, not just disgust. This push/pull 
of desire and repulsion, the familiarity with the medium, an abstract painting, and 
unfamiliarity with the process, pushes the work towards the abject and not just disgust. 
While the work is absolutely disgusting it is not so disgusting as to complete the circuit of 
rejection and radical exclusion that disgust alone entails. Rather, disgust is interrupted 
and mitigated. Like shit, Boadwee’s expulsions are both dirty, but also contain something 
of the artist, rather literally, making them more than an object but something abject.   
 On a personal level, disgust is interrupted by my interest in wanting to know more 
about the process and also about the experience that the work represents. If it were 
completely disgusting, I would not want to imagine what it must feel like to be Boadwee, 
I would be too overcome with repulsion. Disgust is also interrupted through other means, 
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which represent other aspects of an abject methodology. While my own experience and 
interest in the work foregrounds later inquiry in my dissertation, it is still important to see 
what others have said about Boadwee’s work. Previous critiques of Boadwee’s work 
serve not only as another voice through which to understand the work, but also act as 
interrupters themselves to straight rejection. For example, if I were not fascinated by the 
work myself, but read the institutional critiques of Boadwee that argue that the artwork is 
abject and worthy of discussion for its intentional transgressions not just of decorum, but 
of the paradigm of modern abstract expressionism. Using and responding to this research 
would be I would be “listening to other’s retching”. For example, Jones (1998) notes that 
Boadwee’s art functions by 
Reiterating the Pollockian trope of masculinized action painting, but through a  
body explicitly performed as abject, anal and homosexual. Boadwee exposes the  
homoerotic as the hidden threat… The anus – not the penis/phallus – becomes the  
site through which male creativity takes places; and yet, far from being phallic  
and so ‘transcendent’, this site itself is an orifice (and one connected in  
mainstream culture with the most debased aspects of human functioning, as well  
as with homosexual erotics). (p. 100; italics in original) 
The inclusion of others scholar’s thoughts on Boadwee’s work is crucial since feelings of 
disgust can be very personal and can also be determined by historical and cultural norms. 
In regards to personal norms, I find the insertion of something in the rectum “abnormal” 
in the sense that it is not an everyday aspect of my life. However, some may not see the 
insertion of something into the rectum as anything but normal, for example a gay man 
may not read the work as transgressive the same way I do. Similarly, cultural norms 
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pertaining to bodies, sexuality and privacy may impact the way in which Boadwee’s 
work is understood. Listening to other opinions about the work, including the artist’s own 
commentary, as well as those of art historians, art critics, and even those from the general 
population, allows you to vet your own reactions of disgust and to gain the ability to 
interrogate your own responses and well as other people’s reactions. While I personally 
identified a certain eroticism in Boadwee’s work, I would not have understood the 
combination of homoerotics with abstract expressionism as a critique of the masculinity 
associated with modernism. I have also supported my own initial feelings and thoughts 
by verifying that others find the work to be abject, debase and transgressive.  
 In regards to Boadwee’s work, we must examine it within the history of art in 
order to fully understand its satirical and subversive nature. While shit is a  nearly 
universal taboo and a qualifier of the abject, Boadwee’s work make the most impact in a 
contemporary Western context, as he is a Western artist who is playing with and 
satirizing Western art canons through a contemporary use of the abject. Boadwee 
defecates paint, which has been in intimate contact with his bowels, performing abject 
exclusion. He uses the abject to make the homosexual male body into a site of generative 
potential as a creative tool in art making. It is this generative potential of the abject that is 
of particular interest to me. Jones verifies my own initial thoughts on the power of the 
abject, through the idea that a site of dirt and abjection, the rectum, is not “a grave” to 
quote Bersani (1987), but instead is the seat of male creativity. This is an important part 
of my larger project: demonstrating the power and generative potential of the abject and a 
need for an abject visual methodology that can be used to fully uncover the abject’s 
potential. This somewhat extended interrogation of Boadwee’s work done through 
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following the steps of my abject visual methodology is demonstrative of what I will do 
with many of the later works in this taxonomy in a more streamlined fashion. Having 
explicated the use of an abject visual methodology, I return now to the taxonomy of 
abject art and a further investigation of artists who employ bodily waste as a medium.   
For example, Tom Friedman’s True Love (2004) (Figure 9) provides a literal encounter 
with an abject substance as the work features a butterfly resting on a pile of shit. While 
shit can be fascinating because of its attachment to the body, it is also disgusting, making 
us turn away in a protective gesture.  
Figure 9. Friedman, True Love (2004). 
 
 However, the inclusion of the butterfly seems to ensure that the work is not fully 
rejected, that there is something beautiful to captivate the viewer and defer rejection. 94 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Butterflies may be considered the height of ethereal beauty, but many species of 
butterfly are drawn to urine, dung and carrion as a source of moisture rich in salts and 
amino acids (Stokes, Stokes, & Williams, 1991).  
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Friedman is no stranger to disgust: his work Untitled (1999) (Figure 10) features a bar of 
soap with his own pubic hair arranged in concentric circles and Untitled (1990) (Figure 
11) is a large ball of masticated chewing gum which has been smoothed into a sphere and 
stuck to the gallery wall, allegedly through its own stickiness (Hainley, 2001). Through 
their association with bodily refuse, shit, hair and salvia, these works disgust. Yet other 
elements, impeccably arranged concentric circles, a beautiful butterfly, even the curiosity 
of how the ball of gum sticks to the wall, draw the viewer in and fascinate or allure, 
making the work more abject than just disgusting. 
Figure 10. Friedman, Untitled (1999). 
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Figure 11. Friedman, Untitled (1990). 
 
 
4.03.02.02 blood. Blood is another substance tied to the abject through 
menstruation and violent openings of the body and is a substance that appears literally in 
art in a number of ways. Vincent Castiglia is a painter who mixes his own blood with 
water to create a type of sanguine watercolor (Figure 12).95 His works are incredibly 
detailed and often large-scale, sometimes up to seven feet tall, created entirely from his 
own blood. The iron content in the blood becomes a permanent rust tone, and through 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Castiglia’s website offers a wonderful explanation of his process and a gallery of his 
works (http://vincentcastigliaart. com/).  
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careful layering, Castiglia renders hyper-realistic portraits of pregnant women, religious 
scenes, anatomical figures and symbols of death. The works become doubly abject as 
their subject matter – pregnancy and death – are abject signs, as well as the material of 
their creation. While blood is disgusting, symbolizing a tear in our cherished skin border 
and the threat of sickness, wounding and death, Castiglia’s work mitigates this response 
through a hyper realistic execution. The sheer aesthetic beauty of the works, as well as 
the marvel of their execution, combined with the curiosity of how Castiglia collects the 
blood that he uses, lessens the rejection and pulls the viewer in closer to examine the 
skillfully wrought paintings.  
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Figure 12. Castiglia, The Mystery of Death (2010) 
 
 
 Barton Lidice Benes is another artist who uses blood in his art works. His series 
Lethal Weapons (1993) (Figure 13), featured a collection of 30 vessels, including a water 
gun, a perfume atomizer, and a molotov cocktail, filled with his own HIV positive blood 
(Vitello, 2012). Benes’ work is disgusting because it features contaminated blood. 
Disgust is primarily a mechanism to defend against pathogenic harm; however, its playful 
handling by Benes mitigates some of the reaction, pushing his work into the abject. This 
mitigation may not have been as complete as other abject art works that have been wildly 
popular. Benes had a difficult time finding galleries willing to show his work, especially 
	  	  
221	  	  	  	  
	  
during the height of the AIDS epidemic. Vitello (2012) argues that it was “the raw 
approach to death” that made it difficult to find a gallery, rather than the materials that 
symbolized contagion. Foley (2011) explains though, that Swedish health officials 
“forced Benes to heat the artworks at a temperature of 160 degrees in a hospital oven to 
make them safe for public viewing” (para. 5). Although misplaced, the fear of HIV 
contamination at the height of the AIDS epidemic was extreme. And AIDS itself is 
abject. Sandoval-Sanchez (2005) explains in his work on politicizing the abject in 
relationship to his identity as a queer, Latino, AIDS patient,  
I am fascinated with the abject body: if I were not, how would I be able to keep 
on living with AIDS? EL SIDA is the ultimate embodiment of abjection, as 
George Whitmore accurately observed in 1988, AIDS is all “about shit and 
blood” (24), mierda y sangre. How much more abject can you get when you are 
un Latino maricón con SIDA. All in one package. What does it mean to have the 
monster under your skin? (p. 544) 
Moreover, this work becomes abject not only because of the blood, or the threat of 
pollution because it is a water gun filled with blood that has been infected with a fatal 
disease, but also because of the blood’s proximity to an icon of the innocence of 
childhood. Like the children’s shoes of Auschwitz, the work becomes abject because 
something that symbolizes life and childhood, is contextually linked to death. 96  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 Many of Benes’ other works are also abject, including his work Brenda, a wall relief 
consisting of 192 red AIDs awareness ribbons shellacked in a gray paste made from the 
cremated remains of a young woman who had died from AIDs, or a three foot hourglass 
that holds the cremated remains of Noel McBean and his partner James Borden mixed 
together (Groff, 1999).  
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Figure 13. Benes, Lethal Weapons: Silencer (1993). Child’s dart gun modified to shoot 
syringes of the artist’s own HIV infected blood. 
 
 
While abjection is moved to the forefront through bodily fluids, sickness, AIDS, and 
transgression, Lethal Weapons is also humorous and darkly funny. This activates 
something more than rejection, pushing the work towards the abject with an 
uncomfortable titter.   
4.03.02.03 menstrual blood and menstrala. Menstrala is a genre of art that uses 
mestrual blood as its medium. Coined by the menstrual artist Vanessa Tiegs (Figure 14), 
Menstrala can include paintings,97 photographs,98 and installations,99 all of which focus 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 Lani Beloso’s The Period Piece (2010) is a series of paintings using a years worth of 
menstrual blood and was inspired by the artist’s battle with menorrhagia and 
dysmenorrhea, extremely heavy, painful, periods. Vannessa Tiegs’ painting series, 
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on the use of menstrual blood as a material. These artists deny that their work is abject or 
disgusting, instead arguing for either an exploration and celebration of womanhood or a 
sociopolitical commentary on feminist issues like rape, the gendered nature of domestic 
violence, and women’s health. As menstrala artist Beloso (Figure 15) explains, “Damien 
Hirst has preserved animals in formaldehyde. Do we say ‘ew’ when someone has a cut or 
wound? It’s not like it’s human waste, like urine or feces” (cited in Dickson, 2013, para. 
12). Beloso brings up a good point. Not everyone has the same reaction to the body, and 
women in particular may have a different relationship to blood because of menstruation. 
However, I would note that blood outside the body is a form of waste, except in medical 
contexts like blood donation. Also, many people say “ew” or even faint at the sight of 
blood. Researchers believe that all people have some degree of fainting reflex when 
seeing blood and guts, and that it might have even helped our ancestors survive (Lewis, 
2013). Jaeger explains,  
If you're a caveman and another caveman comes over and cuts your arm off, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Menstrala (2003) features incredibly delicate paintings of slightly abstract birds, plants, 
and patterns all in the artist’s menstrual fluids (http://www. vanessatiegs. 
com/creations/menstrala/).  
98 Ingrid Berthon Moine’s photographic work Red is the Colour (2009) featured portraits 
of women wearing their menstrual blood as if it were lipstick (http://www. 
ingridberthonmoine. com/Ingridberthonmoine/Home. html). Zanaele Muholi makes 
digital collages of menstrual stains like Ummeli (2011) (http://www. blankprojects. 
com/1111-zanele-muholi. php).  
99 Judy Chicago’s installation Menstruation Bathroom (1972) is a bathroom spotted with 
blood, overflowing with feminine hygiene products, and a trashcan bursting with 
bloodied tampons and napkins (Vartanian, 2013). Charon Luebber's installation 
Menstrual Hut (1996) was a pyramid, the inside of which was decorated with canvases of 
her face pressed into her own menstrual fluids (Dickson, 2013). Carina Úbeda Chacana’s 
installation, Cloths (2013) featured five years of her menstrual fluids recorded on white 
cloths. Each was stretched into an embroidery hoop with the words “production,” 
“discard,” and “destroyed” stitched below the stains. These were hung from the ceiling of 
the gallery (Vartanian, 2013).  
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sight of blood or injury may cause you to faint. So when you're laying there on the 
ground, you'll look like you're dead to the other cavemen and he won't cut your 
head off. (cited in Lewis, 2013) 
 
 
Figure 14. Tiegs, Menstrala: Galaxy Crossing (2003).  
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Figure 15. Beloso, The Period Piece, Series Two (Detail) (2010). Menstrual blood 
sandwiched between two pieces of plexiglass and lit so that it casts a red shadow on the 
wall behind the piece.  
 
 
Furthermore, the drop in blood pressure and heart rate associated with fainting is believed 
to be beneficial in slowing blood loss (Lewis, 2013).  
However, more than just blood, these works use menstrual blood, activating not 
only the discomfort associated with blood and its breach of the closed body, but also the 
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dissonance of the threatening maternal associated with the abject. As Dickson notes in 
her work on menstrala, many of the responses to menstrual art on the internet have 
expressed pure disgust, labeling the art as unhygienic, with one viewer going so far as to 
email Tiegs to ask, “Why in the FUCK would ANYONE want to ‘celebrate’ their uterus 
waste?” (emphasis in original, cited in Dickson, 2013, para. 14). The author of this email 
obviously views the work as disgusting, rejecting it without the allure of the abject 
(although I would say they perhaps protest too much, which may be interrogated in and 
of itself). However, many others find the work engaging, either aesthetically, since much 
menstrala is visually beautiful; or conceptually, as it is the restoration of power to the oft-
disempowered female body. For these viewers, myself included, the work moves towards 
the abject as it is disgusting but also engaging, beautiful and powerful. The fact that these 
works feature real blood adds to the menace they present, as the viewer contemplates 
how the blood was collected and where it came from, forcing them to think not only of 
wounding but also of menstruation and taboo parts of the female body. These works 
become abject as the secrecy or privacy of menstruation made public is captivating in the 
same type of fascinated victimhood of the abject where one cannot help but look, while 
fears of contamination, from both the blood and from the feminine in general, threaten at 
the same time in a direct way because of the literal presence of menstrual blood.  
The above artists all use bodily fluids or taboo body parts like the anus, to make 
their works and these aspects are very obvious in their use. Boadwee records a video of 
his process and the art of menstrala advertises in its name that it uses menstrual blood. 
The conspicuousness of these inclusions makes the work obviously transgressive and 
obviously abject. However, there are many pieces of art that cause a feeling of the 
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uncanny, which is abject, or engage with the abject in ways that are mitigated or 
contained and effect the ways in which the work is abject. If something were fully 
disgusting, a complete circuit of rejection would occur and the object or artwork would 
be excluded completely. However, the mitigation (through the injection of attractive 
elements) and containment (through the distance that artworks can provide through 
representation) that occur in artwork fosters the fascinated victimhood of the abject and 
haunting sensation that abjection causes.  
4.03.02.04 literal substances that are protected, which protect us. 
The humor of Barton Lindice Benes’ work creates a space for abjection, a space 
that mitigates and diverts the pure rejection of full blown disgust into something that is 
also appealing, alluring, or fascinating. However, there are other ways that works divert 
disgust and create abjection. One example of the abject which may not immediately 
activate a disgust response, but becomes abject upon longer viewing or learning more 
about the work is Chris Ofli’s The Holy Virgin Mary (1996) (Figure 16 and Figure 17) 
and its use of shit. Chris Ofli uses abject substances in his works, although these 
substances have a very different valence or contextual understanding for Ofli. While shit 
in Friedman’s work is immediately discernible as such, without the aid of wall text, the 
viewer may not know that Ofli’s painting contains elephant dung. Some may be familiar 
with Ofli’s use of dung in his painting The Holy Virgin Mary (1996) because of the 
controversy his work and other pieces in the show Sensation inspired when it was 
exhibited at the Brooklyn Art Museum from October 1999 to January 2000. The show 
was first met with protests, then mayor Giuliani filed a lawsuit against the museum and 
its director for using government funds to show “sick stuff ” (Kammen, 2007, p. 294). 
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However, Ofli, a devout Catholic and British citizen, argued that the work was not 
intended to offend, rather the use of dung was meant with reverence as elephant dung is 
sacred and considered curative in Malawi, a part of Africa that relates to Ofli’s own 
heritage and the diasporic African experience (Kammen, 2007; Nesbitt, 2010). This is an 
example of the need for a cultural and contextual approach when using an abject visual 
methodology, as disgust is often about specific cultural contexts. As in this example, 
Ofli’s cultural, national and religious backgrounds impact his use of what many consider 
an offending substance. However, there are other factors that impact the understanding of 
Ofli’s work. For example, shit is not highlighted in the work’s execution: the painting 
does not depict shit, the dung does not maintain a recognizable fecal shape, nor is the 
work covered in thick semiotic brown smears. The manure forms one of the virgin’s 
bared breasts and there are two spheres made of dung on the floor that prop up the 
painting, but the manure is shellacked over and sealed in resin so it does not smell or look 
much different than paint. Resin in Ofli’s work acts as a way to diminish disgust.  
 
 
Figure 16. Ofili, The Holy Virgin Mary (1996) Detail of one of three elephant dung balls 
and pornographic collage elements.  
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Figure 17. Ofili, The Holy Virgin Mary (1996).  
 
 
The popularity of resin sealed tarantulas, scorpions, and other both threatening 
and gross things as paperweights, jewelry, and specimens is a testament to resin’s ability 
to freeze time (Olalquiaga, 2002). I see these as wonderful abject objects where the 
disgust factor is still present, but it is diminished enough by the resin to allow for 
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engagement, contemplation and even pleasure. Similarly, the shellac on Ofli’s work acts 
to freeze and contain the polluting elements of the dung, and thereby protect the viewer. 
This is a psychic protection, as dried elephant dung on a wall is not going to infect the 
viewer literally, so the majority of the threats that activate disgust for us now are psychic. 
Modern medicine guarantees that most infections will not kill us and science’s mastery of 
germ theory has explained that most pathogens can be taken care of with some soap and 
water. We may know that elephant dung on a wall will not harm us, especially since one 
can buy products made from elephant dung. 100 However, the disgust reaction can still 
occur in Ofli’s work and other sites because the concept or the idea of poop being present 
and near by is offensive and threatening. But the response is mitigated by resin and the 
sacred religious content of the work and that alleviation opens the door to the abject. 
While the use of resin as a protective agent when it comes to disgust is not discussed in 
the literature surrounding Ofli or disgust (Kammen, 2007; Nesbitt, 2010; Miller, 1997), I 
argue that it does the same work in art as it does in jewelry, of freezing our emotional 
responses.  
Other factors make Ofli’s work abject beyond the presence of shit, like the 
cherubim’s surrounding the Virgin Mary that are actually collaged photos of genitals and 
posteriors from pornographic magazines. The collaged elements create another type of 
abject response, not to substances, but to dismembered pieces of the body, which 
represent a rupture of the body similar to the one that fluids signal. The fact that all of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 PooPooPaper™ is a company that makes paper products from elephant dung, as well 
as from panda, donkey, horse, and moose dung and any other animal whose dung is 
fibrous. The fibrous quality of the dung means that it can be transformed into paper. They 
advertise their work as recycled and odorless (http://new. poopoopaper. com/).  
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these dismembered genitals are female activates yet another type of the abject, the 
threatening mother, which I will discuss later. The abject is also activated through the 
work’s religious subject matter and its close proximity to bodily substances.  
Although, I argue that Ofli’s work becomes abject through a mitigation of disgust, 
not everyone felt that the work’s offensiveness was lessened, while others were never 
offended in the first place. Ofli argued that the work was beautiful and that the inclusion 
of dung was not only symbolically not offensive in his home country, but that the idea 
had come to him from a group of Malawian nuns, who made a healing poultice from 
elephant dung that was applied to women’s swollen breasts and that allowed new mothers 
to nurse (Kammen, 2007). One particularly devout Catholic man, Dennis Heiner, was so 
offended by the work that he defaced it by covering it in white paint. This, fortunately, 
did not damage the work. The defacement took the form of a purification ritual, the white 
paint covering the virgins bare breast, her dark skin, and the elephant dung (Rothfield, 
2001). The need of a purification ritual to make the work “clean and proper” points to the 
abject nature of the work, which without purification is law violating and filled with 
substances.  
Damien Hirst is another artist whose work often features disgust elicitors like 
eviscerated animals, medical waste, and insects. 101 But like Ofli’s work, Hirst separates 
the viewer from the offensive materials through the use of clear glass tanks. This 
mitigates disgust and activates abjection in two ways: first, the tank protects the viewer, 
containing death and rot while limiting any possible pathogenic contamination. Second, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 Mother and Child Divided (1993) or This Little Piggy Went (1996) (Figure 18); Waste 
(1994); Whose Afraid of the Dark? (2002) 
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the tanks provide a psychic protection because they reference scientific specimens and 
put the viewer in mind of the realm of science, which diffuses death, giving the body an 
eternal purpose in the pursuit of the end of death (Mennighaus, 2003).  
 
 
Figure 18. Hirst, This Little Piggy Went (1996). 
 
 
 
One of Hirst’s most famous pieces, The Physical Impossibility of Death in the 
Mind of Someone Living (1991) (Figure 19), is a large glass tank filled with 
formaldehyde and a preserved tiger shark. Kristeva (1982) explains that the corpse, seen 
outside the realm of religion and science as discourses, is the epitome of the abject. Like 
other bodily substances, dead bodies stand in for both the cessation of life, but also the 
rotting that occurs postmortem and the substances produced as the body breaks down. 
Rotting, while post-mortem, is a moment of life out of bounds, an excess of bacterial life 
digesting the body and turning us into execrable microbial sludge.  
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 The discourses of religion and science explain the presence of death and aid in its 
sanitation. They ease the discomfort associated with demise by offering the possibility of 
an afterlife. For religion, death is only material, it is not a spiritual cessation. Science 
staves off death through the pathologization of the body. The individual didn’t just die 
but, rather cancer killed them, and the individual’s death can now serve the larger 
narrative of scientific exploration through autopsy, preservation and study.  
 
 
Figure 19. Hirst, The Physical Impossibility of Death in the Mind of Someone Living 
(1991). 
 
 
 
The dead are still disgusting, and still dead, but that disgust is mitigated through the 
intersection of the religious and/or scientific. Without these alleviating discourses, the 
corpse becomes a “cropper” (Kristeva, 1982, p.3), or a failure; a failure of life to succeed. 
It becomes an image of pure death in the form of rot. 
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The glass tank in Hirst’s work recalls science, taxonomy and taxidermy. 
Weidemann and Finger (2011) note, “The brutal honesty of these works questioned 
certain practices of industrial society—from livestock confinement on large scale 
“factory” farms to animal testing in research laboratories. The images also raised issues 
surrounding human mortality” (p. 111). The glass, which separates us from the dead 
body, and the formaldehyde, which slows the effects of decay, both act as physical and 
psychological barriers that keep the work from overwhelming us in disgust. In a similar 
manner to the way in which science offers a way to allay disgust, the discourse of 
contemporary art also lessens the experience of disgust in Hirst’s work. The alteration of 
disgust into the abject occurs through the discourse of contemporary art by assertions that 
these objects are art and are meant to be engaged with, even appreciated, in spite of their 
unorthodox materials that incite disgust. Hirst’s work combines the discourses of science 
and art to powerful effect, stimulating long associations between art museums and the 
scientific through the reference to wünderkammern, or Cabinets of Curiosity (Figure 20). 
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Figure 20. Peale, The Artist in his Museum (1822) 
  
These early forerunners to modern-day museums often conflated natural curiosities with 
artworks, all as demonstrations of God’s wonder. These collections would often include 
medical anomalies, pieces of human anatomy like carved gall stones or fetal skeletons, 
and taxidermied animals (Bennet, 1995). Thus, while there are deeply disgusting 
moments in Hirst’s work, the disgust is alleviated at least enough to activate the 
fascination of the abject, particularly curiosity through Hirst’s references to scientific 
display and a culture of curiosity.  
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The artistic process entailing the production of something visual engaging or 
attractive, even when constructed from abject substances, seems to sterilize the 
experience to a certain degree. The attractiveness of the visuals and/or the conceptual 
ideas behind the work keep it from becoming overwhelmingly disgusting, but maintains a 
push and pull of attraction and repulsion, which characterizes the abject. This can be seen 
in Friedman’s work as firstly, the pubic hair is not recognized as pubic hair until one 
reads the wall text. And secondly, following that discovery, the hair’s placement in 
concentric circles and on soap (which is coded as a cleaning agent), counters the abject 
sensations of encountering someone else’s pubic hair, making the work approachable, 
albeit still disgusting. There is a liminal space opened up between disgust and its 
rejection embedded in the work and in the appeal of the design, the unusual materials of 
the piece, and its placement within the museum setting. This liminal space breeds a sense 
of abjection, of wanting to thrust the piece away but being unable to fully do so. In all of 
these examples, the abject is present visually in the form of substances. It may be present 
literally within the space; it may be a representation of its literal existence in another 
space, or it may ask the viewer to imagine its existence.  
4.03.02.05 interacting with bodily substances or watching it happen: tactile 
empathy and the abject. Another category of bodily fluids in art falls under the category 
of interaction with those substances, which creates what Rokonitz (2008) calls a tactile 
empathy. Rokonitz (2008) argues that “the viewers’ embodied resonance” or tactile 
empathy is based on mirror neuron matching, particularly mirror neuron responses that 
take visual stimulation and transfer it into touch sensation (p. 410). Rokonitz argues that 
this accounts for the strong empathetic feelings of disgust when watching movies or 
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plays. For an example of the power of the imagined response to disgust through tactile 
empathy, I return to shows like Bizarre Foods (Steward, 2006-present), where viewers at 
home may shudder while watching the host eat something “bizarre” in an imagined 
response to the same experience. However, the imagined response is not the same as 
literally eating stinky tofu. Even more pertinent to imagined disgust is the viewer 
response to television gore, where some people turn away or feel ill, even though they 
know it’s a movie and is fabricated. 102 Even those who feel ill in the face of televised 
crime drama gore would feel more disgusted if they were to encounter that same gore for 
real, in part because it would involve sense beyond the visual like smell. I argue that 
tactile empathy explains a large part of our reactions to realistically rendered disgust, 
because to see realistic substances or individuals touching that gore is to imagine 
interacting with those substances ourselves.  
To see someone interacting with rotting or disgusting elements causes an even 
more believable and embodied reaction through tactile empathy. The work of Paul 
McCarthy is an example of the role of tactile empathy in art. As Weidemann and Finger 
(2011) explain, “For Paul McCarthy, the body is a primary tool for making art and a 
primary means for exploring ideas” (p. 29). McCarthy established his reputation in the art 
world “his uniquely subversive videos [that] exposed the carnal nature of the artistic 
process” (p. 29). McCarthy’s performance works like Hot Dog (1974) (Figure 21 & 
Figure 22), feature the use of condiments as stand ins for various bodily fluids. Levine 
(2010) explains,   
In performances such as Class Fool (1976), Grand Pop (1977), Doctor (1978), 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 I discuss this at length in chapter 2, p. 24-26.  
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 Contemporary Cure All (1979), and Monkey Man (1980), McCarthy
 systematically soiled plastic dolls with a variety of condiments that stood for
 “dirty” body fluids. In Baby Boy, Baby Magic (1982), he dressed in a diaper and a
 giant baby-head mask and performed a host of infantile activities—spinning
 around until dizzy, banging his head into a wall and table, playing with dolls,
 rubbing his penis—as well as smashing his face in his food, eating with his hands,
 and “defecating” hamburger meat, all while limiting his vocabulary to grunts,
 groans, and gags. In Mother Pig (1983), he simulated urination on a cuddly,
 bright-orange lion (squirting it with a ketchup bottle held at his crotch). In 
 Popeye, Judge and Jury (1983), he fondled a floppy stuffed bunny, rubbing 
 various food products into its increasingly grubby fur. (p. 52)  
Figure 21. McCarthy, Photo documentation of the performance Hot Dog (1974).  
 
 
 
 
McCarthy is known for disgusting performances that have even been stopped by the 
authorities because of their near pornographic content. Levine notes that,  
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In her survey of 1970s performance art, Linda Frye Burnham noted the abundance 
of frank sexuality, violence, death, cruelty, repulsion, masochism and 
masturbation, feces and dead fetuses; yet she singled out McCarthy’s misuse of 
condiments and meat as being “impossible for many performance audiences to 
watch. ” (cited in Levine, 2010, p. 51-52) 
Part of the “impossible” response stems from the fact that these food stuffs often end up 
looking like bodily fluids and watching someone figuratively play with their poo 
stimulates our mirror neurons and tactile empathy, eliciting an even more embodied 
disgust response than if we were to just see an image of these products mixed together. 
Seeing the act of touch and interaction does something different than just seeing an object 
(Figure 23). 
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Figure 22. McCarthy, Photo Documentation of the performance Hot Dog (1974). 
 
 
 There are, of course, other elements in McCarthy’s work that make it abject. 
Some of our first experiences of abjection are tied to food and Kristeva explains that food 
prohibition is possibly our earliest form of abjection. Levine (2010) explains that 
McCarthy’s  
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performances politicized both ingestion and the ingested. Or, more precisely, they 
exposed the already-present politics of food and food rules—the naturalized 
protocols that we instinctively follow, but which must be kept invisible in order to 
operate effectively. Self-restraint, especially with regard to food, is a hallmark of 
modern Western civilization. From the rites and prohibitions of Leviticus to 
modern standards of etiquette, food regulations have allowed individuals to 
distinguish themselves from the “primitive,” while basic table manners—
maintaining control, not throwing food, using utensils, sitting properly—serve as 
important landmarks on the path from infancy to adulthood. (pp. 52-53) 
 
 
 
Figure 23. McCarthy, Photo documentation of the performance Baby Boy (1982).  
 
McCarthy’s work then becomes abject through its attachment to food prohibitions, but 
also in regards to its questioning of the symbolic order through a beastliness that strips 
away culture and returns us to our animal nature (Figure 24). Levine says in regards to 
McCarthy’s work, “Abjection is not only an end in and of itself, but a means of 
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facilitating critique” (p. 54). The critique here is larger than just the pleasures of 
transgression, as McCarthy  
 explore[d] the ways in which American ideals of the body are instilled from 
 infancy by social institutions, and how these ideals are reinforced through routine 
 behavior, food became his medium, and a blatant, often childlike disregard for 
 food rules became his primary tactic of subversion. (p. 52)  
 
 
Figure 24. McCarthy, Spaghetti Man (1993). 
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 But more than attacking the American ideal of the body, McCarthy also questions 
capitalism’s role in this ideal body and its drive to consume through the very substances 
that disgust. Ketchup, barbeque sauce, mustard and hot dog buns all signal the 
quintessential American barbeque, a favorite pastime of the American nuclear family. 
Levine (2010) points out, “like Andy Warhol’s Campbell’s Soup can, the common foods 
that McCarthy features are emblematic of broad cultural values, edible icons of 
Americana that are not only mass produced, but symbolic of mass production and 
consumption themselves” (p. 54). 
 The abjection of Americana then becomes a way to critique “mass production and 
consumption [which] are here seen as generators of extreme homogenization, of 
uniformity and social control under the guise of democratization— what George Ritzer 
has called the “McDonaldization of society” (Levine, 2010, p. 55-56). While McCarthy’s 
work is difficult to watch, especially since the work is sometimes so extreme as to be 
threatening to McCarthy’s safety, it still fascinates, in part because of the extremes that 
McCarthy puts his body through, at times endangering his own health. The work also 
fascinates through its intense attack on consumption and the subsequent homogenization 
of American culture, a consumption that McCarthy bastardizes and conflates with a 
child-like pseudo-sexual abjection of food. Levine notes that,  
food is especially suited to explore the darker aspects of consumerism, since not 
only is eating a universal, mundane, and polyvalent activity, but unlike the kinds 
of purchases typically marked with social significance—cars, clothes, and so on—
food consumption is largely inconspicuous. And yet, as sociologist Alan Warde 
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explains, “it concerns physical and emotional needs, is a site of domestic conflict 
and a key aspect of family formation ”. (p. 56) 
In this context, McCarthy vomits his identity out, as Kristeva explains with the milk, but 
in the process his vomit is filled with the desires of the symbolic other; overconsumption 
and superficial populist images of nationhood are cast out while reiterating the self in 
opposition to those signs. This can be seen particularly well in McCarthy’s performance 
Pinocchio 2 (1994). In the work McCarthy “dressed up as a Disney version of the famous 
wooden boy. Yet McCarthy played Pinocchio as a maniacal father figure, one that force-
fed liquid through the tube-nose of a defenseless ‘child’ Pinocchio puppet” (Weidemann 
& Finger, 2011, p. 29) (Figure 25). The work addresses the abject’s challenge to the 
paternal symbolic order. The id is crystallized in parental desire, which is acted out 
through force-feeding the child milk that has turned slightly. The child has yet to form an 
ego, because abjection, or the spitting out of the milk and the self, has yet to occur.  
 
 
Figure 25. McCarthy, Photo documentation of the performance Pinocchio 2 (1994). 
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Ego formation in the form of abjection is derailed in McCarthy’s work as the father 
figure refuses to let the child vomit themself out. While some (e.g., Weidemann & 
Finger, 2011) see this performance as being about child-abuse, it seems to me to be much 
more of a broader critique of our culture’s crushing handling of childhood and 
adolescence in regards to self-determination. Foster (1996) notes that McCarthy’s self-
denigration is usually part of a broader critique, Foster explains, 
individual degradation is pushed to the point of social indictment, …whereby the 
subject accepts this degradation for protection and/or profit. The principle avatar 
of contemporary infantilism is the obscene clown that appears in Bruce Nauman, 
Kelley, McCarthy, Blake, and others; a hybrid figure… part psychotic inmate, 
part circus performer. (p. 160) 
Another artist who approaches the abject through performative works that activate 
Rokonitz’s tactile empathy is the artist Carolee Schneeman, who describes her artist 
practice as such: “Not only am I an image-maker… I explore image values of flesh as 
material I choose to work with” (Schneeman, 1991, p. 28). Schneeman’s early 
performance and film Meat Joy (1964) (Figure 26) featured eight partially nude dancers 
playing with wet paint and “biting” raw fish, chicken, and sausage. Schneeman (1991) 
called the work an “erotic rite” (p. 29), 
whose shameless eroticism emerged from within a culture that has lost and denied 
its sensory connections to dream, myth, and the female powers. The very fact that 
these works remain active in the cultural imagination has to do with latent content 
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that the culture is still eager to suppress. (p. 31) 
Others, including the police and a number of morality and decency groups, disagreed 
with the shamelessness of the performance and disrupted the work. Schneeman herself 
was even attacked and strangled on stage by an audience member (Schneeman, 1991). 
Princenthal (1997) notes that as with other works of Schneeman’s like Snows (1967) and 
Water Needle (1966), “the tape of Meat Joy unsettled viewers…in ways that are 
unexpected and revealing. In the three decades since these performances, public 
squeamishness has actually increased about some things Schneeman couldn’t have 
predicted—biting raw chickens, for one” (p. 108).  
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Figure 26. Schneeman, Film still from Meat Joy (1964). 
  
 
While Meat Joy seems to be a conceptual mother, so to speak, to McCarthy’s later forays 
into sexual and scatological performances with food, Schneeman’s most famous 
performance and film is Interior Scroll (1975) (Figure 27). In this performance she 
disrobed, struck poses like those from a life-drawing class, read from her book Cézanne, 
She Was a Great Painter, and then slowly pulled a scroll from her vagina from which she 
read as a “sacred text”. Schneeman (1991) explains the work, saying:  
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The need to see, to confront sexual shibboleths was also an underlying motive for 
my performance Interior Scroll…I didn’t want to pull a scroll out of my vagina 
and read it in public, but the culture’s terror of my making overt what it wishes to 
suppress fueled the image; it was essential to demonstrate this lived action about 
“vulvic space” against the abstraction of the female body and its loss of meanings. 
(p. 32) 
Morgan (1997) notes that Schneeman’s “Interior Scroll should be considered one of the 
most fundamental works not only in Schneemann’s career but also in the history of 
feminist art in the 1970s” (p. 100). The significance of her work is tied to the fact that her 
work mixes the personal and the political, Morgan explains, “what is erotic has political 
significance, and what is political is transformed into the erotic” (p. 100). Morgan further 
explains that to understand Interior Scroll is  
to understand the artist’s feminism as being about the body, in contrast to the 
insular protectiveness of the masculine brain. By pulling the scroll from her sex 
and reading it aloud, the artist is stating that what is inscribed on or within the 
sexual body is a discourse inseparable from that body. (p. 100) 
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Figure 27. Schneeman, Photo documentation of Interior Scroll (1975). 
 
 
Morgan praises Schneeman’s work for its feminist critique, for its deconstruction of the 
modernist Cartesian divide in the overwhelmingly male art world, for its return to the 
body, particularly the female body, and its location of the “source of power and intellect 
within the female sexual organs—the intuitive as opposed to the rationalistic concept of 
artistic creativity” (Morgan, 1997, p. 100). However, many find Schneeman’s work 
offensive. I recently showed Interior Scroll to a group of freshman in an introductory 
level women’s studies course and was greeted by many with the typical scrunched face of 
disgust, while other’s mouths hung ajar in shock. 103 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 One of my students asked me how Schneeman’s work was possible, since he was 
convinced that the vagina ended somewhere near the chest, and feared that she would 
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4.03.02.05.01 tactile empathy outside performance and video. When the above 
mentioned works are viewed in video or photographic form they function differently than 
seeing the works in person, as the offending substances are not actually present. 
However, this is when tactile empathy comes into play. However, tactile empathy is also 
activated when viewing videos, photographs and, I would argue, paintings of people 
interacting with offending substances. For example, a strong tactile empathy is activated 
in the way that Rokonitz (2008) first envisioned it in the realm of theater in live 
performance works of artists like McCarthy or Schneeman. Furthering this, mirror 
neurons still work while looking at images of actions, not just static images (Jeffers, 
2009; Rokonitiz, 2008), thus video documentations of performances where the artist 
touches disgusting things also activates tactile empathy. This is a moderated form of 
tactile empathy, since the offending substances are absent. Nevertheless, watching the 
interaction still elicits a disgust response, which can be seen not only in performance 
artists’ work, but in gory films and television shows. Programs like Bizarre Foods 
(Steward, 2006-present) disgust us through our watching of other people eating insects, 
organs, and other “bizarre” foods. This is tactile empathy at work, triggering our mirror 
neurons as we watch, triggering our own bodies through watching the actions, although 
not to the same intensity as witnessing the offending thing in person. The distance 
provided by the screen in these instances may actually allow the abject to reemerge more 
than just disgust because of the distance that screens, videos, and documentation provide. 
In real life, the disgusting elements of a performance may overwhelm, may disgust to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
lose the scroll somewhere in her abdomen. I reformatted the next class to include a much- 
needed lecture on human sexuality and reproduction.  
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point that there is only rejection. However, the distance provided by the forms of 
documentation may provide a mitigating force that opens the up abject.  
4.03.02.05.02 tactile empathy: photography. Images like Andre Serrano’s photo 
Piss Christ (1987) (Figure 7) ask us to engage with bodily substances in an imagined 
space that replicates the real. Viewers of the photograph know that the cloudy yellow 
orange fluid that surrounds the crucifix in the photo is urine, the title indicates this even if 
the viewer is unfamiliar with the controversial image. The indexical quality of 
photography (van Alphen, 2015) tells us that somewhere, out in the world, there is a jar 
of dark urine into which a crucifix has been submerged. 104 Once the materials of the 
work are known and the indexical quality is activated; the viewer is able to imagine the 
smell of piss, acrid and sharp, hear the steady stream splashing into the container, even 
feel the warmth of the jar when it was freshly filled. For most of us, these thoughts are 
disgusting, especially outside the context of a hospital or medical lab, and may make the 
viewer want to reject the photo. Something that is appealing to many, the savior Jesus 
Christ, who is usually framed with reverence, is now combined with a fluid that elicits 
disgust. This describes Kristeva’s concept of the fascinated victim. You are meant to look 
at Christ, yet you are not meant to contemplate your own physical by-products. This 
image engages in the abject not only through bodily fluids, but also through its 
association with religion. Religion is a screen or shield, a protection from the chaos of 
death and disintegration. Remember, for Kristeva, the corpse, seen outside of science and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 Indexical or indexicality is a term that refers to the supposedly truthful relationship 
between a photo and what it is a photo of, or the idea within traditional photography that 
photos are truthful, accurate and real depictions of objects, people and events (van 
Alphen, 2015). Also see Gunning, 2004.  
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religion, is the most abject object as both science and religion offer redemption for the 
corpse, a continued life and purpose that combats the fear and disgust that a corpse 
causes. Yet, in the photo our shield of religious sanctity is immersed, drowned in the 
waste of the mortal body. Serrano’s photo creates a paradox where the viewer can’t look, 
but can’t not look. Serrano has further insured the viewer’s gaze through other aesthetic 
lures, the bright color of the urine, the central placement of the crucifix, and the slight 
haziness to the image, which galvanizes the viewer’s curiosity to look harder. These 
elements invite the viewer’s gaze, but the knowledge of the substance pushes the average 
viewer away.  
Photos, like screens and canvases, offer a measure of protection from disgust. 
Unlike being in the presence of one of McCarthy’s performances or in the presence of 
other works that literally feature bodily fluids, like Tom Friedman’s work, photography 
offers a space to contemplate the work because the actual substances that elicit disgust 
are not present, at least not literally. We are not presented with a jar of urine or with the 
physical denigration of a crucifix in person. We are also protected by the lack of an 
individual interacting with these offensive substances that would trigger tactile empathy. 
This distance allows us to get closer to the image, study it longer without the fear of ‘real’ 
contamination. Photography and video, unlike a canvas, have the aforementioned 
indexical quality, these substances were present to the artist, which may activate a 
deferred tactile empathy. However, the substances are not currently present, providing a 
space to enjoy or gawk at those things that we have been instructed not to play with or 
enjoy.  
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4.03.02.05.03 tactile empathy: paintings. Another type of abject images are 
paintings that depict substances or even interaction with substances, but lack actual 
substances and the indexical qualities that photography, video and performance do, 
meaning the works are fictitious. For example, paintings like Artemisia Gentileschi’s 
Judith Slaying Holofernes (1614-1620) (Figure 28), engage a strong sense of disgust 
through empathizing with the protagonist’s interaction with blood, as the biblical hero 
Judith grabs Holofernes roughly and slices his throat open.  
 
 
Figure 28. Gentileschi, Judith Slaying Holofernes (1614-1620).  
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One could argue for an empathetic connection with Holofernes, especially for someone 
looking at the painting without a knowledge of the Biblical narrative. However, 
Holofernes is the villain, which structures him as deserving of this retribution, which I 
believe is also present in the painting through a complex deployment of gender norms 
that mark Holofernes as immasculated by the women who violate him, making him a 
difficult character to empathize with without threatening normative heterosexual 
cisgendered masculinity. Visual material that realistically depict bodily substances ask us 
to imagine those fluids, interacting with them, viewing them in person, touching them, 
smelling them, and even tasting them. Representations of abject substances without the 
element of interaction or touch still disgust and haunt, but their elicitation of disgust does 
not rely primarily on tactile empathy as the viewer’s body is not implicated in the work..  
 Another example of painted substances that engage with the sense of tactile 
empathy are Dutch still-life paintings. These paintings are highly detailed and are 
designed to make us believe that the flowers in front of us could emit a smell if we were 
only to lean in to experience it; they implicate the viewer through their sensory allure. 
Importantly, though, some of those flowers (or the often accompanying fruit) seem as 
though they are starting to rot in front of us (Figure 29).105 We may logically know they 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 I personally think Dutch still-life painting and vanitas imagery are an outstanding 
example of the abject as a subtle but powerful force. Vanitas images are full of 
outstanding beauty and meticulous detail, but also insects, rot, and death. These 
complicated pairings cause a mild sense of unease along with the pleasure and are subtle 
but decisively abject. Even the flowers that feature so prominently in Dutch still-life 
paintings, the striped tulips that caused “tulip mania” in Holland, are diseased; infected 
with what is called tulip breaking virus (Dash, 2001). Disease and death are related to the 
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are not real. However, representational work asks us, with varying stretches of the 
imagination that are dependent upon the style and execution of the piece, to imagine the 
painted subject as somehow real. If we are to believe the flowers are real, then the threat 
of contamination from the rotting elements is also real.  
 
 
Figure 29. Example of a Dutch Still life with withered flowers and insects. Van der Ast, 
Still Life of Flowers, Shells and Insects (1635).   
 
 
Returning to the broader category of bodily fluids, beyond vomit, and the idea of 
tactile empathy, paintings like Victoria Reynolds’ Reindeer Slope (2008-2010) (Figure 
30) with incredibly beautiful and believably rendered sinews of meat, ask us to imagine 
the tactile presence of sliced flesh through oil paint. While Reynolds does not depict 
anyone touching the meat, the flesh is convincing enough to recall previous interactions 
that the viewer may have had with meat. Voynovskaya (2012) explains,  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
abject, marking another connection between the abject and Dutch still-lives. See Schama, 
(1997).  
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Victoria Reynolds’ oil paintings and drawings of raw meat deconstruct the idea of 
preparing flesh for the purpose of consumption. The meat stops being pieces of 
meat and become biological masses, alluring in their regular, almost crystal-like 
structure. The works elicit a visceral reaction of disgust, but after the initial shock, 
they pull the viewer in for a closer inspection of their meticulously painted details. 
(para. 1) 
 
Figure 30. Reynolds, Reindeer Slope (2008-2010). 
 
 
 
While canvas and paint can act as a screen and provides a certain measure of distance in 
comparison to real bleeding flesh, the imagined experience of flesh still has the capacity 
to disgust and fascinate the viewer, triggering the abject (Figure 31). Voynovskaya’s 
point that the beauty of the painting draws the viewer in, despite the initial reaction of 
disgust, describes a mechanic that is common for the abject; while there may be a knee-
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jerk disgust reaction to many abject works, there is something else present that fascinates 
and mediates the rejection of disgust, drawing the viewer back in for further 
contemplation. In Reynolds’ work there are a number of lures that counter the initial 
disgust including luxurious Rococo frames, the beautiful hues of the oils as they depict 
flesh, as well as a representational trick that turns simple pieces of meat into flowing 
fleshy anemones of pulp.  
 
 
Figure 31. Reynolds, Reindeer Vision (2008). 
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The initial reason to investigate Reynolds’ work through the abject is her use of the body 
rendered as meat, flesh taken outside its normal context and bodily envelope, but an 
abject visual methodology will also look at what mitigates disgust and allows the abject 
to surface, in this instance, a type of beauty.    
 Another example of art that often becomes abject because of the presence of 
bodily substances mitigated, in this instance, by cute, colorful, and sleek design, is the 
genre of Pop Surrealism. Whether in the form of paintings, sculpture, or designer vinyl 
toys, Pop Surrealist works often depict characters interacting with substances or engaging 
in abject activities, like transgressing bodily borders. For example, Ray Caesar’s digital 
paintings, and, in particular, Coming Undone (2007) (Figure 32), features a pretty young 
girl whose back is opening up and blood colored tentacles and a figure are emerging from 
her spine. This work is obviously fictitious, impossible and surreal, but that does not 
mean that the work is not unsettling or disgusting. The presence of bodily fluids, even 
fictitious ones cause us to react. The work is beautiful; the girl is doll-like, the room and 
her clothing is lush, and the scene is highly reminiscent of Rococo painting. However, the 
presences of bodily fluids, even fictitious ones, cause us to react. The girl’s body opening 
up and bloody tissue emerging is a fantasy. The imaginary dream elements of the work 
may heighten the sense of abjection, as they offer a space of refuge in knowing it is not 
real, that helps to defer disgust enough to connect more fully to the work.  
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Figure 32. Cesar, Coming Undone (2007).  
 
 
 4.03.03 metaphoric substances: when yuck hides in plain sight. Another 
instance in which an abject methodological approach is beneficial is in the case of 
metaphoric bodily substances. While some art leaves no question about the fact that 
bodily substances are the subject of the work, at times even the material, other art depicts 
abstractions of bodily substances. Rather than a very clear photograph of what can really 
only be blood, a red splash across a canvas can be understood to represent blood in an 
abstracted form. These abstractions become visual metaphors of the body and its fluids 
where stretched latex is like skin and strands of beads flow like menstrual blood.  
 Eva Hesse’s sculptures and installations are excellent examples of abject visual 
metaphors. Hesse was known for her use of latex and fiberglass, mixing rigid geometric 
shapes with organic soft forms that Robert Smithson called “psychic models” (cited in 
Lippard, 1992, p. 6) of her interior awareness of her gender and it’s impact on her art. 
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Gutierrez-Albilla (2008) notes that Hesse’s work, “can be seen to be politically 
significant for subversive gender and sexual politics” (p. 76).  
In Hesse’s Untitled, or Not Yet, (1966) (Figure 33) pendulous forms are made 
from wire mesh, filled out and made heavy by translucent, shimmering spheres. It is the 
metaphoric body in works like Untitled or Not Yet that make it ideal for an abject visual 
methodology. The form of the work references sagging breasts or dangling flesh and 
challenge the tradition of verticality in art, particularly in portraiture which focuses on the 
upright body, with horizontality and debasement. A horizontal body is fallen, dead or 
wounded. As Gutierrez-Albilla (2008) explains, “Hesse’s bodily sculpture pulls down- 
ward, thus challenging our dominant culture’s concern with the notions of verticality and 
opticality, which are associated with sublimation and vision ” (p. 76). Leslie Jones 
explains that “vision has often been privileged as the superior sense in modernism and 
therefore constitutive of the male subject.  
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Figure 33. Hesse, Untitled, or Not Yet, (1966) 
 
 
The experience of the other senses of the body has been denigrated and relegated to the 
realm of the feminine” (Jones cited in Gutierrez-Albilla, 2008, p. 76). This debasement 
through flesh reasserts the feminine, particularly the monstrous feminine, in opposition to 
the vertical and optically driven art of men. The embodied nature of the abject challenges 
the opticalness of male modernist art in favor of a sense of the body and a preferencing of 
other senses like touch. This critique of scopophilia and opticality as a cultural privilege 
has been called by Margaret Iversen, the “deflationary impulse” (cited in Gutierrez-
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Albilla, 2008, p. 76) and fits both Hesse’s work and much abject art in general which 
focuses on the ugly, the base and the anti-heroic.   
If not sagging breasts, then Hesse’s work resembles spittle or pus dripping slowly 
and viscously down in gooey droplets. In this way, the abject is activated in thinking 
about touching those metaphoric substances. The hesitance to touch Hesse’s work lies not 
in its literal materiality, the latex or the metal, but in what those materials are meant to 
represent: lactating breasts or saliva, perhaps semen, dripping. Hesse’s work and the 
disgust response it can produce is then a form of the previously mentioned tactile 
empathy. The works disgust through an implication that one will touch the work and that 
to touch the work would be to come into contact with something that is both physically 
disgusting; it looks as if it could be sticky or gooey, and psychologically off-putting, 
since it is like touching a bodily substance. The work also seems to reference egg sacks, a 
female production, rendered in industrial materials that are coded as male, making the 
works a hermaphroditic mélange of semiotic sexes.  
More than the feminine or bodily fluids, the work speaks to aging flesh, bodies 
that are moving towards disintegration. More than the formal elements of the work, the 
material itself becomes a metaphor for abject age. Hesse’s use of refuse or lowly 
materials, plastics and abandoned factory materials, speak to the aging body as abject, as 
they are marginalized materials, castoffs that refuse to disappear, detritus waste from our 
consumer society. As Gutierrez-Albilla (2008) explains, “As an industrial material, latex 
is a fragile medium which decays over time” (p. 76). Both the reclaimed elements and the 
material elements speak to deterioration or rot of the metaphoric body. Gutierrez-Albilla 
(2008) notes that, “Many of Hesse’s works have in fact become discoloured and have 
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disintegrated due to their susceptibility to light and heat, thereby becoming an art whose 
ontology is based on its dematerialization and final disappearance” (p. 76). While Hesse’s 
work refuses literal representation of bodily substances, it does abstractly reference 
bodily substances removed from the body and the sense that the body has become 
desiccated or is deteriorating through drooping forms and rusting materials. Her works 
become “abstract prosthetic extension[s] ” (Gutierrez-Albilla, 2008, p. 76) of the body.  
Hesse’s Untitled (Rope Pieces) (1970) (Figure 34) has a similar sense of the body 
abjected and abstracted.  
 
 
Figure 34. Hesse, Untitled (Rope Pieces) (1970). 
 
 
The cordage, hung in tangled drooping knots, is the color of oxidized blood and 
resembles the arterial system or ligaments pulled from the body, or perhaps intestines 
hung like sausage casings. Gutierrez-Albilla (2008) explains,  
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Hesse’s desublimatory sculpture is a fallen body which escapes from logicality 
and lodges itself within the bodily and the obsessional, thereby emphasizing our 
reaction to the sculpture on a corporeal, organic and perceptual level. Desire is 
thus not proposed here as the desire for form and thus for sublimation. Rather, 
desire is defined in terms of transgression against form. (p. 76) 
Hesse’s symbolic abject bodies transgress the sealed body, crossing uncomfortable 
borders as they are turned inside out while their material and conceptual nature stimulates 
an embodied disgust. However, her work becomes further abject in regards to the 
minimalist modern art of her male contemporaries and of the formal qualities they held in 
esteem as her work debases sculpture and art through a corporeal feminine alternative.  
A deeper abject analysis of Hesse’s work would delve into her past, looking at her 
escape from Nazi Germany, her mother’s suicide, and her own failed marriage and how 
these moments of chaos become manifest in the abstract abject bodies of her sculptures, 
particularly in regards to their sexual and maternal content (Lippard, 1992). Delving 
further into Hesse’s biography would be important in a longer analysis of her work. An 
important part of a visual abject methodology is to consider history and biography as 
contextual elements that can lead to a better understanding of abject art, particularly since 
the abject is deeply tied to childhood and the maternal. However, in this taxonomy I 
focus on Hesse’s metaphorical engagement with the abject body through abstraction and 
how those abstractions call for the use of an abject visual methodology to explain her 
works’ haunting explorations of sex, the body, and death.  
 4.03.04 gender and the maternal. Gender is crucial to the abject primarily 
because of the maternal, but also in gender-nonconformity. Because this category is so 
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important and is theorized very briefly by Kristeva, but expanded upon much more by 
later scholars, I will discuss briefly how the abject relates to gender non-conformity, the 
maternal and particularly the monstrous mother. As Chanter (2008) explains, “Women 
are rendered unthinkable by patriarchy except as reproductive vessels or maternal 
caretakers” (p. 3). Chanter argues that the abject is the system’s waste, therefore 
patriarchy’s waste, its binary opposition and exclusion, is woman. Cisgendered 
heteronormativity builds itself against and then incompletely excludes its other: queer, 
transgendered, and non-normative bodies and gender performances (Butler, 1993). An 
abject visual methodology recognizes instances in which gender and the maternal are 
made frightening or disgusting in their difference.   
4.03.04.01 abjectly queer: images of gender non-conformity. Many artists have used the 
abject to challenge normativity like James P. James (Figure 35), a photographer who 
shoots penises that have been covered so thoroughly in glitter that the male members look 
deformed or covered in sparkly legions.106 The now infamous Robert Mapplethorpe 
photographed scenes from the gay S&M subculture in New York City in the 1970’s and 
1980’s, which were both disgusting in their violations of the body, like Self Portrait with 
Whip (1978) (Figure 36), where the artist breaches his own borders with a bull whip.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 James P. James works also include the documentation of drag queens, another abject 
subject (http://www.jamespjames.com/html%20site/glittercocks.html).  
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Figure 35. James, Glitter Cock (2013). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 36. Mapplethorpe, Self Portrait with Whip (1978). 
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However, the photographs are also tonally beautiful, well composed and captivating. 
Many of Mapplethorpe’s works activate the abject not only literally through the violation 
of bodies or the presence of bodily substances, but also in the Butlerian sense of the 
representation of bodies on the borders of societies, the social rejects to which the normal 
is constructed in response. This is present in Mapplethorpe’s work as he documents queer 
life, making social abjects, the subjects of his photography. 
 Similarly, the photographer Catherine Opie has documented her own queer sexual 
practices and queer lives, turning queer abjection into the subject of art. Opie’s work is 
complicated in its abject content, as she carves into her back childlike drawings of two 
girls holding hands deep enough to draw blood (Self-Portrait/Cutting, 1993), or 
breastfeeds her child topless (Self-Portrait/Nursing, 1994) so that one can see the faint 
scars from another performance photograph where Opie dressed in a gimp mask, pierced 
her arms with needles, and carved pervert into her chest (Self-Portrait/Pervert, 1994) 
(Figure 37).  
 The inclusion of cutting and sadomasochistic sexual practices with maternal and 
bodily fluids easily mark the work as disgusting and abject. These images challenge 
gender norms and expectations through abjection, both through the inclusion of bodily 
substances and breaks in the borders of the body, but also in the very inclusion of female 
and queer sexuality, which challenges cisgendered heteronormativity and stereotypical 
gender constructions.  
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Figure 37. Opie, Self-Portrait/Cutting (1993) (left), Self-Portrait/Nursing, (1994) 
(center), Self-Portrait/Pervert, (1994) (right).  
 
 
 
If the normal ego is what is expelled from the child through abjection, then one could see 
the works of Mapplethorpe and Opie as the birth of the aberrant through social abjection. 
Their queer bodies are spat out of the larger social body and, while abjection creates the 
norm, it also forms othered egos that then trouble the norm, in the reciprocal circuit that 
Butler (1993) describes.   
4.03.04.02: the maternal: visions of the threatening mother As with both 
sexual difference and gender difference, particularly in regard to the female, the abject is 
closely related to the maternal. While I have discussed this briefly in the literature review, 
I will revisit some of the main points on the maternal and its connection to the abject 
here. The maternal threat stems from the power of difference, which is at the heart of 
psychoanalysis and its relationship to women: castration anxiety. The female is 
frightening because of her genital difference and lack of a phallus. The assumption that 
the female is a castrated male points to the impermanence and unnecessary status of the 
phallus, and through it the patriarchal system as a whole.  
This is an aberrant and horrifying premise in a phallocentric world. Creed (1986) 
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explains that, “All human societies have a conception of the monstrous feminine, of what 
it is about woman that is shocking, terrifying, horrific, abject” (p. 44). In his paper 
Fetishism (1927), Freud notes, “Probably no male human being is spared the terrifying 
shock of threatened castration at the sight of the female genitals” (as cited in Creed, 1986, 
p. 44). Freud further calls the archaic mother, a figure of the early mother goddess and 
the ultimate female, a “shadowy” figure, while Lacan later refers to the archaic mother, 
the opposition to the phallic father, as “the abyss of the female organ from which all life 
comes forth” (as cited in Creed, 1993, p. 25).  
Creed (1986) explains,  
It is not by accident that Freud linked the sight of the Medusa to the equally 
horrifying sight of the mother's genitals, for the concept of the monstrous-
feminine, as constructed within/by a patriarchal and phallo-centric ideology, is 
related intimately to the problem of sexual difference and castration. (p. 44) 
The figure of Medusa freezes men, turning them to stone, a double entendre for the 
hardness of erection. The man is both fascinated and aroused by the woman, while her 
difference serves as a point of deep-seated anxiety, based in castration fear and in a 
suspicion of the doubled embodiment of pregnancy, in which two entitles inhabit one 
body.  
Simone De Beauvoir discusses the connection of monstrosity to the female gender 
in her seminal text The Second Sex (1949/2011). In her text, Beauvoir explores 
femaleness in other species, noting that the very word female calls to mind images of  
an enormous round egg snatching and castrating the agile sperm; monstrous and 
stuffed, the queen termite reigning over the servile male; the praying mantis and 
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the spider, gorged on love, crushing their partners and gobbling them up; the dog 
in heat running through back alleys, leaving perverse smells in her wake; the 
monkey showing herself off brazenly, sneaking away with flirtatious hypocrisy. 
And the most splendid wildcats, the tigress, lioness and panther, lie down 
slavishly under the male’s imperial embrace, inert, impatient, shrewd, stupid, 
insensitive, lewd, fierce, and humiliated. Man projects all females at once onto 
woman. (p. 21) 
In her reflections on lower organisms, Beauvoir ruminates:  
The organism is reduced to barely more than the reproductive apparatus; in this 
case, the ovum-and therefore the female-takes precedence over everything else, 
since it is above all the ovum that is dedicated to the sheer repetition of life; but it 
is barely more than an abdomen, and its existence is entirely devoured by the 
work of a monstrous ovulation. (pp. 31-32) 
In these passages Beauvoir captures many of the anxieties surrounding generative 
capacities that the male projects upon the female: anxieties that are projected onto the 
entirety of the female gender, not simply human women.  
Much of the power of the female is tied to the maternal, both in regard to access 
to the symbolic order and in terms of her ability to disrupt through difference. Mother is 
the site in which male anxiety is born, according to Freud; it is the mother’s genitals that 
the child first glimpses in horror, marking the mother as the monstrous Other. As Chanter 
(2008) notes, “The feminine comes to stand for a mythical past, relegated to a time that 
predates the Oedipal narratives, the terms of which are formulated in a way that precludes 
the entry of the feminine, other than as masquerade” (p. 4). For Kristeva (1982), this 
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early time is known as “chora,” a pre-lingual but not pre-discursive stage characterized 
by a boundaryless existence of sensation and need. The maternal association with chora, 
with the child’s almost symbiotic existence with the mother before the Oedipal drama, is 
a part of a shared mythic past when we all experienced life as a extension of the feminine. 
This type of union is often considered monstrous because the chora represents a threat to 
the patriarchal Symbolic. Chora is a time, a language, and perhaps even a culture that 
exists outside the Symbolic. The chora predates and even acts as the foundations for the 
language of the father, and represents an alternative to patriarchy.  
The fragility of the patriarchal system is hidden by projecting inadequacy and 
fault onto the female, as she is always considered maternal, whether she is a mother or 
not. Inadequacy is projected not only on to women, but onto all other subjects that appear 
to lack not only the “correct” genitals, but also the hegemonic skin color, sexual 
preference, gender performance, or class. There is a reciprocal relationship between 
woman being the first Other, in the form of the mother, and the subsequent feminization 
of subalterns who are often characterized in the same way as women: weaker, less 
intelligent, more connected to nature, more emotional, and ultimately less worthy. Creed 
(1986, 1993) links the abject to the maternal, the vaginal, the excremental, and the 
menstrual. As Kristeva (1982) lays out and as Creed (1986, 1993) expands upon, the 
maternal is the domain of the abject, as the maternal is what the child builds itself against 
in its first identity formation, and it is the mother that the child fears will consume them 
and destroy their first attempts at individuation. Abjection is a precondition of narcissism 
and ego since, before one solidifies the self, one rejects that which does not belong. 
However, there is a fear that one will lose those demarcations of selfhood and be 
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swallowed back up into the Other/mother. This fear becomes materialized in images of 
the vagina dentata, or vagina with teeth, the consuming mother which will suck the 
individual back into the womb, destroying their identity.  
According to Kristeva (1982) this is demonstrated through defilement rituals. 
Kristeva traces a history of matriarchal power by explaining the rise of a preoccupation 
with purity and defilement through the shift from paganism to patriarchy in religion. 
Defilement is always linked to the female through blood and shit. Menstruation is an 
internal defilement that woman must bear as compensation or as punishment for sex and 
child bearing, and excrement is associated with the woman as an external threat of 
pollution that stems from her role in taking care of the infant, cleaning their filth and 
toilet training them. Defilement is understood as animal-like, marking women as wild and 
uncivilized. It relates to the body by marking woman as counter to the culture and 
civilization of man. However, dirt is also understood as matter out of place, or disorder, 
meaning that women are considered dirty and disordered. This helps to explain the 
historic connection between women and madness, as mental illness is often understood as 
disorder, or an inability to follow rules, observe laws, or clearly use language. It is worth 
noting that hysteria, the early name for female mental illness, is derived from the Greek 
for womb, which was thought to be the cause of hysteria.  
The transgression of borders between nature and civilization, between sanity and 
madness, between clean and dirty, is a way to further mark the mother as monstrous. As 
Cohen (1996) notes, the monster is a figure on the border that occupies an ambiguous 
space between culture and the Lacanian Real. Understanding the mother as monstrous is 
part of what then drives ego formation in the child. The child’s struggle to break away 
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from the mother is made easier by understanding the mother as a monstrous figure. 
Through the child’s rejection, the mother becomes the child’s first abjected, or jettisoned, 
waste. Creed (1986) sums up this complicated relationship between bodily fluids, the 
maternal, the paternal, and disgust as follows: 
Images of blood, vomit, pus, shit, etc., are central to our culturally/ socially 
constructed notions of the horrific. They signify a split between two orders: the 
maternal authority and the law of the father. On the one hand, these images of 
bodily wastes threaten a subject that is already constituted, in relation to the 
symbolic, as “whole and proper.” Consequently, they fill the subject – both the 
protagonist in the text and the spectator in the cinema – with disgust and loathing. 
On the other hand, they also point back to a time when a “fusion between mother 
and nature” existed; when bodily wastes, while set apart from the body, were not 
seen as objects of embarrassment and shame. (p. 55) 
An example of the monstrous mother in contemporary art is the painter Jenny Saville’s 
work The Mothers (2011) (Figure 38), which depicts a woman with a seemingly pregnant 
belly holding two squirming children. The execution of the work is sketchy in places and 
refined in others, rendered in such a way that the distinction between the bodies of the 
figures is blurred. The work depicts a monstrous mother whose body re-envelops her 
children, becoming a three-headed, multi-limbed chimera. 
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Figure 38. Saville, The Mothers (2011).  
 
Another contemporary images of the monstrous mother can be found in Takashi 
Murakami’s sculpture Hiropon (1997) (Figures 39 & 40), which represents a life-sized 
female character reminiscent of manga, or Japanese comics, clothed only in a skimpy 
bikini top. Her top fails to conceal impossibly large breasts that spew a torrent of breast 
milk, with which she engages in a game of jump rope. The work conflates sexuality and 
childhood in the form of a comic-book character caught in the act of transgressive self-
pleasure, as she, quite literally, plays with her own bodily fluids. The figure is infantilized 
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through the use of the manga style, the bright plastic colors of the sculpture, and the 
schoolgirl activity of jumping rope. The figure is also that of the monstrous mother, as 
her monstrously engorged (or surgically enhanced) breasts, replete with breast milk, 
unmistakably signal childbearing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 39. Murakami, Detail Hiropon (1997).  
 
Milk does not drip from her, it sprays from her udder-like nipples, appearing to 
curdle into thick dense cordage that encircles her tiny pre-teen waist, narrow hips and 
smooth genitals. An uncomfortable hybrid of blatant sexuality, underaged innocence, and 
maternal symbolism, the figure and its impossible milk rope become uncanny and abject 
through transgressively eliciting contradictory emotions of pleasure and disgust. 
Murakami is himself well aware of the political and social transgression his work enacts, 
as he attests in his Super Flat Manifesto (2000) and his exhibition and book entitled Little 
Boy (2005), which discuss the rise of the kawaii (super-cute) aesthetic in Japan as a child-
like response to the paternalistic relationship enforced on Japan by America after World 
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War II. As Ivy (2006) explains, “Little Boy, of course, refers to the code name for the 
bomb dropped on Hiroshima, and it is this American bomb and the explosive trauma it 
unleashed that become the source for the infantilization of postwar Japanese culture” (p. 
500). In this context, the figure of Hiropon becomes a doppelganger of the amazing “50-
Foot Woman” of 1950’s B-movie fame. Hiropon is an atomic monster on the border, 
sexualized but infantilized through a cute aesthetic, styled on lowbrow comics but shown 
in fine art contexts. She is the mother and child combined into one uncomfortable body.  
 
 
 
Figure 40. Murakami, Hiropon (1997).   
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Figure 41. Cano, The Miracle of Lactation (1650). 
 
 
I have noted that an abject visual methodology can be used in regard to historical 
works as well. A similar maternal abjection can be seen in the art-historical example of 
lactation in The Miracle of Lactation (1650) by Alonso Cano (Figure 41), which depicts 
the Virgin Mary squirting milk from her breast into the waiting mouth of Saint Bernard 
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de Clairvaux. During the Renaissance, breast milk was thought to be a product of heat 
and blood; an abject substance, blood, created another abject substance, breast milk, 
which carried the essence of the producer with it. So in the case of the Virgin, breast milk 
also contained mystical powers (Yalom, 1998). During the Middle Ages, works such as 
these representing breastfeeding were a metaphor for the church’s ability to provide 
spiritual sustenance (Miles & Lyons, 2008).  
But as the use of wet nurses spread, the image of the Virgin nursing either Jesus 
or anther figure also came to be understood as a political critique of foreigners. This type 
of image is viewed as a cautionary tale about the possible contamination that foreign wet 
nurses could transmit to children through their milk and an instructional for “good 
mothers” to emulate the Virgin and nurse their own children for the sake of the child and 
the state (Yalom, 1998; Miles & Lyons, 2008). Thus breast milk, lactation, and the breast 
itself, became loaded symbols that conflated spiritual nourishment, secular eroticism, and 
the abject.  
While the lactating Virgin remains a sacred subject for many, images of milk 
shooting from a woman’s breast into another’s mouth causes contemporary viewers to 
feel anxiety about the transmission of bodily fluids, and the power of the maternal 
manifest in the action of lactation. The fact that Kristeva cites milk as the substance that 
causes revolt and the jettisoning of oneself through ego formation is no coincidence, as it 
is a sign of the mother: a once-nourishing figure who turns sour during the course of ego 
development. Here the defilement of the milk and bodily fluids is purified by the Virgin’s 
religious sacredness--or at least we can assume that this was the intent of the Christian 
painter: the profane becoming sacred, or cleansed through sacredness. However, in a 
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contemporary and more secular context, this cleansing is incomplete or unconvincing. 
Confronting the Cano painting now, we are presented with an abject, absurd, or 
uncomfortable mythic narrative about the transmission of fluids from the maternal body.  
 4.03.04.02.01: Bourgeois and abject subjects. Having illustrated examples of the 
monstrous or abject maternal as art, I now turn to the artist Louise Bourgeois for an 
extended investigation into the mechanics of the abject in conjunction with gender and 
the maternal. Bourgeois is a feminist sculptor who utilizes metaphor in her work 
referencing bodily substances, gender, and the maternal. In 1982 Bourgeois was the first 
living woman to get her own retrospective at the Museum of Modern Art in New York 
(Walker, 2010). While Bourgeois has rejected claims that she is a Surrealist, she has 
discussed her work in terms of early childhood traumas, often citing her father’s long-
standing affair with Bourgeois’ live-in teacher, thus making the work, in some respects, 
psychobiographical in nature.  
Her piece The Destruction of the Father (1974) (Figure 42) features large forms 
clustered together, protruding from the base like pustules and suspended from the ceiling 
like breasts. As in Hesse’s work, these bulbous forms become a type of abject metaphor 
of the feminine and the maternal, as they represent abstractions of egg sacks or pregnant 
bellies. Pieces such as Cumul (1968), Avenza (1969), even a wearable soft sculpture from 
the performance piece A Banquet/A Fashion Show of Body Parts (1978) (Figure 43), 
feature Bourgeois’ characteristic bulging furuncles.  
 One critic complains, “The problem I have with Bourgeois’ work is its literalness, 
the indexical symbolism that has given her interpreters material for their academic 
frenzy” (as cited in Walker, 2010, p. 4). I would argue instead that these explicit features, 
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which some see as problematic in her work, enable the activation of disgust and a deeper 
interest in content and form, encouraging an abject response. It is the ability to read these 
works as metaphoric representations of bodily fluids and maternal bodies that make them 
abject. Bourgeois installs these egg sacks in cave forms or nooks that are filled with 
swelling tumefactions that reference the body straining at its borders through the weight 
of fat or fecundity. 
 
 
 
Figure 42. Bourgeois, The Destruction of the Father (1974). 
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Figure 43. Bourgeois, Cumul (1968) (left), Avenza (1969) (center), and still from the 
performance A Banquet/A Fashion Show of Body Parts (1978) (right).  
 
Figures of eggs, spheres of fetal development, or egg sacks reference disembodied 
or traveling wombs and become abstractions of the mother and maternal threat.107 They 
represent the body ready to break open and spill out, or at least beginning to drip from 
fullness, like lactating mammilla-stalactites. Any sense that this work was simply formal 
and was not meant to represent a symbolic body is countered by Bourgeois’ succinct 
statement: “For me, sculpture is the body. My body is my sculpture” (as cited in Walker, 
2010, p. 6). Walker notes that the frequency with which this quote appears in literature 
surrounding Bourgeois is a testimony to the “crucial place which the body occupies in 
Bourgeois’ art” (p. 6). The body in Bourgeois’ work is rarely whole or fully figurative, 
rather it “ is always either fragmented, deformed, or completely metaphorical” (p. 6). The 
fragmented body, the deformed figure, and the metaphoric representation of gender all 
inhabit the space of the abject.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 The figure of the traveling uterus is not new; rather, it is the root of the concept of 
hysteria. Greeks and Romans believed that the uterus moved around a woman’s body, 
creating different tempers and moods. This idea led to the notion of women as overly 
emotional, or hysterical, because of their uteruses (Wolf, 2013).  
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Returning to The Destruction of the Father (Figure 39), if one considers that the 
lumps might look less like abscesses or egg sacks and more like breasts that have been 
severed from their bodies, this would make the work akin to a contemporary image of 
Saint Agatha,108 whose breasts, after having been ripped from her body, were placed on 
the floor and ceiling, instead of the martyr’s platter (Delaney, 2005). Images of Saint 
Agatha can be understood as both an historical and a literal representation of the abject. 
The Destruction of the Father is an example of the metaphoric abject, in which physical 
abjection is made more complex when a viewer’s response to a fragmented body is 
compounded by a narrative of religious martyrdom.  
 Bourgeois’ forms are abstractions and visual metaphors which, very ambiguously 
in this instance, reference the maternal abject in the form of giant egg sacks or 
dismembered breasts. However, other works by Bourgeois are more obviously 
metaphoric, less liminal, and less open-ended. Examples include The Woven Child 
(2002), a fiber sculpture of a limbless female torso pregnant with a child enclosed in a 
transparent mesh womb, or Nature (1912-2010), which features the body of a hound with 
multiple human breasts instead of teats (an image Bourgeois returned to repeatedly), or 
her pink fabric piece Fragile Goddess (2002) (Figure 44), in which a pregnant limbless 
torso’s neck stretches into a phallic form. These pieces are also metaphors for the 
maternal. The sculptures function visually as deviant pregnancies; the mother is denied 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 Saint Agatha is depicted in art as a woman carrying a platter bearing two mounds, 
representing her dismembered breasts. This imagery refers to the way in which Saint 
Agatha was martyred; her breasts were torn from her body with hot tongs (Delaney, 
2005). 
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subjectivity through the lack of a face, or is rendered monstrous and bestial through 
animal bodies and hermaphroditic references.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 44. Bourgeois: (left), The Woven Child (2002); (center), Fragile Goddess (2002); 
(right), Nature (1912-2010). 
 
 
These works directly evoke the category of the maternal abject, but other works 
like The Destruction of the Father (1974) (Figure 42), Janus Fleuri (1968) (Figure 45) or 
Fillette (1968) (Figure 46) also function as abject metaphors. While Janus Fleur is not 
obviously depicting the maternal form, in the way The Woven Child does, it does 
resemble the disembodied lower torso of a female seeming to rupture or split apart 
revealing organ-like forms. Schultz (2012) explains, “The bronze sculpture Janus Fleuri 
is a ambiguous form with connotations of sexuality, metamorphosis, and struggle” (para. 
5).  
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Figure 45. Bourgeois, Janus Fleuri (1968). 
 
 
This is a work that Bourgeois often referred to as a self-portrait. The title refers both to 
the past and the future, manifested in the form of Janus, the god of transitions and 
doorways. Michele Schultz has argued that the work “embodies the artist’s Oedipal 
deadlock – an unresolvable struggle between Bourgeois, her father and her mother, 
stalemated by her mother’s death” (2012, para. 5). The vagina is a locus of anxiety, as it 
is the site of woman’s supposed castration, and also the mouth of the birth canal. Because 
it is an opening, the vagina is a point of vulnerability in the bodily envelope as well as a 
complex space of abjection, as it both expels through the sloughing off of internal fluids 
during menstruation, takes in seminal fluids that are used to create life, and then 
eventually expels fluids during childbirth.  
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Figure 46. Bourgeois, Fillette (1968) (left), and Fillete (1968) installed (right). 
 
 
Fillette (1968), like Janus Fleuri, is a vague visual metaphor, unlike Seven in Bed 
(2001) (Figure 47), in which the human form may be deformed but is literally 
represented. Fillette, however, is no less legible as abject, since it resembles a castrated 
phallus. It is a column form surrounded by fleshy rolls, with two spheres at its base and 
pierced through the “head” with a ring. It suggests a horrific vision of the fear of 
difference in the form of the castrated member. But more than simple castration, the work 
references the female body in its title, which plays on the idea of a cut of meat, a fillet, 
but also a young girl—fillette in French.  
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Figure 47. Bourgeois, Seven in Bed (2001). 
 
 
However, Fillette is not the color of flesh (it doesn’t bleed), nor is it hyper-
realistic, like Ron Mueck’s sculptures. It is a sculptural metaphor for a castrated penis. 
This metaphoric deferral may provide distance for the viewer, and the abstraction may 
allow the viewer to come closer, to engage more deeply, because the trauma is less 
obvious. This does not fully remove the abject from the viewing experience though, as 
the work elicits a reaction of disgust and a sense of the uncanny. An abject visual 
methodology must look not only for literal examples of the body’s insides turned out, but 
must also interrogate abstractions, metaphors, and metonyms that reference bodies and 
their byproducts.  
4.03.04.02.02: Bourgeois and abject materiality. Like Hesse’s use of latex as 
symbolic skin, Bourgeois’ sculptures also use material metaphors that activate the abject, 
particularly in regard to gender and the maternal. Bourgeois uses many different 
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sculptural materials, from marble to latex to secondhand fabrics. However, her uses of 
those materials often act as a metaphor, or further complicate the work’s relationship to 
the abject. In his recent article, “Sexing the Canvas: Calling on the Medium.” Chare 
(2009) posits:  
Medium is never gender neutral. Both the artist’s and the art historian’s 
relationship to the substances out of which art objects are crafted is, and probably 
always has been, mediated by values and assumptions about the sexes. (p. 667)  
If medium is gendered, and gender is central to the abject, then material too becomes 
abject in a number of ways.  
Marble is a beautiful sculptural material whose hardness and durability is 
traditionally coded as masculine. However, when Bourgeois uses it she makes truncated 
and debased forms that reference the feminine. Walker (2010) points out that marble, 
when used by Bourgeois, possesses its own meaning. Bourgeois specifically uses marble 
from Carrera, Italy in most of her works, including Sleep II (1959) (Figure 48), a piece 
that resembles a post-coital penis in retreat. Famous male sculptors like Michelangelo, 
Bernini, Canova, and even Praxelities, whose works set the standard for Western beauty, 
used Carrera marble for less subversive and abject purposes. Walker (2010) explains,  
To represent a ‘limp penis’ out of such a ‘noble’ material which we have come to 
associate with some of the great (male) masters of sculpture can be understood as 
a provocation in itself. Secondly, relationship between form and matter has often 
been characterized as one of gendered opposition, where form is related to the 
male and exists prior to its feminized complement, matter…. Placed within this 
context, Bourgeois’ Sleep II emerges, not as a ‘tender portrayal’ of a retreating 
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phallus, but as a radical reversal of the Pygmalion fantasy: in Bourgeois’ hands, 
the woman/artist becomes the creator of the phallus/man. (pp. 17-18) 
Bourgeois is obviously very aware of the impact and role of material in her works. Not 
only does her radical gender reversal suggest a hybrid, a mixture of the male and the 
female in a single work, but it also becomes another type of castration image, with a 
female artist holding power over the phallus. That power creates the phallus, but also 
displays it separated from its host, suggesting castration. Moreover, while Walker sees 
this as a metaphor of a complete man, the work itself appears to me to only be the tip (the 
head of the penis), referencing perhaps a circumcision gone awry.  
 
 
 
Figure 48. Bourgeois, Sleep II (1959). 
 
 
In another material metaphor, Bourgeois uses latex as a reference to skin. Fer 
(1999) asserts, “In Bourgeois, latex does not so much bear the mark of touch – it is not 
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modeled – as act out its previous liquidity, of wetness, of bodily secretions which make 
the skin [or] surface bulge and almost leak or seep out” (p. 32). The latex acts as a 
reference to the wet, seeping body. Michael Kelly (1998) notes that Bourgeois’ work 
Portrait (1963), “in its glistening viscosity and shapelessness, evoke[s] not the 
architecture of a body but the fluidity of its internal matrix” (p. 306). The body that is 
referenced in these material metaphors is the inside of the body, the hidden wet depths. In 
his work on psychoanalytic strategies in modern art, Kuspit (2000) asserts,  
The body and skin – separately or together – are clearly the ultimate avant-garde 
medium, and avant-garde art increasingly becomes an attempt to resurrect a body 
that is experienced as damaged if not dead, and give it a new skin that will 
function as a boundary keeping the outside world out, once and for all. (p. 141) 
It is no wonder then that Bourgeois’ materials, as well as her artistic content, reference 
the debased body. Potts (1999) discusses the difference between Bourgeois’ use of 
material metaphors in a comparison between Fillette and one of Brancusi’s polished 
bronze pieces. He points out: “By contrast …[Fillette] does not have a reassuringly 
smooth surface – the latex in certain areas coagulates in awkward lumps, in places even 
peels away from its core, as if its skin might stick to one rather than glide under one’s 
touch” (p. 45). The latex skin is not the perfect skin to which marble is likened, but 
instead a rough, even disfigured skin that is in flux, peeling and thus dying.  
 Similarly, materials like pink fabric and old clothing, used in Bourgeois’ soft 
sculptures, transgress borders between fine art and craft, mixing not only high and low 
connotations, but also gender assumptions. Fibers and craft techniques are coded as 
female, while traditional sculpture materials like bronze and marble are coded as fine art 
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and masculine. To infuse craft materials with formal and conceptual content, and move 
fibers out of the decorative arena into the realm of fine art, is an act of border crossing, a 
key element of the abject. Walker (2010), referencing Old Mistresses, Pollock and 
Parker’s 1981 feminist critique of art history, notes that  
…the art and craft division can appear on different levels: it can be read on class 
lines, but crucially for the present study, there is an important connection between 
the new hierarchy of the arts and sexual categorization, male-female. The ‘specter 
of domestic art’ is menacing for women because ‘high art and the fine artist have 
come to mean the direct antithesis for all that is defined by the ‘feminine 
stereotype’. Art which is made of materials like thread and textiles and which uses 
processes like weaving and stitching which have long been associated with the 
domestic sphere face the danger of being relegated to the domain of craft. (p. 20) 
Similarly, Bernier (1986) observes: “in the modern Western ideology, an association with 
women, the working class or non-Western cultures is almost invariably accompanied by a 
fall in the status of the art form” (p. 41). To understand that materials are gendered, 
classed, and raced broadens the ways in which materials can be abject beyond their 
metaphorically abject appearance; one must focus on the operation of the materials and 
how they are transgressive. Bernadac (2006) sees Bourgeois’ use of fabric as a “return to 
childhood” (p. 158) which is fraught with the attempt to free oneself from the mother 
through abjection.  
 These transgressions can also extend to issues of aging, defying an aesthetic of 
permanence with materials that decay. Some have characterized her use of fabric as a 
geriatric or morbid gesture (Walker, 2010). In regard to Bourgeois’ use of fabrics, Walker 
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notes that recycled bits of cloth and old tapestries are far more perishable than marble or 
bronze, meaning that these works, like the bodies they depict, will age and eventually 
decompose, enacting an abject disintegration.  
 This prolonged investigation into Bourgeois’s work illustrates the multiple ways 
in which an abject visual methodology can interrogate an artist’s productions, from 
subject matter to materials. It also demonstrates an important subsection of the taxonomy 
of abject art: works that engage with gender and the maternal by depicting a monstrous, 
fragmented, or difficult vision of difference.  
 4.03.05: excess and dearth: life out of bounds and lack.  
4.03.05.01: disability and pregnancy. Another way the abject is made visible is 
through images of excess and scarcity, too much or too little. The ideas of excess and 
lack as relating to the abject stems from Kolnai’s description of disgust (2001), in which 
he emphasizes that disgust can be elicited by a sense of either “too much” or “too little.” 
Excess denotes excessive growth, or life run amok through over-production. Mold, 
tumors, and swarms of insects are all life out of bounds. Similarly, sickness can be 
understood as excess. Disease is not just a lack of health, but an overproduction of germs 
and viruses. Cancer is the rampant growth of mutated and sick cells, which sometimes 
kills the patient by crushing healthy organs with malignant tumor production; cancer 
embodies abjection through both its boundless growth and its transformation of the body 
from a subject into an unruly object (Waskul & van der Riet, 2002). Siamese twins or 
individuals born with surplus parts like vestigial tails or too many toes have too much life 
in one body. These individuals exceed the normal. The excessive production of life, like a 
rat infestation, in which waves of milling bodies create a unitary mass entity out of 
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individual rats, becomes disgusting because there is too much life, too much existence 
bursting forth.  
Correspondingly, shortage and insufficient life are abject. Death, or the absolute 
lack of life, is obviously abject, but there are also less extreme forms of lack. The 
emaciated child with too little flesh and too little healthy fat is abject because she lacks 
the features of a normative body. Kristeva (1982) explains the body seen as a corpse is 
the most abject, in part because it is both excessive and lacking. The dead body lacks 
human life and is ready to slip into decomposition. Yet the state of decomposition is 
teeming with life: microbial bacteria, maggots, and parasites. It is an abundance of life, 
but life in the wrong places. The corpse is both excessive and lacking, contributing to its 
archetypal abject status.  
The relationship of dearth and excess to the abject, when the abject is understood 
as monstrous difference, is also visualized in the disabled body. Kristeva (1982) and 
other abject scholars (e.g., Chanter, 2008; Butler, 1993) do not discuss disability, and 
while other authors make the connection (e.g., Millet-Gallant, 2010; Clarke, 2008; 
Betterton, 2006; Hughes, 2009), they do not explain in depth how images of disability 
depict abjection, or what it could mean in lived experience to be seen as abject. To 
understand the intersection of disability and the abject, a brief discussion of disability and 
crip studies is necessary. Physical disabilities represent the binary other to the physically 
normal-abled body. Summarizing the work of Davis (1995), which traces the historical 
concept of normal, Millet-Gallant (2010) says that “normal is a culturally specific social 
construct that privileges homogeneity and stigmatizes those with physical differences” (p. 
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89). Disability is constructed as a failure to achieve the normative body (Goodley, 2011), 
particularly in a world that stresses compulsory able-bodiedness (McRuer, 2006). 
Unsurprisingly, the way in which disability does not meet or adhere to the 
normative body is often constructed as both a lack and an excess. According to Goodley 
(2011):  
Life is lack for Lacanian theory and this can have major impacts on the lives  
of disabled people. All of us are born into the real with fragmented bodies  
that then lack the imaginary wholeness of the original imago. The cultural  
prerogative is to refute those who remind us of our own fragmentation (e.g.  
impaired bodies) and disability, by definition, implies ‘lacking’ or ‘flaw.’ (p. 130) 
Simultaneously, disability can also imply excess, requiring moderation (Davis, 2002).  
The quality of disability as an open symbol signifying both lack and excess allows 
for varied and plentiful projections of alienation and otherness onto the disabled body. 
Clarke (2008), says that to be female and disabled is to be “doubly monstrous” by 
inhabiting two marginalized subject positions. Garland-Thomson (2002) claims, 
“Western thought has long conflated femaleness and disability, understanding both as 
defective departures from a valued standard” (p. 6). The link between the feminine and 
disability has a long history. According to Samuel (2011),  
[W]e must at least take account of the fact that Western thought has historically 
claimed, not a difference, but a correspondence between disability and femininity, 
which Garland-Thomson traces to the Aristotelian assertion that “‘the female is as 
it were a deformed male’ . . . not only does this definition of the female as a 
‘mutilated male’ inform later depictions of woman as diminished man, but it also 
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arranges somatic diversity into a hierarchy of value that assigns completeness to 
some bodies and deficiency to others.” (p. 55) 
The abject is predicated not only on the maternal, but feminine difference, gendered 
through castration. With this in mind, the equivalence between the female and the abject 
is mapped onto the disabled body. This also relates to Butler’s understanding of the 
abject as queer. Many within disability studies have taken Butler’s idea that gender and 
sexuality are co-constitutive of physical norms, and applied this idea to disability. Butler 
(1997) asks:  
How does that materialization of the norm in bodily formation produce a domain 
of abjected bodies, a field of deformation, which in failing to qualify as the fully 
human, fortifies those regulatory norms? What challenge does that excluded and 
abjected realm produce to a symbolic hegemony that might force a radical 
rearticulating of what qualifies as bodies that matter, ways of living that count as 
"life," lives worth protecting, lives worth saving, lives worth grieving? (p. 15) 
Remember it is Butler who links queerness to the abject, as homosexuality is the socially-
excluded behavior and identity that demarcates the normative category of 
heterosexuality. Disability studies scholars then insert disability into the excluded and 
uninhabitable zones of life either through the feminization of the disabled (Garland-
Thomson, 1997; 2005) or through connections between queerness and disability 
(McRuer, 2006).  
Scholars like Cho (1997) argue that “freakish” or disabled bodies provide the 
answer to Butler’s question of what bodies are necessary for the normal to exist. This 
connection expands the “‘regulatory schemas’ which serve to materialize the abject 
	  	  
295	  	  	  	  
	  
body” (Samuels, 2002, p. 63), broadening the abject beyond its early Kristevan ideas 
surrounding the borderline “deject” figure and maternal figure, and even further 
extending the abject beyond Butler’s abject analysis of queerness. Cho (1997) insists that, 
“far from being agentless objects of the norm which regulates the articulation of normal 
‘bodies’ as such, these abject bodies inform those very norms” (p. 19). The freak is not 
simply the shunned outsider, but holds a certain amount of power through being 
constructed in opposition. Garland-Thomson (1997), like Butler and Cho, sees the 
normal, or “normate” as a figure “outlined by the array of deviant others whose marked 
bodies shore up the normate’s boundaries” (p. 8).  
Freakishly disabled bodies then are so absolutely abject that their jettisoning 
establishes the bounded norm. Garland-Thomson and Cho conflate the difference of 
disability with gender difference, as well as sexual difference, an analogy that is used by 
later disability scholars like McRuer (2006), who borrows heavily from the idea of 
compulsory heteronormativity in the construction of his own ideas around compulsory 
able-bodiedness.  
In further support of this point, Garland-Thomson (1997) observes that,  
Many parallels exist between the social meanings attributed to female bodies and 
those assigned to disabled bodies. Both the female and the disabled body are cast 
as deviant and inferior; both are excluded from full participation in public as well 
as economic life; both are defined in opposition to a norm that is assumed to 
possess natural physical superiority. (p. 19)  
While Garland-Thomson and other disability scholars may not use the actual term abject, 
they are describing the disabled body in similar terms, with a norm created through 
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difference. The abject is then deviant and inferior by virtue of its relationship to a figure 
marginalized through race, sex, gender, sexuality, ability, class, and so on. 
Representations of the disabled body, rendered abject through a visual excess or dearth, 
then become deviant.  
 The sculptor Marc Quinn’s work is often abject. His piece Self (2006) (Figure 49) 
belongs to a series of sculptures made of Quinn’s own blood, which is poured into a mold 
of his head and frozen, to then be preserved and presented in a clear climate-controlled 
vitrine. Millet-Gallant (2010) elaborates:  
Quinn has a certain reputation as a “bad boy” among art critics, a precedence set 
by the inclusion of his work in the controversial Sensation exhibit of 1991. In this 
exhibit, most famously lambasted by the New York Major Rudy Giuliani, when it 
traveled to the United States, Quinn debuted one of his most famous pieces, Self 
(1991), a self-portrait bust made from 9 pints of Quinn’s frozen and preserved 
blood. (p. 64) 
 
 
Figure 49. Quinn, Self (2006-ongoing). 
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For portraits of his sons, Quinn used the placenta and umbilical cord from each birth, 
blended and frozen to cast Lucas (2001) and Sky (2006) (Figure 50). Quinn states that his 
use of unusual materials is attributable to his "preoccupation with the mutability of the 
body and the dualisms that define human life” (as cited in Frank, 2012, para. 2). On the 
relationship between these works and disgust, Frank (2012) warns that “your first 
reaction to the concept might involve re-tasting your breakfast” (para. 2). These works 
are abject in their use of bodily substances, which provoke disgust, and yet are beautiful 
because of their deep burgundy color and icy crystalline finish.  
 
 
 
Figure 50. Quinn, Lucas (2001) (left) and Sky (2006) (right). 
 
 
According to Millet-Gallant: 
These materials represent for Quinn larger interests in self/other social dynamics, 
for they are often associated with abjection, the materiality of the body, and the 
vulnerability of flesh.  
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These works promise that one day the power will fail, the cooling element of the 
refrigeration unit will break, and in that moment these works will melt, turning 
back into an unidentifiable pool of bodily sludge.  
 Millet-Gallant cites Mark Gisbourne, who “states that Self and Quinn’s other 
works in this vein are concerned with what constitutes acceptance, desire/repulsion, and 
rejection of body forms and processes, and that these themes continue in his marble 
amputees” (p. 65). Quinn offers a compounded vision of abjection by presenting a mother 
who is disabled in his sculpture Alison Lapper Pregnant (8 months) (2005) (Figure 51 & 
Figure 52). Placed on a plinth in London’s Trafalgar Square, the “marble amputee” 
represents a nude pregnant figure. The figure represented is Alison Lapper, an artist 
diagnosed with phocomelia, a congenital malformation that has shortened her arms and 
legs. Quinn has argued that the work is intended to overcome prejudice with beauty 
(Betterton, 2006).  
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Figure 51. Quinn, Alison Lapper Pregnant (8 months) (2005) installed in Trafalgar 
Square, London.  
 
However, the work was considered jarring by many, and met resistance when 
placed in the square (Lyall, 2005). Lapper herself has called the work a "modern tribute 
to femininity, disability and motherhood" (as cited in Betterton, 2006, p. 86). But one 
critic called it simply “ugly,” and Robert Simon argued that it was "just a repellant [sic] 
artifact" (Lyall, 2005, para. 8). According to Betterton (2006) one London headline even 
read, “So, is this really what we want on Trafalgar Square’s empty plinth?” (p. 86).  
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Figure 52. Quinn, Alison Lapper Pregnant (8 months) (2005). This is a smaller gallery 
scaled version of the piece in Trafalgar Square. 
 
Serlin (2012) argues that the sculpture is about foregrounding disability within the 
public conversation on the role of the state. Quinn’s sculpture of Lapper is so important, 
he claims, because 
it… forever transformed the historical space of Trafalgar Square (and all of its 
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past and future contexts) into an intentionally public referendum on bodies 
subjected to British imperial power. In a space recognized for displaying statues 
of male royalty and military heroes—most notably Admiral Nelson’s Column, the 
traditional focal point of the square—as well as a famous site for tourism and 
Christmas and New Year’s Eve celebrations, the exhibition of Alison Lapper 
Pregnant confronted citizens who identify Trafalgar Square as a place that 
consolidates national pride and achievement with a body that seems both 
unrecognizable and to a large degree even impossible. (p. 22) 
While the placement of the piece in Trafalgar Square is important, and represents a 
transgression in and of itself, the work and its popular rejection deals with more than 
disability studies alone can uncover. Rather, the work’s complex deployment of context 
through the space and place surrounding an intersectional subject like Lapper can be 
understood best through an abject visual methodology.  
This work literally depicts motherhood in the form of Lapper’s rounded belly, 
which can be seen as intrinsically abject. In her work Promising Monsters, Betterton 
(2006) notes that “the trope of the monstrous has had close connections with pregnancy 
as one of the most embodied, and least rational, of experiences” (p. 81). More than an 
overproduction of hormones and hysteria that challenge rationality, pregnancy involves a 
more literal excess. Betterton continues: “The embodied pregnant woman, like the 
monster, …destabilizes the concept of the singular self, threatening to spill over the 
boundaries of the unified subject” (p. 85). Betterton cites Hiller who describes 
monstrosity thusly,  
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The category of the “other” includes the inhabitants of the realm of supernatural 
beings and monsters, the territories of real and imagined enemies, and the lands of 
the dead--places far from the center of the world, where one’s own land is, and 
one’s own reality. The other is always distant as well as different, and against this 
difference the characteristics of self and society are formed and clarified. (pp. 80-
81) 
More than the growth of a baby bump, the excess of pregnancy is the excess of 
subjectivity, the dualism of a body which houses more than one person and, therefore, 
more than one subject. This is in part what the public is responding to with discomfort; 
the image of ‘mother’ comes preloaded as an image that borders inherently on the 
monstrous.  
As previously asserted, mother is the original other, the first abject to be rejected 
in the formation of the self--never truly granted full entry into the Symbolic, but always 
seen as biological pieces, organs that behave like Beauvoir’s “reproductive apparatus” 
(1949/2011, p. 31). Kristeva explains pregnancy as just such a threat to the coherence of 
the abstract subject:  
Cells fuse, split, and proliferate; volumes grow, tissues stretch, and body fluids 
change rhythm, speeding up or slowing down. Within the body, growing as a 
graft, indomitable, there is an other. And no one is present, within that 
simultaneously dual and alien space, to signify what is going on. “It happens, but 
I’m not there.” “I cannot realize it, but it goes on.” Motherhood’s impossible 
syllogism. (as cited in Zerilli, 1992, p. 111)  
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This passage points out that when there are multiple subjectivities, multiple bodies within 
one form, the sense of self as a rational free-acting agent in the world is lost, and a sense 
of alienation sets in. This is the impossible logic of motherhood: the mother needs a child 
to register within the Symbolic, but the same child threatens her subjectivity with duality 
and alienation. Her own identity must be put in jeopardy, even lost, to gain recognition in 
the world through performing her identity as mother.  
Following her reflections on motherhood in the animal kingdom, Beauvoir 
comments in regard to humanity, “Often it no longer seems marvelous but rather horrible 
that a parasitic body should proliferate within her body; the very idea of this monstrous 
swelling frightens her…pictures of swelling, tearing, hemorrhage, will haunt her” (as 
cited in Zerilli, 1992, p. 111). While the dominant image of motherhood may be one of 
joy and naturalness, feminist scholars like Kristeva and Beauvoir counter this argument 
with one that articulates an “existentialist anxiety about the loss of individual agency and 
autonomy” (p. 112), highlighting an alienation predicated on one’s body behaving unlike 
itself for the benefit of the other being housed inside, one who “challenge[s] the humanist 
idea of a stable, masterful subject” (p. 111). Betterton describes the sense of alienation 
associated with pregnancy:  
But what if that otherness is enclosed in our bodies, as yet unknown, neither 
friend nor enemy, growing inside our own flesh and blood? Such monstrous 
imaginings are the stuff of fairy tales and horror films, and yet, an ontological 
awareness of the body’s alienation from itself and an emergent new relationship 
with an unfamiliar being is familiar to many pregnant women. (p. 81)  
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The alienating, uncomfortable, and even monstrous aspects of motherhood are all part of 
what audiences are responding to with disgust when viewing Quinn’s sculpture of 
Lapper. Moreover, they are responding to the merging of Lapper’s disability and her 
motherhood; the work seems to enact a double abjection through both the dearth of 
disability and the excess of a monstrous (or at least deviant) motherhood.  
Beyond merely viewing the work as monstrously female through its portrayal of 
pregnancy, the deviancy and abjection attached to the disabled body inform the many 
negative reviews and accounts of Quinn’s sculpture Alison Lapper Pregnant. Clarke 
(2008) analyzes Quinn’s statue in depth, commenting:  
Whilst this sculpture appears to transgress normative standards attributed to the 
female nude, because it dares to show a disabled naked woman, it nevertheless 
conforms to the shape of many sculptures from antiquity that through time or 
accidental damage are rendered partial. (p. 6)  
Clarke is alluding to the famous Venus de Milo and her missing arms, but also to a host of 
other works from antiquity, such as Nike of Samothrace. The image of fragmentation 
represented by damaged classical art, which is regarded as the root of Western beauty 
despite the damage, becomes an ideal for disabled artists like Lapper or like Mary Duffy, 
a disabled Irish performance artist who appears nude on stage, posed like the Venus De 
Milo (Figure 53). Lapper has in her own studio practice cast herself as the Venus de Milo, 
explaining that she saw herself in the broken sculpture (Millet-Gallant, 2013) (Figure 54). 
The sculpture of Lapper, which is part of a series of disabled individuals sculpted in 
marble by Quinn, can be read as conforming to one of the oldest standards of fragmented 
female beauty.  
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Figure 53. Duffy, Still from the performance Cutting the Ties that Bind (1987). 
 
 
Figure 54. Lapper, inspired by the Venus de Milo (n.d.).  
 
 
Garland-Thomson (2000) opines in regard to Duffy’s autobiographical 
performances: 
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Like gawking at a fatal traffic accident or the primal scene, looking at Duffy is at 
once compelling and illicit. But Duffy’s body also evokes the familiar contours of 
beauty. Duffy’s simultaneously starkly disabled and classically beautiful body 
elicits a confusing combination of the rapt gaze and the intrusive stare. (p. 336) 
This passage speaks directly to the abject category of “fascinated victimhood” projected 
by viewers of both Duffy’s performances and Quinn’s statues, largely able-bodied 
witnesses caught up in the allure of the “familiar contours of beauty” (Garland-Thomson, 
2000, p. 336), but simultaneously jettisoned and made to experience disgust through 
difference. Garland-Thomson says that “disability performance art foregrounds the body 
as an object both to be viewed and to be explained” (p. 334); in this sense, explanation is 
a type of intimate excavation into the person’s body and history (Figure 52). But what 
interests me instead is the use of “object” to describe a disabled subject whose body 
affects their very subjectivity. As they do not inhabit an ideal body, they also are denied 
an ideal subjectivity, which makes them closer to an object. Yet, they are clearly more 
than an object; they are the abject of ableism.  
While Clarke (2008) points out that the Lapper sculpture is traditionally beautiful 
in many ways, from Lapper’s self assured stare, to the lovely materiality of the 
translucent marble, to the figure’s nudity and classical referentiality, understanding the 
work as simply beautiful does not explain the aggressive and disgusted reactions many 
had towards the work. Clarke herself dismisses this reading as too easy: 
However, if it was just feminine beauty that Quinn was emphasizing then he 
could have covered her shortened legs with drapery. Instead he represents her 
abnormal body in antithesis to hegemonic notions of beauty, defined by Aristotle 
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as that which has ‘…order…symmetry and definiteness…’. Obviously Lapper’s 
limbs do not conform to the usual scale and shape of the classical body, and since 
we are aware of her bodily difference we cannot, nor should we, imagine her with 
normative limbs. (p. 7).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 55. Flanagan, Super Masochist (1993). Another example of a disabled artist using 
their body in the performance of abjection is the artist Bob Flanagan. Born with 
cystic fibrosis, Flanagan turned his personal explorations in sadomasochism, 
which he practiced as a way to manage his disability, into large-scale 
performances.  
 
 
The beauty of the work comes in large part through its resuscitation of neoclassical 
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sculpture. As Millet (2008) explains in her book Performing Amputation, “Neoclassicism 
and its classical heritage communicate philosophical and political ideals through 
constructed body aesthetics” (p. 14). Millet notes that Quinn’s specifically quotes 18th 
and 19th century works that narrated the stories of great men, and their heroic and moral 
deeds. He further explains that “Quinn subverts the signification of neoclassical form as 
the ideal ‘whole’ in this work and in his series of life-size marble sculptures of real 
amputees, The Complete Marbles (2002)” (p. 14) (Figure 56).  
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Figure 56. Quinn, Stuart Penn (2000).  
 
 
This subversion is achieved partially through the use of widely-known models like 
Lapper, and also the disabled punk rock musician Matt Fraser. The very recognizability 
of the personalities represented in Quinn’s sculptures counters the “objectness” that 
visual representations of disability and abject subject matter signal. These sculptures then 
act as a performance of amputation, in the same manner as Joel Peter Witkin’s notorious 
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photographs of disabled individuals and vivisected corpses (Figure 57), Lapper’s self-
portraits displaying her abbreviated extremities, and even Frida Kahlo’s self-portraits of 
her broken body (Figure 58) similarly perform disability, dearth, and deviancy.  
 
 
 
Figure 57. Witkin, Satirio, Mexico (1992).  
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Figure 58. Kahlo, Henry Ford Hospital (1932). 
 
 
Millet (2008) states that “these works challenge how the viewer perceives the body in art, 
as well as in everyday life” (p. 14). I believe that one of the ways that these works 
challenge perceptions of the body is through the display of bodies that are upsetting and 
disquieting, while also beautiful and engaging.  
Clarke (2008) delves more deeply into the abject as she considers Lapper’s 
pregnant body in conjunction with disability, noting that the work displays what is 
considered a normal aberration, (the bodily changes of pregnancy), next to an abnormal 
aberration (the disabled body). Lapper’s lacking body with its shortened limbs is the 
antithesis of the excessiveness of pregnancy. The sculpture can be read as either 
pregnancy filling Lapper’s original lack with its excess, or as an exaggeration of Lapper’s 
original aberration (Clarke, 2008). The sculpture’s ambiguous status rivets the viewer’s 
attention and prevents the utter rejection of the work, which might have resulted from a 
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more shocking image of disability, excess and lack, or monstrous motherhood.  
Lapper’s form is already doubly non-normative. As a woman lacking a phallus, 
her deformed body, truncated like a second castration, marks her as abject through layers 
of difference. Adding her pregnancy to her already female and disabled body causes 
complicated intersections with other indicators of abjection, making the deficiencies of 
her deformed body collide with the excess of her maternity. But rather than canceling 
each other out, as Clarke supposes they could, these dichotomies seem to further 
marginalize her status, making her figure even more abject. Clarke argues that the 
sculpture’s aberrations become grotesque, as Lapper’s “body evokes mythological 
creatures…the grotesque corporality of giants [and] ‘…manifests metamorphosis, an 
ambiguous state of being’” (p. 7). Like that of the abject. Lapper’s pregnant form “is 
imbued with the anxieties, for many, that surround reproduction, pharmaceuticals and the 
possibility of producing a child with birth defects” (p. 7). 
However, as the abject is both horrific and fascinating, I believe that part of what 
captivates viewers in Quinn’s work is its beauty: its neoclassical references, its material 
sensuality, and the West’s most ubiquitous artistic image of beautiful and joyful 
motherhood, the Virgin Mary. If the sculpture had been too radically repugnant and 
horrific, it would have caused a response of utter rejection. Viewers who see the work as 
beautiful and as a brave portrayal of motherhood (Millet-Gallant, 2013) may not have 
responded in the same manner had the work been too disgusting. Perhaps, the evocation 
of the maternal, which can be abject, actually defuses the experience of disgust in this 
work, allowing a space for the viewer to enjoy the heroic scale and placement of the 
work, or the heroic figure of the serene mother. However, Lapper defies normative 
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convention of motherhood yet again, as she is a single mother on government disability 
aid (Millet-Gallant, 2013), indicating another socially monstrous mother figure. Even 
when analyzed using an abject visual methodology, this ambiguous sculpture retains its 
liminal readings.  
4.03.05.02: excess, dearth, disease and freakery. Expansion beyond the 
normative body is seen as disgusting, and continued growth is horrifying. An image that 
deals with this type of excessive abjection, figured through disability, is Joe Coleman’s 
painting of Joseph Merrick, Portrait of the Elephant Man (1993) (Figure 59). Merrick is 
portrayed nude in the center of the work, his body deformed by hugely oversized and 
gnarled growths, caused by either neurofibromatosis or Proteus syndrome (Ford & 
Howell, 2010). Outside of the full nudity, the central figure is reminiscent of sideshow 
banners: brightly painted and shocking in the open display of his malformed body. 
However, in this case, the exotic settings or the large typeface that would normally be 
advertising Merrick as a performer are replaced by images from Merrick’s life, such as 
the doctors who attempted to cure his illness, the ringmaster who displayed him as a 
freak, the hospital where he lived, and threads of tiny narrative text that circle around 
Merrick. The painting almost buzzes with this frenzied field of words and images.  
In Coleman’s painting it is the large and fibrous body, grown out of its bounds, 
that causes alarm and disgust. Merrick’s malformations push the boundaries of what can 
still be called human. For example, his head was so large from these continually 
developing growths that he eventually suffocated under the weight of his own head while 
trying to sleep on his back, instead of sleeping propped up as he had been forced to do for 
many years (Jarmusch & Schechter, 1998).  
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Figure 59. Coleman, Portrait of the Elephant Man (1993). 
 
 
Millet (2008) notes that disabled bodies have been objectified through the 
practices of medical pathologization and public display in freak shows. Medical images 
are some of the most common images of disability, particularly photographs from the 19th 
century. These images ignored the individual, focusing instead on pathology, but through 
a very strict set of visual conventions, including a sense of detachment achieved through 
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the use of a blank background, and by depicting the subject as naked or partially clothed. 
Millet explains: “This kind of voided background, like a natural history illustration, 
symbolizes a void of context or lack of personal information about the subject portrayed” 
(p. 19). This void served to objectify the individual’s body, stripping away subjecthood 
through detached convention, and turning all disabled bodies into objects. Similarly, the 
spectacle of the freak show turned humans into objects of curiosity and entertainment, not 
only through live performances but also through souvenir photographs of the entertainers 
(Garland-Thomson, 1996). Although radically different in convention, both medical 
photos and promotional freak show photos objectify the subject, representing the liminal 
space of a being that is more-than-object, yet not-quite-subject: the space of the abject.  
Many of Coleman’s works deal with the abject, such as his series of paintings 
depicting serial murders. These are rendered in the manner of the Portrait of the Elephant 
Man, insofar as representations of the depicted murderer’s crimes float around the image 
of the killer. Even in self-portraits, Coleman’s work approaches the abject, with tiny 
Bosch-like devils surrounding his own image. In one scene from his self-portrait, My 
Birth (1987) (Figure 60), he emphasizes the bodily fluids and monstrosity of reproduction 
by depicting himself centrally in the canvas as a zygote in utero. Whereas many artists 
portray themselves in a glorified or idealized manner, Coleman acknowledges the 
necessary and inescapable presence of abject fluids, even in his own birth. In Portrait of 
the Elephant Man (1993), Coleman shows Merrick as human, albeit a visibly abject 
human. Merrick’s figure disgusts through its excess and difference, but, unlike in medical 
photos, his life and uniqueness are fully present in the scenes around him. Similarly, the 
showmanship and exoticism displayed in the images on the collectible freak cards is also 
	  	  
316	  	  	  	  
	  
lacking in Coleman’s painting, as Merrick is shown naked, exposed and vulnerable.  
 
 
 
Figure 60. Coleman, My Birth (1987).  
 
 
This work becomes ambiguous insofar as it refuses the modes of display that we 
most associate with disabled bodies. While it is abject in its depiction of the excessive 
skin growths, it also humanizes Merrick, offering the viewer an entry into the work and, 
though this portal, a way to make an empathetic connection with the subject portrayed. 
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The image both horrifies, in the figure of the body out of bounds, but also fascinates 
through the text and images that surround his image. 
4.03.05.03: excessive bodies, fat abjection. The abject image of excess and 
overabundance can be depicted through a disabled body like Merrick’s, but also more 
commonly through a fat body. “Viewed, then, as both unhealthy and unattractive, fat 
people are widely represented in popular culture and in interpersonal interactions as 
revolting-- they are agents of abhorrence and disgust,” argues LeBesco in her 2004 book 
Revolting Bodies? (p. 1). In their analysis of news reports on fatness, Braziel (2001) 
argues that “the implicit message is that least is best. The established binarism opposes a 
contained to an intractable, transgressive corporeality that will (through its very excess) 
induce illness and death” (p. 235). Here the violation of arbitrary norms, established by 
medical discourse and distributed through the ideological apparatus of the media, makes 
excess a transgression of the normal body which will ultimately lead to death, and in the 
interim to social ostracism. The body out of bounds then becomes a threatening body 
because of “the association of corporeity with fluidity-indeed, a polluting, contaminating, 
and viscous liquidity…posited as noxious, venomous and virulent” (p. 243). Fat, because 
of its transgressive, fluid, anxiety-ridden nature, becomes abjection manifested in excess.  
This can be seen quite clearly in the works of Jenny Saville, as in her painting 
Propped (1992) (Figure 61), in which the female figure’s corpulent body seems to 
swallow the stool beneath her. The figure in Propped relates the fat body to the grotesque 
and the monstrous. The figure’s hands are oversized and fat beyond the proportions of a 
real body, and they become claw-like, digging into and almost subsuming the figure’s 
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huge fleshy thighs. Meagher argues that Saville’s work employs a feminist aesthetic of 
disgust, which understands what it means to embody a fat and disgusting form.  
 
 
 
Figure 61. Saville, Propped (1992).  
 
 
When discussing Propped, Meagher (2003) notes its “disturbed proportions” (p. 25), 
while another critic said that Propped “conjured up every woman’s worst nightmare of 
how she might look with no clothes on: huge expanses of quivering milky blubber filled 
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with watery blue veins and scored by stretch-marks bore down on spectators like some 
life-sucking blancmange” (as cited in Meagher, p. 25). 109 Using the same phrase, Clare 
Henry describes Saville’s images as “every woman’s nightmare: vast mountains of 
obesity, flesh run riot, enormous repellent creatures who make even Rubens’s chubby 
femme fatales look positively gaunt” (as cited in Meagher, p. 27).  
Many feel this way about Saville’s images: that they are simply disgusting, 
unbeautiful and thus unworthy of execution.  
Citing Butler’s politicized adaptation of the abject, Meagher (2003) suggests that,  
(b)y materializing the abject female body, Saville reveals what lurks in the 
feminine imagination. That is to say, by representing a specific idea of femininity, 
she speaks to the disparity between the way that many women feel about their 
bodies and the reality of how those bodies are perceived by others. (p. 34) 
Saville has herself said that her work engages with diet culture and western standards of 
beauty, which means that “the paintings are made to serve the interests of politics of fat 
pride and fat liberation, which have as central goals not only reclaiming the word ‘fat,’ 
but also transforming cultural representations of fat bodies” (Meagher, p. 27). However, 
Saville and others reject the idea that the politics of fat liberation is simply equivalent to 
promoting a larger canon of bodies perceived as beautiful, thereby pandering to a politics 
of respectability in which a fat body can be beautiful, but only if it adheres to other 
conventions of beauty like pale skin, good hair, or expensive clothing. Linda Nochlin 
explains that Saville’s work exhibits “her brilliant and relentless embodiment of our 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Blancmange is a British sweet. It is a creamy gelatin similar to panna cotta or vanilla 
pudding.  
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worst anxieties about our own corporeality and gender” (as cited in Meagher, p. 34).  
It is that horror at corporeality that Saville uses to broaden the discourse, beyond a 
simple politics of inclusion to an interrogation of what structures the inhabitation of fat 
bodies: an investigation of the abject. The abject speaks to the nature of living in a 
corporeal form, and the perpetual rejection that must occur in order to continue feeling 
whole while inhabiting an object that is slowly breaking down and decomposing. While 
this rejection is universal, it is structured differently based on culture and context, making 
the female body more abject, more disgusting, more rejected. Yet, that rejection has a 
certain power to create dramatic, embodied reactions in viewers. Meagher (2003) 
explains that Saville’s paintings “not only…provoke the excitement and interest of the 
artworld, they also elicit sensual—even visceral—reactions” (p. 23).  
This visceral response is related to the abject nature of Saville’s work, insofar as 
viewing abject works of art causes the viewer to feel and respond with abjection. Like the 
skin on old milk, which causes the subject to abject themself in response, the abject 
infects; like disgust, it contaminates. To view abject objects, like Saville’s paintings, 
causes abjection in the viewer, or an incomplete rejection of the offending abject object. 
Reminded by the paintings of their own corporeality and what must be rejected to remain 
clean, proper, and whole, the viewer shudders or sneers, a bodily sign of disgust. The 
viewer must reject the painting, like they must reject things like excrement, but it is an 
incomplete rejection that simultaneously leads many viewers to continue interacting with 
the paintings through fascinated victimhood. The fascination stems from the corporeal 
abject body, as the abject always already has a component of the fascinated victim within 
it. But fascinated victimhood is strengthened through the sumptuous application of paint, 
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the impressive, almost overwhelming scale of the work, and the impulse to look at the 
female nude, even if it is grotesque.  
This is to say that artistic intervention in the form of style, materiality, and subject 
choice all acts as ways of mitigating the outright rejection of disgust, making the work 
both desirable and disquieting. Because Saville’s work entices viewers in ways that 
refuse radical and complete repudiation, the work seems to suspend the viewer in 
abjection, trapping them in fascinated victimhood. While this snare is painful because it 
reminds us of our eventual messy end in dissolution, it is also enjoyable, as it allows us to 
continually shore up the borders of our egos. We create ourselves through the menace of 
eventual destruction.  
This haunting rejection occurs in Saville’s depictions of bodies in general, but 
particularly through her conflation of fatness and monstrousness in pieces like Fulcrum 
(1999) (Figure 62). 
 
 
 
Figure 62. Saville, Fulcrum (1999).  
 
 
	  	  
322	  	  	  	  
	  
 This work depicts fat female bodies that are layered or stacked on each other, almost 
merging together to create a single mass of flesh. Another work that mixes fleshiness and 
monstrousness is Hyphen (1999) (Figure 63), which shows two full-faced, jowl-heavy 
heads attached to a single wide-shouldered body. 
 Saville paints other abject subject matter, such as meat, broken and beaten bodies, 
and even hermaphrodites. But her paintings of fat bodies are more successful at 
representing the excess of flesh as abject, not only through the subject matter (fleshy 
bodies), but also through her technique. Saville uses a thick, luscious application of paint 
that physically resembles and becomes a sign for cellulite. Saville’s fat bodies are so 
excessive that they become monstrous, drawing an intuitive connection between fat, flesh 
out of bounds, and the abject.  
 
 
Figure 63. Saville, Hyphen (1999). 
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  Regardless, artworks do not have to merge into monstrosity to stimulate an abject 
response to excessive or fat bodies. Lucian Freud’s paintings of flesh, particularly works 
like Benefits Supervisor Sleeping (1995) (Figure 64), engage with the abject at a 
manageable level of excess. Freud’s interest in excess becomes uncanny, foreign yet 
familiar. He describes being fascinated by “all kinds of spectacular things to do with [his 
model’s] size, like amazing craters…sores and chafes made by weight and heat…It’s 
flesh without muscle and it has developed a different kind of texture through being such a 
weight-bearing thing” (as cited in Hoban, 2014, p. 126). Freud’s description suggests the 
abject body stretched, cratered and rubbed raw. Freud’s fat bodies are large and morbidly 
obese, but their enormity is not taken to a nearly unrecognizable extreme. These are fat 
women that look like women, whereas Saville’s women, as in Fulcrum, become 
monstrous through their fecundity.  
 
 
 
Figure 64. Freud, Benefits Supervisor Sleeping (1995).  
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In fact, Freud’s Benefits Supervisor Sleeping sold for $33 million at a Christie’s 
auction (Associated Press, 2008), proving that the work is quite desirable, at least to 
someone. Freud’s thick, paste-like paint application turns bodies into well-kneaded 
dough, their flesh pulled on heavily by gravity as it lists towards the ground. Even in 
works that depict thinner, more “ideal” bodies, like Two Women (1992) (Figure 65) or 
Nude with Leg Up (1992) (Figure 66), the depicted bodies act like mounds of flesh, and 
do not seem completely human.  
 
 
 
Figure 65. Freud, Two Women (1992). 
 
 
 In Nude with Leg Up, the model’s soft penis lays flaccid against his propped-up 
leg as he reclines. In Two Women, one of the model’s thighs sags backwards, causing her 
buttocks to jut outwards, while the other model’s small yet fleshy breasts flatten 
indistinguishably against her chest. These bodies are not the blown glass vessels filled 
with the breath of God that were the ideal of 17th-century Europe (Mennighaus, 2003), 
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and on which our own ideal body image is still based, as discussed in the literature 
review. Rather, these bodies seem lumpy, filled with bones, organs and fat cells.  
 
 
Figure 66. Freud, Nude with Leg Up (1992).  
 
 
4.03.05.04: thinness or anorexic abjection. While fatness is an expression of 
excess, an overt lack of body weight can also demonstrate abjection. While Quinn’s 
figure of Lapper deals with excess through the monstrous maternal, as well as dearth 
through disability, Quinn’s piece (Sphinx) Road to Enlightenment (2007) (Figure 67) 
deals with another form of dearth, the dearth of the too-thin body. The sculpture depicts 
the skeletal figure of a woman seated in meditation like the Buddha, her ribs and bones 
jutting out painfully, her stomach so concave that it merges with her back. Warin (2010) 
and Battersby (1998) link anorexia to the abject through the obsession with managing the 
body’s borders by controlling what is consumed, and managing the space that the body 
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inhabits. Depictions of overly thin bodies is a visual form of lack that often evokes 
religious connotations, as with the reference to the Buddha’s six years of fasting and 
bodily austerity in Quinn’s sculpture, or the mysticism surrounding Fasting Women110.  
 
 
Figure 67. Quinn, (Sphinx) Road to Enlightenment (2007). 
 
 Images of the inordinately thin body, starved through control, still hold currency 
within contemporary beauty ideals, observable in the proliferation of “Thinspiration” 
internet memes.  These memes juxtapose images of gaunt girls with messages like, “once 
you control your mind you control your body,” “sweat is just fat crying,” or “what you 
eat in private, you wear in public.” But when the thin body becomes the anorexic body, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 Fasting Women, like their male counterparts, freak show performers known as Hunger 
Artists or Living Skeletons, were individuals with incredibly low body weight who 
claimed to survive without eating. These women starved themselves for weeks, some 
reports say years, arguing that divine or miraculous intervention kept them alive. For 
more on this phenomenon and a Foucauldian analysis of these acts as extreme forms of 
self-discipline, see Gooldin’s 2003 article, “Fasting Women, Living Skeletons and 
Hunger Artists: Spectacles of Body and Miracles at the Turn of a Century.”  
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its skeletal form becomes monstrous, as it reminds the viewer of sickness, death and the 
corpse. Whether it is in the form of excess or in the form of lack, when the norm is 
violated, we react in disgust. And when sheer rejection of an image is deflected by gilded 
surfaces, religious devotion, or discordant images of beauty, the image becomes abject.  
4.03.05.05: excess, dearth, and the animal inside. Another manifestation of 
excess and dearth which holds particular significance to the abject is the bestial. The 
abject emerges in images of humanity sliding into savagery, displaying too much of our 
animal origins and too little civilization. The animal represents a negation of the human. 
Rather than seeing animals as our close biological kin, we construct ourselves and society 
to oppose animalistic behavior. Animals are carnal, illogical, driven by instinct, and 
lacking rationality. This lack of rationality is often represented as a significant distinction 
between humanity and beasts, as consciousness and rational actions define humanity. The 
cry of the Enlightenment was the Cartesian motto: cogito ergo sum, ”I think therefore I 
am.” As animals cannot think rationally in the same way as humans, they could not attain 
the same level of being. Previous to the Enlightenment, animals were rejected for their 
lack of a soul or for their dirtiness, which linked them to the earth and the devil through a 
fusion of physical and moral filth.  
For Kristeva (1982), animals and animalism are linked to sex and murder, and 
explain some of the food prohibitions found in religion. Kristeva explains, citing 
Leviticus, that eating herbivores instead of carnivores steers man away from the 
irrationality of animals, because to eat carnivores would be to consume and possess their 
murderous instincts, thereby making one less human. While the logic of this particular 
prohibition is culturally specific, the cross-cultural phenomenon of food prohibitions, 
	  	  
328	  	  	  	  
	  
often directed at meat, demonstrates our fractious relationship with animals. Kristeva 
states: “The abject confronts us… with those fragile states where man strays on the 
territories of animal” (p. 12).  
The animal and the wild are categories that humanity has abjected in the move 
towards culture, stability and order. Another feature of animal behavior that triggers 
abject associations for humans is the animal’s diminished repugnance in regard to waste. 
That is to say, some animals do not jettison their wastes, but roll in feces, or even rotted 
corpses. We shudder at such scenes, and so animality must be continually denied. As 
May (2014) notes in his study on the abject nature of human-to-animal transitions in 
narrative and performance, “in the moments when we entertain the possibility of 
traversing the divide between humanity and animality we become acutely aware of the 
ontological distinction at issue” (p. 72).  
Kristeva (1982) continues, “Thus, by way of abjection, primitive societies have 
marked out a precise area of their culture in order to remove it from the threatening world 
of animals or animalism, which were imagined as representatives of sex and murder.” 
(pp. 12-13). The rejection of the animal and the animalistic are then part of the marking 
out of what is clean and proper, part of the divide between the sacred and profane. The 
wild woods beyond the borders of civilization are inhabited by animals; lurking close by 
and reminding us of our own evolutionary history as primitive creatures in those woods.  
When animal and man are combined, the result is too little humanity and too 
much animality, too little logic and too much passion. Citing Kafka’s story The 
Metamorphosis (1915/2000), in which the protagonist, Gregor Samsa, turns into a giant 
insect, May comments: “My suggestion is that Gregor Samsa’s metamorphosis is rather 
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like the change that one encounters in aging, disease and disability” (p. 75). May argues 
that animal transitions, like other abjections, are dehumanizing because of the rejection 
that the individual feels from society, as well as the fact that animality reminds us of “the 
disease of being finite” (p. 76), or of humanity’s corporeal and temporal end. Like death, 
our mammalian ancestry must be denied in order to enact a clean and proper society. The 
bestial, like the maternal, threatens society with a regression into an earlier state. Both for 
individuals and for the larger society, it conjures memories of the tiny little uncivilized 
animals that we are at birth. It provokes fears of sliding back into the mode of life of 
tribal cultures believed to be less civilized. Animalistic monstrosity is depicted through 
zoological monsters like werewolves, vampires, garuda, yehti, sirens, harpies and a whole 
host of other mythical beasts that occupy a space between human and animal.  
Cohen explains in Monster Theory: Reading Culture (1996) that cultures can be 
understood based on the monsters that they produce. In his seven theses on the role of 
monsters in society, Cohen explains that “the monster is a harbinger of category crisis” 
(p. 6), meaning that monsters cannot be contained in our classificatory regimes. Through 
this resistance to taxonomy, they disrupt the “natural” order of things. While Creed 
(1986; 1993) links the monstrous specifically to maternal abjection, Cohen describes how 
the monstrous is generally synonymous with the abject, as when the feral human refuses 
or is unable to participate in a bounded society. Monsters, Cohen says, “are disturbing 
hybrids whose externally incoherent bodies resist attempts to include them in any 
systematic structuration” (p. 6). He expands on this, proposing that “because of its 
ontological liminality, the monster notoriously appears at times of crisis as a kind of third 
term that problematizes the clash of extremes – as ‘that which questions binary thinking 
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and introduces a crisis’” (p. 6). The beastly human occupies a place between rigid 
civilization and wild nature, a third space of liminal and ambiguous hybridity, the space 
of the abject. The blending, then, of the human with the inhuman, or the less-than-human, 
causes anxiety over boundaries, creating the sensation of the abject.  
Art that depicts animal-human hybridity often veers into abjection. For instance, 
the mix of human and animal qualities in the Australian artist Patricia Piccinini’s 
parahuman sculptures often arouse an abject reaction. Litter (2010) (Figure 68 & Figure 
69) apparently depicts three infants, huddled close together like a litter of kittens.  
 
 
 
Figure 68. Piccinini, Litter (2010).  
 
 
But upon closer inspection, these creatures actually display a combination of human and 
animal features. Piccinini’s sculptures are highly realistic, similar to the hyper-realistic 
works of Ron Mueck or Sam Jinks; her pieces could easily trigger a feeling of the 
uncanny, and result in in a sense of confusion regarding what is real. The infants have 
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humanlike skin and the general phenotype of a (Caucasian) baby, features which draw the 
viewer in with an impulse to coo over cute newborns. A closer examination reveals hair 
where there should be none, culminating in a soft downy pelt on the little ones’ backs. 
The babies have overly large, even slightly bat-like ears, opposable toes, and noses that 
are a little too squished and a little too upturned to be strictly human.  
 
 
 
Figure 69. Piccinini, Detail of Litter (2010).  
 
These cute chimeras provoke an abject response because we are drawn biologically to 
move towards them and care for them because of neoteny – the exaggerated features that 
make them seem helpless and in need. We are also drawn to the sculpture because of its 
hyperrealism; the infants seem so real in their form, color, and texture that their needs 
feel almost palpable. The viewer wants to reach out and care for these creatures. Yet their 
animal characteristics interrupt that response. The animalistic babies, while perhaps cute 
in their own way, become frighteningly abnormal, a throwback to a repressed animal 
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past. Moreover, the hybridity of these creatures borders on mutation or malformation, 
stimulating new abject responses. The furry humanoids in Litter elicit an abject response 
because we both want and do not want to reach out to these newborns. Their hybridity 
becomes a potent symbol of ambiguity, the area of the abject.  
Most of Piccinini’s other work similarly manifests the idea of the abject hybrid in 
the form of hyperrealistic sculptures. Another example is her piece Big Mother (2005) 
(Figure 70). This piece depicts a nude female figure who, with her heavy ape-like face 
and reddish baboon-like buttocks, appears to resemble “Lucy,” an early Australopithecine 
ancestor of Homo sapiens, often referred to as an evolutionary “missing link.” The figure 
is nursing a human baby while a designer diaper bag is siting at her feet.  
 
	  	  
333	  	  	  	  
	  
 
 
Figure 70. Piccinini, Big Mother (2005).  
 
 
Big Mother disturbs the viewer, not only through the hybridity of the adult figure, but 
also through depicting the act of nursing a child of our species. The human baby 
consumes this monstrous figure’s essence, making the scene both a tender moment of 
maternal care and an instance of pollution.  
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Figure 71. Piccinini, Doubting Thomas (2008). 
 
Piccinini’s other works, like Doubting Thomas (2008) (Figure 71), are far less 
recognizable, but still occupy an abject liminal space between beast and human. In 
Doubting Thomas, the figure of a young human boy reaches his hand out to probe a 
monstrous creature, seemingly dog-like or porcine in shape, but with what appears to be 
human skin, replete with age spots and soft hairs. The creature has no discernible face, 
only a wrinkled, fleshy mouth, or vaginal opening, from which a wet head and clawed 
feet emerges. The work not only represents a hybrid monster, but a maternal beast 
birthing a slick, dangerous creature that seems to be threatening the human boy. The 
viewer is meant to empathize with the human boy, not the featureless gaping monster, 
and thus to experience a fear of pollution and physical malice on his behalf. 
Piccinini’s work successfully engages in the abject through the depiction of 
bodily fluids, the monstrous maternal, and hybrid animality. However, she is not alone in 
this endeavor, as many artists’ works engage in the liminal space between human and 
animal, yielding abject results. For example, Kate Clark’s Manimals (Figure 72) are 
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taxidermied animals with sculpted human faces, while Jane Alexander’s work merges 
human bodies with animalistic heads, as in her piece The Butcher Boys (1986) (Figure 
73), where she used abject hybridity to address politics in South Africa during apartheid 
(Mercer, 2011).  
 
 
 
Figure 72. Clark, Manimals: Sharp Tongue (2008).  
 
The blending of the inhuman with the human causes anxiety over boundaries, 
which in turn creates an abject object. The viewer, upon seeing these works, attempts to 
reject the imagery because of its surplus of animality. However, the viewer cannot 
completely reject the imagery, because the human figures included in relation to the 
monstrous animal hybrids, and the human qualities those hybrids exhibit, ensure that the 
viewer sees themself in the piece. While the combined intimacy and disgust these pieces 
evoke compels an abject response, that same attraction and repulsion reminds us of our 
primitive past,.  
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Figure 73. Alexander, The Butcher Boys (1986) 
 
 
4.04 Conclusions: The Problem of Categorizing the Uncategorizable 
 The abject is difficult to categorize, as it is ambiguous and deviant by definition. 
However, in her own methodology, Kristeva lays out a series of categories of abject 
manifestations: bodily fluids, gender, the maternal, excess and dearth, monstrosity and 
the bestial. There are other manifestations of abjection that Kristeva outlines, such as 
food (1982). There are types of bodies that the abject can attach to, beyond the queer 
body (Butler, 1993) or the disabled body (Betterton, 2006), like the poor body (Tyler, 
2013) or the body of color (Scott, 2010). While these are valid observations that deserve 
further exploration, I find the categories of race and poverty to be less visibly constructed 
as abject within the art world.  
I have in this chapter confined my comments to the categories addressed by visual 
artists, and some artworks that illustrate these categories, enacting an analysis enabled by 
an abject visual methodology. It becomes abundantly clear in the above analysis that the 
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abject straddles multiple categories, moving between and juxtaposing the monstrous and 
the maternal, animality and bodily fluids, excess and gender. Even when using the 
categories prescribed by Kristeva, definitions of the abject are still in flux. The abject, 
even when carefully articulated, seems to abject itself, haunting boundaries from multiple 
places of exclusion, making an intersectional approach necessary to understanding the 
ways in which different types of abjection interact.  
 The above work not only identifies the abject impulse in art, but also offers visual 
examples of its multiple categories, something that has not yet been done systematically. 
By expanding our understanding of abject art through an exploration and investigation of 
evocative objects, this taxonomy of abject art adds to the body of knowledge surrounding 
the abject. The abject is diffuse and difficult to understand, even when Kristeva uses 
literature to illustrate her concepts. More than text, imagery induces a visceral reaction in 
the viewer, making it a more direct means of experiencing the abject. Art is an ideal 
conduit for the abject, because it provides a space for the emotion of disgust to be 
partially deferred through aesthetic intervention, creating the fascinated victimhood of the 
abject, instead of the full rejection associated with disgust. The above analyses offer a 
way to understand our complex reactions to abject artwork, and through understanding 
our reactions, we can better understand the complex nature of abjection. In Chapter Five, 
I will explore further implications of this taxonomy of abject categories for art education 
in particular, and the humanities more generally. I will also offer some ideas about the 
future direction of this research.  
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5.0: Further Directions and Implications for An Abject Visual Methodology 
5.01 The Road Ahead, or, Where I Plan to Take my Abject Visual Methodology 
 When one studies ambiguity, it’s a bit misguided to say that there is a definite 
conclusion to the study, since endings and beginnings in liminal spaces are rather 
subjective. Instead, I offer some directions in which I would like to take this work and 
some concluding thoughts on the implications of this study, knowing that this is the first 
step in a longer journey. The abject, though intimately connected with death, still resists a 
final limit; killing the abject only leads to being haunted by it.  
 5.01.01 more categories. The previous chapter laid out a topography of abject art 
and a way to critically approach these artworks. I have focused on a limited number of 
categories, indebted primarily to Kristeva (1982), as well as to Kolnai (2001) and Butler 
(1993). Considering the limited scope of a dissertation, I have tried to thoroughly 
explicate these particular categories. However, there are still other categories related to 
the visually abject that I have not explored in depth, such as food and religion (although I 
have touched on the former in relation to Paul McCarthy). As regards future exploration 
on the intersection of religion and the abject, I am interested in studying the 
contemporary work of sculptor Kiki Smith, who has grounded much of her work in the 
iconography of Christianity and other religious mythologies (Close, 1994; Munro, 2000). 
Additionally, works like the Issenheim Altarpiece, which features a rotting Christ figure, 
influence my appraisal of the abject in Medieval and Renaissance religious art (Santing, 
2009; Hayum, 1989).  
 The next major iteration of my work will be a more in-depth look at the original 
categories of Kristeva’s notion of the abject, the later application of her ideas to social 
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marginalization, and how this dialogue has been represented in art. The goal of my 
project has been to create a framework for an abject visual methodology, while laying out 
the groundwork for the next stage of my inquiry. The art I have chosen to discuss will 
reference categories discussed in earlier chapters. It is easy to see why some are disgusted 
or made uncomfortable by this art. However, other categories of the abject, such as 
marginalized populations, which I began to touch upon in regard to disability, are also 
areas that need to be explored through an abject visual methodology. This is because 
these complicated areas of abjection often result in slippages of meaning, leading to 
subjects being treated with generalized repugnance, and understood in a context of 
disgust.  
However, categories such as marginalized groups of people are outside the 
purview of this study. This is because they often generate far more subtle instantiations of 
the abject that do not always engage a fully visceral reaction of outright disgust, but 
rather activate an aura of the uncanny, or a sense of disease. My work thus far has looked 
at how art depicts the marginalized body, as well as other less well-defined categories 
within the abject, such as ambiguous social borders and new visual discourses of 
childhood. But I am now interested in extending my political analysis through expanding 
my research on depictions of marginalized bodies. For example, I am interested in the 
relationship to ‘the animal’ in works such as Jane Alexander’s the Butcher Boys (1985), 
which examines and critiques the marginalization of black Africans in South Africa 
during apartheid through a conflation of animal monstrosity and social exclusion. I am 
also interested in the grotesque world that Kara Walker creates in her silhouetted 
vignettes, such as I’ll Be a Monkey’s Uncle (1996). These works haunt the viewer like a 
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two dimensional ghost from an antebellum past, based less on historical reality than on 
romanticized fictional accounts of slavery, such as those portrayed in Roots (1977) or 
Gone with the Wind (1939) (Vergne, Gilman, McEvilley, et al, 2007). The stories told by 
these silhouettes feature racist stereotypes and disgusting scenes of violence which would 
cause us to turn away, were it not for a visual appeal created through the use of icons 
from a dramatic and decadent historical period. A blend of rejection and attraction mark 
these works as abject.  
 5.01.02 more sites.  
 5.01.02.01 Pop Surrealism.  
The categorical expansion I have suggested would go beyond established 
theoretical defintions of the abject. These categories have not been widely described in 
relation to visual art, and therefore are outside of the scope of this study. However, I 
would also like to take the approach I have already undertaken in analyzing imagery of 
gender, motherhood, and bodily substances, and apply this approach to other areas of art, 
such as the genre of Pop Surrealism (Figure 74) (Anderson, 2004; Jordan; 2005; Klein, 
Schaffner & Nahas, 1999), and to areas of popular visual culture outside of the fine art 
world, like designer vinyl toys (Vartanian, 2007; Budnitz, 2006). 
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Figure 74. Schorr, Five O’clock Shadows in Disney-Dali Land (1996).  
 
 
 I began this dissertation with a reflection on Garbage Pail Kids, a series of delightfully 
disgusting collectible cards from the 1980s. The resurgent popularity of these cards 
seems largely tied to the rising popularity of Pop Surrealism, a genre of art that combines 
dream-like explorations of desire and fear with a postmodern fine-art interest in popular 
visual culture. These works often feature absurd exaggerations of the body, fluids in 
abundance, and grotesque mutations, mitigated by the appeal of bright colors, 
commercial icons, and dexterous painting skills. Considering the complicated 
deployment of disgust and the abject in Pop Surrealist objects, an abject methodology is 
the best way to understand them. 
 5.01.02.02 designer vinyl toys. Many Pop Surrealist artists also participate in the 
subculture of designer vinyl toys (Figure 75), which are made in limited numbers and 
sold in specialty shops.  
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Figure 75. Chueh, Mugs Bunny (2008) from the Vivsect Playset, produced by StrangeCo.  
 
 
These toys are highly sought after and rather expensive,111 and they enjoy a robust 
aftermarket. There is even a convention devoted to these toys: Designer Con, boasting 
over 7,000 attendees in 2014 (Designer Con, 2014). These toys often represent zombies, 
hybrid creatures, and bodily fluids, making them prime objects for analysis through the 
lens of the abject.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 Prices for these works vary radically based on size, rarity and artist, but a standard 3” 
or 4” blindboxed (unknown) figure is $10 to $15, while a rare toy of the same scale could 
easily sell for over $100 on eBay, as of April 2015. See Kidrobot or Rotofugi’s websites 
(http://www.kidrobot.com/ or http://www.rotofugi.com/home/). 
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 5.01.02.03 children’s toys. Additionally, I would like to look at toys in general, 
not just designer vinyl toys, which are a niche market for specific collectors. Even in the 
broader world of toys, the abject makes a regular appearance, as demonstrated with 
Garbage Pail Kids cards, originally intended for children. Many toys from the 1980s 
featured what Cross (2004) has called a “cool” aesthetic, featuring acid colors, offensive 
characters, and an aggressive “street” style. However, this trend in abject toys continues 
today. I have already commented on toys that mix cute and disgusting elements, like 
Monster High dolls, which are basically discordant Barbies (Figure 76); while thin and 
beautiful, they also sport scars and fangs. Their equally abject tagline declares, “Be 
yourself. Be unique. Be a monster” (Mattel, 2014). Another example of disgusting toys 
are Skelanimals, which are skeletal stuffed animals, advertised with the slogan, “Dead 
animals need love too” (Skelanimals, 2014) (Figure 77). These toys’ aesthetics are 
mitigated by both the discourses of cuteness (Ngai, 2012) and the “ket aesthetic.” 
Thompson (2006) describes the latter as a style of junk culture that employs garish 
coloring and deliberately provocative names for candy brands such as Nerds or Sour 
Patch Kids. Nevertheless, these children’s toys are still disgusting (or at least disturbing), 
and call for an abject methodology in order to understand their seemingly dissonant 
visual deployments of sweetness, coolness and creepiness.  
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Figure 76. Mattel, Monster High: Draculaura doll (2010). 
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Figure 77. Skelanimals LLC, Jack (2006). 
 
 
 5.01.03 more theory. 
 5.01.03.01 border studies. I am also interested in exploring new directions in the 
theory of the abject. The abject deals with the transgression of bodily borders, and much 
work has already pointed to the correlation between bodily borders as metaphors for state 
borders (e.g., Casanova & Jafar, 2013). I believe that abject studies could benefit greatly 
	  	  
346	  	  	  	  
	  
from an infusion of concepts discussed in border studies, particularly those found in the 
work of Gloria Anzaldua (2007). Anzaldua discusses borders as alien territories, where 
differences grate against each other to produce wounds. Building upon this metaphor, the 
abject could be applied to transnational politics and global movements, while also 
helping to interpret images that deal with borders and border crossings.  
Many artists analyze and critique borders, which are both symbolic and 
geopolitical. Guillermo Gómez-Peña is a Chicano multimedia performance artist and a 
founder of the artist collective Border Arts Workshop/Taller de Arte Fronterizo. His work 
often deals with the U.S./Mexico border, and borderlands in general. He states in his 
book Dangerous Border Crossers (2000), “I want to reveal what lies behind and beneath 
the making of performance art, particularly when crossing extremely volatile geographic 
and cultural borders” (p. 7). Alan Michelson, a Mohawk artist, also uses the idea of 
borders in his work. For example, his piece Third Bank of the River (2008) is a 6 x 40-
foot image digitally sandblasted onto glass. The image is a composite of multiple 
photographs of the banks of the Saint Lawrence River, at the border between Canada and 
the United States. Michelson shot these images from a boat “in order to capture the river 
and its banks from many perspectives and to convey the complexity of the cultural and 
geographic landscape of the border zone” (Morris, 2011, p. 553). Michelson’s work 
hangs in the lobby of a U.S. border crossing station, and is intended to interrogate the 
fabricated nature of borders, particularly the U.S./Canadian border: a charged space for 
native peoples who historically occupied lands in both countries, but are now subject to 
the limits on movement imposed by immigration and citizenship.  
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While these images do not feature the literal bodily substances readily associated 
with the abject, they do deal with borders and ambiguity, both hallmarks of the abject. I 
believe that a consideration of the role of the abject through the lens of border studies 
could play an important role in understanding some dynamics of globalization.  
 5.01.03.02 discourses of childhood. Another area of the abject that I feel could be 
generatively elaborated upon is the intersection of the abject with the concept of 
childhood. While the abject is born during the formation of the ego during childhood, 
very little literature on the abject discusses the lived experience of childhood or how the 
changing discourses surrounding childhood might impact the notion of the abject. 
Childhood is a time full of disgusting explorations, the pleasures of transgression, and the 
shame that accompanies defilement. While ripe for exploration through an abject visual 
methodology, little research in the field of childhood studies has focused on disgusting 
images in relation to products of and for children. Nor have I read any literature on the 
abject that looks at children as a marginalized co-constitutive Other to adults.  
I hypothesize that much of this silence stems from contemporary discourses on 
childhood that consider children to be either little angels or little devils, both of whom 
must be kept away from disgust and contamination, albeit for different reasons. I would 
like to use an abject visual methodology infused with the historical discourses of 
childhood to analyze the artwork of both Sally Mann and Jock Sturges, whose respective 
images have been alternately labeled as pornographic, or as moving portraits about the 
beauty of youth (Rubin, 2002; Kammen, 2007). An abject methodology could enlarge 
upon the dual interpretations of these works as both obscene yet beautiful, due to their 
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depiction of childhood, a vulnerable and terrifying time of life, both disgusting and filled 
with wonder.  
 The groundwork I have laid out in this dissertation could be built upon to pursue a 
variety of projects. The supplemental research I have proposed lies in a number of areas; 
some ideas point toward the expansion of theoretical ideas on the abject, while others 
focus on different sites for interpretation, but all fit within the purview of the abject. The 
abject occupies a contested but promising discursive space between nature and culture, 
biology and psychoanalysis. In the future, I look forward to expanding my preliminary 
interests and research in a multitude of new directions. I want to further pursue my 
primary research goal for this dissertation, which was to find out why things that disgust 
us also appeal to us, and how we culturally and symbolically interpret the physical 
paradox of rejection and enjoyment that we experience when confronted with the abject. 
5.02 Implications in Art, Art Education and Social Justice  
 5.02.01 enacting revolt through abject art. This study has a number of 
implications for the creation and study of art, the field of art education, and can even be 
applied to social justice issues. In regard to art, this study offers a way to apprehend 
difficult or disgusting art. Foster (1999) has noted that contemporary art practice is 
obsessed with trauma and fascinated by abjection. He surmises that “a special truth seems 
to reside in traumatic or abject states, in diseased or damaged bodies,” and he goes on to 
note that the violated body is “often the evidentiary basis of important witnessings of 
truth, of necessary testimonials to power” (p. 254). Foster proposes a new or specific type 
of ‘the return of the real,’ the repetition of a traumatic experience outside of language.  
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Barrett (2011) explains that the abject, like the Lacanian Real, is unrepresentable 
and thus unknowable. She says,  
As a symptom, abjection appears as affect--fear, loathing, and aggressivity 
directed towards an unnameable other. Artistic practice is able to harness and 
mediate these impulses by translating them into aesthetic form. (p. 106)  
For Kristeva, whether in literature or other forms of expression, art is a catharsis, a 
release of repressed emotions. Barrett argues: “The structure of artwork… has the 
capacity to effect a transference of affect that underpins the renewing and cathartic 
impact of aesthetic experience” (p. 93). I agree with her claim that visual art, which 
provokes the emotion of disgust, offers an immediate experience of the abject. In my 
dissertation I have expanded on this premise by using the theory of mirror neurons 
(Jeffers, 2009; Rokonitz, 2008), to explain how viewers can vicariously experience 
actions depicted in an artwork. Because abject art instantly activates the body, abject art 
can often overwhelm our sense of logic, pushing us to obey our reflexive physical 
reactions. These reactions often prompt a ‘yuck’ response, causing the viewer to 
immediately flee the scene.  
 Feelings of catharsis and happiness usually come at the price of feelings of 
revulsion and discomfort. Kristeva (2001) reflects on this using her notion of the revolt. 
She observes,  
 (H)appiness exists only at the price of a revolt. None of us has pleasure 
 without confronting an obstacle, prohibition, authority, or law that allows us 
 to realize ourselves as autonomous and free. The revolt revealed to  accompany  
 the private experience of happiness is an integral part of the pleasure principle.  
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 Furthermore, on the social level, the normalizing order is far from perfect and  
 fails to support the excluded: jobless youth, the poor in the projects, the homeless, 
the unemployed, and foreigners, among many others. When the excluded have no 
culture of revolt and must content themselves with regressive ideologies, with 
shows and entertainment that far from satisfy the demand of pleasure, they  
become rioters. (p. 7) 
What is revolting causes us to turn away in disgust. But “revolt” is the root of the words 
“revolting”and “revolution,” making Kristeva’s revolt about motion and action as much 
as aversion. This may be reminiscent of one’s reaction to something abject, which can be 
understood as a process or movement that “turns aside” (Kristeva, 1982, p. 10), “turns me 
away” (p. 11), and “turns me inside out” (p. 12).  
  Oliver (2004) explains the nature of revolt:  
 Kristeva’s prescription for depression and melancholy is what she calls 
 intimate, or psychic, revolt. Intimate revolt is a challenge to authority and 
 tradition analogous to political revolt that takes place within an individual and is 
 essential to psychic development. It is a revolt in the psyche that enables us to 
 live as individuals connected to others. (p. 143)  
Revolt is vital and necessary; it keeps an individual and a society from stagnating. Many 
of the great moments of culture and art from the 20th century can be described as acts of 
revolt, predicated on criticism that opposes unfounded emotional affect (Kristeva, 2001). 
Kristeva (2001) expounds: 
 The European tradition, where this phenomenon is most manifest, has an 
 experience of culture that is at once inherent in the social fact and active as 
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 its critical conscience. Europeans are cultured in the sense that culture is their 
 critical conscience; it suffices to think of Cartesian doubt, the freethinking of the 
 Enlightenment, Hegelian negativity, Marx’s thought, Freud’s unconscious, not 
 to mention Zola’s J’accuse and formal revolts such as Bauhaus and surrealism, 
 Artaud and Stockhausen, Picasso, Pollock, and Francis Bacon. (p. 6) 
Abject art links many of these cultural figures, all of whom have caused revolt by stoking 
a feeling of abjection in the viewer. This happens primarily when disgust is mitigated by 
skill or aesthetic appeal, and thereby the initial drive to flee is deferred long enough for 
the viewer to confront the work, and thus experience a profound feeling of abhorrence.  
Oliver explains that in regard to psychic development, a child becomes an 
individual through questioning, making this act one of the initial forms of revolt. 
Questions are a form of revolt insofar as they challenge social codes and meanings, 
placing the ability to create signification in the hands of the individual. Oliver elaborates:,  
 Questioning reopens the realm of words or signification through a challenge 
 to signification itself that operates as an invitation to the depressive to refind 
 lost bodies within words. Through the question, signification turns back on 
 itself in the movement of a double negation that negates representations’ 
 negation of things. (p. 145)  
Like the abject, revolt challenges authority and the symbolic and deals with borders. 
Oliver claims: 
 Without psychic revolt, which enables and authorizes sublimation and 
 creativity, individuals suffer from various forms of borderline states in which 
 negotiating the frontiers of relationships to self and others is precisely what 
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 is at stake. Intimate revolt is an ongoing process through which the borders 
 of self and others are constantly renegotiated. (p. 143) 
The dejected subject is similarly obsessed with borders, constantly renegotiating 
frontiers, devising territories, and “demarcating his universe” (Kristeva, 1982, p. 8).  
My abject visual methodology offers a questioning strategy, a way to engage with 
works of art that enact their own type of revolt. A strategy of revolt for dealing with 
abject images that encourage revolt is not only desirable in the world of art criticism and 
art history, but very important to the field of art education as well. Art educators are not 
preparing students to be artists, as, statistically speaking, few students will become 
professional artists. However, art educators can still demonstrate the value of art and 
visual literacy. The benefits of art include the ability to feel catharsis, emotional 
development through making and viewing art, and an understanding of the political 
power of images. Art education must expand, to look not only at images that appeal to 
their audiences through beauty alone, but also images that seduce and instruct through 
disgust.  
 5.02.02 revolting classrooms. The institutional art world has embraced the abject 
with the valorization of shows like Sensation and artists like Damien Hirst and Chris 
Ofili. However, the field of art education often avoids “difficult” art, usually meaning 
contemporary art. This is in large part because firstly, the target audience for art 
educators is children, and secondly, the modernist tradition of art education shuns 
contemporary artistic styles and conceptual practices because of their conceptual 
complexity. Burgess (2003) explains this reticence towards contemporary practices:   
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 In secondary education teachers often shy away from most contemporary art 
 because they consider it too difficult, an art ‘full of monsters, replete with 
 vulgarity and coarseness…[monsters] formed in relation to the inability of 
 knowledgeable, patient and contemplative practice to express the experiences of 
 the actual existing subjectivities of young artists.’ (p. 108) 
This shying away is not only seen in education, but also within the sensibilities of the 
public at large. While the institutional art world may have embraced many abject artists, 
as well as conceptual artists, performance artists, and other types of contemporary 
practitioners, many laypeople have been excluded from engaging with these artworks 
because they have not been given the tools to understand them. 
 Burgess cites Becker, who “claims that art that appears complex, which deals with 
subjective or psychological concerns, is often considered obscure and inaccessible to 
those outside the art world” (pp. 113-114). And without a guide it is easy to see why 
obscure and psychologically demanding works can seem daunting, as they are predicated 
on revealing the problems of the dominant culture. Instruction in how to approach 
difficult images should begin in the K-12 art room, and thus so should the discussion of 
the potential value of wrestling with these images. But in this context, attractive finished 
products and artists who have been thoroughly enshrined in the art historical canon are 
widely preferred.  
 Rose and Kincheloe (2003) contend, “Controversial or sensational art has 
traditionally been grounded on an artist’s perception of what he or she sees as the 
pathology of the status quo or the insanity of the dominant culture” (p. 14). 
Acknowledging the flaws and inequality of the hegemonic order, through which schools 
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operate as institutional apparatuses, and critically discussing and attempting to change 
unjust norms, are pedagogical tasks well beyond the agenda of most schoolteachers. But 
apprehending the disordered nature of the dominant regime can be a revelation similar to 
“a special truth [that] seems to reside in traumatic states” (Foster, 1999, p. 254). Such a 
revelation constitutes a revolt, the abject being a revolt that reveals the most hidden and 
pertinent concepts about ourselves and our relationships to death and difference.  
However, there are more practical and immediate reasons to bring the abject into 
the classroom. The association of the abject with marginalized subject positions reflects 
the firsthand experiences of many students. Contemporary classrooms are diverse spaces 
that include immigrants and refugees, racial minorities, and varied gender performances 
and sexual identities, all subject positions from which the abject nature of experiences of 
marginalization can be appreciated.  
 5.02.03 abject students and a need for revolt. Oliver (2004) addresses 
marginalized positions through her development of a social theory directed towards using 
psychoanalysis as a way to diagnose and potentially treat the ills of society. Oliver posits 
her theory as revolutionary, although Kristeva (1982; 2001) and other psychoanalysts 
(e.g. Freud, 1916) have long placed the use of psychoanalysis in a broader cultural 
context. Nevertheless, Oliver’s work has much to offer in terms of applying 
psychoanalytic ideas on a large scale, weaving her formulations together with the ideas of 
Fanon, Butler, and other theorists of marginalization. Oliver’s interest in the social 
application of psychoanalysis to diagnose and analyze society appeals to me because of 
its broad applications to the study of culture and social justice.  
Oliver declares that,  
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 to explain the effects of oppression on the psyche - why so many people suffer 
 at the core of their subjectivity and its concomitant sense of agency when they are 
 abjected, excluded, or oppressed - we need a psychoanalytic social theory that 
 reformulates psychoanalytic concepts as social and considers how subjectivity is 
 formed and deformed within particular types of social contexts. (p. xvi) 
All students in elementary and secondary art classes belong to one or more abjected 
categories, if for no other reason than that they are young. Moreover, we tend to treat 
children as non-knowing and asexual beings (Burgess, 2003), while we simultaneously 
try to shield them from anything that we fear might make them “grow up too quickly,” 
like sexual or violent content. However, as Duncum (2000) states, “Aestheticizing 
childhood creates fantasies of children that have little to do with actual children…To 
aestheticize children is to offer a Peter Pan world where children never grow up” (p. 31). 
This is a fantasy of the highest order, since childhood is anything but excluded from the 
forms of social oppression affecting adults. Children too experience racism, homophobia, 
and misogyny, often in brutally abusive ways.  
Clark (1988) famously demonstrated this in the 1940s with his “doll test,” a 
psychological experiment that asked children several questions in relation to two dolls, 
one white and one black. He asked them which doll was better, which one they preferred 
to play with, and which one looked most like them. African-American children 
overwhelmingly said that the white doll was the better and the more desirable doll, 
illustrating children’s early and deep indoctrination into racist hierarchies. This test was 
used as evidence in the Supreme Court case Brown v. Board of Education, in which the 
majority decision argued against the legal doctrine of “separate but equal” established in 
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Plessy v. Ferguson (Clark, 1988). The “doll test” has since been re-administered, and it 
still shows a marked preference towards white or light skin among even very young 
children (Davis, 2005; Berry & Duke, 2011). Age acts as an additional oppressive 
limitation on the agency of children, who comprise a marginalized group, Due to the fact 
that many students belong to other socially marginalized groups because of their race, 
gender, and early demonstrations of sexual and gender identity, there needs to be a way 
for them to critically assess their lived experiences of alienation and minority status.  
 Oliver proposes that the recent rise in depression and an overall cultural fixation 
on melancholia and violence, are causally related to forms of alienation produced through 
hierarchical systems of value where some bodies, particularly female bodies and bodies 
of color, are abjected, jettisoned, and devalued. In a racist, imperialist, misogynist, 
homophobic culture, there is no way for the abjected to find value in themselves, as they 
are denied access to positive images and models of the self because of who and what they 
are. Oliver argues:       
 Those excluded or abjected by dominant values are made to feel ashamed not 
 about something that they have done but about who they are. Shame is 
 directed at the very being of the marginalized subject. Several psychologists 
 postulate that shame is a “keystone affect” in identity formation insofar as it 
 appears very early in infancy before any notion of prohibition. (p. 114)  
With this in mind, the very identity of the abject subject is predicated on and structured 
by shame. Oliver continues: 
 Social melancholy is the result of losing a lovable self. While classical 
 melancholy is the result of losing a loved other that produces feelings of guilt 
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 in the self for aggressive or hostile thoughts toward that other, social 
 melancholy is the result of losing a lovable self that produces feelings of shame in  
 the face of aggressive or hostile thoughts from others. Shame affects one’s sense 
 of self-identity as lovable. (p.115)  
Without positive images of themselves in the world, abject subjects have no positive core 
sense of self. Rather than feeling guilty about their actions, they feel shame that, unlike 
guilt, cannot be alleviated.  
 Discussing the ramifications of this social abjection, Foster (1999) maintains: 
“This is a politics of difference pushed beyond indifference, a politics of alterity pushed 
to nihility” (p. 254). Society offers only nihilism to those who are truly othered and 
different. Oliver argues that when people are denied lovable images of themselves 
through constant denigration and abjection, they experience a lack of core self worth. 
Oliver suggests that the answer to this denigration, to the abject subject’s loss of a lovable 
self, and consequently of their agency or their ability to act in the world, is a space to 
mourn the loss of loved others and to mourn the lack of loveable images of the self. She 
elaborates,  
 The lack of social support for the negative affects of oppression, the silencing 
 of those affects within mainstream culture, creates a type of double, or even 
 triple, bind for those othered by that culture. On the one hand, dominant values 
 within mainstream culture do not provide positive self-images for those othered  
 and excluded, oppressed or repressed, which leads to the colonization of psychic  
 space by abject self images. This abjection is compounded by the lack of social  
 space, or even social taboos, for talking about the truly painful affects and shame  
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 caused by racism, sexism, and homophobia. The result is that those othered are  
 shamed and forced to carry the burden of shame for privileged subjects, who  
 project their own shame for benefiting from the oppression of others onto those  
 very others. The privilege of those empowered within mainstream culture is  
 maintained through a taboo on speaking of the negative affects of oppression.  
 (p. 129)  
Oliver highlights the need for positive alternative images from society, which provide 
what she calls “social support” (p. 129). When one’s psychic space has been colonized by 
the hegemonic discourse, a decolonizing process must occur. This process includes 
mourning for what is absent, but also the reconstruction of something positive.  
 5.02.04 abject and revolt in art education. I noted at the very beginning of this 
dissertation that my interest in disgust and the abject marked me as an outlier, particularly 
in my home discipline of art education. However, this does not mean that no one else has 
discussed abject art, how to incorporate it into curricula, and the potentials it offers to art 
education. Many facets of an abject visual methodology have applications within 
education. An understanding of the abject offers a way to empower the marginalized, 
who constitute the majority population of many schools—of all schools, if we consider 
childhood itself to be a marginalized status. If using an abject visual methodology can 
decolonize psychic space, opening up a place early on for children to understand difficult 
images and discuss a lack of their own images in the mainstream, then perhaps some of 
the suffering Oliver discusses can be avoided.  
Moreover, while the emotion of disgust is something that, some say, children do 
not experience (Miller, 1997), it nevertheless seems to me that children are indeed 
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involved in and negotiate disgust on a regular basis.112 Children are engaged in ego 
formation as they attempt to differentiate themselves from their parents, in order to create 
an autonomous self. This is often accomplished through disgusting acts. Think of the 
child who wipes their runny nose on their sleeve, or uses their straw to froth their milk 
into bubbles that run over the sides of the glass. These are disgusting acts, and they are 
also acts of rebellion. The child abjects themself, analogizing the frothing milk to the act 
of vomiting , or through a wiped nose that pollutes the fabric of a sleeve with interior 
moisture. Children are dealing with bodies that are perpetually erupting and changing. 
Moreover, children have yet to be fully indoctrinated into the Lacanian Symbolic order, 
the register of laws which act as a protective barrier to seal off disgusting things. Their 
incomplete adoption of these prohibitions and protections makes children closer to the 
abject. 
 The rise of visual culture art education as a pedagogical movement also creates 
space for an abject visual methodology. The practice of visual culture art education 
encourages the use of popular culture images in the classroom for a number of reasons; 
adherents advocate a student-centered approach that validates the student’s own interests 
and culture (Keifer-Boyd, 2010; Duncum, 2010, 2006, 2001; Freedman, 2003), a need for 
media literacy in a highly visual and screen-based world (Mirzoeff, 2009, 2012; Taylor & 
Carpenter, 2011), and an analytic that demonstrates the intersections of power, ideology, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 In my personal experience, a teacher only needs to work with children and clay to see 
that kids, from kindergarteners all the way through high school, have strong disgust 
responses. While working at a local elementary school as a visiting ceramics artist, there 
was not a day that went by where the children didn’t squeal, whine, giggle 
transgressively, or shout “ew” in disgust at the wetness, coldness, sliminess, smell, color 
and shape of wet brown terracotta clay. 
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and representation (Duncum, 2008). Many popular culture sites (images, movies, 
television, video games, etc.) are disgusting, from computer generated effects that follow 
bullets through bodies in the crime drama C .S. I. (2010), to buckets of corn syrup-based 
blood in horror films, to images of genocide on the news.  
There must be a way to discuss these images and not simply reject them, 
particularly since they are part of the lived experience of children, who are not the 
innocent angels portrayed in popular discourses of childhood (Ritter, 2001). Nor are 
children the asexual, naïve beings represented in dominant mass culture. Burgess (2003) 
observes that “‘monsters,’ although forbidden entry to the classroom, roam freely in the 
playgrounds, where students confront ‘real’ life experiences” (p. 108). Burgess uses the 
term “monsters” loosely, meaning anything that is uncomfortable, disgusting, or 
dangerous; such entities are familiar to viewers of contemporary abject art.  
 When teaching controversial subjects, teachers often underestimate their students’ 
ability to understand these topics. Rose and Kincheloe (2003) argue for the benefits of 
teaching with and through controversial images, asserting:  
In an era of rationalistic curriculum development, top-down standards, edicts 
against controversial issues and the deskilling of teachers at all levels of 
education, teachers need to think carefully about interpretive schemata and 
offending images” (p. 14).  
Burgress notes that when difficult subject matter is incorporated into the classroom, it is 
often done with an emphasis on prohibition and the status quo. For example, when sex 
education is provided, it is offered with prevention in mind, instead of curiosity, pleasure 
and diversity. Such prudishness is often mimicked in art. As Burgess argues,  
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 Art educators do young people a disservice if they confine contemporary art’s  
 ‘monsters’ to the playground. Rather they should coax them into the classroom,  
 where young people can confront them and allow them to enrich their developing  
 subjectivities and inform their art production. (p. 120)  
Burgess’s argument is further supported by Barrett’s work (2000) observing 
students’ reactions to the controversial photographer Sally Mann. While some of the 
public has called Mann’s work child pornography (Kammen, 2007), responses cited by 
Barrett show that students see Mann’s photos as documents of children’s and 
adolescents’ lived experiences. This demonstrates young students’ abilities to both look 
at and understand complex and “dangerous” images. Comparing student understandings 
of popular visual culture to viewing strategies advocated by formal art education, Burgess 
claims that “research also identifies that when encouraged to make ‘intergraphical’ links 
between different forms of visual imagery (fine art and popular culture), students reveal 
a… sophisticated understanding of images and their power to influence” (p. 113). To 
view children as naïve, perpetually innocent, and incapable not only does them a 
disservice, but limits their agency as individuals and art makers. 
 Rose and Kincheloe (2003) argue for the necessity of confronting abject images, 
as well as interrogating society’s project of sweeping the abject under the rug. They base 
their argument on their own experiences of teaching about the 1997 show Sensation 
during its run at the Brooklyn Museum of Art, continuing on through the subsequent 
backlash against the show, the museum, and the National Endowment for the Arts. 
Reflecting on these experiences, they opine as follows. 
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 In all [the show’s] pieces “protective” taboos are broken in a way that forces the 
 viewer to deal with the abject. Only when individuals engage with that which 
 repulses them, Kristeva and the “Sensation” artists maintain, can they begin the 
 process of self-understanding. Thus, in this context, “Sensation” promotes an 
 aesthetic of “exposure therapy” where viewers encounter that which frightens  
 them the most in order to overcome the phobia. Kristeva argues that avant-garde 
art burns the veil that hides the abject, thus rupturing the power of religious, moral 
and rationalistic domination. In this interpretive schema, critics such as Mayor 
Giuliani do not grasp the confrontation with abjection playing out in the 
exhibition of such work. Their anger is not an unpredictable reaction to a 
portrayal of realms of human existence that they strive to deny. They object to the  
 abject. (pp. 13-14)  
The idea of exposure therapy is to create catharsis, to release the repressed and pent-up 
fears and anxieties that plague us. However, catharsis can only come through the 
expulsion of surplus affect, often enacted through the creative process. Similarly, in 
viewing objects created from and through catharsis, including art objects, the viewer is 
presented with evidence of difficult and abject experiences that can support growth. In 
considering the effects of revolt, Kristeva (2001) notes that happiness, and arguably 
wholeness, are only found through confrontation with authority, a taboo, or an obstacle. 
Abject art can cause both revolt and catharsis; however, there needs to be a structure for 
teaching and learning about these difficult images and for guiding emotional responses to 
abject art. Thus I identify a need for an abject visual methodology.  
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Art educators should reconsider the purpose of art, and go beyond considering the 
work of art to be simply a pleasing object that matches one’s couch, in order to move 
toward recognizing true art as political, thought-provoking, gut-wrenching, and 
ultimately transformative. While more robust notions of art are normal in the art world, 
this view of art has yet to filter out to the general public, in large part due to the reliance 
of art educators who teach in K-12 settings on traditional art and art education strategies. 
Burgess (2003) quotes Becker, who claims: “Art is a location – a designated imaginative 
space where freedom is experienced.” He goes on to declare that,  
 art must dislocate the viewer by its refusal and inability to become part of the 
reality principle, in other words it is not the function of art to enable viewers to 
become assimilated in society; art should challenge its assumptions through ‘the 
demands of intellectual and visual rigor and the heightened recognition of pain 
and pleasure.’ (p. 114)  
Art teachers, she contends, are “notorious for being atheoretical” (p. 115), but 
nonetheless, “(a)rt is unavoidably political and it is without doubt one of the roles of 
artists today to highlight social, cultural and political issues and concerns” (p. 120). If art 
is unavoidably political, a sentiment that I agree with wholeheartedly, we need to equip 
students with tools to understand the conceptual and political aspects of these artworks. 
Not only do we need to include difficult and controversial artworks in the classroom, and 
to model ways to approach these artworks, but also, if we believe that we are training 
young artists, we must prepare them for an art world that is engaged with these types of 
images.  
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“Something’s stirring in the unkempt undergrowth of art,” Hutchinson (as cited in 
Burgess, p. 108) portends, “(y)oung artists seem to be abandoning the manicured lawns 
and bridleways, and diving into the bushes to partake of dark and lurid activities.” This 
stirring is what Foster (1999) has called the art world’s “fascination with trauma, [and] 
envy of abjection” (p. 166). In teaching young artists, we must teach them how 
contemporary artists make art, or we deprive them by not preparing them to appreciate 
contemporary art. Burgess notes: “These issues are as relevant to the developing 
subjectivities of students as they are to the ‘actual, existing subjectivities’ of artists” (p. 
108). In teaching art, we are teaching students not only to make, but to think like artists 
who are engaged in creating difficult images and embodying devalued and abjected 
subjectivities.  
 5.02.05 implications for social justice. The implications of an abject visual 
methodology for art and art education have been discussed, but I believe that a focus on 
what disgusts, how it disgusts, and the slippage between physical and social abjection is 
important in a broader social context. While the emphasis of this study has been on the 
application of an abject visual methodology, the work that I have done in explicating 
current uses of the abject, as well as in emphasizing potential connections to social 
justice, has implications beyond art.  
 5.02.05.01 revolting remedies: social support, or an embrace of abject 
solidarity? To feel disgusted and abjected by viewing abject art may be the closest many 
people will ever come to the experience of being socially abjected through objectification 
and marginalization. This becomes a powerful site for empathetic connections--not 
through a shared humanness, but in fact through a shared monstrousness. In Pedagogy of 
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the Oppressed (1970/2005), one of the primary texts that influenced both Sandoval’s 
writing (2000) and my own project, Freire explains that we live in a time when concerns 
about humanization must be paramount. In discussing humanization, we must 
acknowledge the extent to which dehumanization runs rampant, and structures ideas of 
humanization. Dehumanization of both the oppressed and the oppressor is in fact so 
expansive that humanization may not seem like a viable possibility. However, 
dehumanization, “although a concrete historical fact, is not a given destiny” (Freire, p. 
44). It is the task of the oppressed, Freire argues, to free both themselves and their 
oppressors: not by a simple reversal of power arrangements, but through a struggle 
toward self-determination and freedom. Freire proclaims: “Only the power that springs 
from the weakness of the oppressed will be sufficiently strong to free both” (p. 44).  
 Oliver (2004) agues that there is a need for positive media images of those who 
are marginalized, as a current lack of these images contributes to their continued 
abjection and disempowerment. There is evidence that positive images of those once 
completely jettisoned by society are increasingly prevalent. Take, for instance, the 
proliferation of racially diverse figures in the media (Luther, Lepre, & Clark, 2011), or 
most recently, the inclusion of the first runway model with Down Syndrome, Jamie 
Brewer, at New York’s Fashion Week in 2015 (Stampler, 2015).  
Nonetheless, I must admit that I am dubious about society’s ability to create 
positive images of everyone. As McRuer (2006a; 2006b) points out in regard to 
“compulsory able-bodiedness,” each time a marginal group is brought into the dominant 
discourse, another group is further disenfranchised. He explains that, while many people 
with disabilities have entered into the media and popular culture, appearing to advance 
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the goals of inclusivity, this inclusion is concurrent with a further subjugation of those 
who are profoundly mentally and physically disabled. Freire (1970/2005) echoes these 
concerns, explaining that the first step that most take in liberation is to adopt the role of 
their oppressors, becoming “sub-oppressors” (p. 45). Freire expands upon this idea, 
stating: 
The oppressed, having internalized the image of the oppressor and adopted his 
guidelines, are fearful of freedom. Freedom would require them to eject this 
image and replace it with autonomy and responsibly. Freedom is acquired by 
conquest, not by gift. It must be pursued constantly and responsibly. Freedom is 
not an ideal located outside of man; nor is it an idea, which becomes myth. It is 
rather the indispensable condition for the quest for human completion. (p. 47)  
In their first step towards liberation, the oppressed are still bound up in the system of 
oppression, which has not been changed simply through expanded inclusion. The 
revolution cannot be private or singular, but must be broad, addressing systems of 
oppression and not just existing for those served by those systems. 
Freedom, like revolt, is the movement towards completion, not the completion 
itself. It is liminal and transient; it is a constant pursuit, not a stagnant condition. Like the 
abject, freedom requires “ejection,” or the radical exclusion of the oppressor who 
maintains the hegemonic norm that the oppressed have internalized as an image of 
freedom. In fact, the oppressor is not free either, but trapped within the same system of 
dehumanization. Thus, a positive image would have to be a continually evolving image 
that was generated by the oppressed, and not just a reversal of power dynamics that 
placed the oppressed in the same position as their former oppressors. For example, the 
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Vanity Fair cover story on Caitlyn Jenner in June 2015, in which a mainstream magazine 
referenced the misogynistic tradition of pinup models in presenting the image of a 
transgender woman, is not an illustration of authentic freedom as it continues to 
perpetuate sexism. Rather, this cover offers “the security of conformity” (Freire, 
1970/2005, p. 48) that protects the system of oppression.  
 Kristeva (1991) offers an alternative to Oliver’s perhaps rather naïve suggestion 
that marginalization can be fixed through positive images of self. Kristeva proposes: 
 To discover our disturbing otherness, for that indeed is what bursts in to confront 
 that "demon," that threat, that apprehension generated by the projective 
 apparition of the other at the heart of what we persist in maintaining as a proper,  
 solid, "us." By recognizing our uncanny strangeness we shall neither suffer from  
 it nor enjoy it from the outside.... The ethics of psychoanalysis implies a politics:  
 it would involve a cosmopolitanism of a new sort that ... might work for a  
 mankind whose solidarity is founded on the consciousness of its unconscious-- 
 desiring, destructive, fearful, empty, impossible. (p. 192) 
This is to say that the strangeness of the Other is a powerful currency that belongs to the 
oppressed, a currency that offers a mode of solidarity based in alterity and a conscious 
understanding of the abject unconscious. Edmunds (2009) argues that solidarity through 
alterity is a kind of political consensus that would involve a “constant analysis of the 
forms of rejection that must take place for the ‘us’ to be formed” (p. 217). This solidarity 
and its accompanying analysis have much to offer, he insists, as it calls, 
 for a curiosity toward what had been rejected, destructive in that it could not 
 possibly fully articulate the loss of those rejected, fearful in that it would have to 
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 confront the reasons why it had rejected the others, empty in that it would be a 
 mere sublimation or representation of the loss, and impossible in that for all of the 
 above reasons, the lost or repressed other would surely return. (p. 218)  
While this may appear to be a strange form of political solidarity, it does offer common 
ground for communion and support. This political solidarity carries with it an “ethics of 
analysis.” Founded “on a working out or working through of forms of social unity and 
exclusion, the unity [this political solidarity] provides is not theoretical, but one of 
practice” (Edmunds, 2009, p. 218). Furthermore, apropos of Freire, it is grounded in the 
experiences of the oppressed, a necessity for the movement towards freedom. 
Kristeva’s argument, explicated by Edmunds, is, in short, that through an analysis 
and interrogation of difference we can build solidarity and communion, regardless of 
anyone’s status as abjected or other. I would take this a step further and say that it is 
because of the stigmas of monstrosity and abjection attached to the oppressed, as well as 
to those who through their solidarity with the oppressed have become similarly 
“contaminated,” that radical political change can be created. The abject is strong enough 
to impact both the oppressed and the oppressor. No one can escape the othering power of 
the abject through association, nor the ability of a politics of psychoanalysis to reveal the 
other in us all.   
 5.02.05.02 we’re all monsters here: decentering and difference. With an “ethics 
of analysis” in mind (Edmunds, 2009, p. 218), in relation to the abject, I would suggest a 
strategy other than simply expanding the parameters of inclusion. In contrast with Oliver, 
I propose instead to affirm the monstrous through analysis, rather then just denying the 
monster in favor of positive images. Freire (1970/2005) writes, “Liberation is thus a 
	  	  
369	  	  	  	  
	  
childbirth, and a painful one. The man or woman who emerged is a new person, viable 
only as the oppressor-oppressed contradiction is superseded by the humanization of all 
people” (p. 49). Outside of the obvious connections between the abject-mother and 
Freire’s childbirth metaphor, what I draw from this is a need to move beyond the binaries 
that Oliver continues to uphold, favoring instead a different, more inclusive, possibility.  
 The monstrous and the abject are taboo subjects, and often they cannot be 
discussed or represented without an overwhelming sense of disgust. Taboo involves the 
avoidance of things that are too dangerous, too abhorrent, too powerful. When Oliver 
(2004) argues that there needs to be a space to mourn, she means that there must be a 
space for the discussion of taboo subjects, such as the abject. Whereas for Oliver the 
space for conversation is one of mourning, I posit instead that this space should be used 
for a dialogue about the generative power of the oppressed, and the non-traditional 
agency that abject bodies and subjects possess, rather than as a space for melancholic 
brooding. Much of the conversation surrounding the abject seems to end in a reification 
of binaries, although that is not the intent expressed by Kristeva (1982), who repeatedly 
insists that the abject is ambiguous and not a clear opposition of sides. The opposite of 
disempowerment is the empowerment that Oliver (2004) seeks for the disenfranchised in 
her social theory of psychoanalysis. However, empowerment is not the goal of the abject. 
The abject is a sideways step that offers a different vision of what power can look like, 
through forms that unleash the power of horror.  
On a similar note, Oliver (2004) argues that the current obsession with self-
validation and ego fortification issues from mainstream culture, which does not offer 
affirming visual reflections to most members of society. Most of us are abjected to some 
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degree and suffer from that rejection. All humans exist on the peripheries of the 
normative in some way, because the normative is an ideal, an ideal whose closed and 
static edges are challenged by the abject on a multitude of fronts. While Oliver does not 
say this explicitly, it seems that her answer would be to expand the center, thus allowing 
a more diversity-conscious hegemony to emerge. However, if we rely instead on the 
ideas of Narayan and Harding (2000), who take for granted the proposition that the 
majority of people already exist on the margins and outside the mainstream, then why not 
decenter the normative instead of expanding the center? Since the monstrous is always on 
the border, it makes sense that the abjected are border crossers, opening paths for us so 
that we may move away from the restrictive center and towards images of ourselves on 
the periphery.  
Some have argued (Foster, Buchloch, Krauss, Bois, Hollier, & Molesworth, 1994; 
Bois & Krauss, 1997) that the abject simply reifies whatever is regarded as low. My 
intentions with respect to the abject and abject art are not to uphold the abject in the 
traditional sense, or to somehow turn disgust into sweetness; rather, I would value the 
latent potential power in the monstrous other, power that we are all connected to in 
varying degrees at different points in our lives. I do not simply advocate putting a 
monster on a pedestal, but would emphasize the monster’s ability to overturn pedestals. 
Audre Lorde announces: “It is not our differences that divide us. It is our inability to 
recognize, accept, and celebrate those differences” (as cited in Samuels, 2014, p. 8). An 
abject visual methodology is a way to approach difference that can be disturbing and 
difficult, but crucial both for society and for the field of education.  
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 5.02.05.03 reappropriating the power of abjection. The strategy of 
reappropriating and reclaiming the abjected and monstrous can be seen very clearly in the 
work of many feminist artists. Meskimmon suggests that “the monster becomes an 
empowering trope for women artists precisely because it cannot be fixed: it is always 
‘becoming,’ poised on the borders.…They exist in a state of becoming rather than a false 
marker of fixity” (as cited in Burgess, 2003, p.118). This outlook can be seen in the work 
of artists like Jenny Saville and Patricia Piccinini, but also in many other forms of 
popular culture. According to Warner,  
Former misogynist commonplaces are now being seized by women; in rock 
music, in films, in fiction, even in pornography, women are grappling the she-
beast of demonology for themselves. The girl is the heroine of our times, and 
transgression a staple entertainment. (as cited in Burgess, 2003) 
From the Riot Grrl scene113 to the “final girl” phenomenon,114 women have reclaimed a 
space for themselves in popular culture through refusing normative demands, focusing 
instead on reappropriating slurs and obscenities.  
 Reappropriation is the cultural process by which a group reclaims terms or 
artifacts that were previously used to disparage that group. This is most obviously seen in 
the reappropriation of derogatory language. Galinsky et al. (2013) explain: “Derogatory 
labels express contempt and derision and, as carriers of stigma, they represent 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 Riot Grrls are followers of an underground feminist hardcore punk movement started 
in the early 1990s. See Marcus, S. (2010). Girls to the front: The true story of the Riot 
Grrl revolution. New York, NY: Harper Perennial.  
114 “Final girl” refers to the horror movie phenomenon where the final survivor, who kills 
the monster and arguably saves the day, is most often a woman. See Clover, C. (1993). 
Men, women and chain saws: Gender in the modern horror film. Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press.  
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mechanisms of social control that reinforce a group’s disempowered state” (p. 2020). 
However, the authors go on to counter that “self-labeling with a stigmatizing group label 
may facilitate reappropriation, the process of taking possession of a slur previously used 
exclusively by dominant groups to reinforce a stigmatized group’s lesser status” (p. 
2020). Reappropriation is a form of reclamation, as laid out by Godrej (2011):  
To reclaim literally means to make one’s own, to regain, retrieve, recover, 
repossess, salvage, or rescue. We reclaim terms, words, specific phrases, so that 
we refashion their meanings to correspond to our particular goals, we rescue or 
salvage them from their earlier, often derogatory, meanings we repossess them so 
that we make the our own, so that their meanings have the authority of our 
ownership behind them. (p. 1) 
Godrej goes on to say that “reclamation is usually a tool for disarming the power of a 
dominant group to control one’s own and others’ views of oneself. The point… is to 
reshape the social landscape” (p. 1).  
Critical to reappropriation is a shift in power and agency. This is particularly 
important in conversations surrounding the abject because of the tendency to reduce it to 
binary oppositions. Foster (1999) raises a concern that the politically abject may end up 
being oversimplified into the categories of the abjected and the abjector, the victim and 
the aggressor, the dominant and the marginal. This is a dualistic description of power that 
has been put into question in many fields, particularly in post-colonialism studies 
(Ashcroft, Griffiths, & Tiffin, 2013). Moreover, this binary and hierarchical 
understanding of power is antithetical to the ambiguity and fluidity of the abject, which 
acknowledges binary poles, but operates in the in-between spaces. 
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 Returning to the importance of the abject in the classroom, the aforementioned 
reappropriation strategies of female artists who have embraced social abjection by using 
monstrous representations of themselves, both in the fine art world and in popular 
culture, offer us a guide to the usefulness of the abject. Rose and Kincheloe (2003) 
describe this strategy:  
 That which the dominant culture deems offensive often opens a window to  
 cognitive development, to new levels of insight that produce new modes of  
 consciousness of the way the world operates, the way identity is produced. In this  
 context aesthetic experience can lead to a new level of insight not only about art  
 but about the world at large and ourselves in relation to it. Such an  enhanced  
 awareness and the empowerment that can be drawn from it cannot be omitted  
 from a commentary on educational purpose. (p. 14)  
These windows to cognitive development are exactly what we, as teachers, want for our 
students, as these windows provide opportunities for personal growth, empathetic 
development, and learning. The role of the arts in education continues to be questioned 
because of shifts in education towards quantitative results, the promotion of STEM fields, 
and a general trend toward teaching for testable outcomes. It falls on the arts not only to 
teach discrete disciplinary lessons, but also to broaden the scope of lessons to include 
building empathy and other social and emotional skills. In the past, art pedagogy has 
focused on personal expression, as promoted in the work of Cizek (Day & Hurwitz, 
2011) or on discipline-based arts education, which emphasizes art history, aesthetics, 
critique, and the process of making art (Greer, 1984). However, as other educational 
disciplines have shifted towards curricula that makes assessing students’ understanding 
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and progress easier and more quantifiable, the arts have become one of the last fields to 
encourage difficult classroom conversations that can lead to personal development, 
student agency, and in the end, the type of happiness that is found in revolt.  
While such dialogue may seem incongruous with art education, because of the 
discourses of innocence and vigilance that surround children, the abject is in fact a vital 
component to visual culture, and can be crucial to a postmodern and student-centered art 
education. This is even more evident when one embraces art education as a field whose 
overall goal or project is one of social justice. The authors of Art and Social Justice 
Education: Culture as Commons (2011) all argue in one way or another for a deep 
connection between art education and social justice. This is not an isolated trend; indeed, 
many have considered the relationship between art, social justice, and education. 
Sánchez, a Los-Angeles-based artist and art educator, argued in a 2014 HuffPost article: 
“(A)s an arts educator, I have a role and responsibility to engage students and their 
community through the arts” (para. 3). A culturally relevant and community-based art 
education program that is steeped in anti-racism and gender equality is a first step 
towards a model of art education committed to social justice.  
Inspired by Freire, Hanley (2013) stresses the need for collective engagement and 
the pursuit of humanness through a social justice-focused art education practice, saying:  
To get to this place of our fullest humanity, consciously and unconsciously, we all 
engage in a never-ending push-me-pull-you dance along the continuum of social 
justice, looking for ways to assert our individual and collective desires and needs. 
(p. 2) 
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While also discussing the role of social justice in art education, Quinn, Ploof, and 
Hochtritt (2011) cite the poet Gwendolyn Brooks, who muses, “Art hurts. Art urges 
voyages - and it is easier to stay at home” (p. xviii). Art is an integral part of social justice 
advocacy, testified to by the work that many artists make addressing issues of equity and 
disparity (Dewhurst, 2014). Keeping the welfare of our diverse students in mind, social 
justice needs to be an integral part of art education in the 21st century, so that art can 
support and promote movements of revolt that can enact positive change. Art is vital, not 
despite its provocations, but precisely because of the pain and disgust art can induce. 
These emotions can break down walls that keep oppression in the realm of abstract ideas, 
allowing a visceral appreciation of suffering that affects real people.  
 5.02.06 some final thoughts on love. In Anatomy of Disgust, Miller (1997) 
suggests that one of the very few things that can help us to overcome utter disgust is love. 
He reflects: “One way of describing intimacy (and/or love) is as the state in which 
various disgust rules are relaxed or suspended” (p. 132). Through love, he says, one 
develops a “tolerance for bodies and a willingness to excuse their foibles as well as to 
indulge their dangerous and polluting qualities” (p. 132). As a way of explaining these 
claims, Miller looks to the examples of diaper changing and bad breath. The ultimate sign 
of parental love for their child is the changing of dirty diapers, the willingness to possibly 
become contaminated by potentially touching feces. Shit is meant to make us turn away, 
but love, and its concomitant loyalty and humility, ensure that the diaper is changed. 
Similarly, care for the elderly, which involves many of the same disgusting substances 
that are experienced during child-rearing, is guaranteed by love, manifested in the type of 
disgust management that happens in reciprocal loving relationships. It also can be seen in 
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the example of bad breath, which we may consider vile or vomitous from a stranger, but 
from a loved one it is often overlooked or ignored. Love mitigates disgust.  
 I pause here to discuss love and disgust because love has been at the center of a 
number of theoretical texts and frameworks surrounding my own project. Another 
example of this suspension or mitigation of disgust is kissing. When Rozin and his fellow 
researchers asked individuals if they would drink they own spit from a glass, for the most 
part, they refused (Rozin & Fallon, 1987; Rozin, Haight, & McCauley, 1993). The saliva, 
even though it was their own, had left their bodies and become foreign. However, we 
willingly exchange and ingest other people’s saliva when we kiss. Similarly, intimacy, 
which is predicated upon love in some form, ensures that a touch, which would be 
perceived as unwanted and violating from a stranger, is pleasurable when it comes from a 
loved one. To be sure, Miller’s argument that love is the answer to overcoming taboos of 
disgust is not without its own problems. He conflates sexual desire with love, which may 
arguably be a type of love, but is not the same as love that is experienced in 
intergenerational care.  
 Oliver (2004), whom I rely upon heavily for my own broader understanding of 
psychoanalysis as a social theory, argues that, as a culture, we are melancholic due to a 
lack of lovable images of ourselves. The abject subject is in need of a lovable self-image 
in order to combat the internalized shame of being the “deject” of society. Oliver is 
borrowing a great deal from Kristeva (1992, 2001, 2003) in this formulation, not only in 
regard to the abject, but also in terms of her notions of melancholia and love. Barrett 
offers that, for Kristeva, “melancholia and love emerge as two sides of psychic 
functioning that constitute the subject’s relation to language, to self and to the social 
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other” (2011, p. 61). Kristeva (2001), like Oliver, believes that the ubiquity of the media 
and the dominance of consumerism have created a perpetual state of melancholia, as we 
are all alienated from ourselves and from each other through the power of popular 
imagery. However, as Barrett goes on to say:  
 The amatory discourses of psychoanalysis and art have the capacity to engender  
 self-love and love of others. Kristeva’s account of melancholia and love are thus  
 fundamental to understanding artistic production as a set of ethical practices that  
 serve a crucial function in society. (p. 62) 
Art provides a way to overcome depersonalization and alienation; it creates a psychic 
space of self-love and engenders empathetic connections with others who participate in a 
community of support, solidarity, and love.  
 I now return to one of the inspirations for my own abject visual methodology, 
Sandoval’s Methodology of the Oppressed (2000). For me, the major outcome of reading 
this book has been to motivate me to create a systematic methodological approach to the 
abject in visual imagery. Additionally, Sandoval’s goal of emancipation from hegemonic 
disempowerment has also influenced my project. Sandoval is seeking to codify a way to 
create change. Similarly, I am seeking to systematize an approach to the abject that 
privileges deep investigation and empathetic embodied connections in confronting 
disgusting and difficult images. With practice, this method would mitigate, alleviate, and 
mutate some of the reflexive discomfort that abject images often cause. My abject visual 
methodology and the type of study that it encourages seeks a final goal of emancipation 
from the hegemonic and tyrannical normalcy that disempowers so many individuals. An 
abject visual methdology is meant to provide a means of access to abject images that 
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normally cause revolt, and to redirect that impulse towards transformation instead of 
expulsion and rejection.  
 Sandoval ends her book with an argument for a powerful “neorhetoric” of love. 
Her argument for love builds on the work of other authors who have argued that love is 
the only thing that can overcome otherness, disgust, and alienation, as when Frantz Fanon 
announces: “Today I believe in the possibility of love, that is why I endeavor to trace its 
imperfection, its perversions” (as cited in Sandoval, 2000, p.156). Sandoval looks also to 
Che Guevara, who proclaims, “The true revolutionary is guided by great feelings of love” 
(as cited in Sandoval, 2000, p.156). And Sandoval cites feminist scholar bell hooks, who 
insists: “Love…is an important source of empowerment when we struggle to confront 
issues of sex, race and class” (as cited in Sandoval, 2000, p.156). For many scholars, love 
is the only possible answer to oppression. As much as oppression is founded on a 
misunderstanding of otherness, or on feelings of disgust, or on alienation from the other, 
it makes sense that love can in turn overcome reactions of disgust.  
 Sandoval’s neorhetoric of love is informed by her reading of Roland Barthes’ 
ideas on love, and particularly his description of prophetic love. She tells us: 
 Romantic love provided one kind of entry to a form of being that breaks the 
 citizen-subject free from the ties that bind being, to thus enter the differential 
 modes of consciousness, or to enter what Barthes perhaps better describes  as “the 
 gentleness of the abyss.” (p. 158)  
It is the freeing of the subject from the authoritarian rules of the symbolic order, of 
governance, or even of consciousness as we know it, that draws so many to love as the 
antidote to the oppressive forces of the hegemonic order. The gentle abyss is frightening 
	  	  
379	  	  	  	  
	  
in its lack of structure, but liberating in its possibilities for reformulation. Sandoval’s 
neorhetoric of love, or postmodern love, is not just romantic. Neorhetoric is postmodern 
in its focus on polyvocality and multiple truths. As Cole (1995) puts it, “the 
neorhetorician’s single text with many meanings take[s] the place of the rhetoricians’s 
single meaning with many texts” (p. 22). Sandoval’s neorhetoric of love represents a 
multitude of love in many forms, from the solidarity that supports communities, to 
parental love, to romantic love. It is love in any form that accomplishes the goal of 
freedom through submission.  
Sandoval argues, relying again on Barthes: “To fall in love means that one must 
submit, however temporarily, to what is ‘intractable,’ to a state of being not subject to 
control or governance” (p. 159). In this model, falling in love is an ambiguous state of 
being that is neither consciousness nor unconsciousness; rather, it is another type of 
consciousness that Barthes calls “prophetic love.” Prophetic love can best be understood 
through the love we already have and share, forms of love that make us transgress 
boundaries, not with anxiety but with joy, and without the realization that a border has 
even been crossed. 
 Sandoval’s interest in love is no wonder, considering the strong influence of 
Freire on her writing, who also sides in the end with love as the antidote to violence and 
oppression. Freire (1970/2005) asks:  
 Who are better prepared than the oppressed to understand the terrible 
 significance of an oppressive society?...They will not gain this liberation by 
 chance but through the praxis of their quest for it, through their recognition of the 
 necessity to fight for it. And this fight, because of the purpose given it by the 
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 oppressed, will actually constitute an act of love opposing the lovelessness which 
 lies at the heart of the oppressors’ violence. (p. 45)  
Dehumanization is predicated on a lack of love and an inability to see the oppressed as 
humans who have been exploited. By enacting the fight for freedom, the oppressed not 
only free themselves, but also free their oppressors. This constitutes an act of great love, 
because while it is attractive to reverse the roles of domination, true freedom liberates 
everyone. “True solidarity,” Freire declares, “is found only in the plenitude of this act of 
love” (p. 50). “This act of love” denotes the moment when the oppressor truly joins the 
oppressed in solidarity by abandoning oppression as an abstract category and embracing 
those who have been deprived, cheated, and exploited. Love, in the end, is the key to true 
revolution and liberation.  
 5.02.06.01 loving monsters. As I suggested before, rather than putting the 
monster on a pedestal – which reinforces the binary divisions that sustain hierarchical 
oppression – we should sidestep that temptation, and instead value the monster and 
explore the diversity and power that comes from difference. With this in mind, I would 
like to offer a final thought: in order to truly break down the barriers that create 
difference and mark the monster as the excluded, we should attempt to love the monster, 
rather than vilify it. Love is not about objectification; it is instead an ultimate form of 
familiarization with the subject. Furthermore, if love can help us overcome disgust, and if 
it is the truly radical element that can offer us a new way of being in the world, and 
nurture our awareness of prophetic love, then any opportunity we have to practice love 
must be pursued.  
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My goal for an abject visual methodology is to aid in the promulgation of 
prophetic love, after Barthes’ description, with the hope that my methodology promotes 
the creation of a space and a mindset conducive to accepting, even loving, the abject. 
Empathy, or the psychological identification with the feelings or thoughts of another, has 
been previously discussed in this study, primarily in regard to the embodied empathy 
created by mirror neurons. But I have also treated empathy in general as part of an abject 
visual methodology, in order to explore the mindset of creators and subjects of the abject. 
At the very least, I believe that an abject visual methodology can help in the development 
of empathy, or a deeper understanding of the experience of otherness. In a traditional 
paradigm, otherness and its associations with disgust, weakness, disempowerment and 
invalidation would, like those who are constructed as other, be jettisoned to the periphery. 
Yet art, often pushed to the side in K-12 curricula by standardization regimes such as 
Common Core, still occupies a place to explore the love of monsters. The infamous 
graffiti artist Banksy borrows from Christian sermons (Best, 1992), when he writes (on a 
public wall, of course), “Art should comfort the disturbed and disturb the comfortable” 
(2007). It is my hope that an abject visual methodology can provide a way to create 
generative disturbances, and that through revolt and love we may all become more 
comfortable with our monsters.   
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